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THE
ANDOVER REVIEW

A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL
MONTHLY

VOL. I.—JANUARY—JUNE.—1884

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THE
ANDOVER REVIEW:

A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.

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THE THEOLOGICAL PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW.

“LET us learn to live ACCORDING TO CHRISTIANITY.” This was the standard raised by a leader of the Primitive Church at a time of strenuous conflict between Christianity and Judaism. “Let us learn to live according to Christianity. . . . For Christianity did not believe into Judaism, but Judaism into Christianity, that every tongue which believes might be gathered together unto God.”

These memorable words define the theological as well as the ethical and practical purpose of this Review. They connect theology with life. They point out the path to unity of religious belief. They suggest the need and indicate the method of a Christian construction of Christian doctrine. Let us learn to *think* according to Christianity.

The Church that included an Irenæus, a Tertullian, an Origen, in its membership — the old Catholic Church — set up the standard of Apostolic tradition, both oral and written. The Ancient Church emphasized catholicity; the Mediæval Church, ecclesiastical tradition; Protestantism, Sacred Scripture. Each of these tests of doctrine has a legitimate place and necessary function. We should not fail to understand the significance and validity of each. But for our time it is even more important to recover the vital element in each; to recur to an earlier, profounder, and more comprehensive test; to revive the primitive consciousness of spiritual truth; to realize the living gospel out of which came the gospel that Apostles preached; to require that ecclesiastical confessions and dogmas and all theological creeds and systems prove themselves, if they can, to be truly Apostolic and Biblical by showing that they are genuinely Christian. This is not to set up a higher standard than Apostolic authority or Sacred Scripture. It simply requires us to understand what such phrases mean; that

the letter is not the spirit, though we cannot find the spirit save by the help of the letter ; that the Bible is an organism whose life is in the Incarnate Word ; that Christ is the subject of Christian dogma as well as its revealer ; that all religious truth has its unity in Him. Theology is the science of God. God is revealed in Christ. The possibility, the unity, the verification, of a science of divinity are given in Him, and in Him alone.

It is one of the plain, broad, suggestive facts of history that no religion save the Christian has ever developed a living theology. Even Judaism has transmitted to us no "Body of Divinity." Still less has any heathen religion produced anything like that progressive scientific development of its dogmas which Christian history presents. As the early Church saw what Christ is in the system of things and felt its union with Him, it became aware that it had a possession of truth committed to it which for the good of men it must preserve, a source of truth opened to it from which it ought continually to draw. It became of necessity a theologizing church. It felt itself in union and communion with the Eternal Word, and therefore it had a doctrine. It believed that the Logos of the new creation is the Logos of the old. He is the Eternal Reason, the Author of human reason, the Maker of the universe, the giver and inner Reason of its laws, the Principle of revelation in Sacred Scripture. Christianity is his workmanship, the product and expression of his reason and will. Whatever is truly rational is in harmony with Christianity and allied to it. All thinking not in harmony with Christianity is irrational. Susceptible of abuse as such a conception of the authority of Christianity is readily seen to be, it is its immediate and necessary outgrowth. For Christianity is essentially a *Credo*, not a ceremonial, nor a cultus, nor a system of types and symbols, nor a prophecy, but a revelation through a divine revealer, a faith, a creed. This revelation which God has made of himself in Jesus Christ is given to us in the Scriptures. It is also attested by the witness of the Spirit. A genuine Christian doctrine has a subjective as well as objective basis. The divine word is received by faith. There is thus produced a new, a regenerated consciousness, which becomes itself the spring of a new knowledge. The true theologian is not a mere collector and classifier of proof-texts, but a reproducer of the divine testimony. Truth thus received and wrought out is not something simply above human reason and conscience, but something friendly to the soul, commending and attesting itself in life and conduct ; not a law of commandments, nor a handwriting of

ordinances, but a law of the spirit of life, which frees from the law of sin and death, and discloses itself more and more fully as absolutely authoritative. And from this knowledge reason, in accordance with its own laws, which are laws of the Author of Christianity, advances to larger conquests and possessions of truth. Men sneer at religious dogmas and rail at their authority, deny their possibility or rank them with things that perish. Many dogmas have become extinct. Others must go. Not all is genuine which wears the garb of orthodoxy. But a genuine Christian dogma is not simply a divine revelation; it is also the surest and grandest achievement of human reason. It is enduring as the Eternal Reason. It is the mind of Christ formed within the minds of those who have learned to think in his school and after Him. It has for us the authority of God, and at the same time it becomes the believer's personal conviction and assurance. A brilliant and fascinating preacher has said that creeds are like birds' nests. They give a place of rest; but, like birds' nests, they should be pulled down and built new every year. Too much occasion and justification have been given for such a saying. It suggests a caution, but it misses a fact. The Church has not wholly failed to realize its calling and prerogative in the domain of religious doctrine. Amid all that is variable in creed and theology, there are constant elements, truths and logical statements of truths, that abide through the centuries. The imperfection of the work should not blind us to the high calling of the workmen. "Ye are of more value than many sparrows." "Ye are my friends." And this is the privilege of friends, to know the truth of God. "Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth; but I have called you friends: for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you." There is a kind of depreciation of creed and dogma which is at bottom a depreciation of reason and liberty and Christianity. Sparrows produce no Brunelleschis nor Michael Angelos. They spread no spacious doimes over myriads of worshipers in the succession of centuries. It is derogatory to human reason, as well as to the Christian Church and Christian science, to deny to it the power of building for all time. "I have ordained you that your fruit should remain." Birds' nests! If theologians are tom-tits! It is derogatory, also, and hostile to Christianity. Through the centuries dogmatic statements have sprung from Christianity as naturally as trees from seeds. Christianity will doubtless continue to produce them to the end of time. The symbol of Judaism was circumcision.

The symbol of Christianity is the Apostles' Creed, — *Symbolum Apostolicum*, — out of which has sprung, and will continue to grow, a theology centring in Christ, the only begotten Son of the Father, the Eternal Word.

Yet in the development of religious truth, as received by faith, into scientific dogma there have always been at hand two serious dangers.

One peril is that the scientific statement or system will lose or loosen its connection with the religious life at its root, and with the progress of Christianity.

The history of theology shows that a scholastic period inevitably follows one of new religious life and movement.

It was so in the Greek Church. There were the first centuries of Christian faith and heroism, and a series of great theologians imbued with the spirit of the Primitive Church. They developed a theology which was summed up in the early Ecumenical creeds. Then followed the Greek scholasticism and the substitution of orthodoxy for piety.

So was it in the Latin Church. Augustine, by a wonderful preparation through an experience, first, of the insufficiency of the Latin religion and philosophy to satisfy the wants of the soul, and especially to make it pure, and then by an equally thorough experience of the renewing and hallowing power of the gospel, developed the Christian doctrine of grace as it never before had been expressed. Then followed the Latin scholasticism, and the substitution of obedience for faith and of legalism for submission to the reasonable and spiritual authority of Christ.

Again, at the Reformation, the leaders of the movement, guided by the Spirit of God, and through the fresh use of the Scriptures, developed the truth of Justification by Faith only, — Faith receiving the free forgiveness offered in Christ. The Christian world was waiting for this doctrine. It was water to the thirsty, liberty to the captive, life to the dead. It proclaimed "the freedom of the Christian man." After this, Lutheranism and Calvinism, each became scholastic. Have we not seen, on a smaller scale, the operation of the same law in the New England theology, since the great awakening and the publication of Edwards's "Treatise concerning Religious Affections"?

This invariable sequence shows clearly two things. Scholasticism has a relative necessity. The new life, or new elements in religious life, must become subjects of reflection. The possessions of Faith must be subjected to the examination of the logical un-

derstanding. The truth immediately known must be reduced to definite statement, and the propositions thus obtained form the premises of logical processes. In this way religious thought takes account of its gains, and comes to a better understanding of them both in themselves and in their relations to other scientific acquisitions. Only ignorance or prejudice will treat systematic theology with indifference. If the spiritual theology of the Reformation had not been scholasticized, Protestantism would probably have been defeated in every university of Europe, and the choice of the nations would have been either Romanism or infidelity.

But there is a limit to the scholastic process. When the truths taken up in an era of religious progress are precisely stated, when everything, certain premises or definitions being allowed, has become clear to the understanding, there follows of necessity a reaction. For it is always found that certain logical deductions are inconsistent, not necessarily with anything in the system of which they form a part, — though usually this also is the case, — but certainly and inevitably with something or other in that broader and profounder religious life which the Spirit of God keeps alive in the Church as He witnesses in it ever of the things of Christ. Sooner or later it appears that the postulates, the definitions, are too narrow or exclusive, that something more needs to be taken up into the system, and that this something more saves from conclusions otherwise established. The Greek theology needed a better doctrine of sin and grace; the Latin theology, a better doctrine of guilt and atonement; the Scholastic Reformed theology, a more free and comprehensive use of the historical facts of the Scriptures; the Lutheran, a truer sense of the kingdom of God and the organic power of the gospel; both Lutheran and Reformed, Evangelical and Puritan, a more Christian conception of personality. It was for a time a vigorous and stately tree of knowledge which grew up out of the Reformation; but when, in the seventeenth century, its roots began to be cut off from the perennial springs of a religious life, and the soil about it, instead of being kept open to celestial influences, was trampled hard by contending hosts of polemic theologians and religious zealots, the tree stopped growing. It would have died to the roots had there not been fresh recurrence to the sources of life, new culture, better methods.

Another peril is that in the process of formulating Christian doctrine foreign and incongruous materials will be introduced.

Ideally the phrase "Christian doctrine" denotes something per-

fectly true, a correct reflection of the truth revealed in Christ. Experimentally and practically it includes that appropriation and explication of this truth which has been going on in the Church to the present time. It means revealed truth interpreted, applied, logically developed, formally stated, by Christian minds. It denotes, thus, not an immediate revelation, but a reproduction and development of Apostolic teaching according to the laws which govern human thought; in a word, the Christian Faith in the form of scientific knowledge. The process by which this result is reached shares in the imperfection of those who work it out. Take the beliefs of the Christian Church, the statements of its theologians at any point during the past eighteen centuries down to the nineteenth, and history shows that the teachings of any two succeeding ages are not precisely equivalent nor altogether harmonious. And every now and then come great epochs of reform. It cannot reasonably be questioned that every reader of these pages is now holding some belief as a part of his Christian faith, some dogma as a part of his theology, which Christian men of later generations will reject. This experimental law of belief should teach modesty. It should stimulate reflection on the true method of theological construction. Mistakes cannot be wholly avoided; but excessive dogmatism can be curtailed, and wisdom can be learned from sage experience. The one lesson which comes to us from every page of the history of doctrine is the necessity of a strenuous endeavor to think according to Christianity. Two or three historic illustrations will serve to impress this lesson.

The first great theological task of the Church was to construct a Christian doctrine of God. The process started rightly. It took the revelation made in Christ. It was guided on the whole through the early centuries by a right instinct. It sought to apprehend the Divine Being as Triune. But down to the time when Augustine wrote his epoch-making treatise on the Trinity, and even in its pages, it is easy to see how the way to a clear apprehension of the Christian revelation was obstructed or obscured by a conception of the divine transcendence which was extra-scriptural in its origin and anti-scriptural in its nature. We refer to the philosophic notion that God, as the Absolute, is a Being whose nature is such that He cannot come into direct connection with the finite, nor communicate with men. This Alexandrian philosopheme seems to have been taken up by Justin Martyr almost at the beginning of Christian theology, and the consequent method of his thought as disclosed in his placid dialogue with Trypho is exceedingly instructive; for

we see as in a mirror a typical instance of a law which operates through the whole history of Christian theology, the disturbing influence of extraneous and incongruous forces. Justin the Martyr was in full communion with the Church of his day in its faith in Christ as the Son of God and God. "God He is called," he says in his hearty way, "and God He is, and will be." Yet Justin conceives of the Son as begotten by the will of the Father, and associates his Sonship invariably with the thought of the creation. He is a hypostasis necessary to creation and revelation, the beginning of God's ways to his works. That is, Justin's theology does not express or fairly represent his Christian faith. We see the beginnings of an Arian theory of Christ. A being dependent for his existence on the will of another is not necessarily existent, is not clearly and permanently distinguished from created beings. Arius followed the logic of such statements to the end. The Son, he taught, is a creature, incapable of bringing God to man and man to God. Justin, doubtless, did not foresee such consequences. His fault was one of method. That ethical exaltation of God which pervades the theology of the Old Testament is associated in Justin's mind with a metaphysical exaltation which savors more of the Alexandrian philosophy than of the Scriptural teaching. In dealing with the exceedingly difficult problem forced upon him in combating Judaism, and as a Christian apologist, he did not appreciate the truth that, since Christianity is a special revelation, the special motive and principle of a Christian doctrine of God must be found in this revelation. The formula of his method, roughly stated, was: Given the Alexandrian doctrine of the Absolute and the Jewish doctrine of the numerical unity of God, to find room for the Christian faith in Christ as God. Given the Oneness, to obtain as much of a Trinity as is practicable. We miss the exact monotheism of the Old Testament. We miss the "God in Christ" of Paul's and Polycarp's Epistles. We miss the Christology of John: "In the beginning was the Word;" "God so loved the world;" "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." We miss the elevation and precision of the Nicene symbol, "very God of very God . . . co-essential with the Father." We miss, in a word, a conception of the Divine Nature formed by what is specific in the revelation made by Christ; that is, we miss a Christian doctrine of God. It cost the Church three centuries of controversy, it cost Athanasius, one of its purest and greatest leaders, his five banishments and twenty years of exile, before this erroneous method was overcome.

The treatment of the ethical materials of theology by some of the Fathers, and especially by the Mediæval schoolmen, affords another and a striking instance of the same peril. It deserves particular attention because, far more than is commonly recognized, modern theological ethics have been dominated by the method thus introduced. Indeed, it is only in our own time that a distinctively Christian ethics is appearing. The systems of theology native to our soil and most in use make no account of any distinction between Systematic Divinity and Christian Ethics; and — which is far worse, for this defect may be chiefly formal — they make no attempt at a rigorous Christian ethics. One can see at a glance the confusion, now more or less skillfully covered up, by looking into the writings of the men who first introduced this pernicious method; into the “*De Officiis*,” for instance, of Ambrose, or into the “*Sentences*” of the Lombard, or Aquinas’s “*Summa*.” Dr. Uhlhorn says: —

“The first Christian Ethic is the work of Ambrose, ‘*On Duties*.’ It borrows its title, and something more than its title, from Cicero’s famous work. . . . The teachers of the Church found a complete and well-worked-out philosophical system of Ethic. They had learned this in the schools. . . . Hence they accepted the entire framework of ancient Ethic, its categories and definitions, and used it for the insertion of the new Christian matter. The new wine was put into old bottles, and this could not be done without its acquiring their flavor. The form influenced the matter, and the result was not a Christian Ethic, but a mixture, which is perceived to have flowed from two sources, one ancient, one Christian, just as Basil was at once a Christian and a classically educated Greek, and Ambrose a Christian and a genuine Roman; nay, just as the Christianity of those days was of similarly mixed appearance, rooted on the one side in Bethlehem and Golgotha, on the other in Rome and Athens.”

Peter Lombard’s summary of human virtues makes the method palpable. In his “*Sentences*,” for long the leading text-book in divinity, he derives from the traditional teaching and from Scripture three theological virtues, Faith, Hope, Charity; then from Greek philosophy, four cardinal virtues, Justice, Fortitude, Prudence, Temperance; then from Isa. xi. 2, 3 (Vulgate) seven gifts, Wisdom, Understanding, Counsel, Fortitude, Knowledge, Piety, Fear of the Lord. Aquinas’s system is much more elaborate, but shows the same unadjusted double point of view, that of the natural man and that of the spiritual man, the ethics of Aristotle and the

ethics of Paul. And so in many a later writer. The natural and the supernatural, God and the world, are not only distinguished but separated. The conception of Nature as preformed to be the instrument and organ of the divine wisdom and love ; of the soul as created for a holy life, in communion with God ; of grace as so related to the will that the more grace the more freedom ; of all Christian virtue as having a common root in Christian faith and a common essence in holy love ; of salvation as a redeemed and purified life ; of self-devotement for Christ's sake, and not for reward ; of a Christian use and conquest of this world, as well as of an inheritance of the world to come, — all this is either so wholly lost sight of, or, to say the least, so obscured and overlaid, so mixed with inferior or irreconcilable principles, that a true development of Christian life is made impossible. Dr. Uhlhorn has powerfully exhibited the evil influence of a "double Ethic" in the Ancient Church in respect to charity. Its pernicious influence was greater in the Mediæval Church. It affects to-day the benevolent offerings of our churches. The ethics of Christian giving — the duty, motive, methods, instrumentalities, of a genuine Christian charity — need to be developed from a purely Christian point of view. So with other Christian obligations. The incongruous blending of pagan with Christian, of Jewish with Evangelical elements in the ritual and practice of the Roman Catholic Church is a commonplace with Protestant polemics. It is time that a clearer consciousness was reached that Protestantism itself has not eliminated all such disturbing factors. Indeed, a "double Ethic," more or less discordant, may be traced through the history of the Church from the date of the "Shepherd" of Hermas to our own time. In his treatise "On the Freedom of a Christian Man," Luther opened a new path, which has been too much neglected. The development of Christian ethics is a work to which Protestant theologians are peculiarly called. It is still and more than ever before an imperative necessity as respects the purity and efficiency of the Church in the manifold spheres of its activity and influence.

One other illustration of the exposure in formulating doctrine to extra-christian and partially unchristian influences must, for the present, suffice. We take it from the modern Church, and from the Protestant theology we have inherited. Let any man carefully and candidly review the history of the doctrine of Imputation since the Reformation, and he will have a vivid sense of how theology mixes water with the pure wine of divine truth. The anthropology of the Reformers and of the leading Protestant

symbols was in general a revived Augustinianism, and was opposed to the Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism which had become current in the Romish Church. As a revived Augustinianism it inherited some of the defects of Augustine's anthropology, especially his imperfect apprehension of Personality. It contained, indeed, from the beginning a reformatory element, in its sense of personal guilt and need of reconciliation to God, and in its assurance of divine forgiveness; and these personal elements latent in the moving principle of the Reformation, Justification by Faith only, have been developing through the modern period. But, at every stage of the course, they have encountered in the Church and in the teaching of its theologians foreign and hostile elements, which appear conspicuously in the history of the doctrine of imputed sin and guilt, and give it the character of a process of elimination. The Reformers were realists. All men, by participation, sinned in Adam, and fell with him in his first transgression, and for this cause deserve eternal damnation. The first serious modification of this belief, leaving out of account for a moment the Arminian remonstrance, was through the development of the conception of a covenant relation between God and man. Applied first and exclusively to the covenant of grace, its extension soon followed to the covenant of works, a relation supposed to have been established between Adam and his posterity on the one part and the Divine Being on the other. At first the conception of a federal relation was added to that of a natural or realistic connection; then superseded it. About the time the Puritans came to this country a movement began among the French Calvinists which, within the century, went through, on a narrower line, the leading phases of the New England Theology from Edwards to Finney, — not to say Channing. Its leading thought was moral agency. Through both of these special developments, and through the original Arminianism and the more powerful and evangelical Methodism of the Wesleys and their successors, not only has the original conception of imputed guilt disappeared, but even the word "Imputation," once so prominent, has given place to other and better terms.

If it were necessary to our purpose, these illustrations might easily be multiplied. It could readily be shown how even within the past two hundred years philosophic, juridical, governmental assumptions have been taken up, one after another, into the changing theological formulas, and one after another have been superseded; how futile the endeavor has proved to frame Christian

doctrine through a use of proof-texts dominated by conceptions, philosophic or otherwise, of the divine attributes; how the real growth, the genuine and admirable progress which has been made, has been due to its promoters having become more and more Christian in their conceptions of honor and right, of justice and grace, of creation and its laws, of government and its prerogatives, of persons with their correlative duties and rights, of God and man, of this life and the life beyond; how many, how great and serious, errors might have been avoided if the aim had been more intelligent and resolute to think according to Christianity.

If we had space it would point the same moral to notice the endeavor now making in certain quarters to construct improved statements of Christian doctrine through the postulates and dogmas, and even the terminology, of natural science. The Christian theologian must welcome all discoveries of the laws and methods of Nature. The author of Redemption is the Lawgiver of the Universe. The unity of the *Cosmos* is a theological principle. But the attempted identification of natural law with supernatural, of the forces with which physical science deals and those which rule in the spiritual sphere, is but a new instance of an old peril. Calvinism cannot be established by Darwinism, admitting Darwinism to be itself established. An outcome of the universe in a survival of the fittest may or may not be a true conception. It can only be a Christian one when interpreted so as to admit and emphasize a condescension of the Giver of Law to the cross and the tomb, a personal forgiveness of sin, a divine Shepherd who seeks and recovers the lost.

It is possible that some who may do us the honor to read this article may infer that in advocating a development of Christian theology and ethics more rigorously determined by the genius of the Christian religion, we are unfriendly to what is called natural theology. We disclaim any such antagonism. The problems of theology are problems of philosophy. The latter has its rights, — its independent rights, — and it is indispensable. Naturalism, materialism, agnosticism, atheistic and pantheistic systems, must be met on the plane of rational belief and knowledge. If we reason at all upon the things of faith, we must reason according to the laws of logic. Christian consciousness is as real and authoritative as natural consciousness, but religion cannot supersede, annul, nor alter a single constitutional principle of the human mind. If Christianity is true it cannot be discordant with any other truth. If it is what it claims to be, the final and perfect religion for man and the highest truth, all other truth will in the end do it homage.

It promotes investigation in every department of knowledge. That for which we contend is that Christianity is a revelation, the crowning revelation of God to men; that it is a given historical and spiritual magnitude; that it brings into evidence its own truth, its own laws, and is to be understood in its own clear light. Attested by its own evidences, announcing and substantiating its own origin and purpose, master in its own sphere, it demands of right a scientific construction of its doctrines harmonious with its own genius and ruled by its own central and supremely authoritative principle. Natural theology should believe into Christianity, not Christianity into natural theology. Pagan ethics should not shape Christian ethics, though the latter cannot contradict any truth the former may contain. Any philosophy has much to learn which finds itself unable to embrace even a single fact in the spiritual realm ruled by Christ. Human consciousness attains its normal purity and recovers its line of constitutional development just in proportion as it is genuinely Christian. The highest ultimate aim of the philosopher as well as of the theologian will be to think according to Christianity.

The editors of this Review will welcome to its pages the contributions of men of various schools of thought who are seeking with them to develop a truly Christian theology. We believe that the Ignatian maxim already quoted points the way to a profounder, clearer, more practical apprehension of revealed truth than has yet been gained, to a larger charity, to a higher unity. We are the farthest possible from any conceit of leadership; we simply have convictions which have cost us something, and which we hope may be of help to others. We desire help from others. We seek to promote large-minded, large-hearted discussions of Christian truth, recognizing our own limitations, and the many-sidedness and growing proportions of the truth as it is in Jesus. We desire especially to do what we may to confirm the faith of believers in the essential truths of the gospel, to unite them in intelligent and effective Christian work, and for this end to aid in the development of a Christian theology which by its genuineness and purity, its reality and comprehensiveness, shall stimulate and sustain the highest endeavor for the advancement of Christ's kingdom. To our thought, there is a preparation and demand for better statements of Christian doctrine in the religious life of our time. This is a missionary age. Never before has that enthusiasm for humanity, which is from the very heart of Christianity, so taken possession of the Church. There is need of a more distinct theological recognition

of the providential and spiritual leadership of the world by its Redeemer and Lord; of a theology which discerns his greatness, and which sets over against the terrible magnitudes of human misery and sin and guilt the magnitudes of his person, his cross, his lordship, his final coming as the Judge of mankind. If this Review is helpful to the growth and diffusion of such beliefs, its theological purpose will be fulfilled. The present article will be followed by others, from different pens, in harmony with its spirit and design, and treating of particular Christian doctrines.

Egbert C. Smyth.

CHRISTIANITY AND ÆSTHETICISM.

RIGHTEOUSNESS and service are the two ruling principles of the Christian law, the foci of the curve by which it describes conduct. The two ideas of righteousness and service may be nearly identical to perfect moral vision: to an angel, doing right and doing good may be always the same thing; but it is more convenient for most of us to separate them in our thinking. Righteousness is obedience to an ideal law that reports itself in consciousness long before we are able to give any clear statement of its contents. Men's judgments differ widely as to what is right; but they do not differ, except as they have been sophisticated by a bad philosophy, in the belief that there is a right to be done and a wrong to be shunned, nor in the conviction that they ought to cleave to the one and resist the other. The Christian ethics recognizes this untaught belief and this sense of obligation as fundamental, and builds on them. It endeavors to enlighten our judgments, that we may have clearer knowledge of what right is; but it assumes that we know that we ought to do right, and it holds us firmly to that obligation.

Not merely conformity to an ideal rule of conduct, but unselfish ministry to the needs of our fellow-men is enjoined by the Christian law. He whom we call Master and Lord went about doing good, and He calls his disciples to follow him in the same path.

These two principles of integrity and benevolence have been steadily held up to men for eighteen centuries as the cardinal principles of conduct, and the central elements of character. To all men, asking how they may live aright, the New Testament makes answer, "Live uprightly; live unselfishly." And it must

not be forgotten that Christianity makes these ethical elements supreme. It inculcates faith, but faith is always the servant of righteousness and love. We believe, not for the sake of believing, but because, by believing, we may obtain power to fulfill the law of righteousness, which is also the law of love. Whatever other elements may be included in the divine sacrifice for men, it is acknowledged by all that the deepest meaning of it is not perceived until we behold the divine love going forth after men to rescue them from the ruin into which their sins have plunged them, and to lead them in paths of righteousness. Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth, but only when He has made them righteous in thought and word and deed. He saves his people from their sins. The religion of the New Testament finds its crown and its completion in right conduct; we fast, we pray, we sing our solemn hymns, we believe and trust and worship, that we may gain strength for holy living and faithful service.

It is true that the supremacy of the ethical has not always been well understood by the professors of Christianity; its ritual and dogmatic elements have sometimes been unduly exalted, but the fact is there in the documents, and it has not been possible for the most perverse interpretation wholly to conceal it. At the end of nineteen Christian centuries we find this truth generally recognized among Christians, that the end of religion is right character; that no philosophy of Christianity will stand that does not make character the supreme thing.

Not only so; until very lately it was accepted outside the Church as a truth — almost as a truism — that the Christian estimate is right; that right character is the main thing. Even those who handle the Christian records rather freely, finding in them no supernatural element, have joined to extol the service they have rendered to morality in lifting it into the place of eminence. "Conduct is three fourths of life," says our latest distinguished guest, Professor Matthew Arnold; and the Bible, he insists, is, above all other books, the book of conduct; there is much of superstition in the Bible, but it says, and says over again, and keeps saying, until it makes us believe it, that righteousness is the principal thing; and it tells us, too, the one truth that is higher than heaven and deeper than hell — the truth which experience enables us to verify — that behind all the forces of the universe is an eternal power that makes for righteousness.

Our literature has been saturated with this ethical element;

all our social commerce has expressed it. There have been many who did not obey the moral law, but few who would not freely own that they ought to obey it; few who would not confess that righteousness is the principal thing, that an unselfish service of our fellow-men is the supreme obligation.

By some moralists, the claims of morality have been overstated. They have not only made it supreme, as it ought to be, they have made it exclusive, as it ought not to be. Conduct is three fourths of life, but conduct is not everything. Other elements enter into human experience. Art, as well as morality, has valid claims upon the life of man. Beauty, as well as righteousness, is offered for his worship. Beauty, as well as holiness, is an attribute of the Being whom we worship. The nature of God appeals to our æsthetic faculties as truly as to our ethical. "The beauty of the Lord" has found expression in his works, and it is offered to us for our admiration and delight. The pleasure that we find in natural beauty, and in our own reproduction and idealization of it is, therefore, innocent and legitimate; the loveliness of the things that are made, whether by God himself, or by the sons of God into whom He has breathed his own spirit, affords us a pure and perennial refreshment. No proof of the goodness of the Creator is stronger than that which is shown us in the beauty of his works.

Thus the realm of the æsthetical is set alongside the realm of the ethical; there is a domain of duty, and there is also a domain of refined and rational pleasure. The man who answers God's call by saying, "I obey: I serve," answers it also by saying, "I admire: I rejoice." Man's chief end, in his relation to God, is not only to glorify Him by doing his will, but also to enjoy Him forever, and forever includes this hour.

These two realms of human life have long been contending for the supremacy. As soon as the arts and the refinements of civilization begin to express and to stimulate man's love of beauty, the dispute arises as to the relative rank of art and morality.

The Greek civilization, in its luxurious days, took beauty for its constructive idea; the master-word of that civilization was art. To a Greek of the later times, ethical considerations were secondary, if not meaningless; criticism had stripped religion of her authority; patriotism was a slender bond; the strenuous sense of obligation which vibrates through the tragedies of Sophocles had ceased to stir the hearts of men; their religion was self-pleasing, and their philosophy, even, was little more than the diversion of the

learned. Some feeling of moral obligation must have been left to them, for man cannot be wholly divested of his crowning faculty; but the feeling was scarcely a motive; it did not move men.

The English Puritanism, on the other hand, was purely ethical. It knew no law but duty. The æsthetical sentiments were banned; the admiration of beauty was a misdemeanor. Some sense of the beautiful must have lingered in the breasts of the grimmest of the Puritans, for this sentiment, though less deeply rooted in the nature of man than the moral sentiment, is yet a vital element in him, and not easily killed; but it was secretly indulged, if indulged at all; art had a smaller place in the life of the Puritan than morality had in the life of the Hellenist.

Now, as between these two types — the Greek Paganism and the English Puritanism — the latter is the worthier. Morality is the principal thing; art ought to be subordinate; civilization without art would be better than civilization without righteousness. But neither would be complete civilization. That contemplates the perfect manhood of the race, with no part wanting.

The unloveliness of Puritanism need not be disputed. Its rigors were overstrained. Life was never meant to be so bleak and bare as the Puritans made it. From such severity a reaction was sure to come. It did come in England, after the manner of a deluge, at the time of the Restoration; if its coming in America was somewhat delayed, it has been long on the way; its overwhelming arrival on these shores is a fact too patent to need proclamation.

One who carefully watches the development of social morality must have noted, within twenty-five years, a gradual change of the regulative sentiments underlying conduct in what is called polite society. With the growth of wealth and the increase of luxury, the notions of the wealthier classes about obligation seem to have been silently undergoing modification. I do not think that this change affects the whole of society; perhaps the class of persons who heartily accept the Christian rule, and faithfully endeavor to obey it, is relatively as large now as ever it was: my own opinion is, that it is larger than ever. But this class never yet was in the majority, even in the most austere societies. The people who care more for pleasing themselves, in one way or another, than for living uprightly or benevolently have always been numerous enough, even in our churches. In former times, however, this purpose was never avowed; those who acted under it often carefully concealed it from themselves. Nearly every one acknowledged the

ethical rule of the New Testament as binding, owned that he ought to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness; that he was bound to use his strength in helping the weak to bear their burdens; that self-pleasing was not the right rule of life. Of those who frankly said, "I live for myself; I mind my own business; I cannot concern myself with other people's needs or troubles; my problem is to get the greatest possible advantage and enjoyment for myself out of this life," there were not many. Such a sentiment would have been voted atrocious by the great majority of those who practically guided their lives by it.

Of late years, there is less of this theoretical adherence to a standard practically repudiated. The people who profess Christianity, but practice Paganism, as Herbert Spencer keenly puts it, are less numerous than formerly; but their number has been reduced by bringing profession down to the level of practice. This is not an unmixed evil. If you propose to live by the Pagan rule, it may be well to avow it; certainly it is not well to deny it. But this change is far from being an unmixed good. Something is gained by the abandonment of hypocrisies; something also is lost by the degradation of ideals. There is always a measure of disparity between our standards and our conduct; if there were not, no progress would be possible. When every moral standard is abandoned that is not perfectly realized in conduct, there will be moral stagnation. Many a man has been saved by holding on to a plan of life which was very poorly worked out. And while we may say that it is better not to avow the Christian law of righteousness and service if we are determined not to conform to it, we may also say that for any man voluntarily to renounce that standard of living and turn away to a baser one is a great renunciation—a great moral catastrophe. Yet this is what not a few of our neighbors seem to be doing. They are loosening, little by little, the bands of obligation that they have heretofore recognized as binding them; they are beginning to ask themselves whether the law of righteousness be not rather tyrannical; whether the command to love others as ourselves be not too hard for any rational person to think of obeying; whether it were not better to take an easier rule than the Christian rule, and forbear to strain after the impracticable.

Signs of this change in the standards of conduct appear on every hand among the luxurious classes. It is not very uncommon to hear people say that they do not consent to the law of philanthropy; that they intend to please themselves; that they

do not recognize any claims of humanity upon them for a life of service. "We that are strong, and prosperous, and fortunate intend," they say, "to live as pleasantly as we can; to have no associates that are not congenial; to do no work for others that is not agreeable; to gratify our own tastes; to please ourselves."

The change of sentiment to which I refer is revealed in the literature provided for the diversion of the luxurious classes. Twenty-five years ago, the popular novels and poems were charged with the Christian sentiments. Take the stories of Dickens, for an example: the Christian virtues of fidelity and self-sacrifice were depicted with glowing sympathy in every one of them; the ideal of the novelist, badly as it was worked out in his own life, is the Christian ideal. The same is true of Thackeray: the thin veil of cynicism thrown over his characters does not conceal the deep sympathy of the writer with genuine altruism. The poems of that time, those of the Brownings and Tennyson in England, and of our own Bryant and Longfellow and Whittier and Lowell, struck the same chord; the praise of purity and integrity, and heroic self-forgetfulness and devotion to all human welfare was the theme of these poets in their noblest songs. Some of these voices are not yet silent; but what shall we say of the writers of this period? It appears to me that, without speaking of the distinctively moral element, there is a marked absence of philanthropic sentiment from much of our latest literature. There is no call for sweeping remarks, and there are illustrious exceptions to the statement I am making. It is quite possible, too, that the change of which I speak may be due, in part, to a natural revulsion from a kind of philanthropic cant, with which our literature was lately somewhat overstocked. It is possible, again, that the "enthusiasm of humanity," in the breasts of some writers, may have been chilled by a discovery of the mischiefs caused by an effusive and indiscriminating charity. Such natural causes may account, in part, for the change which we note in the tone of our polite literature, but they do not seem to be a sufficient explanation of it. Unless I greatly mistake, we may easily detect, in much of our literature, the unconscious substitution of some other standard of living for the Christian standard.

What this new rule of life is, it is not hard to tell. It is the artistic ideal; the æsthetical law. The increase of wealth, the enlargement of leisure, the inventions of luxury, have turned the thoughts of multitudes toward the realm of fine art. The old Puritan doctrine, that art is sinful, has been roundly repudiated,

as it ought to have been. Not only so, a kind of resentment has found expression against the Puritan standard, as having laid unjust and oppressive burdens on men, as having robbed them of pure and high enjoyments that belonged to them by right; and this, too, is natural and just. But revulsions of this sort are sure to become violent and excessive. If our modern votaries of beauty were content simply to reclaim for that divinity the rights of which she has been robbed, all would be well. Instead of that, they are pushing now to have her exalted to the throne of life; to elevate the standards of taste above the standards of morality; to put æstheticism in the place of Christianity. The modern cult of art is one symptom of this tendency. And while many are engaged in the study and the practice of art who do not permit their devotion to art to become their supreme devotion, there are still not a few who have submitted to its empire and practically confess no other allegiance.

Now the standards of æstheticism are purely selfish. What is beautiful? That which gratifies my taste. What is good art? That which pleases me. There is no other rule; the criterion of all art judgment is the individual's own pleasure. You cannot go behind that. *De gustibus non est disputandum* is the fundamental canon of art criticism. The man who substitutes the æsthetical rule for the Christian rule simply says, therefore, "I intend to live in such a way as to please myself." That is exactly what it comes to; and the hard fact cannot be disguised.

Selfishness sometimes takes the form of addiction to sensual pleasure, and sometimes the form of bondage to some constitutional desire, as the desire of wealth or power; but there are multitudes among us over whom it has thrown a different snare, who are devoting themselves to the gratification of their tastes, whose god is æsthetic pleasure. The kind of self-gratification to which they are addicted is more refined and less repulsive than that of the debauchee or the miser, and is all the more dangerous on this account. The silken fetters of æstheticism are grateful to the sense, but they hold the soul no less firmly than the golden chains of mammon or the iron manacles of lust. Many a cultured gentleman there is, whose heart is growing as hard as the tiles where-with he decorates his hearth; many a delicate lady, whose own hands are busily embroidering the napkin wherein she will wrap for burial the talent God gave her for the service of her kind.

Here, again, no sweeping statements must be made. It is not true that all those who delight in beauty, and seek to fill their

homes and encompass their lives with loveliness, are hard and selfish: forth from many beautiful homes go the feet that are swift to run on errands of mercy; dwelling in the midst of everything that can charm the eye are many who keep their love of beauty always subordinate to their love of God and their fellow-men, whose lives are consecrated to Christian service. We must not overlook these; we must not forget to praise God for them. They are witnesses that there is no necessary conflict between the good and the beautiful. But we cannot fail to see that there are many others also with whom the gratification of the æsthetic nature has become the supreme concern, and who have become hardened and corrupted by this unworthy preference. For there is degradation in it, whoever follows it. The pleasing of the taste is not the end of life, and he who makes it the end misses the meaning of life, and loses all that is most precious.

This is true of a man, and it is equally true of a nation. I have spoken of the later Greek civilization as having beauty for its constructive idea; but from the time when this became true of Greece, the marks of decay began to be visible. The great days of Greece were days when the motives of patriotism and religion ruled in the hearts of the people. When the ethical gave place to the æsthetical, the dry rot began to invade the national life.

Moreover, the best art of Greece was the product of the days before art became supreme in the thoughts of the people. The heroic age of Greek sculptors, architects, poets, makers of all sorts, was the age of Pericles; and the art of that time was the servant of patriotism and religion. It was the consciousness of national unity and greatness, awakened in the breasts of the Greeks by the wars of liberation, that gave the impulse to Pericles and those who wrought with him. "A great national movement," says Curtius, "had seized upon the entire people; its result, the rout of the Persians, was a deed of that people; a state of free citizens had headed the movement; and this state had now attained to wealth and power, and these citizens possessed sufficient artistic sense to regard the erection of great works of art as a matter of the highest public importance."¹ It was not art that these Athenians were glorifying; it was their native land. The æsthetic motive was subservient to the patriotic motive. And not only to this, but also to that deeper sentiment which is never absent from the life of great nations. In a striking passage, Dr. Curtius makes this fact appear: "The art of the Periclean era had received

¹ *History of Greece*, ii. 552.

a very definite and religious mission; for the spirit of rationalism had everywhere shaken the popular faith, and a thoughtless life, devoid of any but the traditionary notions, was no longer possible. Philosophic thought had loudly and vehemently rebelled against the unthinking worship of idols. 'They pray to images,' said Heraclitus, 'as if a man were to hold converse with houses;' and the same philosopher had resigned, in favor of his brother, his hereditary priestly office. A dangerous rupture was at hand, unless the ancient faith were purified and elevated, after a fashion, in accordance with the age. In religion, too, room must be given to free thought, so as to satisfy the progress of human consciousness, and to reconcile the traditions of the past with the rationalism of the present. Mediators in this sense appeared in the persons of the great poets of Athens—in Æschylus, the firm believer in the religion of his fathers, and in the pious Sophocles; their sentiments were shared by Pericles, who, notwithstanding his philosophy, publicly, and in his own house, zealously offered sacrifices to the gods, and never entered upon any operation of importance without prayer. Phidias worked in the same spirit, by elevating religious sculpture, for which Attica had been distinguished from an early age, into a totally new sphere; and this is the side of his labors as an artist which obtained for him by far the highest glory among both contemporaries and posterity."¹

Such were the impulses from which sprang the noblest art of Greece. It was by thinking of something greater than art that Phidias and Æschylus, and Sophocles became great artists. And it was just when the people began to make artistic culture the chief thing, that artistic power began to wane. Art must have some inspiration above itself; when it turns its look inward and begins to be absorbed in contemplating itself, its arm is palsied and its work is done. So the later days of Greece were not only days of political degeneracy, but of artistic inferiority: the grand work of Phidias was never repeated in the gay Hellenic capitals.

In all the ages since, the best work has been done in all the arts by men who fed their strength at the highest sources. Love of country, love of humanity, love of truth, love of God—these may furnish inspiration for great art; the soul that is thrilled by such passions may lift the glorious arches, or shape the majestic statue, or sing the undying song; but simple love of art never made a great artist,—no, and never will, any more than love of rhetoric will make an orator or love of dress a gentleman. The

¹ *History of Greece*, ii. 573.

moment æstheticism begins to reign, the days of art are numbered. You may have marvelous technique, but you will have no ideas; you may be able to express anything, only you will have nothing to express.

“You may say,” says President White, of Cornell, in that stirring speech of his on “The Mission of the Nineteenth Century to the Twentieth,” one of the notable utterances of this time, “that the feeling for art has been spreading and developing of late in a new direction. By all that, you perhaps mean the mania of the æsthetes — boudoir pictures with Meissonier as their chief deity; an art of mere fashion and whims; one year chamfered corners with decorations in crude red and black; another year rounded corners with decorations in peacock blue; one year a muddle of gold-leaf and green called an ‘arrangement;’ another year a muddle of silver-leaf and yellow called a ‘symphony;’ one year what is called Gothic, another year what is called Queen Anne, — all of which will probably ten years hence furnish the most woe-ful thing to look back upon in the history of art. The question in all this is simply, where is the virile art which commemorates great deeds, which stirs the hearts of men, which aids to make a nation something more than a shop, and its civilization really come to something in the sum of things?”

President White finds the cause of the decadence of art in the “mercantilism” which is absorbing the energies of our people, and this probably is the true explanation. But æstheticism is the philosophy of life which mercantilism always adopts. The æsthe-
tete is the perfect flower of a plutocracy. It is curious to find Mr. Oscar Wilde railing, in mellifluous verse, against mammon-worship: it is as if a delicate-tinted toadstool should turn and rail at the compost heap on which it grows. We are really indebted to the individual just named for rendering, all unwittingly, some service to good morals in his late visit to this country. Certain classes of persons may be relied on, the proverb says, to tell the truth; and this young person, with a frankness which is due either to immaturity or to natural fatuity, contrived to blurt out quite a number of confessions which exactly convey to us the philosophy of life on which æstheticism is founded. “We spend our days,” he says, “each one of us, in looking for the secret of life. Well, the secret of life is in art.” “Love art for its own sake, and then all things that you need will be added unto you. This devotion to beauty and to the creation of beautiful things is the test of all great civilizations: it is what makes the life of each citizen a sac-

rament, and not a speculation. It is not an increased moral sense or moral supervision that your literature needs. Indeed, one should never talk of a moral or immoral poem. Poems are either well-written or badly written, that is all."

Such is the philosophy of æstheticism, neatly and concisely stated. Truth, purity, honor, faith, patriotism — these are secondary matters; beauty is the only object of worship; art is the supreme pursuit; æsthetical pleasure is the paramount concern. Mr. Wilde only puts into plain English a doctrine which is more guardedly expressed in much of the current poetry and criticism, a doctrine which his master, Rossetti, everywhere suggests. It is the creed by which a great many persons who never saw Wilde or heard of Rossetti are unconsciously shaping their lives. Out of such a philosophy can spring no great art, no high character, no grand civilization; it can give birth to nothing but a pretty, petty, puny dilettanteism, weak in the sinews, light in the head, rotten at the heart.

It is evident that the two kingdoms of Christianity and æstheticism are now in many quarters contending for the mastery. "We that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves," says Paul, the apostle. Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all good things shall be added unto you, says Paul's master. This is the clear statement of the Christian law of life. The modern Paganism lays down its law also: "Love art for art's sake, and all things that you need will be added unto you." The very words of Christ's law are travestied, and art is put in the place of righteousness as the supreme end of life. Could blasphemy further go? But it is well that the truth should be told, no matter who tells it. All men can then perceive that these two are rival kingdoms, and that each makes exclusive claims; that no man can make the one supreme without rejecting the supremacy of the other. To be a Christian disciple, it is not necessary that one should abjure the pleasures of refined taste, but it is necessary that he should make these pleasures subordinate and tributary to the service of God and men. The love of beauty is not denied to the Christian, but the love of righteousness and of humanity is with him the master passion. And the question, which one of these loves is supreme, is no trivial question; it goes to the roots of character. It will make a mighty difference with multitudes of men and women in our polite society which one of these ideals they consciously set before themselves. And every minister of the gospel who stands

before the cultivated and luxurious congregations of our great cities is bound to be faithful in his testimony against this æsthetic Paganism, whose gods are set up in so many of the homes of his people, and whose degrading worship threatens the life of the church and the nation. To revert to æstheticism, after having known the Christian way, would be a fearful loss. These neighbors of ours might have been good Pagans if they had lived in the days of Socrates ; but he who has seen the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ, to whom the King in his beauty has appeared, can never go back to Pagan patterns without crippling and corrupting his soul.

“ We needs must love the highest when we see it,
Not Lancelot, nor another.”

The rejection of the good which it knows to be the highest is the soul's prerogative, and the most terrible of tragedies.

Washington Gladden.

THE NORRIS GIFTS TO THE ASSOCIATE FOUNDATION IN ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

RECENT discussion has revived, in a measure, the interest taken many years ago in that portion of the funds of Phillips Andover Academy which may be appropriately styled The Norris Fund. By this is meant the donation of \$10,000, made in 1808 by John Norris, of Salem, to the fund of the “ Associate Foundation,” whereby he became one of the three Associate Founders ; together with the legacy of \$30,000 left by Mrs. Norris, in 1811, in aid of the same Foundation. The other two Associate Founders, each so constituted by a gift of \$10,000, were William Bartlet and Moses Brown, of Newburyport. Thus this Foundation originally consisted of \$30,000, to which Mr. Bartlet soon added \$10,000. Of the donations of Messrs. Bartlet and Brown, whether the first or those of later date, it is unnecessary, for our present purpose, to write particularly. The indebtedness of the Seminary to these donors was sufficiently commemorated at its Fiftieth Anniversary, and no fresh occasion has since arisen to reiterate the tribute then paid to their memory.

The case is somewhat different in respect to Mr. and Mrs. Norris and their generous endowment. Let it not be inferred, how-

ever, that, on the occasion referred to, these benefactors failed to receive the tribute of grateful mention which was their due. So far from this, special efforts were put forth to collect the information which tradition had preserved relating to the excellence of their Christian character, and to the motives which prompted the consecration of so large a portion of their property to this one favored object. But, since that time, records have been brought to light which add much to what was previously known of Mrs. Norris, to whom, no less than to her husband, belongs the credit of what they jointly did for the cause of Christ. These records are in the form of a journal, kept daily by her own hand and for her own private use, and covering the entire year which immediately preceded her death, the last entry being made only eighteen days before that event. They thus reveal the interior life of this devout woman; they place the reader in the very centre of the scenes in which she constantly mingled; they introduce him to the society which habitually frequented her Christian home and enjoyed her generous hospitality. They even lay before him the thanksgivings, the confessions, the supplications, with which she closed each day, and the renewed consecration of herself, her time, her possessions, and all that was hers to the service of her God and Saviour, before resigning herself to sleep. They show, beyond a question, how constantly and unreservedly this humble disciple stayed herself on God, how faithfully she endeavored to serve Him, how earnestly she prayed to be his honored instrument of blessing to all immediately about her, and to all, whether far or near, to whom, by a wise use of her property, she might be a messenger of salvation through Christ. They leave on the mind of the reader an impression, painfully deep, of her views of the heinousness of sin against a holy God, and of the utterly hopeless condition of the individual sinner and of a fallen race, without the glad tidings of the gospel. So profound was her own sense of unworthiness as to deprive her of much of the peace and joy which belong to the Christian hope, and to cause her to forego communion with Christ at his table. She was accustomed to witness with sincere pleasure the administration of the Supper and the happiness of her fellow-believers in partaking of the sacramental emblems; but not for once did she venture to pick up a fallen crumb, or place to her lips the consecrated cup. There is something extremely sad and pathetic in this attitude of hers respecting a public profession of faith in Christ. It seems to have been maintained, not because of any real doubt of the genuineness of her faith and trust and

hope, — a hope which she prized as dearly as did her husband, who declared, “I would not relinquish a hope that I am a child of God for a thousand worlds,” — nor yet because of any reluctance to be numbered among Christ’s avowed followers, but simply, as it appears, because a profound conviction of unworthiness and an unconquerable fear of self-deception triumphed over her conviction of immediate duty, and caused her to defer the decisive step in the hope of finding clearer light. In common with many of that day, and not a few of this, she walked far too often beneath the shadows of Sinai, far too seldom amid the radiance of Calvary. She could *believe* herself delivered from the bondage of the law, but she could not *realize* the full blessedness of the freedom where-with Christ makes free. Yet her distrust of her own religious experiences and good estate caused not a single wavering of her faith in the completeness of our Lord’s redemptive work, or in the imperative duty of his Church to send the glad tidings of salvation to all the earth.

As a condition precedent to the establishment of missions to the heathen, Mrs. Norris looked with great favor upon the suggestion when first made, as early as 1806, that a seminary should be established for the preparation of young men for the ministry, with special reference to the missionary work. It was her memorable saying, “The missionary work and the Seminary are the same,” that influenced her husband to double the amount he had first intended to give to the Seminary. His own heart was already enlisted in the germinating cause of missions, and his resolution to contribute liberally to this cause had already been formed. But his work on earth ended before the formation of the American Board, and the duty of executing his benevolent purpose devolved upon his widow, — a duty which she contemplated only in the light of privilege. The intensity of her interest in this cause is vividly illustrated by the well-attested fact that, when a committee to devise ways and means for the support of the first missionaries was in session at her house in Salem, she called out Mr. Bartlet, and said to him, “I perceive that you are in trouble for money. Now, if you will give \$30,000, I will. The committee was at the time deliberating on the possibility of raising \$60,000 for the purpose proposed. The plan failed; but the \$60,000 were subsequently given by Mrs. Norris alone for the two objects which she regarded as one, Missions and the Seminary. From the time of her husband’s death, her one unflinching purpose was to make her property subserve the cause of Christ by the providing of her-

alds of salvation, and the sending of them forth on their mission of love. Thenceforth this was her single aim; this was the consummation of her hopes, her prayers, her public benefactions.

It is much to be regretted that the making of her will was so long delayed. This delay came perilously near to defeating her most fondly cherished plans. It greatly imperiled the validity of her will. It involved much expensive litigation, and deprived both the Seminary and the Board of the use of their legacies for four or more years. The fact, that less than three hours intervened between the signing of the will and the death of the testatrix, afforded the heirs at law a strong hope of success in an attempt to break it — a much stronger hope than could have been cherished had the instrument been made while Mrs. Norris was in health and, beyond dispute, “of sound and disposing mind.” Accordingly, her heirs resolved to defeat the object of the will at all hazards. To their view the mere fact of giving such a sum of money for purposes so chimerical and foolish was evidence sufficient to prove imbecility of mind, subjection to undue influences from without, and absolute insanity. Sooner than have their sister’s property used to disseminate evangelical religion, they would gladly see it reduced to ashes, but far more gladly would they have it added to the generous portions bequeathed to them.

The case was intrusted to the ablest counsel of the day, to be pursued to the end, however bitter it might prove to be. With what spirit and resolution these counselors executed their commission is sufficiently evident from a remark of Hon. Samuel Dexter to Rev. Dr. Worcester, “Well, Doctor, I am determined to kill this will!” to which remark, it may not be amiss to add, the Doctor retorted, “I have no doubt, Sir, of your *murderous intentions*.” Nevertheless, the will was approved by the Probate Court, and a similar result followed the appeal which was taken to the Supreme Court.

One point made by the counsel and confidently relied on to defeat the will was found in the extremely short interval between the dictation and the execution of the instrument. But this endeavor was frustrated by a circumstance conclusively proved, namely, that, after completing the dictation, and before consenting to add her signature, Mrs. Norris asked to have the document read to her, in order to assure herself that every item was in accordance with her intentions. When the gift to the Seminary was reached she informed the scrivener that the legacy was not designed for the Andover Seminary but for the “Associate Foun-

dation" of the same; and she required a corresponding alteration to be made in the form of the bequest. But for this opportune correction, the legacy might have been lost to the Associate Foundation, and thus its purpose have been defeated; and but for the necessity of making it, no other equally conclusive evidence of the perfect sanity of the testatrix might have been found. But the purpose of God, that shall stand; and it evidently was his purpose that this will should stand, and, consequently, that all devices formed against it should be brought to naught. As we proceed, another and yet stronger illustration of this truth, as related to this document, will present itself.

In all ordinary cases, a will which had fought its way through both courts would be deemed safe against further assaults. In this case, however, the prize to be won was too great, and the defeat of the object of the legacies too important — at least in the estimation of the opponents of the will — to retire from the field of conflict without one more attempt, desperate though it might be, to accomplish their "murderous" purpose. Accordingly, they fell back on the policy of delay. By counseling the executor to resort to this artifice they hoped to save time to mature their plans, and to weary the parties whose title to the legacies had now been established. This master-piece of strategy was adopted and maintained with masterly inaction.

Meantime, the Trustees of Phillips Academy and the designated trustees of the legacy to the A. B. C. F. M. — which was as yet without a charter — were considering the next step to be taken, on their part, to bring to an end this vexatious delay. When patient waiting had ceased to be a virtue, they determined, by advice of counsel, to take the offensive, and bring action for debt against the executor, in order thus to compel payment. The opponents of the will, being thus unexpectedly placed on the defensive, were doubtless sorely tried to determine what defense could be set up which could afford the slightest hope of success. There remained just one possible position hitherto untried. On this they resolved to take their stand, and abide the issue. The legacy to the Academy being exclusively for the benefit of the Associate Foundation, the astute counsel for the defense determined to pose as profound theologians, and attempt to prove that the Creed under which this fund was to be administered was in conflict with the theology of the original Foundation, and consequently that the legacy was void. What success rewarded their desperate exertions will presently appear.

The case had now assumed a form of intense interest to the public. Both parties in the contest were represented by the ablest counsel to be procured. Both seem to have realized that everything depended on the result of these trials; that sink or swim was the only alternative.

The cause of Phillips Academy was argued at the November term of the Supreme Court, 1814, by Dane and Prescott for the plaintiffs, and by Dexter and Merrill for the defendant. The action being continued *nisi* for advisement, the opinion of the Court was delivered at the following March term in Suffolk, by Justice Thatcher.

The Court having enounced the broad principle of law on which its decision rests, namely, "A liberal construction will be given by the Court to bequests for the support of Christianity; and objections drawn from technical theology will have little weight, when urged in avoidance of such bequests;" and having made certain statements explanatory of the case in hand, proceeded as follows:—

"Another objection was urged upon us, 'That the legacy is void, because the trustees of Phillips Academy, by the act of June, 1807, were made capable only to hold property for the support of a theological institution, *agreeably to the will of the donors, if consistent with the original design of the founders of the Academy.* And the original design of the founders of the Academy was to propagate *Calvinism*, as containing the important principles and distinguishing tenets of our holy Christian religion, as summarily expressed in the *Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism*; whereas, the design of the donors of the Associate Foundation is, to add to *Calvinism* the distinguishing principles of *Hopkinsianism*, a union or mixture inconsistent with the original design of the original founders of the Academy and of the theological institution.'

"This objection appears to me to be founded on a mistaken view of the original design of the founders of this Academy; which, as far as it can be collected from the case agreed, appears to have been to teach youth the great end and real business of living; to convince them that goodness and knowledge must be united to form the most perfect character in human life; that vice, in the most comprehensive sense, ought to be hated and avoided; and virtue, in an equally extensive sense, ought to be loved and practiced; to cultivate, establish, and perpetuate in the Christian church,

the true and fundamental principles of the Christian religion, as far as that institution might have influence, by an early inculcation of those principles on the minds of the pupils." . . . "The name of *Calvin* or *Calvinism*, as the end and object of the institution, is not mentioned. The objection, therefore, avails nothing against the legacy in question.

"The objection seems to have confounded the benefactors to the Academy, on whose bounty the theological institution or seminary is established, with the original founders of the Academy. For, although it is true that Mr. John Phillips was one of the founders of the Academy, we must, in this instance, distinguish between him as a founder and as an after-donor or benefactor. In his will he directs the donation therein given to the trustees of this Academy to be appropriated to the support of such charity scholars as might be designed for the gospel ministry, and, having received the first part of their education at the Academy, and before a theological professor, should be instituted in this or in the Exeter Academy, as was expected in some future time, they might be assisted in *their theological studies under the direction of some eminent Calvinistic minister of the Gospel*, until such time as an able, pious, orthodox instructor should be supported in one or the other of those academies, as a Professor of Divinity, by whom they might be taught *the important principles and distinguishing tenets of our holy Christian religion*.

"It deserves notice, and is evidential of the *good sense* and vital Christianity of this holy man, that, although this instruction was to be from some eminent *Calvinistic* minister, until an *Orthodox instructor* (that is, one who should teach, explain and inculcate the important principles and distinguishing tenets of the religion of JESUS, as it had been delivered to the Saints), should be instituted; yet he is to teach nothing but *our holy Christian religion*. He was not to teach Calvinism.

"If it be objected that Calvinism and Christianity are identically the same, then it seems to me that the principle of the objection would be to give the preference to *Calvin* over JESUS as a religious instructor, and to rob the latter of some honor and glory, which I have ever considered as belonging to him over all his followers and other teachers."

"I should not have thought it necessary to take any further notice of this objection, were it not that the counsel for the defendant brought forward in the argument, and urged upon the

consideration of the Court with great force, several specific propositions or articles of two opposing creeds, or which, the counsel contended, were directly contrary to each other ; insisting that the intent of the founders was to maintain *Calvinism*, or the theology of *Calvin* ; and if there were but one single article or proposition in the creed of the associate founders contrary to *Calvinism*, the trustees of the Academy would have no right to take and appropriate the legacy in question ; and should the creed imposed by the associate founders omit a single article contained in the creed of *Calvin*, or as Calvinism was understood at the time of the foundation of the Academy, it would be such a departure from the *intent, design and plan* of the original founders, that it must intercept the intended legacy, and prevent any right from vesting in the plaintiffs. It was then stated to be an essential article in the creed of *Calvin*, and what all Calvinists must necessarily believe, to make them Christians according to the Calvinistic theology, ‘that the original sin of *Adam* is imputed to all his posterity, in some way or manner that they are all and every one actual sinners.’ Whereas, the associate foundation did not admit this article in the creed taught in their branch of the theological school, but substituted the following article in lieu thereof, and made it a necessary part of the religious creed to the professors, and to be by them taught to the students in the institution, namely : ‘*Adam*, the federal head and representative of the human race, was placed in a state of probation, and in consequence of his disobedience, all his descendants were *constituted* sinners ;’ which latter article, it was urged, is not only an article of a system of religion called *Hopkinsianism*, but it is so inconsistent with, and contrary to, the system of Calvinism in general, and particularly to the foregoing article of the creed of *Calvin*, or of a Calvinistic Christian, as taught in the *Assembly’s Shorter Catechism*, as could not be taught in consistency and harmony with the design, views, and intentions of the original founders of the Academy ; and thus the legacy being given to promote *Hopkinsianism* in opposition to Calvinism, as explained in the said catechism, is void, and ought not, or rather cannot, be recovered by the plaintiffs, who, as trustees of the Academy, cannot take any donation or bequest contrary to the intent of the founders.”

“To this objection, thus drawn out and explained nearly in the words of the eloquent argument, it is enough to reply, There is a clear, intelligible meaning, consistent with the whole course of the providential government of GOD over the natural and moral

world by general laws, so far as the subject has been investigated, which may be applied to the two articles attempted to be contrasted, with no greater latitude in the use of language, than is frequently applied by *orthodox divines* to words and phrases in the *Bible*, not always to be taken literally; in which sense these propositions or articles will mean the same thing. And in such sense, they are consistent with the revelations contained in the *Bible*; which revelations make up the fundamental principles of the religion of JESUS. Hence, there is no necessity of conjecturing a variety of meanings which the words may possibly be susceptible of in minds more habituated to dwell on the theories of certain divines, than on the religion of JESUS, as delivered by himself and those who were authorized by GOD the Father to preach it. And I hesitate not to say, that, in all cases like this, we ought to be satisfied, whenever we can reconcile the language of honest Christians, by yielding to them that charity of construction which it is allowed by all that we should apply to the Holy Scriptures.

“For myself, I confess that I do not clearly perceive any other sense, than that in which the two articles mean substantially the same thing, notwithstanding some diversity of expression, in which they can be said to be true, and consistent with the Christian religion. And knowing, as we all do, the founders, as well as the after-benefactors who have set up the Associate Foundation, to be persons of great piety and most sincere believers in the religion of JESUS; and that the first and principal object with all of them has been to establish, teach, and enforce the belief and practice of that religion on the students of the institution, and, through them, on the whole world of mankind, why should we be now called upon to apply an *astute, narrow, and uncharitable* construction upon a few technical propositions, merely to divert the legacy of a pious woman from an object dearer to her than life itself? And let me add, in this case the object is great and noble beyond almost anything in our country.”

“It is the opinion of the Court that judgment must be rendered on the verdict.”

Nothing could be more conclusive than this decision and the arguments by which it was supported; no discomfiture could be more complete than that of the defendants in this case. In the light of this decision, can be seen, most clearly and impressively, the wisdom of Divine Providence in permitting this attempt to rob the treasury of the Lord to be made; for thereby opportunity

was afforded for a final settlement, under the ægis of law, of the question, whether "technical theology" could be allowed precedence over the broad and fundamental principles of "our holy religion;" whether any human name could be permitted to supplant the name of JESUS. Here, the issue was squarely made, and a righteous decision irreversibly rendered. In no other way, unless by subsequent abuse of trust, could the same question have come before the same tribunal. In forcing this issue, the defendants meant only evil, but God meant it for good; for no weapon formed against the Almighty can prosper; He can cause even the wrath of man to praise Him. As the matter now stands, the funds of this Seminary can be disturbed in the promotion of their "great and noble object," only on conclusive evidence of having been employed for the dissemination of heresies distinctly forbidden, and in violation of the fundamental principles of the religion of Christ. Praise be to the Great Head of the Church for thus gladdening the hearts of his people when disquieted within them by the machinations of his foes; praise be to Him, that, only by their own infidelity to his teachings and service, can his cause, as related to this creed, be again placed in peril.

In the light of this judicial decision, and in view of the statements previously made relative to Mrs. Norris, the reader cannot fail to discern and admire the interposition of Providence in behalf of an humble handmaid of the Lord, maintaining her cause against all the devices of her adversaries, and giving answers of peace to the many prayers she had recorded for a Divine blessing to follow her gift. What clearer proof could be afforded that her offerings were accepted on high; that, dying in the Lord, and now resting from her earthly labors, her works had followed her, and were thenceforth sure to be jealously guarded for the accomplishment of the noble object of the giver. Moreover, by this decision, our thoughts are led directly back to the consultation between Mr. and Mrs. Norris which resulted in the creation of the fund which we have designated by their name; and all room for doubt is removed, respecting the correctness of the position already taken, that *their* purpose in creating this fund was, simply and solely, the furtherance of the gospel.

This position was taken because the direct evidence of the donors admitted of no other; because no other would be in accord with the fundamental object of the Seminary and the Board; and, yet again, because, from the beginning to this day, the Seminary has been administered, strictly, and with unwavering fidelity,

for the promotion of this end. This has been the common aim of trustees and visitors, of officers and students. No man living can deny this fact. No man dare impeach the motives or official fidelity of those to whom, in successive periods, has been committed the charge of this world-renowned institution. No man dare assail the religious standing of those who have sent forth, from its hallowed walls, successive generations of students, thoroughly furnished for their high vocation as ambassadors for Christ. In view of this judicial decision, which has so long lain buried in comparative obscurity, no man would presume to affirm, that, in giving relative prominence to the broad principles of the gospel, and in holding in relative abeyance what appertains, chiefly, or even solely, to "technical theology," the teachers in this Seminary have, in any way, come short of duty or violated the bond under which they have executed their solemn trust. On the contrary, all men of broad views and liberal spirit will heartily rejoice in the fresh evidence now presented, that these faithful teachers have, in so doing, been simply following the lead of our highest judicial tribunal, while, at the same time, they have done only that which inclination prompted and conscience demanded; only that which was "according to the best light God" had given them.

That would be an extremely "astute and narrow" view of the obligation of these teachers which should claim that singleness of aim necessarily involved uniformity of exegetical or philosophical opinion; that identity of creed precluded diversity of interpretation. A view so narrow would also preclude all independence of thought and all increasing light. It would impose utter subserviency to the dogmas of the past, and reduce instruction to the level of machine work. Has the opinion ever been avowed in this Seminary, or in any similar institution, that diversity of speculative opinion, and progress in methods of interpretation, were inconsistent with unity in system of belief? Has it ever been maintained, for example, that an equally unreserved acceptance of the doctrine of inspiration could not be predicated of those who accept and those who deny an inspiration which is only verbal? Can it be affirmed that he who cordially accepts the statement, that "the Son of God, by his sufferings and death, has made atonement for the sins of all men," thereby binds himself to a particular theory of the atonement? Has it not been always conceded, that, within the specified limitations of his system of belief, the teacher of that system might walk at liberty, and that only thus was a progressive orthodoxy possible? The creed of the Seminary is universally

recognized as a compromise between divergent views, effected after long delays, and with extreme caution, in order that non-essential phases of belief might be excluded, while everything essential to evangelical religion was retained; effected, in order that the two parties to the compromise might stand on common ground, and work harmoniously for a common cause. Surely, the men who, with greatest pains, prepared this document were not the men to sacrifice the essentials of religion in any particular; neither were they men who were incapable of discovering at what point concession ceased to be a virtue. And here let it be distinctly observed, that, in thus elaborating and guarding this creed, its authors were doing precisely that which the Associate Founders of the Seminary would have them do; they were anticipating, and precluding, so far as was in their power, all subsequent controversy which was liable to arise, alike in theological circles and before judicial tribunals; they were making plain paths for all who should follow their lead; they were removing stumbling-blocks from before the feet of trustees and professors; they were rendering possible that harmonious and brilliant career of usefulness which, for seventy-five years, has been the glory of this Institution, alike in our own land and the wide world over. And, in this connection, it should also be observed, that, but for this far-sighted compromise of conflicting views; but for this wise surrender of personal preferences, and non-essential differences of opinion, the shrewd tactics of the lawyers might have given them the victory in the contest which has just passed in review; something far from non-essential divergences might have been successfully maintained; the design of the pious donors of the funds might have been defeated; and the period of its infancy might have bounded the life of the Institution.

For, had the denial of the right of the Trustees to accept the legacy not been overruled by the Court, that denial, resting, as it did, solely on differences in technical theology, would have applied with equal force to all the funds of the Associate Foundation, and would have debarred the Seminary from all assistance from that source. The consequence would have been that the heirs at law of Mr. Norris could have recovered the \$10,000 which he contributed to those funds; and Mr. Bartlet and Mr. Brown would have been compelled to withdraw their donations, and devote them, according to their original purpose, to the establishment of a theological seminary at Newburyport, or to abandon the benevolent object for which those funds had been set apart. This can be confidently

affirmed, because those who framed the Creed under which these funds were given to the Associate Foundation at Andover had gone to their utmost limit of concession to the Calvinistic party; and, as the attempted union of interest between the two parties to the compromises of the Creed had now been virtually annulled by judicial decision, no alternative remained to either party except a final separation of interests, and the maintenance of two independent schools of theology. Whether two schools — *one*, in aim and in all essentials of faith; *two*, only in respect to a few differences of opinion on points relatively unimportant — could long have maintained a separate existence, is, to say the least, extremely doubtful; but, whether either of the two could have had anything more than a *name* to live, scarcely admits of a question. It would seem, then, that when the lawyers determined to “kill that will,” they aimed an equally deadly blow at the Associate Foundation of the Seminary, and at the very life of the Institution.

Obviously, therefore, an overruling Providence, which sees the end from the beginning, presided over all the deliberations alike of the donors to the funds, and of their spiritual advisers. It warned them to guard equally well every avenue of approach for theological opponents and for adversaries before the law; to make equally sure the safety of the funds here held, and the purity of the faith here to be inculcated. And the reader will not fail to admire, in this connection, the harmonious coöperation of the Founders, the Associate Founders, and the spiritual advisers of both. The Associate Founders laid no claim to ability to frame a creed for this Institution; they had not even placed themselves under any church creed or covenant; but so completely did they confide in their pastors and religious teachers, that, without hesitation or reserve, they could and did commit to them the work for which they recognized their own incapacity. Themselves were ready with their liberal offerings for the treasury of the Lord, but others, wiser than they, must guard those offerings against misappropriation or perversion. Hence the necessity of a distinct enunciation of the limits within which those gifts could be appropriately employed, and an equally specific delineation of the boundaries which they could not lawfully cross.

With a history replete with evidences of good accomplished; radiant with tokens of the Divine favor; rich in present possession of greatly augmented means of usefulness, can there be a reasonable doubt that far greater achievements for the cause of Christ await this Institution in the years to come, than have illu-

minated its path hitherto? Is not its aim the same now as before? Is it not equally true to the faith once delivered to the saints? — equally faithful to the purpose of the Founders? — equally devoted to Christ and his cause? Does not the same object animate its present guardians and teachers as inspired those of former times, — to send forth heralds of salvation to all the world? Whenever, on fitting occasions, that tender “Parting Hymn,” so often heard within this Seminary, is sung anew by consecrated lips, and with the overflowings of young and ardent souls, —

“The voice of my departed Lord,
‘Go, teach all nations,’
Comes on the night air
And awakes mine ear,”

does not the same thrill of interest pervade student and listener now as before, gladdening, animating, and inspiring every responsive heart? Nay, rather, does not the memory of successes already achieved for Christ, by his many youthful disciples who have here responded to his call, greatly enhance the interest of every similar occasion whenever it recurs, and call forth an intenser thrill of joy? And is there not, now as aforetime, joy among the Angels of God also, at every announcement amid their ranks, of souls redeemed and sins forgiven? — of new trophies laid at Immanuel’s feet? — of fresh evidences that the prayers offered when the very foundations of this Seminary were laid are daily receiving new answers in the salvation of multitudes? And shall not like occasions for thanksgiving and praise be repeated, until every knee shall bow to Christ, and every tongue confess that He is Lord, to the glory of God the Father?

George B. Jewett.

A BIBLE STUDY — THE UNJUST STEWARD.

THE parable of the Unjust Steward has often been treated harshly, and so has been slow to tell the best thing that it has to say. It has been puzzled over as a kind of divine enigma, and meanings have been wrung from it. Truth is better coaxed than coerced. The way to read a parable is the way we read a picture, which is a parable on canvas. There does not need to be too much trying to see what a picture means: nor a parable; both are, in this particular, like coy children that begin to grow talka-

tive when you let them alone. When our eye is allowed to play upon a picture that has been artistically wrought, it will gravitate, generally, with a good deal of ease, if allowed to, to the point where the artist's interest centres, and around which other lines and figures have been introduced by him, as accessories to the main effect.

Another fault in our way of treating these pictures, these word pictures, is that we overwork them, think into them more meaning than it ever lay in our Lord's mind to express by them. We see more between the lines than there is space between the lines to hold. We must be satisfied to find in a parable a little truth scattered over considerable ground. Parables will be better treated telescopically than microscopically. This parable of the unjust steward has been shaken through too much fine sieve.

The meaning of the parable is gathered up and applied in one verse: "*Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness, that when ye fail they may receive you into everlasting habitations.*" We shall spend only enough time on the parable to get at that meaning. A certain rich man put the administering of his estate in the hands of an agent. After occupying the position for a season, his master, for reasons that we need not stop to state, gave him notice that after a certain time his services would not be wanted. The agent had laid up nothing, was not equal to manual labor, and too proud to beg. The question that pressed upon him was, — who was going to take care of him after he had served out his notice. After considering and then dismissing one expedient after another, it occurs to him that he will compound with his employer's debtors, — in that way take a mortgage on their affection, to be paid off in terms of bread and shelter after his wages have stopped. The dishonesty of the transaction is apparent enough: but that, let it be remarked, is only an accident of the case, a mere accessory stroke. He accordingly calls his master's debtors to him, one after another, remits in part the obligation of each, and, while opportunity serves, plucks from present circumstance down sufficient to feather the nest upon a higher branch. The man who owed a hundred measures of oil was permitted to make out a new due-bill for fifty. The debtor who owed a hundred measures of wheat was allowed to substitute a bond for eighty; and so on around; that when he was put out of the stewardship they might, at the instance of gratitude, receive him into their houses. He made sure of a pleasant home by and by, by converting into friendships the resources of the instant.

If now we will make one or two substitutions in our verse in accord with the reading of the new revision, the meaning of the verse and the purport of the parable will become easily and pleasantly intelligible. The text says, "Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness." "The mammon of unrighteousness" is a way of saying "the unrighteous mammon." Mammon is here the personification of earthly wealth, and called "unrighteous" because it is so apt to be unrighteous, both in the manner of its acquisition and in that of its expenditure. The preposition of — ("make to yourselves friends *of* the mammon of unrighteousness") — is in the new revision replaced by the expression "by means of." So that the first clause of the text has now been corrected and simplified to read, "Make to yourselves friends by means of your earthly possession." In the second clause a single change is shown, in the new revision, to be necessary, — "That when *ye* fail," — so it stands in our Bibles: that when *it* fails (that is, when the earthly possession fails) is the revised reading. So that in its altered form and dress our whole verse runs in this way: "Make to yourselves friends by means of your earthly wealth, that when it fails they (the friends you have made by means of it when you had it) may receive you into everlasting habitations." The man in our story used his resources while he had them to increase the number of those that loved him, that when his resources were gone there might be those who in hospitality and affection would welcome him to their homes. Now the Lord, in our verse, applies the lesson to his hearers, and says to them in substance, Do you in the same way make to yourselves friends by means of your resources, that when your resources by and by slip out of your hands, you too may have friends away yonder who shall give you a glad and loving welcome, not to temporary residences, as in the case of the steward, but to the mansions and the home that shall be everlasting.

Out of the verse as thus phrased, three or four lessons offer themselves.

The first lesson has reference to the convertible quality of earthly values. Property of one value was by our agent converted into property of another value, a greater value, and, what is important to notice, a higher grade of value. As a matter of practical result, the oil and wheat at his disposal were by him converted into, — not more oil and wheat, but into affection and hospitality. Somewhat of the same purpose inheres in all trade. Property in hand is not treated generally as a finality. No man has ten thou-

sand dollars invested, or indeed one thousand, who does not keep an eye pretty steadily open to the possibility of doing better with it. That is the animus of trade. That is what we mean by watching the market. Trade is not an exchange of equivalents. There is no such thing as barter pure and simple. When we lay down one value we do it with the purpose of taking up a larger value in its stead. We succeed in our purpose and "make"; our purpose miscarries and we "lose." The farmer puts one bushel of seed into the ground and in the fall gathers sixty bushels in its stead. That is trade, in a sense; only nature, and not the ordinary run of grain dealer, is the other factor in the transaction. Now the peculiarity of all this grade of transaction is this, that it looks to a return in kind. You plant corn to get corn, only more of it. On the street you take money which is in one kind of stock and put it into different stock: but money is the aim of the transaction, only more of it. It is still a return in kind. The transaction is legitimate, or may be: the point of the illustration is that your object in the transaction is to get out the same kind of thing that you put in, only in greater abundance. It is the same thing that our agent would have done if he had taken that fifty gallons of oil in the first instance, and, instead of converting it into affection and hospitality, had put it into the oil trade, with the intent of gaining more of the same commodity in the issue.

Now there is another sort of transaction in which men engage which has its financial aspect, and yet which is a shade off from those just referred to, — in fact several shades off. You take a thousand dollars, if you have it to spare, and put it into a work of art, a painting, for instance, not as an article of merchandise (you are not supposed to be in the picture-trade); but you purchase it as an adornment to your house, and it becomes a bright thing there. You hang it upon the wall, and your eye and heart feed upon it. And after you have had it awhile some one makes you an offer for it, double perhaps what you paid for it, and you say, "No; that picture isn't in the market." Now that is really a great thing. It means that the man, however mercenary he may be reputed to be, nevertheless has something whose value, even in his own estimation, is not readable in terms of dollars and cents. Now that is more like our agent in the story, who, while he used the purchasing power of his oil as a means of obtaining something better, would never have allowed that better thing to be converted back into oil again. The value of his friendship was not with him readable in terms of oil, wheat, or other staple. He had gotten

up into worth of another grade, values of a higher scale. So we may have other treasures, such as books, articles of virtu, or a house, or rather a home, for that is part of the difference between a house and a home. One might be willing to sell his house, but the home, though money may have obtained it, he nevertheless would not convert willingly back into money; its value is not computable in terms of pounds, shillings, and pence.

And that is our lesson just at this point, that values lower and higher are ranged like the steps of a stairway, each step being placed to conduct to the one superior; so that each grade of value is in its best sense worth what it will buy out of the grade next above; that the value of money thus is not in the money *eo ipso*, but in the purchasing power of the money. That is a lesson that a good many men are not learning, that the best significance of a dollar is what the dollar will do; that what the oil will purchase is worth more than the oil. A man of large property died in New York awhile ago, who, late in life, made one or two munificent benefactions, but said before he died that he wished he had commenced to give earlier. He learned late, but he learned one of the best lessons of life, that a dollar carefully spent denotes more than a dollar scrupulously kept; that the best thing about lower values is their convertibility into higher values; and that with the man, as with the reservoir, distribution, as well as accumulation, is conditional to his being either a thing of beauty in himself or a well-spring of gladness to his times.

The second lesson has reference to the fact that the time comes, with every man, sooner or later, when these lower values cease to signify, and when, unless they have previously been converted into higher values of an indestructible kind, one is left stranded in a condition of utter and irremediable pauperism. That time, that crisis, of course, is the moment of his death. The agent in our story had his crisis, of a different kind, to be sure, but nevertheless intended by our Lord to be typical of death, and the agent anticipated his crisis; he got his resources into such shape that they could survive the crisis. The oil and the wheat he could not carry with him out of his stewardship; but while he was still steward he could convert some of those staples into a commodity such that his discharge from stewardship could not alienate it from him. That exactly is what we mean by treasure laid up in heaven, — possessions of such a sort that death cannot impair nor diminish it, — of that indestructible quality that the death-power can work in it no corrosion. That was what was intended when it was said

of a recently deceased philanthropist that he took his wealth with him; by which was meant that he carried up with him to the heavenly home and the throne of God the friendships, the loves, and the prayers of the multitudes all around the earth who had had their burdens lightened and their lives strengthened and sweetened by his tender beneficence. He indeed took none of his money with him, but before he was called hence he had converted a good deal of that money into something which he did take with him, and which to-day composes part of his crown of rejoicing as he treads the golden streets of the celestial city. If we have property in buildings we insure it. Insurance is a sort of contingent and anticipative conversion of combustible values into incombustible, so that they will survive the conflagration if it befalls, and be ready to our hand on the other side of the conflagration, undiminished and unscarred. Or if you are a man of wealth and your property is scattered, and disaster of any kind impends, with the first suspicion of disaster, or the first rumor of war, your instant care is to convert it, so far as may be, into values of so impregnable a sort that the shock of war and its devastations will not shatter them, and thus you be let through onto the thither side of disaster, with your estates and effects in the least possible measure impaired.

We have not said much about what it is that these lower values can be converted into to the insuring of their permanence and indestructibility. The third lesson concerns that matter, "Make to yourselves friends by means of your earthly possessions." Carlyle was speaking quite closely in the line of Scripture when he said: "The wealth of a man consists in the number of things he loves and blesses, and in the number of things he is loved and blessed by." A friend, as it is meant here, is a person that has so come under the power of our love as to love back; loving us because we loved him. Such friends we take with us. Death does not terminate the possession. They are value which survives the good-by. They are celestial treasure; if they are gone up before, they are treasure laid up in heaven, where moth and rust do not corrupt. By this love we do not mean mere pleasant acquaintance between person and person. That is another matter. It is a gospel affair, this love. It is the same sort of going out and losing ourselves in other people that was in Christ's case. In Christ's case we call it giving himself for others. That is love exactly, letting go of ourselves in the taking hold of another; and one that gets under our hold in that way is our friend, he is our

treasure, he is our jewel. He may be here or may be there; we may be here or may be there, but he is our jewel. And our possessions of money or talent or otherwise will help us make friends, not because friends can be bought, but because we can make the things we give the emblem to them of our self-giving, even as sympathetic tears win our hearts just because they are the glistening symbols of sympathy. That is certainly a great deal of the meaning of Christ's blood; it comes from the heart, and means heart. And men are saved by Him because they are loved by Him, and know they are loved by Him.

And love of this kind, the love that makes friends, does not work inside of fixed lines—it is not a matter of lines—any more than warmth will slip along a groove, or light go by latitude and longitude. Christ loved up and down, all the way from the throne of his Father to the spirits in the nether prison. Love that works at particular levels is always to be suspected. Christly love is like the sun, which sheds its beams vertically as well as horizontally. When I find a man of great means whose lovers are only from the class of the well-to-do, the beautiful, the cultivated, I am not authorized to say that his friends are not friends, in the gospel sense of the word; but when I know that the turf on his grave is moistened by the tears of the poor, the degraded, I know that that man was a Christian. Love that works vertically is born only of God. And it may be added that there is nothing the poor and degraded need so much as they do love. They need love more than they do money; if we gave them less gold and more affection they would be better off in heart, mind, and estate. Christ instituted no charitable organization, only as every Christian is designed to be himself a charitable organization, collector, treasurer, and committee of disbursement, all in one. Men are to be redeemed by love; love is power,—personal power working toward another winningly, operating in him actuatingly, resting on him as a benediction. Love is the redeeming element; love is the pith of the gospel, the axis on which all turns. And men grow surprisingly lovable as soon as we begin to love them; startlingly interesting as soon as we begin to be interested in them. We shall find in people just as much heart as we have the heart to find in them. As soon as we begin in a Christ-like way to love people, we shall discover that they love to be loved. They are in our power, if our power is heart-power. It is an easy thing to make a friend. It is like God to make a friend, and a friend is a permanent possession, treasure in heaven, imperishable jewel, star in our crown of rejoicing, out of which the light never fades.

And the friends we have made in this way, knit to us in the meshes of an undying love, if they pass up before us, will be there waiting for us. That is part of the meaning of the parable, — that when your possession fails, those whom you have made to love you may receive you into the home that is everlasting. It really takes that to make out the idea of home, — somebody waiting for you. When you have come back from the church-yard where has been laid the precious dust of your companion, and have crossed the old threshold, and entered the familiar room where so many times, as you have entered, a tender greeting has been given you, it is just the loss of that, and the knowing that he or she is never going to be waiting there for you again, that unmakes the home. So this verse contains another of those hints, that, here and there, like stars dispersed in a dim firmament, give our hearts something to take hold of, and wind themselves about. Heaven comes into a little more real and social relation to us. A bridge, light and impalpable, but strong enough to bear the freightage of a great hope, gets thrown across the interval.

I know we are going to have Christ there, and so we have Him here ; but that does not destroy the need of human fellowship, but rather makes the need the greater. We shall love there more, not less. That the sun shines in the sky with such splendor not makes other objects less needful, but more so. It is through them in part that the true power and glory of the sun get disclosed to us. We have Christ here ; and a part of his felt power and loveliness now is in the beautiful relations that, at his hallowing impulse, contrast themselves among men. It seems a little transcendent to say that there Christ is to be our “all.” But it does just cover the ground to say that there He is going to be our “*all in all*.” When you have crossed the sea, and on nearing port and coming up to the deck have seen among the throng of eager expectants no eye that was looking for *you*, no face that was flushed with a glad welcome for you, your heart has faltered within you, and you have turned back a wistful glance over the tired leagues that divide you from country and friends. But if among the throng you detect a responsive eye that is waiting for you, and a face flushing with old-time love that has been strengthening with the interval, right there, just on the threshold of the strange continent, there grows up in you a deep restful sense of home.

Remember that your stewardship here is not for long. Use carefully and lovingly the things that God has given you. And when it comes time for you to depart, may there be many hearts

here that shall be orphaned by your going, and many waiting hearts there that shall be gladdened by your coming.

Charles H. Parkhurst.

PILGRIMAGE.

A SILENT monk, in cloister gray,
At his cell window stands,
While knightly hosts, in rich array,
Move by in shining bands.

They march on, singing, undismayed,
In chorus sweet and strong;
The banner of the cross displayed
Above the knightly throng.

They hold their course right towards the sea,
The ship they stand upon;
And forth it flies so merrily,
It soon looks but a swan.

The monk stands at his window-sill,
And gazes on their way:
"I am a pilgrim like ye still,
Though here at home I stay.

"Life's journey on through seas of rage
And burning wastes of sand,
Is verily a pilgrimage
Unto the promised land."

From the German of Leitner.

C. H.

VIA VITÆ.

I HAD a message from the Lord:
He bade me rise, and seek His face;
He set me in a shady road,
That bloomed with beauty and with grace.

I wandered on, from flower to flower;
I breathed their perfume with delight.

How sweetly passed each sunny hour!
 How full of beauty every sight!

Till almost I forgot that I
 Was but a traveler on the road;
 The vale so fair, so blue the sky,
 It seemed it must be my abode.

Then colder grew the azure sky;
 The night came down, the flowers were gone.
 A voice spoke to me from on high:
 "Thou foolish child, press on, press on!"

C. H.

THE DOCTRINE OF SACRED SCRIPTURE.¹

THE two large volumes before us are themselves an illustration of an incidental observation made by the author. When speaking of the modifications of the post-Reformation theory which have been brought about by critical study of the Bible, he remarks that "the practical uses of the Bible, and the dissemination of its facts and truths, have been nearly in the inverse ratio of the currency given to the former theological conception." As the theory of the perfect infallibility and equal authority of all parts of the Bible has been slowly yielding its untenable ground, the Bible itself has been more widely read, more intelligently studied, more spiritually applied to Christian life, more confidently taught and preached to all nations. Not only are translations and commentaries multiplied for popular use, but also books concerning the Bible are pouring from the press: books on the canon, books on the text, books on the authorship, books on the science, on the history, on the miracles, on the prophecies of the Bible; extended treatises on Inspiration, on the characteristics of Revelation, on the higher criticism, and even on the methods of studying the Bible. Here is a book of fifteen hundred pages entitled "*The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture*," and discussing the claims and facts of the Bible, in order to frame a theory of its origin. It has been known for a

¹ *The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture*. A critical, historical, and dogmatic inquiry into the origin and nature of the Old and New Testaments. By GEORGE T. LADD, D. D., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883. Vol. I. pp. xxii. and 761. Vol. II. pp. xiii. and 765.

considerable time that Professor Ladd was preparing such a book ; its publication has been awaited with much interest, and it has been read, or will be read, by nearly all critical students of the Bible. That there is a demand for so exhaustive a treatment of such a theme justifies the remark which has been quoted. The study of sacred Scripture from every point of view goes quietly on. Exact knowledge accumulates, and existing theories are modified correspondingly. In some respects investigation abates, in some respects exalts, current opinions, but ever carries us to a more intimate knowledge of the facts upon which consistent theories must be built. Such a book as Professor Ladd's — and this gives it large part of its value — brings discussions and conclusions down to date, and marks the point already reached in the progress of enlightened research. Its significance is that enough has already been gained by critical and historical studies to warrant the attempt to construct or to reconstruct the doctrine of the inspiration, authority, and infallibility of sacred Scripture. And it is safe to predict that the main lines of conclusion followed by the author and by those scholars who substantially agree with him will not be widely departed from, but that future modifications will be almost exclusively of details, proportions, and emphasis.

The first impression received on glancing over these numerous pages is of patient research and exhaustive learning, — an impression which is confirmed by the actual reading. There is scarcely a page but has its foot-note of reference to English, German, French, Greek, Latin, or Hebrew sources of information. The results of German scholarship and the conclusions of German dogmatics, both conservative and radical, the author has well in hand. The criticism may perhaps be fairly made that he is somewhat too generous in his quotation and citation, and that the literary method of his book follows too much the German in accumulating vast masses of materials from every quarter, and in saying all that can possibly be said on all branches of the subject. To this criticism the author would doubtless reply that if his readers only knew how many quotations have been omitted which he intended to make, and how much material has been laid aside which it was in his heart to use, they would pronounce these one and a half thousand pages a marvel of condensation. Notwithstanding, it may justly be said that the treatment borders on diffuseness, and that much would have been gained both for the circulation of the book and for the weight of its opinions by compactness and incisiveness. The approach is at times so gradual, there are so many preliminary state-

ments, there are so many promises of what is coming later (all of which are faithfully fulfilled), that one becomes somewhat impatient, and either incontinently skips a page or two, or wishes the author had adopted for his literary work the philosophy of oratory laid down by Mark Antony, "I only speak right on." It is so necessary, however, in such a discussion to prevent all misunderstanding, even that of supposing that a question or objection has been overlooked, although it is to be discussed later, that some diffuseness and repetition may be pardoned. Besides this criticism, and the observation that some sentences are circuitous and labored expression of the thought, there is little unfavorable comment to be made.

Interest centres in the conclusions which the author claims to have established. It may be said, then, with almost unqualified emphasis, that the treatment of the questions under discussion is judicial throughout. There is no special pleading. When facts are plainly in conflict with received opinion, their bearing is honestly indicated; and when they are not in conflict, even if some insist that they are, the integrity of the accepted view is maintained. He is careful to remain well within the lines of moderation, and not to claim more, but rather to claim less, than might be claimed by insistent pressing of facts. The perspective is well preserved, so that recent discoveries and inferences which from their present interest are close before the eye are not allowed to be magnified into undue importance. The tone of the writer is conservative. The caution which is characteristic of the book adds all the more weight to conclusions which are deliberately accepted. Above all, while there must, in the nature of the case, be much destructive criticism, the spirit of the book is thoroughly evangelical. The views presented concerning the supernatural in revelation, concerning miracles, and concerning the Person of Christ, are all that could be desired by the most cautious of Christian believers.

The method adopted is natural and effective. The first part, covering about two hundred pages, treats of the claims the Bible makes for itself. What did the historians, law-givers, prophets, and apostles claim concerning the inspiration and authority of their writings? What does the New Testament imply concerning the Old? What is the impression made by Christ's quotation, application, and qualification of the Old Testament? How did He distinguish the essential from the temporary in the Hebrew Scriptures? What promises did He make his disciples concerning the guidance of the Holy Spirit in their utterances and writings?

The second part, including four hundred and fifty pages, deals with the facts of the Bible. It is a critical study of the phenomena of the Bible, such as its statements concerning creation and the laws of physical nature, its historical records, its account of miracles, its predictions and their fulfillment, the imperfection of some of its ethical contents, the authorship of the several books, the language and style of the writers, the formation of the canon of Scripture, and the variations of the text. The third part, occupying two hundred pages, is an historical sketch of the development of the doctrine of sacred Scripture, with special attention to the period succeeding the Reformation, as furnishing the only distinct theory of the origin and infallibility of all parts of the Bible which has ever been held. The fourth part, embracing the remaining five hundred pages, is an induction from the facts thus studied, the several chapters, one after another, carefully tracing the characteristics of revelation as historical, gradual, progressive, original, and organic, in a complete unity; reverently inquiring concerning the agency of the Holy Spirit in the formation of Scripture; minutely analyzing the mental and spiritual activity of the writers of the Bible in receiving and recording the truths revealed by the Spirit; cautiously combining glimpses of the visions, dreams, ecstasies, visits of angels alluded to in the Old Testament with the calmer moods of mental quickening implied in the New Testament to frame a consistent theory of inspiration in its many grades and forms; discriminating broadly between the Word of God and the writings in which that Word is contained; clearly recognizing the mutual dependence of the Bible and the Church, while subordinating the Christian consciousness of the ages to the Word of God; carefully defining the authority of the Bible as residing in the ethico-religious sphere, and always gaining a response from a living faith; and at the end dwelling with some glow of fervor on the spiritual uses of the Bible for the individual and for society.

Is there, now, any concise and comprehensive statement of the author's conclusion? His theory is, and is repeatedly styled, Christo-centric. The value and the authority of the several parts are determined by their relation to the redemption which is in Christ Jesus. The Word of God, as distinguished from the sacred writings, is all that pertains nearly or remotely to the Person and work of Christ. All that was preparative in the history of Israel and of the world to the kingdom of redemption; all movements, however insignificant in themselves, which converge towards Christ; all the record of the sacred life, the precepts, the deeds, the

sufferings, the death, the exaltation of Jesus; all the history and doctrine which were wrought into the structure of the early Church, are the Word of God, and the Christian consciousness of this and of every age may be trusted to recognize it. The statement of this view by the author is frequently given in various forms, such as these: "The Word of God is that organism of truth, consisting of both fact and doctrine, which has been made known by the historic process of divine self-revelation in redemption, to men whose spiritual activities were for that purpose supernaturally illumined, quickened, and purified." "But if such a true Word of God really exists, it certainly exists nowhere outside of the sacred writings of the Old and New Testaments. Words of God there may have been which are not in the Bible, but *the* Word of God, as an organic unity of progressively revealed truth set in the history of the kingdom of redemption, must lie within the Bible." But is the entire Bible the Word of God? "The Bible is not, in its whole extent and throughout, identical with the Word of God; but the Bible contains, embraces, and conveys the Word of God." At an earlier stage of the discussion, the writer contented himself with indicating his opinion that the "Bible is the record, substantially true and sufficiently accurate, of the history of that process of divine self-revelation and redemption which culminates in Jesus Christ."

The practical question with readers of the Scriptures is concerning the amount of Bible which is not the Word of God. How much of the Bible is out of organic relation to the redemptive kingdom of Christ, and may therefore be considered to have no other origin and purpose than belong to uninspired writings? The author does not trace geographical boundaries running in and out between this book and that, or deviously winding among verses and sentences. He trusts Christian reason, faith, and experience, guided by all the helps of exact knowledge, to distinguish the divine revelation from such imperfections and excrescences as pertain to the human media through which the Word is given. But it is reassuring to know that all the results of modern critical research leave the New Testament in its entirety almost untouched, and take from the Old Testament almost nothing but that which the Church has always recognized as of subordinate value. More definitely, besides the slight discrepancies and inaccuracies of the four evangelists which all intelligent Christians have long since conceded, and which serve to confirm rather than to invalidate the historical genuineness of their records, and besides similar trifling er-

rors in other parts of the New Testament, the whole book stands as coextensive with the Word of God. Only two considerable sections are of doubtful place in the four Gospels,—the closing verses of Mark's Gospel, and the account of the woman taken in adultery; and of the latter it is supposed that the event actually occurred, although it was not recounted by John. Those books which only slowly gained the right to stand in the canon, namely, the Epistle of Jude, the second of Peter, the second and third of John, and the Apocalypse, are to be held as integral parts of the Word, having fought their way to recognition, although they are obviously of secondary rank, especially the shorter epistles. Even if criticism should throw out the Epistle of Jude, and the other short epistles mentioned, we should scarcely be aware of any loss to the completeness of revelation. The fourth Gospel is now confidently claimed, as the Church has always prized it, as the Gospel according to John.

In the Old Testament, only the Book of Esther and the Song of Solomon hold their places doubtfully in the canon. Would any one value his Bible less, or know less of God's redemptive revelation in Christ, if the history of Mordecai and Esther were on a level with the history of Tobit, or if the drama of the Canticles no longer presented him its obscure allusions and oriental imagery as the inspired Word of God? As to the authorship and date of certain books of the Old Testament, there must, indeed, be a reconstruction of opinion; as to the unequal grades of inspiration in history, psalms, prophecy, and proverbs, there is no dispute; but with the exceptions named, the books of the Bible, as a whole, retain their canonical position.

Difficulties concerning the inspiration of the Bible, as an indivisible whole, arise chiefly from the reading of the Old Testament. What does the author say, then, or what does modern criticism, as interpreted by the author, say about the science of the Bible,—that is, its account of creation; what about the exterminating wars and the imprecatory psalms,—that is, its apparent approval of that which we consider wrong; and what about the story of Jonah, and Joshua's command to the sun to stand still? There is a candid discussion of all these difficulties, into the details of which this brief paper cannot enter.

As to physical science, the opinion is no other than that held by all Christians who lay claim to any intelligence, not to say common sense whatever, unless it be the Rev. John Jasper of Virginia. Any clergyman, under examination by a council, is bold to affirm

that the Bible was not given to teach science ; that it does not transcend the opinions and the language of the times ; that, in fact, it would have been unintelligible if it had given an absolutely correct account of creation. No more than this is asserted by the book under notice. It is well known that the biblical account of creation corresponds, in many striking features, with the traditions of other nations. "The dark night and the mass of water" — this is the author's quotation from Reusch — "are universally the principal features in the more definite description of this chaos. The six days, or six creative acts, are found in several cosmogonies, from China in the east to the Etruscans in the west, and in essentially the same succession as in Genesis. Man is, without exception, rated as the last creation ; most of the heathen mythologies recognize his formation out of the earth's soil, and some also recognize the formation of woman out of one of the bodily members of man." The writer of the first chapter of Genesis unquestionably made use of existing traditions, and incorporated some of their errors of detail. What gives this account its character of revealed truth is its religious quality. Thus it shows that "the universe is dependent for its existence and present order upon the will of God ;" that "the divine qualities of power and wisdom, as evinced in the divine work of preparing the world of physical substances and forces, of living creatures, and of moral subjects made in the divine image, are prominent ;" that "the divine qualities in their creative activity penetrate every detail of creation, that the divine institution of the Mosaic Sabbath gave distinctive shape to the Mosaic cosmogony, that man stands at the head of creation, and that the universe has been constituted by God through successive acts of creation, an orderly and progressive whole." These are religious conceptions, and it was not necessary to their clear presentation that the method, the order, and the duration of the creative period should be accurately given. What is conspicuous is the immense superiority of this to other traditions from the religious point of view. The author deprecates attempts to harmonize all the details of the biblical narrative with the latest conclusions of science. That the days of creation were thought to be long periods of time is not probable. The writer doubtless thought they were six solar days. No harm was done in leaving that mistake uncorrected, except the harm done by those who try to show that at that early time an account of creation was given precisely corresponding with the theories of modern science. So of the order of creation. It is evidently a mistake to have said that plant life was exuber-

ant before the light of the sun fell on the earth. What a relief it is to the overstrained faith of some to be able to admit that errors of detail in ancient traditions of creation were allowed to stand, while it was only important that the Divine Spirit should so shape and color those traditions as to reveal God as the Creator and the Life of the Universe! What is there in such an admission to obscure the revelation God has made of himself in redemption through Christ? How much more reasonable to admit the errors than to try to explain them all away, as if we thought the spiritual truths of the Bible depend for their validity on the absolute scientific accuracy of the Mosaic cosmogony!

The view of Dörner has much to commend it, that knowledge which is gained in an empirical way is not given by revelation; that inspiration in purely scientific, historical, and chronological matters could only take place internally in the form of vision, but that vision could not exhibit things in their empirical reality, since these by their very nature must be apprehended by means of external experience. Revelation does not, perhaps cannot, make known facts which are discoverable by observation. It is enough to insist that freedom from error applies to the external and human only so far as it stands in essential connection with spiritual truth. The same generalization might justly be made of all knowledge which is gained by observation.

Professor Ladd's method of explaining verbal inaccuracies of quotation by the writers of the New Testament, in citing passages from the Old Testament, is identical with his explanation of errors in the science of the Bible. He frankly admits that they did not pretend to quote verbatim, but gave the thought as it was remembered by them. There was "eagerness to seize on the contents of truth without anxiety as to exactness of verbal form." Sometimes they quote from the Septuagint, sometimes from the Hebrew Scriptures, sometimes in a single sentence they mingle both, sometimes they give only the general sense, showing that they did not consider the exact language of the Bible to be inspired, but only its contents of truth. "It is not primarily the written words, but the divine truth in them, which is regarded as the Word of God." It is shown that Christ himself treated the Old Testament Scriptures with the largest freedom, distinguishing sharply the ethical and religious from the transient contents, showing "a wonderful clearness of vision into ideal truth, together with equally wonderful reserve upon questions of criticism."

The apparent discrepancies and contradictions of the writers of

the New Testament are limited to insignificant points of detail, and it is not necessary to reconcile them in every instance. While it is remarkable that the alleged discrepancies are in many cases no real contradiction, and that so good a showing can be made in attempts to adjust them, nothing vital depends on their explanation. The writers had to use such memories as they had, and even the quickening of the Holy Spirit, recalling many half-forgotten facts, did not make the recollection of events different from original observation of them. Slips of memory and mistakes of perception concerning details do not invalidate the reality of the history of Jesus nor destroy one of its essential features. Since no theory of inspiration is to be held which stands or falls with imperfections in the form of revelation, or with mistakes concerning non-ethical matters, believers may be indifferent to the success of attempts to harmonize inaccuracies, and may even contend that harm is done the Revelation itself by nervous efforts to disprove all imperfections. That which is essential is the ethical, religious, spiritual contents of the Bible. These elements stand out in unmistakable clearness. They even lift themselves in more imposing grandeur by contrast with the imperfections of that which pertains to the form, and with mistakes concerning physical science and secular history.

But are not the ethical contents of the Bible themselves open to criticism? Should Jael have been praised for deceiving and then killing Sisera, who had accepted her hospitality? Is the cruelty of exterminating wars to be justified? Are the imprecatory psalms consistent with the ethical claims of the Bible? These objections have been so thoroughly answered that the author had only to reiterate what has often been urged. Revelation of ethical and religious truth has been progressive. It began to come to men in the twilight of history, and only by degrees increased its light as they were able to bear it. Cruelty, revenge, hatred of enemies, could not be condemned in ruder ages as the Gospel condemns them. In order to be led higher men must start from where they are. Education implies ignorance, and ignorance cannot be removed by a stroke of almightiness. The mild virtues and refined graces which were not understood, and for which there were not even names until Jesus had lived them out in concrete form, could not have been made intelligible to the Israelites as they marched through Canaan. The tragedies of Shakespeare are almost meaningless to a child. Neither is it the design of the inspired writers to ignore the mistakes and sins of their heroes. "David's anger,"

says our author, "against his enemies in a psalm will not necessarily differ from David's anger when otherwise expressed." These honest biographies and these scraps of vindictive poetry make it all the easier to trace the ethical progress of Israel. The Canaanitish wars, even if directly commanded by Jehovah, were not of necessity immoral. "Stern and exterminating war by divine command does not in itself contravene the absolute principles of morality." We might as well say that God should not let men die at all, or that a murderer should not be made to atone for his crime by suffering the penalty of death.

Only two other objections, and those of popular interest, need be mentioned: the alleged standing still of the sun at the command of Joshua, and the story of the prophet Jonah. The author considers the historical ground of the first of these narratives very insecure. He says, "The songs praising the great deeds of that day, and contained in the book of Jasher, furnished the basis of representation of the book of Joshua; and the representation itself seems to have been gained by misunderstanding the figurative speech of poetry as though it were a narrative of veritable history. The author of the book of Joshua, in taking his account from the ancient poetic source of the book of Jasher, misinterpreted its poetry as the statement of fact. Of the magnitude of the physical difficulties which stood opposed to this interpretation, the writer of Joshua had of course no adequate conception." This explanation has reason, and contradicts no consistent theory of inspiration. It is certainly more satisfactory than the puerile devices of supposing that there was a remarkable refraction of light which lengthened the twilight, or that the army was in so deadly earnest killing its enemies that the work of one day seemed like the work of two days.

The story of Jonah has not so insuperable difficulties, if taken literally, as the narrative in Joshua. It is not impossible that a man could be preserved alive in the belly of a sea monster two nights and a day, while it is impossible that the revolution of the earth should have been stopped ten or twelve hours within the knowledge of man. But Professor Ladd's view is that the story is a blending of fact with legend. "A critical examination of the book of Jonah seems to show that it is a composition designed by its author as allegorical and didactic upon a certain basis of historic facts. A poetical invention of incidents is attached for didactic purposes to a basis of history and to a name derived from ancient and trustworthy tradition. The hymn of the prophet in

the belly of the whale, where he conceives of himself as surrounded with water, his head bound with seaweed, and himself drifting with marine currents, or sinking into marine caverns, is surely a peculiar style of historical composition." The references made by Jesus to the narrative do not pronounce upon its historical reality, but only make use of it as a well-known story having some features of resemblance to his own mysterious death. The value of the book of Jonah is in its teachings concerning the compassion of God.

Enough examples have been chosen to show the manner of dealing with difficulties. The old maxim concerning the Bible, *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*, is discarded. The attempt is given over to balance the pyramid of revealed truth on its apex. Its base is the sacred history of God's dealings with men in the preparation and accomplishment of redemption and the establishment of Christ's kingdom. Upon these solid facts it stands securely, and rears its majestic outlines above all surrounding structures. The scratches, the nicked corners, the open crevices here and there, do not weaken the noble pile, but rather suggest its venerableness and heighten the effect of its rugged massiveness.

The author has perhaps yielded more than is necessary concerning the alleged mistakes, inaccuracies, contradictions, and imperfections of the Bible. Many of these which he does not care to explain away may perhaps be capable of explanation. But he has doubtless conceded so much for the sake of showing more clearly the real progress of revelation, the essential facts and truths involved in historical redemption, and the actual influence of the Spirit by which the writers of the Bible were directed. Let us have a theory of the Bible, he is always saying, which is in accordance with the facts, and which distinguishes the permanent from the transient, the divine from the human, the essential from the non-essential, the spirit from the letter, the treasure from the vessel. Let us not put the Sermon on the Mount on a level with the Levitical sacrifices, nor make the Gospel of John no loftier than the Song of Solomon. Let us not stumble over the story of Jonah so that we cannot follow Christ, nor allow an error in the counting of an army, or in the age of a patriarch, to deprive us of a David's psalms, an Isaiah's prophecies, or a Paul's doctrine. The Word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword. With this gleaming blade in our hands, we are not concerned if we detect a scratch on the scabbard. The light shines from the golden candlestick, and it is of no con-

sequence if a blemish is discovered in a line of the carving. Better a plain, honest candle, which sends its beams into a dark world, than the most beautiful lamp which is empty of oil, and in the darkness cannot itself be seen.

But how may we know, is the inquiry of many an anxious mind, what is non-essential? How are we to distinguish the transient from the permanent? Is it not safer to preserve the faith of the fathers that the entire Book is free from errors, and that it is only our distorted sight that seems to perceive them? It is never safe to embrace theories for the sake of convenience or imagined security which are not supported by fact. It would not be difficult to show that much existing skepticism concerning the authority of the Bible is due to those extreme theories of its absolute perfection which are not yet entirely abandoned. But apart from that, the answer of Professor Ladd is, that the Church Catholic, through the ages, has power of discernment to recognize the Word of God in the sacred writings which contain it. Christian reason and faith illumined by the Holy Spirit, or, to use a current expression, the Christian consciousness, will not go far astray in its spiritual discernment of spiritual things. The Word of God is outside the individual, a dead letter, until he appropriates it to his own life. It is bare facts and words to the Church until it is assimilated into contents of living faith. "It is the *testimonium spiritus sancti* within the Christian reason which forms the chief witness to the verity and authority of the Word of God in Scripture. For the act of discerning and testing, as well as of receiving and uttering, the Word of God belongs to the function of the Christian consciousness." It is not meant at all that the objective Word of God, historically given, is subordinate to subjective consciousness, for redemption through Jesus Christ has independent validity, but that Christian consciousness is always an organ for the reception, interpretation, and application of the truth. Neither is it meant that every Christian makes his own Bible, choosing what he likes and rejecting what he dislikes, but that the common consent of believers and the practical agreement of the Christian ages guide each person in separating the secondary from the primary in the sacred writings. After historical and exegetical criticism have done their work, there is no practical difficulty in grouping the contents thus given in a Christocentric arrangement, and in perceiving their proportionate value from that exalted point of view. Christian insight protests emphatically against spiritualizing the trivial details of Old Testa-

ment history till the story of Joseph is made to run parallel with the history of our Lord, and the book of Exodus to suggest the glories of Redemption. We are led to ask why it was necessary for Christ to come and for the New Testament to be written at all, if the gospel is thus wrapped up in ancient history. Christian consciousness says that this is secondary, preparatory, and to be taken only for what it pretends to be. This spiritualizing process, which was a legitimate result of the theory of verbal inspiration, is condemned by an enlightened church; that which is subordinate, even that which is mistaken and defective, is easily recognized. There is a Bible within the Bible. The fourth Gospel is the heart of Christ. The Epistle to the Romans outranks the Epistle of Jude. Actual use in the church, in the pulpit, in the family, and in the closet, instinctively values the great, and esteems lightly the little.

That the different parts of the Bible have different grades of importance has long been recognized even by those who cling to the opinion that every portion of the Bible is inspired of God. Ingenious distinctions are made of inspiration by dictation, by elevation, by suggestion, by superintendence, by permission. Under such a classification everything in the Bible may be called inspired. The caustic remark of the author is deserved. "Irrational clinging to a term as a kind of supposed necessity of orthodoxy, even after it has been emptied of all its essential contents, characterizes no small amount of discussion at the present day."

It is too well-known to need repeating, that the doctrine of an infallible Book was set up as against the doctrine of an infallible Church by those who came after the Reformers, although the Reformers themselves exercised a large liberty in their use of the Bible, — Luther pronouncing the Epistle of James a "right strawy epistle," and declaring it ought not to be in the canon, a judgment which is rightly set aside by the Church, because ethics is as essential in the gospel as justifying faith. The post-Reformation theory encouraged Bibliolatry, which, in its way, may be as bad as Mariolatry. The Bible was exalted above Christ. Theories of the Bible which are now forcing their way to acceptance, and which are advocated in Professor Ladd's solid book, exalt Christ to the supreme place, and look on the Bible as a divinely appointed means for fixing in the knowledge of men the preparation for his coming, the glory of his Person, the infinite greatness and efficacy of his Atonement, and the laws and triumphs of his kingdom.

There is not space in this paper to indicate the position of the book on controverted critical questions. As to the authorship of

the Pentateuch, it is enough to state the author's conclusion. While he admits that Moses could not have written it all with his own hand, but that there have been revisions and additions by later workmen, yet the material, taken as a whole, constitutes the one Mosaic law. The substance of it was given to and through Moses, so that later enactments and customs get their principle and coloring from the existing law of Moses. Codification makes the entire history and law an organic, living whole. "The two convictions, that the law is one and of Mosaic origin, and that the history of Israel is a narrative of the dealings of Jehovah with Israel on the basis of a law which is the covenant, cannot remain apart." It is claimed that the system of worship described in Exodus and Leviticus is of Mosaic origin. It is also claimed that the importance of this question of authorship is overrated, that the integrity of the Word of God is not impeached by the fact that later writers composed or reëdited parts of the Pentateuch, any more than by the fact that some of the Psalms are not Davidic.

All the way through the book a commendable caution is exercised, and the opinion is cogently maintained that the Bible as a whole stands unhurt by critical research and attack, and that the supernatural character of revelation, the divineness of our Lord's Person and of his work, and the true inspiration of the record, are more certain than ever. He would agree with Professor Fisher concerning the disputed books of the canon, and would carry that opinion over to the sum total of the Bible after all reasonable concessions are made on every point. That statement is, "It is obvious at a glance that, even were all of the books enumerated under the head of Antilegomena eliminated from the canon, the loss, however considerable, would not obliterate a single essential fact, or a single essential doctrine of the Christian system." And he adds, "The example of Martin Luther may reassure timid souls who conceive that absolute certainty respecting the authorship of all the books in the canon is an article of a standing or falling church."

So brief a notice as this does slender justice to the learned and able work under review, but may serve to indicate the conclusions, and to suggest the spirit, of the author, as well as to mark the progress made by critical study towards a consistent and spiritual view of the revealed Word of God.

We have reason to be grateful in view of two general results of recent investigation. One is the unmistakable tendency towards caution in reconstructing theories of the origin of the Bible. The

extreme conclusions of those who would place the beginnings of the entire ritual of Jewish worship in the period following the Exile are rejected. The spirit of iconoclasm which would destroy the historical reality of integral portions of the Bible is repulsed. The skepticism which would reduce God's redemptive work in history to mere naturalism is squarely met and vanquished. The divine revelation given through human media which are not immaculately perfect is the veritable Word of God resounding in our ears. Heaven and earth may pass away, but the sacred Word shall not pass away. Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever.

The other result for which we may be grateful is that, in the light of the more rational and scriptural views of inspiration, much doubt concerning the Bible is dispelled, and much question concerning its authority silenced. When imperfections of form and detail are frankly admitted, imperfections which are easily distinguished from the revelation of ethical and religious truth, and which only willful perversion will indiscriminately confound with the Word of God, then nearly all perplexities and objections disappear. That was a tremendous strain put upon faith by the theory of two hundred years ago, that the Bible is perfect in every detail, inspired in every expression, equally authoritative in all its parts. That theory has made a thousand skeptics where a theory based on facts makes one. There is danger, indeed, that undue license will be taken if any imperfection is admitted, and that the authority of the whole will be denied, but the danger that the revelation will be rejected is incalculably greater when a doctrine of perfect infallibility is imposed. Even for the Bible, it is wiser to claim too little than to claim too much. It is part of our spiritual discipline to discriminate the essential from the non-essential, to get in through the setting of circumstance to the eternal truth. Those may use the Bible most fearlessly who are most free from the bondage of the letter. God's Word will vindicate itself. He who knows it for what it is has least fear concerning its authority and efficiency. He welcomes all investigation. Timidity is characteristic of those who cling to an artificial theory, who fear the gospel will perish if a genealogical list is incorrectly given, or if it should appear that Moses did not write every chapter of the Pentateuch with his own hand, who accept without qualification a theory supported only by tradition, and a tradition, at that, by no means mossy with antiquity.

It is not important to claim for the entire Bible more than Paul

claimed for the Old Testament. His theopneusty is ethico-religious. Following the revised version, we hear him say, "Every scripture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction which is in righteousness; that the man of God may be complete, furnished completely unto every good work." *George Harris.*

THE CHURCHES OF THE HUGUENOTS AND THE RELIGIOUS CONDITION OF FRANCE.

THERE are special times and places which accentuate themselves in their demands for Christian attention. There are signal opportunities when God's providences and promises are seen to be working together, when the All-wise Omnipotence draws the bolts of hindrance, when causes are combining to influence minds and to open the domain of inquiry, when, in short, God's clock of time strikes the hour of special opportunity. Then the Church of Christ finds itself confronted by problems of new promise and grandeur. Such times and places are strategic for Christ. To see the open door and to enter in is the wisdom of the wise. Without doubt, such an opportunity now presents itself in France. Many are the appeals in this land for Christian attention. The French are a people of interest. Their qualities of mind, their susceptibility to great suggestions, their quick apprehension of ideas, the irresistible fascination which seizes them when under great impulses, their ardor and enthusiasm, are characteristics which command consideration. They are confessedly a people of genius in art and architecture. They have music and form and color. In many ways they are brilliant. Their literature sparkles with epigrams. They crystallize volumes in sententious sentences. They communicate earnestly what they think and feel. They have a spirit of aggression. They have never failed to put their stamp upon the times and things with which they have to do.

The nation holds rank in the family of nations. It has numerical and commercial power. Its influence reaches far. Whatever touches France touches Europe, Asia, Africa, and the islands of the sea. All of this intensifies the claim upon the attention of those who believe that the world belongs to Christ.

The questions which are presenting themselves to this people at the present time, in respect to the correction of ancient errors in

government, in education, and in religion, together with the condition of the popular mind, make this claim upon Christian regard special and urgent.

We have long known that France needed the gospel. But to what degree does France feel her need? We are hearing of a new religious movement in France. What is its character, extent, and true significance? The desire to know the facts more accurately, to measure their hopefulness and unhopefulness, is evident in the manifold inquiries which are unceasingly made of those who are in a position to study the problem carefully and to give the conclusions of experience. But an intelligent view cannot be a hasty one. Even when the elements of careful study and candid personal observation are duly considered there will be opinions.

It is difficult even in the United States, where church work has the organization of time and statistics are as free as water, to take exact inventories of the religious condition. The vital statistics of piety do not all get into the columns of figures, nor do we write in numbers the forces of sin. Some magnify hopes, others intensify hindrances. Some see degeneracy, others progress. One bewails, another sings. Much more in France one question leads to many. The present is deeply rooted in history, and cannot be cut off and considered alone. Many of the religious problems are complex. Religious liberty is recent. Organizations for gospel aggression are tentative. Statistics are necessarily meagre. Much is in the experimental stage. The very name of religion must be emptied and refilled with new meanings. There are social and political influences. Those, therefore, who run through France in a fortnight, or who spend a few weeks in Paris — which, religiously, is not France — may speak with more confidence than knowledge. Impressions are not facts. A view which shall not lean to inclination, which shall take account of the present in its inheritances and its modifications, which shall be broad in its scope and true in its conclusions, must be considerate.

A brief outline of modifying history may assist us.

History tells us how ancient Gaul became merged in the general destinies of Rome, and how the new Frankish nation — peculiar compound of Teuton and Celt, with their mixed qualities — made a thousand years of experiences in these bonds and bondages a most sadly interesting illustration of the continuance of an original stamp.

When the spirit of the Reformation was in Europe multitudes received the word with gladness. France promised to be the leading

Protestant nation. The "new religion" spread so rapidly that there was not a corner in the kingdom which had not its incipient Protestant churches. Persecutions at once began, and to resist these the Protestants confederated under the name of Huguenots (1560). In this compact they grew strong. In 1561 the alarmed Cardinal de Sainte-Croix wrote to the Pope, "The kingdom is already half Huguenot." This was exaggeration; but notwithstanding intolerable persecutions the Huguenot ranks multiplied. The dreadful massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day in 1572 indicates the fury of the purpose to exterminate the rising faith. Sixteen years afterwards, when the Huguenot churches were numbered, it was found that not less than two thousand churches dedicated to the reformed worship were braving the fury of this deadly purpose to destroy them. Seventy years then passed until in the gracious providence of God this tenacious fidelity was rewarded by the consent of the government to the right of existence for Protestant faith. The celebrated Edict of Nantes (1598) decreed with a few restrictions universal liberty and equality to religious profession and worship. The reformers made the most of this until Cardinal Richelieu (1624) declared the Huguenot power too great, and proposed to destroy it. This purpose he pursued undeviatingly, using all the forces at his command, until it ended in the famous siege of La Rochelle (1628), which city, after a heroic defense of fifteen months, in which one half of the population had perished from hunger, surrendered, leaving the Protestant cause in abject prostration.

In the reign of Louis XIV. (1685) it was found that the Protestants had been slowly but steadily recuperating, and were again gathering strength. Madame Maintenon (the strange granddaughter of the Protestant historian D'Aubigné) goaded the king to yet another effort for their extermination. Her wicked influence was too potent. He began by excluding the Huguenots from all public functions, from the liberal professions, from the universities, and from various branches of commerce and industry. He *dragonnaded* soldiers upon them and incited their cruelties. He ended by revoking the Edict of Nantes—the spirit of which had long been violated—and annulled forever the religious liberties of Protestants, ordering all their churches to be leveled with the ground, prohibiting their worship, and exiling their pastors within fifteen days. Their children must be baptized by Roman Catholic priests and strictly educated as members of the Papal Church.

Now came another period of deaths and dungeons. Whole dis-

tricts were laid desolate. Horrible tortures and outrages of every kind followed the decree. All Protestant schools were closed, their universities of Saumur, Montauban, Nîmes, and Sedan were destroyed, and their professors scattered. Their books were burned. The army, as if led by the Furies, was employed for years in hunting Huguenots. The history reads as if diabolism were let loose. Nevertheless, a poor remnant of the Huguenots remained. In their oppressed and dangerous life, they worshiped by night in forests, in caves among the hills, in the mountains, and in whatever places would keep their secrets of fealty to their religious faith.

Louis XIV. died on the first of September, 1715. Two weeks previously Antoine Court, a name ever to be honored as the restorer of the Reformed Church, braved death, and convened the Protestant churches in the first synod that had met for thirty years. This synod, which numbered nine members, there in the depths of the forest, concealed from all but God, reorganized the churches in consistories, synods, and assemblies, under the name of the "Church of the Desert." They decided that the discipline and the faith for which they had contended should stand and be maintained. Three hundred unhoused churches were soon numbered in this organization. Extemporized and unroofed theological schools did not lack for students. They lived in accepted poverty. They held their synods, disguised as shepherds and peasants, and when detected in the night they fled from rock to rock, by the light of the flames which were consuming their houses. They were driven in the depths of winter to the shelterless recesses of the mountains. Fathers arrested went to the galleys for life, mothers to sleep on the bare bricks of dungeon floors. Children were taken from families, and were lost to them. When there might have been quietness and rest from these cruelties with the denial of their holy convictions, they preferred torture with conscience. They would not lie to God. The records overflow with such illustrations of the possible stability and tenacity of character in this people when they are deepened and steadied by the gospel. But in the nation this was a century of political depravity, religious hypocrisy, and moral decay. Once again, in 1787, Louis XVI. in an edict recognized the right of Protestants to live in France, to be born, married, and buried according to law. This tardy concession was too late to prevent the approaching day of judgment. The Papal religion which had taken the sword was now put to the sword by those whom it had educated in its school of horrors. The nation which would not have the

God of the Huguenot's Bible beheld at last a poor shameless creature in the form of a woman led through the streets of Paris in the character of the "Goddess of Reason," and infidelity, the legitimate child of an inhuman religion, wrote over the cemeteries, "There is no God." Thus the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes recognized its offspring in the bloody revolution of 1789.

In 1801 Napoleon the First made his famous religious Concordat, — a cunning scheme of political ambition, — which both reëstablished the Roman Catholic Church in subserviency to the state and gave Protestantism the right of recognized existence with the intent of its subserviency. This came to the fragment which remained now in extreme weakness as to numbers and without much spiritual energy. A repressed life with absence of aggressive activities had chilled the faith. Under these conditions there had crept in a rationalistic sentiment which gradually threatened to defeat what persecution could not destroy. It was a philosophic and rationalistic spirit which settled upon many of the churches like a blight. This was not "Radicalism," which is a recent phase of the religious question which has but a relatively small minority of ministers and churches, and which has in itself the principles of its own dissolution. The rationalism here spoken of was reverent and exemplary. It did not cease to pray, but it prayed to God as "the Supreme Being."

In the monarchy of Louis XVIII., sixty years ago, a most precious revival of spiritual religion, which had its beginning among the Wesleyans in Normandy, made itself felt with great power throughout the Huguenot churches. A remarkable movement and return to evangelical life developed itself for a score of years, in which religious quickening multitudes disavowed their philosophic speculations and consecrated themselves to faith in Christ, while many were converted from Romanism, among whom were the parents of some of the most devoted of the present Christian pastors of France. It was at this time that the father of the celebrated De Pressensé renounced Romanism.

The product of this revival was the missionary spirit, which immediately began to incarnate itself. Louis Philippe, chiefly under the influence of the Protestant historian Guizot, his prime minister, granted additional legal rights for Protestant schools, and a restricted liberty of propagandism. This was an hour of new hope.

In 1833, in this reign, was organized the first missionary society for Protestants in France, — the "*Société Evangelique*," since

honorably known under the secretary-directorship of the lamented Dr. George Fisch, who was himself converted in the revival mentioned. This only French society for missions for two years was a valiant pioneer. It was a "union of evangelical denominations."

Following this, came the special organization of the "Reformed Churches of France," named the "*Société Protestante d'Évangélisation de Bordeaux*" (in 1835), the bureau of which was soon removed to Paris under the name of the "*Société Centrale*." It then had a budget of three hundred dollars a year, and supported three missionaries and eight stations. This was the beginning of the missionary work of the churches which had been reorganized by Antoine Court in the deserts in 1715.

The bright hope of the Protestants was soon clouded. Political changes engrossed the minds of the people. Then came the second Republic, and following it the second Empire. The air was full of political ideas. They were exploding. The thoughts of the time were distracted. Missionary work could not make headway, and evangelical effort was crippled. The internal life of the churches soon felt this, and Rationalism took a new grip. Ministers again began to pray to the "Creator."

When the times morally compelled an enlarged liberty — in the last Empire — those who were steadfast in faith took new courage. The missionary spirit revived and with it evangelical life, so that in the third Republic, under the administration of Thiers — when the Huguenot churches were granted their first official synod since 1661 — they were found to number more than seven hundred churches and about nine hundred thousand nominal Protestants, in a population of thirty-seven millions. Alsatia with three hundred thousand Protestants had been lost to France in their enumeration, but not in their influence.

This synod took account of doctrinal beliefs, and discovered a wide divergence of religious convictions. Nearly two thirds, however, were holding firmly to the discipline and faith of the Reformed Church, while a very persistent third contended for a system of Christian ethics, and opposed any formulated statements of belief. This question divided the churches. Remaining classified by the state as one, the separation was distinctly defined. Those who were what "is commonly called evangelical" declined to be held, in any other than a nominal relationship, as one under the government; and in administration, as in spirit, withdrew from all coöperation with those who called themselves "liberals," except

in such directions as do not touch the question of faith and its development.

Meanwhile the government, whose duty it is to convoke the synods, now declines to call the churches together in view of this division. Hence no other legally "official" synod has met, but the synods "unofficial," which are regularly held by the evangelical churches, answer every purpose. Their "authority rests in the reason of it." Three "general," and twenty-one "local," synods comprehend about six hundred congregations of evangelical churches; less than two hundred churches, whose ministers at least are liberal, not meeting with them. At these synodal meetings the material and spiritual progress of the churches is reported, and the various missionary enterprises which are entirely in the hands of evangelical forces are reviewed. The last reports show much spiritual development, a large gain in laical energy, and many genuine revivals within the churches.

The spirit of the ministry is fraternal, observant, determined, patient, and hopeful. Of the nine hundred Protestant pastors and ministers in France, the Reformed Church of France has seven hundred and six, of whom more than five hundred are in pronounced evangelical fellowship. The remainder include the "Free" churches, the Wesleyan, Baptist, and others, which are evangelical; the Lutheran, also, which are partly evangelical. The membership of communicants is estimated to be about three hundred thousand.

Financially, these churches are weak. Their history explains this. Their church edifices are extremely plain. Not a carpeted church may be found among them all. The singing of the worship is congregational and voluntary. It is somewhat sad in strain, as if it carried the memory of their struggles and sorrows. With new hope, however, new songs of joy are introducing themselves, and with these many hymns of a revival character, which fact indicates the gracious work going on within the churches. New editions of hymn-books are presenting their claims for attention. In France this is not yet a curse. All pastors are compelled by the government to take the degree of Bachelor of Arts previous to their ordination, and that which was originally intended for a restriction, and which does not apply to the Romish Church, has happened for the furtherance of the gospel in furnishing the churches with a well-educated ministry.

Their salaries are most meagre. The larger number receive \$360 a year from the state, which is not greatly augmented by

the people, whose taxes, in part for this purpose, are heavy. The salary of an eloquent leading pastor, in the expensive city of Lyons, is \$840 a year. The pastors of Paris receive \$800 a year from the state, except those who, from Free Church principles, decline this aid. It need not be said that these pastors include many large minds, and very much resolute self-denial and needed consecration.

The importance of their theological seminaries is keenly recognized. The professors are equal and devoted to their places and their day, but are driven to most laborious additions to their professional duties to eke out a lamentably small support. The faculty of the Protestant Theological Seminary under the government at Paris is not free from the rationalistic element in the person of one or two of its members. Hence this institution is not sustained by the evangelical portion of the churches.

The hindrance of "Rationalism" among the French pastors has been, and is, deeply felt, but in some respects it has been exaggerated.

In the first place, while there is one legal recognition of all Protestants by the state, the separation is as thoroughly complete as it could be in our own land. Then, also, the missionary enterprises, benevolences, aggressions, and sacrifices, all have their spring in the evangelical body, and are in their control. Rationalism has, moreover, in France, "advanced" to "Radicalism," which the more speedily overthrows itself. Lacking motive for existence, lacking justification for sacrifices, and lacking sacrifice, its stronger forces are constantly withdrawing from the ministry as a divine calling. It has not consecration, and has poor pay. Its leaders may now be found among librarians, inspectors of public schools, and in various grades of government offices. Two are in the more congenial sittings of the parliament. The strength of this religious "Radicalism," which is its affinity with the natural propensity of the unregenerate human mind, is also its weakness. It cannot recruit its clergy, while evangelical candidates for the evangelical theological schools multiply. Many students whose hearts are quickened with Christian desire for their country are compelled to forego their purpose to enter the ministry through lack of a little aid. That such a Radicalism is a hindrance to evangelical forces in France is certainly true, as it would be anywhere, but this constitutes no reason why our brethren in Christ, who are wholly separate from these in spirit and in work, should not the more have our cordial help, which

they need. If Demas forsakes Paul, the apostle is still the servant of God. We do not give comfort to Rationalism when we send succor and sympathy to those who are faithfully and successfully contending against it.

There are two great facts with which these churches of the Huguenots have to do. First, Infidelity. This is the legitimate child of a superstitious faith which has been false to human needs. Hence "Free-thinkers" in France; but they are not thinkers. While they oppose religion in every form, they have nothing to offer in its place, and the people will not rest content with denials. The French are constitutionally positive. The strength of infidelity in France is chiefly in its voice. It vociferates, but the people feel that it is "impuissant." Its widely heralded councils are small. Their advertised mass meetings are less respectable in numbers than such gatherings are in the United States. They could scarcely be less respectable in quality. The most dangerous infidelity in France is that which is least pronounced. It does not oppose religion. The faith which it has seen, and the only religion which it knows, it scorns. It calls itself "Free thought," but this is only a name. It is simply nothing. The religious sense is deadened, the moral sense feels this, and the character is materialistic. It says, "Let us eat, drink, and be merry." The thought upon religion, so far as there is thought, is agnostic. "*We do not know, why should we care?*"

And yet all this is not beyond the power of God. While old ideas are sinking, and new questions are rapidly rising, there is, even among these classes, a wonderful readiness to listen and to discuss. There is a remarkable spirit of hearing in the land. Many are not so indifferent but that curiosity and the general atmosphere of inquiry move them to listen to the promises of a "new religion," and to whatever can be said for it. Some notable exponents of Christian faith have come through the deepest quagmires of infidelity, and many are saying, "This I know, that whereas I was blind now I see." The leaders of infidelity are both bitter and intolerant, but they represent little. The forces of Christianity are courageously active and earnest, but their positive recruits from this large agnostic element are relatively small. A few years ago there was a marked tendency to Protestantism on the part of many influential persons, who thought that they saw in it a great and stable power for their country; but when it was more fully seen that it was an earnest faith, and could only be a political force as it became a saving faith, the proffered sympathy

ceased. It left Protestantism to itself as a religion. The most which can be said for this part of France is, that the door is invitingly open wide.

The second great fact with which these Huguenot churches have to do is Romanism. It remains a great power, and will so remain for some period of time, because decay is slow. That it has many true Christians under its care may not be denied, but as a system it has proved itself false to man. That it has lost its prestige in France, and the confidence of the great majority of the people, is plainly evident. That it unconsciously fortifies infidelity is demonstrated in the existing facts. But it is rooted in the centuries, and roots have great significance. It has millions of mothers at its confessionals. Women are the last to leave their church. This means long self-perpetuation by its educational system. At the same time, there is a very large fraction among those who yet call themselves Romanists over whom the church has lost its power. Many from these attend Protestant meetings, and are reading the gospel and religious tracts, and inquiring, with a singular absence of religious bigotry. French Romanists are far more accessible than those of other lands. Without disguising the difficulties that come in the exchange of faiths, or exaggerating the hopefulness, the condition is full of interest. Here, also, the door is wide open, and eager inquirers are coming through it with utmost sincerity. There are no legal material hindrances. The greatest difficulty which now appears is to rouse people from indifference, — to meet the deadness of conscience, and to reach the insensibility to sin. All this state of things is the heritage of the past. The power to overcome it is not of man.

To these problems of religious life in France the Huguenot churches are earnestly addressing themselves. They are efficiently and economically organized for this. Their "Bible Society," which in 1871 distributed sixteen thousand copies of the Bible, last year distributed forty thousand.

The "*Société Evangelique*" has planted one hundred and sixty-three stations for the regular preaching of the gospel. Thousands have found light in its light. As a "union" society, it especially represents the "voluntary principle" in churches. Its receipts for the first two years of its existence were \$360. It now dispenses about \$20,000 yearly.

The "*Société Centrale*," the organization of the "Reformed Church of France," which began with three missionaries, employs

now one hundred and fifty,¹ with three hundred and forty-five missionary stations, forty-five of which have been added within four years. It has planted eighty new churches in the last twelve years.

The yearly contributions of these French churches and missionary work aggregates \$200,000. This is very much for those who give, and whose missionary training and opportunity are recent. It is not much, however, for thirty-seven millions of souls. Not more than one fourth of the missionary funds used in France comes from abroad, not including in this statement the popular evangelistic missions of Mr. McAll, which are well known as a most earnest and successful system of city missions among neglected classes.

The "*Mission Intérieure*" is comparatively recent as to its origin, and has for its object a preparatory evangelism to open the door for the societies engaged in permanent occupation. It efficiently fills its place, and addresses many thousands every year who for their first time have heard the proclamation of the gospel by other than the priests. The "*Evangelical Society of Geneva*" has a number of stations in the south and southeast of France.

During the past ten years the Protestant Christians of France have multiplied their printing presses, and have doubled the circulation of their reading. Seventy-three Protestant religious papers are published in the French language.

In respect to schools. The attitude of the government on the whole makes for Protestantism. The government favoring Deism requires religious neutrality. This at least breaks the Papal power, which for centuries had time and opportunity to show what it could and would do, and which left to the Republic its legacy of thirty-seven millions of people, thirty-six and nine tenths per centum of whom could neither read nor write. At that time 10,000,000 of francs was the government aid to primary education. In 1882, 25,000,000 of francs were expended for this, and for all phases of instruction 114,353,941 francs. This is a wonderful gain. Five years will substantially educate a generation. The importance of this fact cannot be overestimated. It means a new France, and it shows us that this is not an ancient country in decadence like Spain.

The Protestants are guarding with care the religious education of the children and youth of the schools. The churches have an

¹ About fifty of these missionaries are "auxiliary" to the seven hundred and six pastors before mentioned, and must be added in our account of Protestant forces. A number of school-masters, also, evangelize on Thursdays and Sundays. They are a strength in the ranks.

important society to foster primary secular schools, and in them are earnestly providing for religious instruction. Each Thursday is a "rest day," the forenoon of which is commonly used in religious instruction, while these thus taught are collected in the churches once in a month on Thursday forenoon, and are catechized by the pastors. Thus whatever the intent of the government in disallowing any religious instruction, the result is to enlarge and quicken Christian zeal to secure for the youth of the Protestant families a sound religious education.

The Sunday-school system, which lately had scarcely an existence in France, is being earnestly developed with the aid of the "International" scheme of Bible lessons. These schools, however, sadly need a suitable literature, which most schools have not the means to obtain, and which indeed but to a limited degree could be found. The churches in their freedom and self-development are thus called to many new forms of service, to many responsibilities and sacrifices, which more favored brethren in other lands may wisely remember. There is a serious demand for good religious reading for young and old.

The view of the situation then is this: The impress of the original stamp upon the nation was strong. The inheritors of centuries of confirmed customs will not see past influences annihilated in a generation. It must be faith and patience which shall inherit the promises. At the same time, religion in France has a different meaning from the Protestant meaning. The original stamp has never reached the heart. Religion has been rather an exterior form than an interior conviction. It has been a political and state force under the claims of a divine sanction. It has not exalted the needy, nor been a blessing to the poor. There is, therefore, no inclination to Romanism now, beyond that which comes by the momentum of unthinking habit. But this unthinking habit is passing away. Those who never read before are reading. Those who never thought are trying to think. If the logic is not always good, it is altogether natural. The wonder is that it is no worse. If Romanism finds a reaction in atheism and in various forms of infidelity and socialistic philosophies, why should it not? It may not be altogether ill-omened. The pendulum of thought will swing towards a true faith. Atheism has no arguments, infidelity no satisfactions. They offer nothing. The French are human and have warm hearts. They have quick sensibilities. Being positive, they dislike cold negations. They are full of inquiry, and that which has arguments, and promises satisfaction, which is found to

make for good homes, domestic virtue, and national prosperity, does not, and will not, lack a hearing. Let it be remembered that Paris is not France, and the French are emphatically a people of homes and of loving families. They are not deaf to these appeals. While many of the upper classes are yet citadeled in conservatism and in ancient forms; and while trade and commerce dislike changes, and fear that which may break the power of feudalism and caste; and while millions of mothers think that to renounce Romanism means renouncing heaven; the fact remains that the mediæval ages have taken their final departure. The strange and manifold reactions of French history have yet, in the resultant, furnished a most impressive opportunity for Christian faith. The element which hates the very name of Rome as that of an oppressor and an enemy is large. That which laughs it to scorn is large. Those who remain loyal to it are everywhere running against interrogation points. Questions like flocks of pigeons fly through the air. In this condition of things, if Protestantism must indeed overcome many prejudices and win its way among those educated to distrust that which bears the name of religion, it yet does not suffer hate; it has the respect which sincerity begets; and it goes to those who love questions, saying, "Ask, and we will answer." That is a great advance from the time when Rome summoned kingdoms, and the only doubtful states were England and Sweden. When France first began to ask for the pure gospel, Rome had crowns at her feet. No sovereigns are now in her councils. France, her last hope in Europe, through her Protestant children, is now scattering a free Bible over the land. While millions are as ignorant of its contents as they are who live in the jungles of India, the gospel is increasingly preached to all classes, and with sincere fidelity. The political upheavals have been God's plowshares, to turn up the furrows for the seed of his kingdom. The blood of the martyrs has made the soil rich for the harvester.

As a government—whether or not the Republic shall remain—the people will remain. The eagle is out of its shell. It will not be again in its former confines. A fleet of ships is in the acorn. Those who criticise the French Republic do this disregarding history. The surprise should be that it does so well. Times of transition are of necessity times of anxiety. The monarchies of Europe seem to be interested to foment distrusts of republican institutions among them, and of all movements which relate to these. The sister republic of the United States should have hope and not fear. The more, because God is in providence. The people

to a marvelous extent are breaking with the past not unwisely. While confirmed customs are losing their confirmations, we may not exaggerate the attendant conditions. The old influences yield like the thick ice of a river in the spring-time. That which has been very solid needs but the atmospheric changes when all the streams behind it and the little rills hurry it on and away. If the ice may crack with the frictions, and the waters may unduly rise with the floods, this is temporary; we know that summer is coming.

Taking account, therefore, of these things, of the past and the present, we may say without fear of question that France never had a like opportunity to receive the gospel, and the Christian world never had a more inviting field.

If Romanism dies slowly, it is yet in decline. If atheism puts forth strength, it has not the strength of God. If past influences have in some directions deadened conscience, and paralyzed the sensibility to the fact and nature of sin, if Christianity has been discredited in France, it is the same in all lands which have been blighted with Romanism. Sin blights all lands. It is the gospel which renews, purifies, and saves. If God can save Turkey and China, He can save France. Many indeed are the glorious names which tell us that the heart and head of this nation make most excellent soil for the gospel. It has shown us this people tenacious, constant, stable, strong, and great. The gospel is all that is needed to deepen French character and to make the nation a firm and strong power for Christ. We know well that it would be an aggressive power. In our missionary enterprises we should estimate nations, not by numbers, but by weight; we should measure conditions and influences. In the problem of winning the world to Christ, forty millions of people in France would outweigh an hundred millions in Turkey. A million dollars expended to save France would outweigh many times more used in Spain or Austria. It is the doors of an influential and forth-putting nation which have swung at last wide open. In its world-wide bearings, we who pray for the conversion of the world cannot afford to wait. It is an elect time for a strategic power. The problem is unique. These churches prepared by the discipline of suffering can furnish organized forces intent upon possessing the land. They have the consciousness that the mission of God is upon them. In their history, nationality, faith, and feeling, they are the ones to press the evangelization of France. They may receive impulse and help from without. They are ready to take lessons from larger mis-

sionary experience. They welcome sympathy in foreign laborers with gratitude and love, but they themselves, through their own missionary societies, agencies, and permanent institutions and churches, are the ones to meet this great and divine call. From their own race and their own ranks they must call their own teachers and preachers, and we may have no confidence in any methods or movements for the permanent powers which must do this deep and continuous work, which have not the organized forces of the faithful Huguenot churches behind them. It is most hopeful that in their numerical and financial weakness they do not shrink from this. Their courage is admirable. Some would call it optimistic. Some do call it chimerical. It is neither. It is faith in God's omnipotence working through human weakness. Their tragic and faithful past, their earnest and needful present, and their most hopeful future appeal for them. To help this Christianity in France in a most generous and in a systematic way is both the dictate of a grateful love, and the wisdom of a Christian fidelity to the commanding call of Providence. Christian America is doing nobly many things. It may be questioned if our country, which has reason to remember how good saving help was in a critical struggle for our national life, could do a worthier or grander work than to return saving help for the spiritual life of a people which now needs to feel our heart as we felt its aforesaid.

A. F. Beard.

EDITORIAL.

SOCIAL CLASSES IN POLITICS.

AMERICAN politics have thus far encountered but one serious danger, that from sectionalism. Race and religion, the disturbing factors of older states, have not yet disturbed or modified to any extent our institutions. Possibly they may not. We have the right to trust much to the completeness of the separation of church from state, and to the absorbing and dominating power of the Anglo-Saxon among the races.

Our immediate political dangers are evidently to come in some form from our material prosperity. One danger from this source has recently been brought to light in unmistakable clearness. In the late political campaign in Massachusetts, the attempt was made, the first avowed and organized attempt, to introduce the workingman into politics as representing a social class. The appeal was continually made to the class feeling thus aroused; and intimations were given that if the attempt was successful, the policy would be extended throughout the country with a view to the presidential election.

It is not our purpose to discuss ordinary questions of local or national politics. We call attention to the issue thus raised because of its moral significance, and because we fear that the moral significance of it will not be fairly estimated. In a personal campaign too much is attributed to mere personality. The personal element is really strong only as it represents something. Dangerous men are dangerous as popular leaders, because society gives them the conditions in which to do their work. No man can extemporize a party for his own benefit. No man can create the reasons, or even the conditions, which make parties. All that the most ambitious, or skillful, or magnetic man can do, is to intensify and organize an existing sentiment or prejudice, of which he is the first to discover the personal or political uses. The national significance of the Massachusetts campaign is to be found not in its personalities, but in the fact that class feeling was introduced in a manner and to an extent before unknown, as a determining influence in American politics.

And if now the question be asked whether the political use of this influence is to be continued and extended, the answer must be made that nothing can prevent its continuance and extension, if class feeling itself is suffered to grow and become embittered. Given the material, the use of it is simply a matter of time.

Viewed in the light of this possibility, the relations of capital and labor are seen to be more than economic. Society is legitimately concerned with the conduct of employers, and with the sentiment of the employed, if any grievance, real or supposed, is to be made the foundation of a

political party It is to be carefully noted that class feeling is connected not with work, but with employment. It is the employed class, not what is termed the working class, which furnishes the material for social and political agitation. Practically class feeling is associated with the development of the mechanical industries and with the growth of corporations.

Can the element of class feeling be kept out of politics? Which is but asking whether it can be so reduced that it will cease to be a temptation to politicians?

Evidently the producing class, in all the industries, ought to be a unit as against its natural foes. The producer, of whatever degree, can have nothing in common with the idle, the vagrant, the ignorant, and the vicious. But the combination may be made, unnatural as it is, between the producer in labor and these very classes. The workingman may be brought for a time into an alliance with his natural foes. Why is this? Perhaps a sufficient reason is that to the mind of the workingman the choice is not so plain or single as it may seem to others to be. He sees idleness and vice above him as well as below him. And labor will always unite with idleness in poverty sooner than with idleness in riches, with vice in poverty sooner than with vice in riches. Nothing is more irritating to the man in the daily struggle for bread, or to the man reaching out toward a competence, than the sight of profligate, or ostentatious, or even indolent wealth. Any honest endeavor, therefore, for the suppression of class feeling must be accompanied by those habits which can give it moral support. No successful appeal can be made to the workingman as against any unnatural alliance on his part, such, for example, as that with the rumseller, except as the appeal can be enforced by the plain virtues of temperance, charity, honest work, and respect for the public good.

Something, too, is to be thought of in respect to the disposition and methods of the managers and agents of corporations. A corporation is an invisible force. The capital which supports most of the manufacturing towns is non-resident. The agent is the authoritative representative. How much depends upon him, upon his character, his bearing, his ideas in respect to men, as well as his knowledge of his business, any one familiar with a manufacturing town well understands. He can be a greater moral power than a church. He can also be a demoralizing and irritating force in a community. Within recognized limits he can elevate or depress labor. He can train the men under him to habits of self-respect and toward public spirit, or he can humiliate them, arouse their prejudices, repress the natural instincts toward good citizenship, and force them into unhealthy combinations. And society, it may be repeated, has the right, if labor is to be made a factor in politics, to concern itself with the representatives of capital.

Beyond these moral considerations, which may be fairly said to be nega-

tive for the reduction of class feeling, thought must be given to the maintenance of the American idea and ambition in respect to labor. The English workingman aims at coöperation. From the nature of his surroundings he can expect nothing beyond this. The American workingman aims at proprietorship, or its equivalent. True, the great majority can never satisfy this ambition, but the large possibility remains, which acts as an incentive, not only to the few, but, indirectly, to the many. And, notwithstanding the growth of corporations, the number of independent proprietors is still very large. In some localities the number is increasing. And it is to be observed in regard to these independent proprietors, that capital is now in the hands of men who have risen from the ranks, or in the hands of their sons. In scarcely any instance can capital be found to be at the remove of more than a generation from labor. Maintain this ambition of the American workingman toward proprietorship, and leave the way reasonably open to him, and the formation of a social class, based upon employment, is made impossible on any large scale. The elements which would make up such a class are not at rest long enough to congeal into a caste. Neither can they be reduced to such uniformity that they can be manipulated to merely personal or partisan ends. And among those who cannot expect to reach proprietorship in business, as among the employees of a great manufacturing corporation, the facilities are still large for proprietorship in land. As a matter of fact, the corporations of the Merrimack valley have graduated no inconsiderable number of their Irish laborers into small but independent farmers, and the process is still going on.

The great reliance, however, in attempting to reduce class feeling among operatives to its lowest limits, must be placed upon a fair and intelligent understanding between the parties concerned in production. Why should the discussion of business questions, or of questions vitally affecting business, be left to politicians? Why should the politician, rather than the man of business, have the ear and confidence of the workingman? Let the principles and methods which underlie a given industry be fairly discussed between employers and employees. Argument here is worth much. Perhaps personal contact is worth more. Class feeling thrives upon separation. Bring together the parties concerned, show the interests which are common to both, establish a *business unity*, and all social distinctions will prove useless for political ends. The politician cannot break the ranks of capital and labor if capital is respectful toward labor. Recognition is what the workingman asks for, — the recognition of his intelligence, of his good sense, of his personal interest in the business. The politician recognizes these qualities in the workingman. He addresses him as a citizen. No other kind of recognition will avail on the part of the capitalist. Capital may listen patiently to his grievances. It may take the initiative, and devise ways for his personal and social improvement, But this is patronage. It may become

charity. What is wanted is more business intercourse between capital and labor, a better understanding of the mutual interests involved, a more honest and hearty endeavor to create a real unity among the productive classes, as against the dangerous classes in society.

Doubtless the remedy for this state of things is to be found, not in one, but in many directions, but the danger cannot be too quickly or too carefully considered. Politics is a mould in which whatever is cast in heat straightway becomes set. And if class feeling is to be cast into this mould, in the heat of a general political campaign, it may henceforth be considered a fixed quantity in American politics.

THE "ENRICHMENT" OF PUBLIC WORSHIP.

THE recent convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church proposed to the dioceses certain changes in the order and forms of worship. During the three years which intervene before the next convention there will be much discussion of liturgies in that branch of the Church. Surprise is felt because the proposed alterations will not have the effect of shortening the service. The demand for a change sprung from impatience with the length of morning and evening worship, but it is recommended only that certain improvements and enrichments be incorporated. While the restoration of several ancient forms which were either mutilated or omitted when the present Prayer Book was compiled is a decided gain, that which is felt by the mass of worshipers to be a defect is not remedied. For the next six years, at least, the devotional services of the Lord's day will be as long as ever.

That so much of the time of the convention was given to discussing minor changes in the Prayer Book reminds us anew that dignity of form and of diction in worship is the secret of the attraction of the Episcopal Church. That Church has learned the importance of ministering to a refined taste and of cultivating a devout spirit, and knows that even uncultivated people are impressed by dignity and reverence in worship.

It cannot be questioned that in other denominations worship needs enrichment. Too much is left to the devotional culture of the minister. Too little is made of the devout participation of the congregation. Since it is true that the spirit and diction rather than the prescribed forms of worship are the sources of strength in the Episcopal Church, it follows that other churches may enrich their worship, not by borrowing details, but in accordance with the genius of their own history and custom.

A service which has place for unwritten prayers has richest capabilities. Its dangers are more than compensated by its spontaneity and flexibility. This is the characteristic of non-liturgical churches that the prayers are not by the book. In this respect the devotional culture of the preacher must be trusted. But worship is enriched when the congregation makes audible use of devotional portions of Scripture by responsive

reading or preferably by chanting, of the Lord's Prayer, and above all of the best religious music.

The musical part of worship has become barren by the use of dragging, mechanical tunes, or paltry by the use of jingles and boisterous refrains. The introduction of the noble compositions of Barnby, Dykes, Monk, Sullivan, and others, and of the majestic chorals of Germany, would transform the character of worship by a simple and practicable method.

There is no better conception of what is needed than that which is expressed by this word enrichment. The worship of all churches needs not so much to be revolutionized or even adorned as to be enriched.

More extended treatment of the subject may be looked for in future numbers of the Review.

GERMAN BIBLE REVISION.

THE first copy of the Revised German Bible was presented to the Emperor in Berlin on the four hundredth anniversary of Luther's birthday. The earliest official suggestion of such a revision, according to Dr. Düsterdieck,¹ — to whom we are indebted for much of the information used in this note, — proceeded, in 1856, from a district synod in Baden, which requested the High Consistory at Carlsruhe to make overtures to the Evangelical Conference at Eisenach for the appointment of a commission. This initial movement failed. But it was soon revived from another quarter, and in a different form. In the same year the representatives of ten Bible societies held a conference, and voted to request all such associations in Germany to unite in securing a common text of Luther's translation. They arranged also for further consultation in connection with the next Church Diet. It was stated that there were at least six texts in circulation which varied from the Halle or Canstein text. Professor Riehm subsequently gave the number in use as about eleven. The variations were not merely formal, but affected the sense. In Dr. Mönckeberg's tabulated synopsis, which gives the more important of these different readings, they fill one hundred and thirty-five quarto pages. In 1857, from fifty to sixty representatives of the societies met, at the Diet, and decided that a revision of the text, or a recension, should be made on the basis of the one published by the Institution founded at Halle by Baron von Canstein,² and that this Institution should take the lead in the movement; also, that the Evangelical Conference at Eisenach should be requested to establish a commission. Dr. Nitzsch, the well-known theologian, advocated a revision of the translation, but it was

¹ Die Revision der Lutherischen Bibelübersetzung. Zur Verständigung der Kirchengemeinen. Von Dr. Fr. Düsterdieck, Oberconsistorialrath. Hannover, 1882.

² In 1881 this Institution published its three hundred and seventy-third edition of the German Bible.

thought that the time had not come for this, though its necessity was recognized. A similar meeting, at the next Diet, 1858, approved of the plan that the work of recension should be conducted under the direction of Dr. Mönckeberg of Hamburg, Professor v. Raumer of Erlangen, and Dr. Frommann of Nuremberg. Dr. Mönckeberg has been for many years a pastor in Hamburg, and is connected with its Bible society. The others named, especially Dr. Frommann, are eminent specialists in the German language, particularly in the vocabulary and idiom of which Luther is the recognized master. It was further voted that a specimen of the proposed recension should be issued. The movement thus begun naturally pressed against its prescribed limits. Private revisions appeared. Dr. Mönckeberg pointed out seventy-five passages which needed either clarification or positive correction. The Canstein Institution asked counsel of the Oberkirchenrath (High Consistory) of Berlin. This body replied, April 17, 1861, approving a recension, but not a revision of Luther's text. It brought the matter, however, to the notice of the next conference at Eisenach (1861); and one of its delegates, Dr. Nitzsch, proposed that manifest errors in the translation should be indicated by corrections under the text, in pearl type. The conference, — through the Canstein Institution, in order to avoid any appearance of official direction, — referred the latter's memorial to the Consistory to the higher authorities of the various evangelical churches, for the purpose of eliciting expressions of opinion. Recension rather than revision was still the main thought. Four replies came in, two from Wurtemberg, one from Dr. Nitzsch, and one from the University of Rostock. The latter opposed any change other than a restoration of the text to the form given in Luther's final edition (1545). The other opinions were favorable to a very limited amount of revision. Dr. Nitzsch thought that the New Testament alone should first be dealt with, and that the Old Testament should wait until there should be greater clearness and adjustment of opinions. At the next conference (1863), a committee appointed two years previous, consisting of Dr. Ernesti of Wolfenbüttel, and Dr. Dorner of Berlin, reported in favor of amendment of the translation as well as improvement of the text. An earnest and protracted discussion followed. Dr. Niemann of Hanover and Dr. Kliefoth were specially urgent in opposition. Another Hanoverian, Dr. Brüel, made an influential speech, in which he maintained "that recognized errors in the translation should no longer be circulated, but should be corrected; that the difficult but indispensable task was to establish a text true to the sense, and universally intelligible, though not in all respects verbally accurate; that as the existing translation had not arisen through any formal authority of the Church, the revision should not be taken in hand directly by the conference, or the ecclesiastical rulers, but only indirectly; that is, by providing means and leisure for men fitted for the required labor." These sentiments prevailed, and the recommendations of the committee

were adopted. These approved of a recension of the Canstein text, which was accepted as a *textus receptus*, and of a revision of "the comparatively few passages, at first of the New Testament, whose alteration might seem to be necessary and unobjectionable in the interest of the understanding of Scripture." The execution of this scheme was left to the mediation of the Berlin Consistory, and the Canstein Institution. Further efforts followed to ascertain the disposition of the ecclesiastical authorities in the different German states where the various Bible institutions are located, and finally by the higher church officers in Prussia, Hanover, Saxony, and Wurtemberg, a commission was established for the revision of the New Testament, which met, for the first time, in Halle, September, 1865. The members selected were Professors Nitzsch, Twesten, Riehm, Beyschlag (Prussia); Drs. Meyer and Niemann (Hanover); Professor Brückner and Pastor Ahlfeld (Saxony); Drs. Schröder and Frommüller (Wurtemberg). They were assisted in all questions of usage and idiom by Drs. v. Raumer and Frommann, and by the careful textual labor of Dr. Mönckeberg. Upon the withdrawal of Dr. Nitzsch, Professor Köstlin took his place. In 1867 a "proof-edition" of their work was published for the purpose of obtaining expressions of opinion respecting it. In 1868 the commission, with the light thus obtained, made a further revision, which was published in 1870, and has now passed through about sixty editions. In 1868 a committee, of which Dr. Dorner was chairman, reported in commendation of this revision to the Eisenach Conference, and that body thereupon expressed its substantial agreement with the result of the commission's labors, and, in 1870, resolved in favor of the appointment of a similar, though larger commission for the Old Testament. It was composed of Professors Dillman (whose place was soon taken by Superintendent Hoffmann), Tholuck, Schlottmann, Riehm, Kleinert, and Kamphausen (Prussia); Professor Bertheau and Dr. Düsterdieck (Hanover); Dr. Clausen (Holstein); Dr. Ahlfeld (whose place was subsequently filled by Pastor Kühn), Professors Delitzsch and Bauer, with Dr. Thenius (Saxony); Dr. Schröder, Superintendent Kapff, Pastor Grill, Professor Diestel, and, after the latter's death, Professor Kübel (Wurtemberg); Professor Grimm (Province of Saxony). This commission has, from time to time, given to the public specimens of its work, for the sake of eliciting opinions, and other contributions that might be of service. In 1873 Dr. Riehm published for the commission a tentative revision of Genesis, together with proposed changes in Isaiah; and, in 1882, an Easter programme on certain Messianic passages of the Old Testament. In 1876 Dr. Schröder published — with corrections in Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, and Ruth — the proposed revision of the Psalms; and, in 1882, Lic. Kühn that of Ezekiel's vision of the Temple. The public were invited to examine the results which had been reached, and suggestions and criticisms were earnestly invited. The revision of

both Testaments is now issued, but still, as respects the Old Testament, not as a finality. The aim is to secure as general coöperation in the final revision as may be practicable; to make it representatively a work not only of the scholarship and literary skill, but of the practical piety also of the entire Protestant Church. The revisers have kept prominently in mind that the Bible is a book for the unlearned as well as for the cultivated, for public worship as well as for private meditation, and that it should speak the language, as Luther says, of the mother in the home, the children on the street, the common man in the market, so that they who hear it will perceive that it speaks German with them. In necessary changes the greatest pains has been taken with diction, idiom, and rhythm. The Canstein parallel references, marginal explanations, headings of chapters (mostly as given in the Stuttgart Bible of 1866), have been partially revised, particularly as required by changes in the version. Throughout, the wants of ordinary readers have been steadily kept in view, as they were by Luther. And, in submitting their work, the revisers appeal to men of this class, as well as to scholars, for judgment upon it, and aid in perfecting it. Says Dr. Düsterdieck, "The greater, the more difficult and delicate a matter is the revision of the Bible, the less can we expect a rapid and unanimous recognition of our work. Every serviceable, well-grounded judgment will be thankfully received by the commission, and carefully weighed, before, at the third reading, the final conclusion is reached. It seems to me to be of the highest consequence that we receive judgments upon our work from unlearned readers of the Bible, out of their pious hearts and spiritual experience. May Christian fathers use the revision in family worship, . . . may faithful readers of the Bible make themselves familiar with the new edition, and then tell us whether they have, or have not found in the emendations a help to a fuller, deeper, more certain understanding of the Divine Word."

There are some in Germany, even among the revisers, who think that the revision has not gone far enough. Dr. Kleinert, in an address, of which an account is given in "The Catholic Presbyterian" for October, indicates that the difference of opinion on this point "corresponds to a difference of *locality*; the revisers belonging to the East and North inclining to the more conservative side, while those belonging to the South and West, the divines of Wurtemberg and the Rhineland, would have preferred a more thorough revision." The writer adds this suggestive comment: "This is not a little significant in view of the fact that the churches of Wurtemberg and Westphalia are precisely those most distinguished for practical energy in Christian work. The loudest call for Bible revision, either in Germany or elsewhere, does not come from the circles in which literary and scientific interests are supremely valued. On the contrary, it is in communities pervaded with the profoundest sense of the divine inspiration and authority of the Scriptures, and their in-

finite value for the salvation of souls, that there is to be found the strongest sense of the duty lying on the Church to put her children in possession of the most perfect attainable version of the Bible."

AMERICA'S IMPRESSIONS OF MATTHEW ARNOLD.

MATTHEW ARNOLD, not long ago, recorded his impressions of America without having seen America. Now that England has lent to us the master literary critic of his times, and he has actually stood and spoken in the midst of us, it is a matter of no small interest to inquire concerning America's impressions of Matthew Arnold. An English writer, well acquainted with Mr. Arnold's manner and method in Poetry and Criticism, prophesied that our new English guest would "pique and tantalize the intelligent curiosity" of the Americans who should crowd to hear him, as few Englishmen have ever piqued or tantalized it before. The ground of our pique, according to this prophet, lies in the conflict between Mr. Arnold's pessimistic creed and his poetic buoyancy as a seer. We are to find him "undermining for us our best hopes, and yet gazing with a look of radiance, such as Emerson himself could hardly have put on, towards the new heavens and the new earth, not of his creed, but of his poetic day-dream." Cassandra's warnings have been uttered. Was the home-made prophecy a true one?

It is not too early to answer the question, for Mr. Arnold has said to us all that he intends to say in public. He has presented himself in but two aspects of his self-appointed function as a public teacher through criticism, — one, in his ordinary rôle of the student and censor of literature, society, history, philosophy, and science, in his lectures on Numbers, Literature and Science, and Emerson; the other, in the unusual character of a public reader of his own poetry. The published title of his opening lecture was the first thing to pique the curiosity of the good people of New York. What was the significance of "Numbers"? Those who crowded Chickering Hall to hear him were tantalized to exasperation because they did not hear him. Excepting to the three rows of listeners nearest the speaker, the subject of the lecture might have been Deuteronomy. The audience quickly discovered that to her inarticulate-speaking literary men England had already sent over, in the persons of Froude and Freeman, she had added a third, and the worst speaker of the three. These lecturers seem to be ignorant of the truth that the chief thing in public speaking is *speaking*. Mr. Arnold's failure to meet the simplest technical conditions of good public address was aggravated by an awkwardness of platform manner in consequence of his extremely defective eye-sight, and the ill-arranged light upon the stage. The disappointed ones might have consoled themselves by mentally contrasting with the speaker of the evening America's foremost literary critic and man of letters, and also one of her most accomplished public speakers,

her minister to the court of St. James — Mr. James Russell Lowell — who, as English authorities declare, cannot be matched as a speaker by any living literary man in England. This was Mr. Arnold's first experience before a popular audience. His efforts in speaking hitherto had been academic in character and surroundings. Instead of succumbing to his defeat, Mr. Arnold manfully concealed his chagrin, and courageously set to work to remedy his most important defects as a speaker. In nearly all of his subsequent platform addresses he has been heard distinctly and with pleasure. This experience has taught over again the lesson that, even in delivery at threescore, it is never too late to mend.

The lecture on Numbers is practically a sermon on the Power of the Remnant, preached from a double text: Isaiah's affirmations concerning the righteous remnant as the saving element in Israel, and its New Testament commentary in Paul's injunction to the Philippians: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, just, pure, lovely, of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things." Majorities are bad; they are unsound. The remnant that is to save all national life and gradually transform it is the enlightened and conscientious few who embody in their lives, and directly and indirectly disseminate, the things that are true, just, pure, and of good report. The great want of Germany is civil courage; the great want of France is morality; the great want of England is lucidity; and the great defect of our republic is disobedience, want of respect, and exaggeration. But there is power in the large remnant amongst our fifty millions to save the nation. The remedy lies in greater activity in righteousness. Unceasingly multiply the numbers and efficiency of the remnant. This doctrine struck us not as new, but as true. We discovered no undermining of our best political hopes; and yet we wished that, after sounding the alarm-bell so vigorously, he had been more specific in pointing out to the members of the hopeful American remnant before him, eagerly waiting on his broad and penetrating wisdom, definite applications of his doctrine for national well-being. Do not we, as well as the unsound majority in England, need lucidity? Amidst all the confusion of the elements in our social and political life, is there not the great necessity for the discipline of ideas? Would not Mr. Arnold be still more helpful if he could cherish in larger measure Emerson's hope for the unsound majority, and his wise sympathy for them? As a model of rhetorical art, in effectually lodging his subject in the minds of the audience, in the warp and woof of structure and style, the lecture was admirable. No one understands better than Matthew Arnold the use of structural emphasis through the skillful iteration of important ideas without wearying the listener or offending a sound literary taste. The oral quality in his style is rarely absent even in his remarkable essays. He says himself, that, in composing, he always keeps his audience before his mind's eye.

In his second lecture, "Literature and Science," Mr. Arnold essayed

to answer the living educational question so ardently discussed in America. In the training that human nature needs shall science be substituted for literature? His reply naturally was made from his point of view as a man of letters. Plato's ideas still rule, and education should be governed by the ideas of men like Plato. We need to relate all pieces of knowledge to beauty and conduct. Mr. Arnold enforced with great power and clearness his own conception of the office of culture, namely, disinterestedly to learn and propagate the best that has been known and thought in the world. Professor Huxley means by literature simply *belles-lettres*. Mr. Arnold means much more. Literature contains that which will enable us best to know ourselves and the world. A scientific education is too narrow for this. He afforded immense comfort to the defenders of the study of Greek in the present outcry against it. The English speaking race has a galaxy of great minds of its own; but the cultivation of Greek literature helps to supply the prime defect in English literature — symmetry of thought and expression. The time will come when women will know Greek as did Lady Jane Grey, and when our American girls will be studying it in the schools of the far West.

But it is in the lecture on Emerson that the eminent critic piques intelligent curiosity, utters the bravest words, shines the brightest in his luminous critical power, and suffuses his theme with the warmth and glow of earnest feeling and eloquent expression. To speak of Emerson as he does among the friends and worshipers of the American seer requires an heroic temper. The critic undoubtedly reversed the judgments of many admirers of the Concord philosopher by correcting them; and we believe that time will justify his estimate of his great master. As a poet, Mr. Arnold says that Emerson cannot meet Milton's test of poetry. Poetry must be simple, sensuous, impassioned. Emerson's poetry lacks directness, correctness, energy. He is not a great man of letters. His style has not the requisite wholeness of good tissue. Nor is he a great philosophical writer. He cannot build. Not with the Miltons, and Platos, and Spinozas, and Voltaires, can we rank Emerson. His relation to us is more like that of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. He is preëminently the friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit. His insight is admirable, his truth precious; but the secret of his effect is in his serene, beautiful, hopeful temper. Happiness in labor, righteousness, and veracity in the life of the spirit, joyfulness and eternal hope — that was Emerson's gospel. We cannot praise him too much, nor heed him too diligently. His essays are the most important thing done in prose during the century, as Wordsworth's work is the most important done in poetry. Emerson's work is much more important than Carlyle's. He has lessons for both branches of our race; for laden and laboring England, he shows for guidance his lucid freedom, his cheerfulness and hope; for his own dearly loved, great, intelligent, sensual, avaricious America, he shows his dignity, delicacy, serenity, elevation. In

no lecture has Mr. Arnold held his audience so closely in sympathy with his theme or with himself. Responses were frequently elicited, and all were held by a spell of enchantment.

As a reader of his own poems, Mr. Arnold modestly disclaims all intention of entering the field of artistic vocal expression. He simply responded to the wish of many of his admirers that he would "lend to the rhyme of the poet the beauty of his voice." But perfect as is the metrical rhythm of this poet, and full of spirituality and tender sentiment as is his musically expressed thought, there is no beauty in his voice. His faults in the delivery of prose are intensified in the delivery of poetry. One naturally expects to find some inner harmony between the creating spirit of the author and the form of expression in its rhythmical diction and the speech-tunes of his voice. But there is no interpreting power in Mr. Arnold's reading of his verses. No revelations of subtle meanings appear in modulations born of closest sympathy with poetic thought and feeling, so that the utterance becomes a suggestive commentary, lighting up the interior sense of the poet. His manner is that of a quiet, genial, scholarly gentleman, who ministers to the enjoyment of his assembled friends by indicating the intellectual qualities of his work, touched with a gentle glow of feeling, but keeping the tint of vocal coloring a neutral one throughout the reading of his varied selections. And yet there was a certain fascination growing out of his personality that held the gratified attention of his audience. It was pleasant to catch self-revealing glimpses of the man's heart. After hearing *Thyrsis*, and the *Elegy* on a pet dog, who could resist the feeling that Mr. Arnold's nature was not only tender but affectionate? In this unconventional line of effort he furnishes a new illustration of the distinctness between the gift of literary expression and the gift of vocal expression in the interpreting function of delivery. Shakespeare was a poor actor, but no one has ever better expressed the true theory of the representation of character and sentiment than he in *Hamlet's* golden advice to the player. The wonder about Dickens's public readings was the combination, in so high a degree, of the gifts of the creator and personator of so many diverse characters.

In none of his public utterances before American audiences has Mr. Arnold shown himself as a reformer of theology. He rigorously abides by the purpose avowed in his "*Last Essays on Church and State*" to speak no more in direct terms on these themes, but to return to his proper field of literature, and do indirectly there what he can for Church and State. He is wise in his fidelity to this resolution. For, while he has made even theology entertaining, he does not possess the instincts and training of a theologian. The application of the literary method in judging the Bible and the works of theological science has landed him in bewildering inconsistencies with himself. With all his consummate ability, he failed to accomplish the task of reconciling the religion of the Bible with the rejection of the supernaturalism of the Bible. It was a failure in "lucid-

ity," and the task is impossible, both in appearance and reality. But while we criticise his method and deplore his results, we cheerfully admit the nobility of his aim to make the Bible better understood, and admire the power, ingenuity, and originality of his work. He clings to the real Bible. He has a profound, practical, and unwavering sympathy with its religious teachings. No man has written with more force and beauty on the true character of Hebrew prophecy, and in his exposition of the method and secret of Jesus there is scarcely anything that is not profoundly true, and all of it is most finely and delicately expressed. Mr. Arnold's criticism of the theological aspects of the Bible is no tea-table criticism. He is a man to be answered, and not to be ignored or laughed at; and he has been successfully met by able men, who have recognized in him an antagonist worthy of the best powers of their controversial steel.

Regarding Mr. Arnold's work in America as a whole, we find that the total effect is literary and ethical. He is still no more to us than what he has been — the gifted, polished, gently ironical, and yet genial instructor in letters and conduct; but he has failed to arouse enthusiasm as a speaker, or as a master in political science. We find, too, that we are not piqued and tantalized by any mixture of a hopeless creed and hopeful poetry. The half-satirical prophet who put us on the *qui vive* in this respect evidently forecast Mr. Arnold's work in America as the shadow of an unsatisfactory piece of work that he once built in England. The "negative lucidity," which wrought such incomplete and unsatisfactory results in theology, has found scarcely an application in his addresses in America. He is diligently studying our public school system, our social life, and public men, under competent guidance; and we confess that what most piques and tantalizes our curiosity is what Mr. Arnold's impressions of America will be after he has carefully reflected upon his newly-acquired data, gained, according to his own canon of criticism, by looking directly at America and seeing her as she really is. His after-thoughts will be racy, instructive, and, most likely, irritating reading. But it will always be a pleasure to associate the face, voice, and figure of the sincere, unaffected, and most courteous English gentleman and scholar with his words, as we continue to read the writings of this master of charm among the foremost literary workmen of the present age. We welcomed him to America with cordiality; we shall part from him with regret; and remember him with grateful pleasure.

— The fact stated by the Rev. Dr. Jewett that not one of the Associate Founders of Andover Theological Seminary was a member of a Christian church will doubtless excite in some minds surprise. It is not without significance in relation to certain recent discussions. It has a wider interest as opening a deeply pathetic and unwritten chapter in the religious history of New England. The earlier and greater confessions of our

fathers stand in marked contrast with the working theory of church membership of a later day, and with its one-sided individualism and subjectivism. Baptized children were regarded as members of the visible Catholic Church of Christ, although full communion with any particular church, it was held, requires a personal and public confession. And the Cambridge platform affirms in beautiful and perfect harmony with the teachings and spirit of Christianity: "The weakest measure of faith is to be accepted in those that desire to be admitted into the church, because weak Christians, if sincere, have the substance of that faith, repentance and holiness, which is required in church members; and such have most need of the ordinances for their confirmation and growth in grace. The Lord Jesus would not quench the smoking flax, nor break the bruised reed, but gather the tender lambs in his arms and carry them gently in his bosom. Such charity and tenderness is to be used, as the weakest Christian, if sincere, may not be excluded nor discouraged."

— In this connection we take pleasure in noticing a letter recently received by a Congregational church from a sister church. We omit names.

The — Congregational Church — — — to the Church in —.

DEAR BRETHREN, — We hereby certify that — — — is one of the baptized children of this church. And as such, we cordially and prayerfully commend her to your watch and care.

Wishing you grace, mercy, and peace,

In behalf of the church,

— — —, Pastor.

— The Rev. Dr. Beard's article, prepared by special request for this Review, on "The Huguenot Churches and the Religious Condition of France," brings together a mass of facts never before collected and set in the same relationship. They have been gleaned from many fields and much personal observation and inquiry in different parts of the country. Its author made the acquaintance of pastors of the Vaudois among the Hautes-Alpes, who said that no American pastor had before visited them; examined their theological schools and missionary schools; attended the socialistic gatherings of infidels; and put himself in full communication with men best qualified to furnish trustworthy information respecting the various agencies which are determining the religious and moral condition of the people. We commend his statements to thoughtful consideration.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

NOTES FROM THE ORIENTAL CONGRESS AT LEIDEN.

THE Sixth International Congress of Orientalists was held in Leiden, Sept. 10-15, 1883, and brought together more than two hundred scholars from various parts of the world. Probably no more successful meeting has been held since the first organization of the Congress at Paris, in 1873. According to a good custom, the management of the body was intrusted to a committee belonging to the country where the meeting was held; the officers were all from Leiden. Professor Kuenen was President, Professor Kern, Vice-president; the Secretaries were Professors De Goeje and Tiele, and among the other members of the committee were such well-known men as Land and Oort. It would be easy to speak at length about these gentlemen; and the tireless energy and unvarying courtesy with which they discharged their arduous duties cannot be too highly appreciated. The magistrates and citizens of Leiden, as well as the officials of the Hague and Amsterdam, joined with the representatives of Dutch learning in making the sojourn of so many strangers among them memorable for ceaseless and lavish hospitality.

The members came from near and far: Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Russia, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Arabia, India, Ceylon, Java, America, all sent delegates, and there were members not in attendance from Servia, Algiers, Syria, and Japan. Holland was, naturally, more largely represented than any other country. Great Britain came next in order of numbers, and then France and Germany. The United States, with three members present, came far down the list, — at which, again, no one can be surprised.

Sight-seeing and feasting divided the time with the more serious work of the Congress; but though these pleasant things were of much interest at the time, they may be here passed over. For its real business the Congress was organized in five sections, the first of which was divided into two sub-sections. I. Shemitic section: (*a.*) Arabic; (*b.*) Other Shemitic languages. II. Aryan Section. III. African Section. IV. Section for Central and Eastern Asia. V. Malaysian and Polynesian Section. From the nature of the case, it was in the proceedings of Section I. that students of the Bible found the discussions in which they were most concerned. Section I., *a*, chose as its president M. Ch. Schefer, of Paris. The Vice-presidents were Professors Socin (Tübingen) and Goldziher (Buda-Pesth); the Secretaries, M. Guyard (Paris) and M. Snouck Hurgronje (Leiden). Section I., *b*, was officered by Professor Schrader (Berlin), President; Professors Robertson Smith (Cambridge) and Kautzsch (Tübingen), Vice-presidents; M. Carrière (Paris) and Mr. Rylands (London), Secretaries.

A few of the papers which were of value to Old Testament scholars may be mentioned. The first subject which occupied I., *b*, was the best method of editing the text of the Old Testament. The suggestions contained in Professor Oort's paper on this topic were simple, and related

chiefly to the disposition of various readings and emendations in the text and the margin, and the reason for noticing the matter here lies not in any special ability or judiciousness exhibited in the paper, but in the intrinsic importance of the subject itself. If there were any considerable mass of well-sifted and tested material ready to be edited into a critical Hebrew text of the Old Testament, then the considerations of Dr. Oort would be very well in place. But so long as this prerequisite is unfulfilled, the imperative need of a better text points in the direction of hard, patient, minute study of the documents upon which chief reliance must be placed in constructing it. These documents are the ancient versions. When we consider that we are only beginning to get a thoroughly prepared text even of the Septuagint, and that, for lack of encouragement, this is appearing without an *apparatus criticus*, it will be evident that years of unnoticed labor and unwearied comparison of results among workers in this field must precede any earnest attempt at a revision of the present Hebrew text. The emendations suggested in the exigency of his interpretation by this or that Old Testament exegete may be at times of value; but the work that clamors to be done in order to bring us as near to the original of the Old Testament as, thanks to an abundance of MSS. and generations of study, we have been brought to the original of the New, is a very different matter.

The variety of the topics discussed shows itself as we turn to a paper, read by Professor Tiele on the following day, on "The Goddess Ishtar." There is probably no man living who has thought so earnestly and written so powerfully on the history of the ethnic religions as Professor Tiele has done, and this brief paper contained a close and brilliant attempt to explain the Babylonian conception of Ishtar (עֲשִׁתְרֵת, Ashtoreth, As-tarte) as a personification of the fruitful earth, and the mythological treatment of her hardships and triumphs in Babylonian poetry as at bottom an account of the fortunes of the earth, exposed to cold, darkness, and tempest, but emerging into the freshness and beauty of the spring.

Rev. J. N. Strassmaier (Widness, Lancashire, Eng.) gave an account of some Babylonian contract tablets which are preserved in the Museum at Liverpool. American scholars, who think chiefly of Liverpool as a place to arrive at and to leave, may be interested to hear of this new attraction in a city whose attractions are really not few.

Other papers in I., *b*, which deserve notice, but cannot be easily summarized here, were that by Professor Schlottmann (Halle) on the strophe in Hebrew poetry, those by Professor D. H. Müller (Vienna) on the broken plurals in the southern Shemitic languages, and on אֵל and אֱלֹהִים in Sabeian, that of Professor Oppert (Paris) on some new Babylonian inscriptions, those of M. Halévy (Paris) on "Assyrian Allography," — a new attempt to prove his untenable theory that the Akkado-Sumerian language is only Shemitic Babylonian with a different system of characters, — and on the Thamudite inscriptions; and in I., *a*, a paper by Professor Land (Leiden) on the Arabic Gamut, and a posthumous and unfinished paper by the late Professor Dozy (Leiden) on the religion of the Haranians.

Especial attention should be called to a carefully prepared essay by Dr. J. F. McCurdy (late of Princeton) on Permanive forms in Assyrian. Dr. McCurdy takes the ground — which he fortifies by ingenious argument and ample illustration — that the Permanive or Perfect forms

of Assyrian are developed, not out of the participle, as seems at first more natural, but out of the infinitive. The correctness of this interesting opinion must be a matter for future discussion.

Section I., *a*, furnished a suggestive contribution to Shemitic study in a plea by Professor Landberg (Stockholm) for greater attention to the spoken language of the Bedouins in studying the classical Arabic. Professor Landberg has spent much time among the Bedouins, and had with him in Leiden Sheikh Amīr al-Madani, from Medina. He has found a most striking similarity between the language which the Bedouins now speak, and the literary Arabic, and is convinced that the former throws much light upon the latter. The preservation of the classic language, through so many centuries, in the mouth of the denizens of the Arabian wilderness, is a very remarkable fact, which the isolation of these tribes can only in part explain. It is a new proof of the persistence of linguistic phenomena in the Shemitic race; it suggests the likelihood that the spoken languages of the Hebrew and Assyrian peoples may not have differed very materially from the language of their documents, and it lessens from a new side the strain which is put upon belief by the view of those who still hold that the ancient Hebrew literature which is preserved to us covers a period of a thousand or twelve hundred years.

A single word, at least, seems to be due to Section III. (Africa), where Professor Lieblein (Christiania), and Dr. Golénischeff (St. Petersburg), presented communications not destitute of interest; the one especially for Biblical scholars, since it treated of the Egyptian religion; the other, for them in common with a wider circle, since in it the young Russian specialist discussed the origin of the alphabetic value of certain hieroglyphs. If, as is now generally — not universally — held, the Phœnician alphabet, and hence our own, was derived from the Egyptian hieratic, everything which bears on the appearance of germs of an alphabetic system within Egypt itself, claims attention from those who care for the origin of that process which we find it so hard to follow backward, but which has resulted in the culture of the Japhetic as well as the Shemitic race. In connection with this may be mentioned an animated discussion which took place in Section II. (Aryan) on the origin of the Indian (Sanskrit) alphabet. It was opened by a paper from Mr. Cust (London), deriving this alphabet from the Phœnician.

It is perhaps evident from the foregoing remarks that while nothing of exceptional novelty was discussed at the Congress, there was plenty of material for solid and serious debate.

The general advantages of such a gathering cannot now be dwelt on. They are such as the opportunity for the interchange of views and mutual stimulus between scholars, who otherwise might never meet; the opportunity for combining scholars in great scientific undertakings, and giving forcible utterance to the wishes of thoughtful students; and, for the city and country where the meeting is held, a considerable permanent impression and valuable impetus resulting from the presence of a large body of finely trained and enthusiastic men, who come — not to make money, nor to spend it, not to glorify themselves or congratulate each other, but — from a pure interest in language and literature and history, a genuine zeal in acquiring and imparting knowledge. It is these considerations which might well be emphasized, if we should ever have the prospect of entertaining the Oriental Congress in America.

Francis Brown.

STUDENTS' MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN AMERICA AND GERMANY.¹

THE fourth annual convention of the Inter-Seminary Missionary Alliance met in Hartford, Conn., October 25, 1883. Three hundred and forty-five delegates, representing nearly thirty seminaries, were in attendance.

Papers were read upon "Lessons from the History of Missions," "Moravian Missions," "Departments of Foreign Missionary Labor and their Requirements," "Needs and Methods of Western Frontier Work," and "How to Arouse and Maintain Missionary Interest in the Churches;" and these subjects were discussed with a great deal of interest and spirit by the delegates. The actual work of missions was represented by several missionaries, who spoke of their fields, and of the difficulties and rewards of their labors.

Addresses were also made at the evening sessions by the Rev. A. J. Behrends, D. D., on "The Principle of Christian Missions;" the Rev. Richard Newton, D. D., on "Paul, the Model Missionary;" Prof. A. A. Hodge, D. D., on "The Call to Foreign Missions."

On Sunday afternoon the Rev. L. T. Townsend, D. D., spoke on "Old Testament Types of Orthodoxy and Liberalism, Micaiah and Zedekiah," — a theme whose connection with the objects of the Alliance we are unable to divine; and in the evening the delegates and a large congregation were addressed by the Rev. A. J. Gordon, D. D., on "Preparation for Service."

This abstract of the proceedings can give no idea of the enthusiasm that was in the convention itself, and which reached its height perhaps in connection with the powerful personal application of the principle and duty of missions which Dr. Hodge made.

The results of such gatherings, the interest excited in them and carried back by the members to their seminaries, ought to be apparent at what is after all the critical point in the work of Missions at home and abroad, — the supply of the right men in sufficient numbers. The Alliance is an agency at work in the right place. That the movement originated spontaneously among the students, and has been managed wholly by them, is encouraging. It is a hopeful sign that Foreign and Home Missions are regarded not as clashing interests, but as harmonious parts of one work. It is an indirect gain, which may some day be the direct gain of both Home and Foreign Missions, that a feeling of comradeship is developed among students of different denominations, and a disposition to treat denominational differences generously. Unless the writer is mistaken, it was the pretty strong feeling of the convention that if the young men directed what may be called denominational strategy, two or three Missionary Boards would not so often be contesting with one another the possession of a field too small to sustain more than one church, and that the waste of money, and the worse waste of men, would be stayed, if not stopped. These are hopeful things; we look for good to come of them.

There lies, however, in the very power of these conventions to rouse

¹ *Report of the Fourth Annual Convention of the American Inter-Seminary Missionary Alliance, Hartford, Conn., October 25, 1883. Über die akademischen Missionsvereine Deutschlands. Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift, 1883, pp. 454-461.*

enthusiasm to a high pitch the danger that a certain class of men will be swept away by the current, without fairly measuring their own ability. The question, "Am I called to be a missionary," is but one form of the fundamental question, "Where can I be most useful." And this is a matter for the soundest and most deliberate judgment, taking into view all aptitudes and disabilities. The less the disturbing factor of feeling, especially of epidemic impulse, enters into this judgment, the fewer failures and disappointments there will be.

From this point of view, as well as from others, it seems to us to be a mistake, although no doubt it is made upon principle, that the men who alone almost have an expert knowledge of what is needed in the missionary as well as of the needs of the field, the history and methods of missions, — the missionary secretaries and editors of the different churches — should not be asked to contribute of their knowledge. There need be no fear that such men would abuse the occasion in sectarian interests, and if the catholicity of spirit among the delegates is genuine there need be no fear of the suspicion.

From the statistical tables annexed to the Report of the proceedings of the convention we gather the following: There are connected with the alliance 52 seminaries and theological schools, 32 of which reported to the convention. In the 32 reporting seminaries there are 1707 students. Of the classes which graduated in 1883, 35 have entered, or are about to enter on foreign missionary work; 65 on home missions. These figures of course are only approximate, as the reports in this column are not complete.

The Report of the convention has been printed in very good form under the direction of Mr. C. H. Dickinson, of Yale Seminary, New Haven, Conn.

In connection with this Report, which brings before us the missionary activities of our American theological schools, it is interesting to read the account which Theo. F. Christlieb has recently given of the missionary societies in the German universities. Several of these missionary societies have been in existence for many years. (Berlin, *e. g.*, since 1824; Halle, 1842; Bonn, 1849; Rostock, 1860; Leipzig and Tübingen, 1868.) Others have been founded more recently. The whole number is now twelve.

Within the last two or three years there has been encouraging advance both in the number of universities on the list and in the membership and activity of the societies. The whole number of members in the winter term, 1879–80, was 201; in the winter term, 1882–83, 410. The largest societies are at Halle (60), Leipzig (57), Göttingen (50). Berlin has thirty-two members; Breslau — the smallest — nine.

By no means all the students of theology are connected with these societies. In Rostock the proportion is seventy-five per cent., Greifswald thirty-five per cent., Göttingen twenty-two per cent., while at Leipzig the proportion is only about eight per cent., and in Berlin seven. In Göttingen twenty per cent. of the members are from other departments of the University, but in most cases there are few, if any, but theological students. The societies at the different universities have no connection with one another. An alliance has been several times proposed, and the plan, including a constitution, annual meeting, prize essays, etc., but hitherto nothing has been accomplished in this direction.

The societies meet every two or three weeks, and their work does not differ materially from that of the missionary societies in American seminaries. There is usually an address or paper upon some subject of the history or theory of missions, sometimes by a student, sometimes by a missionary, a professor, or another who is qualified upon the subject.

There are two points in which we should see a difference. The first is that these societies interest themselves only in foreign missions, existing side by side with the more popular Students' Gustavus Adolphus Societies, which cultivate what we should call home missions. The other is, that hardly any of the members of these societies offer themselves for the work of foreign missions. That men of university education are needed as missionaries is an idea which gains ground slowly in Germany, and has hardly taken hold at all of the young men in the universities. And just here, it seems to us, lies the immediate work of these societies, and of those who have influence in them.

George F. Moore.

ARCHÆOLOGICAL NOTES.

— It was fitting that the sixth International Convention of Orientalists should hold its triennial session at Leyden in September last. The university once boasted names famous in these studies. Such were Drusius, for whom Cambridge and Oxford contended, and Erpenius, the most noted Eastern scholar of his time. We are glad to hear from Professor Francis Brown that three Americans were present in the city where once the Pilgrims sojourned. We trust that at Vienna, in 1886, the number will be tripled. If then America become the host of the Oriental Congress for 1889, there may well be expected to appear some fruits of American archæological scholarship. Meantime the proposition of the "Independent" of a Euphrates expedition is sagacious and patriotic. Fifty thousand dollars invested thus to-day will yield returns to art and letters, to science and religion, exceeding tenfold that investment at a tardier date. Why should not the Metropolitan Museum in New York take the initiative?

— At the sixtieth anniversary of the Asiatic Society, held May 21, the Right Hon. Sir Bartle E. Frère in the chair, an interesting eulogy was read by M. Revillout on the great Egyptologist, M. François Joseph Chabas. M. Chabas's name is associated, to the Frenchman, with the decipherment of the obelisk of Luxor; to the Englishman, with the "Travels of an Egyptian" in the "Records of the Past." He was born at Briangon, and died at Versailles at the age of sixty-five. Brought up to business like Schliemann, like Schliemann, too, he had a passionate taste for study, which at the age of thirty-five he was able to gratify by retiring to Chalons-sur-Saône and devoting himself to Egyptology. In four years he published "Notes Explanatory of Two Groups of Hieroglyphs." This swift acquisition was joined to vast productiveness. So valued a worker in his chosen field had he become in twenty years, that at the Oriental Congress of London, 1874, he was appointed member of the international committee for the publication of M. Naville's forthcoming *variorum* Edition of the Ritual. His "Harris - Papyrus on Magic" (published 1861) is still the classic on that theme. M. Revillout says,

"Setting aside only Dr. Birch and M. de Rougé, all the Egyptologists of Europe were his pupils." The marvel of his learning was that it was gained during the last half of his life, without travel, from his library of fac-similes, in the seclusion of a provincial town.

— M. Naville suggests Pithom. His identification of it with Tel-el-Maskhutah hangs fire. On the one hand Lepsius, in a recent number of the "*Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache*," combats the new discovery that threatens to rob him of his site for Rameses. This on three grounds. (1.) The statements of Antoninus in his "Itinerary" respecting Thoum and of Herodotus respecting Patumos locate Pithom at the west end of Wady Tumilat, and this cannot be the same as Heroopolis twenty-four miles eastward, that is, Tel-el-Maskhutah. (2.) The necessities of the triple worship at *Heroopolis* to Ra, Rameses, and Tum. There must have been a Pi-Ra, a Pi-Rameses, and a Pi-Tum. But Pi-Ra = Heliopolis, and Pi-Tum = Patumos. Hence Tel-el-Maskhutah must be Pi-Rameses, the great frontier city of Rameses II. (3.) The name Heroopolis — city of heroes — is the same as an Egyptian word meaning "great of the strong ones" found on the site under discussion. From another point of view Rev. L. Dickerman, May 2, before the American Oriental Society, brings forward eight forcible objections to M. Naville's hypothesis. He presses the difficulty of finding a city near and rich enough to answer to Rameses, and to furnish gold for the golden calf. He asks why, if the buildings at Tel-el-Maskhutah were erected by Hebrews, were the bricks with the cartouche of Rameses I. without straw? He ends with the query, "granting that the fragment of a limestone statue belonged to the priest of Tum and his Pithom-temple was Succoth, how does that prove that the place where it was found was Pithom-Succoth, that the priest never lived anywhere but here, that his statue had never been carried from one place to another, when the obelisk in New York has been twice removed?" Mr. Dickerman's paper has won praise from so high an authority as Dr. Birch. On the other hand, R. S. Poole of the British Museum, in the "*Academy*" of September 22, argues against Lepsius that his Egyptian epithet belongs to a king, not a place, and that ar (store-house) refers to a city not of the fortress kind. He sees no difficulty in two Pithoms twenty-four miles apart. One could be specially designated as in parallel cases. Miss Amelia B. Edwards favors the same identification, as do Ebers and Maspero.

— M. Naville himself, in the "*Academy*" of October 6, calls attention to the fact that inscriptions are an authority no less weighty than Herodotus, and that monuments of every period from Rameses II. to Ptolemy Philadelphus are at Tel-el-Maskhutah. Pi-tum, or Ha-Tum (abode of the temple of Tum), or Thuku-Succoth, or both together, are common. The *naos* is dedicated to the god Tum-Harmakhis (Hormakku = the sun on the meridian), and contains a sphynx with human head. Succoth is also inscribed. So "good recorder of Pi-Tum, chief of the prophets of Tum, first prophet of Succoth," is a specimen of several inscriptions putting Pithom and Succoth together, — names which Lepsius does not deny to be identical. M. Naville says, also, (1) the place is great as a store-city, insignificant as a town; (2) the name Pi-Rameses never occurs; (3) a Pithom at either extremity of the nome is proved; (4) if Maskhutah be Rameses and Tel-Abu-Suleiman be Succoth, then the Israelites, in the first march from Rameses to Succoth, journeyed twenty-two miles

from east to west, turning their backs on the Red Sea. He bespeaks patience and promises fuller proofs. The Christian public will accord him, doubtless, a fair hearing, and meantime reserve its decision.

—Another Frenchman, M. Perrot, gives us a glimpse of Egypt and Chaldæa together. This in his paper before the *Académie des Inscriptions* of April 20 and 27, 1883. It is entitled "Art Comparison of Egypt and Chaldæa," and is understood to be the concluding chapter of volume ii. of the "*Histoire de l'Art dans l'Antiquité*," MM. Perrot and Chipiez, Paris. M. Perrot contrasts the land of the Euphrates with the land of the Nile to the disadvantage of the former in architecture. If equal in dimensions and in splendor, the temples of Chaldæa fell below those of Egypt in nobility. They lacked the sovereign and mysterious beauty of their rivals. The terraced towers might astonish by their bulk and please by their color. Yet they bore the seeds of their own decay in their very materials. Beside the majestic piles of Karnak they were colossal improvisations.

—M. Sarzec's late discoveries at Tel-Lo, in Southern Babylonia, furnish M. Perrot with a basis for a like antithesis between the sculpture of the two peoples. To be sure the balance is somewhat more even. Egypt shows purer lines and a greater delicacy and grace. Here is the unrivaled serenity of attitude and feature, whether in figurine or colossus. Chaldæa, on the other hand, excels in power of action and energy of model. The great qualities of force and fire are here in higher degree. More frankly anthropomorphic, too, is her Pantheon, undisfigured by head of hawk and crocodile that make hideous the Egyptian deities. But when we look at fidelity of likeness the scale turns the other way. The funeral customs of the Nile demanded good portraiture. Hence royal statues recognizable even by the foreigner after generations. No similar motive urged the Chaldæan chisel. Chaldæa was preëminent as a sculptor of dogs and lions, whose bodies were seen under the sunlight and free from trappings. Egypt was master as a sculptor of men and women, the muscular modeling of whose flesh and the undulating lines of whose forms no cumbrous drapery hid. For the want of study of the nude, Assyrian sculpture is a blighted bud. For the cultivation of it, all Egypt is a people of statues, emerging from the very tomb.

—French discoveries in Babylonia are beginning to excite English jealousy. It appears that the English firman under which Mr. Hormuzd Rassam worked has expired. The French firman has been renewed and enlarged. Aboo-Hubba and other sites partially explored by Mr. Rassam, are to be visited by a French savant, with possible power to anticipate English work and break the completeness of English collections there. Should this occur the French might possibly forgive the British Museum for their possession of the Rosetta Stone.

—Meantime Mr. W. S. C. Boscawen, who has furnished a translation of the twelfth Izdubar legend in volume ix., and of the Tower of Babel in volume vii. of the "*Records of the Past*," has written the London "*Mail*" (Times) of August 3, 1883, a letter spurring the jaded English interest in Assyriological exploration. He deprecates the unfinished state of the excavations at Aboo-Hubba. Here Mr. Rassam has restored the remains of a city founded 3800 years before Christ. The discovery of the Nabonidus inscription, and of fragments of sculpture like those found by M. Sarzec at Tel-Lo, shows we have here a city most ancient in a land of

ancient cities. Everything indicates that the site has been free from violent disturbance, and may yield other invaluable records. Sargon I. was the Romulus of Chaldæa. From his inscription is but a step to the rise of Semitic power in North Babylonia. This usurper king compiled the first great collection of Babylonian literature, and specially the huge astronomical work in seventy tablet volumes, known as the "Illumination of Bel." These works were in the library attached to the temple of his divine protectress, and in the city Agadhe, the Hebrew Akkad, one of the quarters of Sippara. At Aboo-Hubba one hundred chambers of the edifice have been uncovered, two of which are record rooms. From these were obtained several thousand contract, fiscal, and legal tablets extending over the late Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian empire, and on into the time of the Seleucidæ.

—Mr. Boscawen specializes two points of interest as respects Sepharvaim and Cutha, from which Samaria was colonized. One is an inscription of Nabu-Abaddidin (B. C. 880), furnishing a code of sacrificial ritual and a series of annual festivals for the temple of the Sun-god, so closely resembling the Jewish Levitical law, that it points the reason why the Samaritans became so soon converts to Judaism. The second is drawn from Tel-Ibrahim, the ancient Kutu, the Cutha of the Bible. This was one of the chief necropoli of Babylonia. Its temple was dedicated to Nergal, the lion-headed death-god of the Babylonians, and seems likely to throw light on the vexed question of the Babylonian disposition of the dead.

—The foregoing appeal to the British public ends with an outlook toward more Eastern exploration still. This is on the ground of the Sarzec statues and the historical and mythological inscriptions, telling of the Akkadian emigrants' journey to the plains of Shinar, through the provinces of Khuzistan and Kurdistan. Here Sir Henry Rawlinson is quoted as saying, "Layard, in his paper on Khuzistan, mentions twelve places in Elymais where cuneiform inscriptions are either known or are believed to exist, yet of this grand collection we have only two short and sadly copied specimens from Mal-Amir and Kul-Faroun." What a field does Elymais present to an enterprising archæologist.

—Sir Henry Rawlinson's acceptance of the approximate date of 3800 B. C. for Sargon the Great should not be forgotten. In a letter to the "Athenæum" of December 9, 1882, the substance of which is printed in the "Independent" of January 18, 1883, he gives the grounds for adopting this immense, and, at first sight, improbable chronology. Our readers will recall the discovery of the Nabonidus cylinder, by H. Rassam, on the site of Sippara, the Biblical Sepharvaim, and its decipherment by T. G. Pinches of the British Museum. Nabonidus, the last native king of Babylon, the inveterate antiquary, unearthed thirty-two feet below the surface the inscription on the foundation-stone of the Temple of the Sun, a memorial tablet of Naram Sin, son of Sargina, which he said had not been seen by mortal eye for 3200 years. Sir H. Rawlinson, a sober and cautious judge, accepts the figures. (1.) From the allusions in royal inscriptions to intervals of 60 to 1600 years, as if notorious. (2.) Because Berosus, in presence of the documents, after classifying the dynasties to 2400 B. C., names 86 kings of one line, extending from the Median Conquest to the Flood. Now, allowing 20 years to a reign, we have $20 \times 86 = 1720$ years, which, added to 2400,

gives us 4120 B. C., a still older date than that in question. (3.) The Flood was an accepted historical epoch, and Sargina is named in close connection with it. The fact that he was deified later does not disprove his historic personality. For this is put beyond doubt by the summary of events on an astrological tablet, by Nabonidus's discovery at the Temple of the Sun, by an inscription of an alabaster vase found by the French in 1852, but lost in the Tigris afterward.

— The subject of the Deluge is revived further by a review of the second edition of Schrader's masterly "*Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*" (Giessen, 1883). This appears in the October number of the "*Studien und Kritiken*," from the pen of Gustav Röscher. The writer calls attention to the far closer connection between the Biblical narrative and the Chaldean legend than Berosus had given some to suppose. The Hebrew knowledge of this legend by no means dates from the exile. Noah is already a well-known personage in Ezekiel and the second Isaiah.

— Even more, however, has the publication, by Dr. Paul Haupt, of the cuneiform narrative of the Deluge, in the same book, furnished the Assyriologist with facts of fascinating moment. No reader of it will wish to lessen Schrader's prefatory praise of the piercing insight and comprehensive learning of his coadjutor. On the contrary, he will be grateful that the last "*Hebrew Student*," now the "*Old Testament Student*," Chicago, contains an article on the same theme, from the same pen, and that Johns Hopkins University has now this brilliant investigator giving instruction to American students in Hebrew, Ethiopic, Arabic, and Sumero-Akkadian. The coming of such a scholar to our shores is an educational event of the happiest omen.

Another German, Friedrich Delitzsch, has been enriching the "*Athenæum*" with a series of seven papers, beginning May 5, 1883, on the "*Importance of Assyriology to Hebrew Lexicography*." He is severe in his strictures on the ninth edition of Gesenius's dictionary for its forcing Arabic meanings into Hebrew words, and for its slighting of Assyriological derivations and discoveries. According to him, the Rem of Job xxxix. 9, 10, is not the corresponding Arabic word *antilope leucoryx*. "This animal's home is only in the sands of Arabia and Africa. The Rem is the Ri-mu of the cuneiform inscriptions. He is the strong-horned, fierce-looking, wild bull, skilled in climbing mountains, whose colossal and formidable likeness was placed by the Assyrian kings before the entrance of their palaces, to ward off and terrify the approaching enemy." The Hebrew names for the months Dr. Delitzsch would have no longer saddled with Sanskrit, Persian, or even Hebrew etymologies. Of Babylonian origin, let them show their parentage. "Nisān, in Babylonian nisānu, the name of the first month, means, doubtless, 'start,' 'beginning,' from nisu, which is also the meaning of Tishrī, in Babylonian, Tishritu, the first month of the second half of the year. Iyyār — in Babylonian, Airu, Aru, — means the 'bright month'; Adar — in Babylonian, Addaru, February-March, is the 'dull, gloomy month,' that time being specially rainy in Babylonia. The rainy season commences in Tēbēt, *i. e.*, December-January, the month of rain-showers, according to Sennacherib's graphic account (Sennacherib, iv. 75), for Tēbētu means the 'sinking in water' from tibū." Two of the writer's many Scriptural revisions are of special

interest. One is Canticles ii. 1, where he reads the Hebrew equivalent to *chabatsillatu*, "I am the *reed* of Sharon and the lily of the valley." The other is Psalm xxiii. 2, "He causes me to *rest* beside the still waters," which he confirms by the standing side by side of *nahālu*, *nāchu*, and *rabātsu*, in the old Babylonian lists of verbal synonyms.

— The famous Shapira forgery, as far as connected with the British Museum, is summed up historically in the Quarterly Statement of the Palestine Exploration Fund, October, 1883. First appears a succinct narrative of the negotiations with the British Museum by M. Shapira. Following it are letters from M. Clermont Ganneau, who was the cause of the discovery of the spurious potteries offered to the German government, by the same dealer some years before, from Captain Conder, who was claimed falsely as a voucher for M. Shapira, and from Professor Sayce of Oxford. The last link in the chain of exposure is given by Dr. Ginsburg in his elaborate and convincing report to Dr. Bond, with reasons external and internal for esteeming the MS. a fraud concocted by several Jews who used the margins of synagogue scrolls for material and the Moabite stone for model.

— Rev. John P. Peters, Ph. D., who early in the year sent notes from abroad to the "Hebrew Student," and later was the author of some able articles in the "N. Y. Evening Post," on the "Study of Hebrew in American Colleges," has just read a paper on the "Babylonian Origin of the Alphabet," before the American Oriental Society, which attracted marked attention, although its leading positions did not command general assent.

— Professor G. D. Lyon, of Cambridge, the tireless and enthusiastic incumbent of the Harvard chair of Assyriology, is to represent American scholars on the staff of the new "*Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung und verwandte Gebiete*," Otto Schultze, Leipsic, publisher. Marc Bezold and Fritz Hommel, Privatdocent of the University of Munich, are the editors-in-chief, assisted by A. Amiaud and E. Babelon, both of Paris. The magazine is to be international in character. English, German, French, and Italian are the languages to be used by the writers. In scope it will treat of Babylonian and Assyrian research, including language and history. Under this general head we are promised the publication of shorter texts, palæographic, grammatical and lexical articles; Semitic and non-Semitic, geographical and historical papers on the countries of the Euphrates and Tigris, and investigations from the earliest sources in the religions, art, and culture of Western Asia. It is expected that Schrader will write in the opening number on the pronunciation of the sibilants in Assyrian, and Oppert on some recently discovered Akkadian monuments.

— On the 31st of October the Archæological Institute of America held a public meeting in Boston, at which reports were heard from Professor W. S. Goodwin, of Harvard, the first director of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, and Mr. J. T. Clarke, the leader of the expedition to Assos. From the excellent report of the "Daily Advertiser" of November 1, we draw the following: Professor Goodwin spoke of the school of the French government on Mount Lycabettus, thirty-seven years old, with M. Foucart for director; and of the German school, now in its tenth year, Professor Kohler director, an offshoot of the great institute founded by Bunsen and Niebuhr in the Capitol at Rome. The Ameri-

can school with eight pupils originated from Mr. Clarke's spirited letters on the classic remains still unexplored in Athens, and has been housed where its windows command a view of the broad Saronic Gulf, and the hills whence Agamemnon's signal fire flashed the tidings of the capture of Troy to Clytemnestra at Argos. The English, last June, met at Marlborough House to consider the expediency of forming a fourth school, and some twenty or thirty scholars, Mr. Gladstone at their head, urged that course; in consequence of which large subscriptions have since been made for the purpose.

— The excellent work done by the American students in Athens was next commented on, and the modern literary Greek was declared to differ less from that of Xenophon than the Greek of Xenophon from that of Herodotus. To be abreast of the other nations, America must have a permanent instead of a temporary director. On topographical and historical accounts, for knowledge of the best plans of travel in Greece, for acquaintance with the resources of Athens, ancient and modern, for the opening of the ruins, the libraries, the museums of the city to the students; and last, not least, for familiarity with the language of Greece and the work of the other schools, a resident chief is needed, who shall have the income of a professor in our American colleges. Professor Goodwin cited the fact that the choicest works of Greek art have been discovered within the present generation, and the most famous within the last five years, and believed, if an earlier start had been made, Boston, and not Berlin, might be visited for casts and photographs of the Hermes of Praxiteles or the Nike of Pæonius. Mr. Clarke then gave a vivid account of the work at Assos, in some respects ranking with that at Olympia. The agora, the bouleuterion, the cemetery, the baths, the temple, the gymnasium, the atrium, the sarcophagi, the vases, the mosaics, the glass were described, and it is hoped will be figured in suitable monumental volumes. The Rev. Phillips Brooks offered the final resolutions of support and of finance, which were enthusiastically carried.

John Phelps Taylor.

BOOK NOTICES.

BIBLICAL STUDY; ITS PRINCIPLES, METHODS, AND HISTORY; TOGETHER WITH A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS OF REFERENCE. By C. A. BRIGGS, D. D. 12mo, pp. xv., 506. New York: C. Scribner's Sons. 1883.

This is a general introduction to Exegetical Theology. The material is disposed under three heads: Biblical Literature (Canon, Textual Criticism, Higher Criticism); Biblical Exegesis; Biblical Theology. Much the larger part of the book is given to the first division, under which we have chapters on The Languages of the Bible; The Bible and Criticism; The Canon of Scripture; The Text of the Bible; The Higher Criticism; The Literary Study of the Bible; Hebrew Poetry. The lack of a strictly methodical arrangement of these chapters is, no doubt, due to the relation of the work to the earlier occasional writings of the author which are enumerated in the preface. The whole work finds a fitting conclusion in a chapter on The Scripture as a Means of Grace.

A book covering this ground, and written with an eye to the needs of the busy parish clergy, theological students, and intelligent laymen, could hardly fail of wide usefulness, especially at a time when the interest in all that concerns the Bible is as deep and general as it is now.

Dr. Briggs has done his work thoroughly well. He has brought to it a learning of which he is master, a spirit at once reverent and critical, and an enthusiasm for the Bible which is contagious. He has expressed himself clearly, vigorously, and opportunely. In the chapters which have to do with Biblical criticism, he has explained, in a very lucid way, the aim and methods of criticism, confident that when these are understood there will no longer be any question of the right and duty of criticism.

He protests against the attempt to lay the anathema of dogmatic theology upon the critical study of the Bible or its results. "Biblical criticism is confronted by traditional views of the Bible that do not wish to be disturbed, and by dogmatic statements respecting the Bible which decline reinvestigation and revision. The claim is put forth that these traditional views and dogmatic statements are in accordance with the Scriptures and the symbols of the church, and that the orthodox faith is put in peril by criticism." He declares that the Bible cannot be imperiled by a more thorough study of it; that truth need not fear criticism; and that "these cries of alarm for the church and the Bible, in their last analysis usually amount to nothing more than peril to certain favorite views." He warns those who are pressing the critics with the dilemma, *inerrancy* or *uninspired*, that they are not so likely to impale the critics — who would poorly deserve their name if they failed to detect the fallacy and escape — as "to catch the people who know nothing of criticism, and so undermine and destroy their faith."

Dr. Briggs's manly and strong defense of the right of criticism has the more weight because his own views on most critical questions are conservative; a fact which appears in various parts of this book, as well as in his article on *The Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch*, in the "Presbyterian Review," January, 1883.

For a pretty large class of readers his arguments will get additional weight from the proof he brings — the fruit of a thorough special study of the Puritan Reformation — that the freer views which he advocates are really more in accord with those of the fathers of the Westminster Symbols than the scholasticism of some who have constituted themselves the peculiar defenders of that faith. Altogether, this is a book which one would like to see in the hands of every thoughtful reader of the Bible.

One or two criticisms of points of detail may be permitted. We cannot think that the author has sufficiently guarded himself from misunderstanding on page 72 where he describes the work of Christianity, on the ethical side, as consisting in "the elevation of the graces of meekness, patience, long-suffering, self-sacrifice; and the dethronement of the Greek virtues of strength, beauty, bravery, and manhood." Christianity has already suffered too much, from within and from without, because of the notion that it means to dethrone the virtues of strength and manhood. The reviewer regrets that Dr. Briggs gives the weight of his influence to the custom of writing the Old Testament name of God, *Jahveh*. In German, from which we have borrowed it, this may be a fair transcription; but on an English tongue, *Jahveh* sounds scarcely nearer the true pronunciation than *Jehovah*. Why not *Yahwè*, or *Yahveh*?

The bibliographical appendix is a valuable feature of the book. It is a careful selection, not collection, of titles. Here and there an addition suggests itself — Nöldeke, for example, is missed among the Syriac grammars — but in general both the inclusion and exclusion justify themselves. A simple system of marks points out from the larger list books to be specially recommended to laymen, or for a pastor's library. The three indexes greatly facilitate the use of the work. The publishers have done their part well. A few misprints have crept in, especially in the Appendix, — *Catafalgo*, p. 434; Lane, *Eward*, ib.; *Dunker*, p. 473, for example, but none, so far as we have observed, that are likely to cause any inconvenience to the reader.

G. F. Moore.

THE SCRIPTURAL IDEA OF MAN. By REV. MARK HOPKINS, D. D. New York: C. Scribner's Sons. 1883.

This is a small volume made up from six lectures given to the students of the New Haven, Chicago, and Oberlin, and subsequently to those of the Princeton Theological Seminaries. It is a book of results rather than of processes. The conception is felicitous. Man in his original state, as created in the image of God, man in his present condition, and man as receiving a still larger increment of Divinity in the man Christ Jesus, furnish the central points of the discussion.

The book is of special interest as showing the conclusions which Dr. Hopkins has reached on points now under discussion between Christian Theists and the assailants both of Christianity and of all genuine science. For the larger part of a century, which seems destined to be known in history as the century of agnosticism, Dr. Hopkins has been a student and teacher of philosophy. He has been able to watch the discussion as to the ultimate grounds of human knowledge, awakened by the idealism of Berkeley denying validity to the sense perceptions, and by the universal skepticism of Hume denying validity to the other forms of knowledge. Within the century attempts to rebuild the fabric of science upon a firm basis have been made by men worthy to rank with the philosophers of any age, and the problems they have attempted to solve have carried both the assaults upon Christianity and its defense to the last point at which either assault or defense is possible. The denial of man's power to know the supersensible by any apparatus of cognition in his possession, is the gist of all infidelity and atheism in our times. The denial of his power to know anything, even to know that he doubts, is a strategic refuge — a sort of philosophical bomb-proof — to which, notwithstanding its utter darkness, skepticism retreats, whenever it is driven from the only position it really cares to maintain, that man, though knowing all that is "of the earth earthy," knows nothing heavenly or divine.

Dr. Hopkins deals with the questions raised in this great polemic of our age, in the quiet, easy fashion, possible only to a long and thorough familiarity with the subject. His book will be read with special interest as a conclusion and a testimony.

Dr. Hopkins is clear and strong in rejecting the substitution of *feeling* or *faith* for an intellectual cognition of religious truth. He emphasizes the definition of faith which identifies it with confidence in a person.

He rejects Calderwood's definition, namely, "The consciousness of our primary beliefs," as well as Hamilton's, "Faith is the organ by which we apprehend that which is beyond our knowledge." He also condemns that very common conception which is formulated by Christlieb as "The principle by which we apprehend the invisible."

We may say that this so-called "faith" is *knowledge*, knowledge gained through relations, — the relations of things seen with the involved correlated things unseen. In many cases it is the highest form of knowledge. But it is not *faith*, unless that word be used in a forced sense, given to it to meet a philosophical emergency.

To such a statement, as we understand it, Dr. Hopkins would assent. At least he falls back with entire confidence upon a true and proper knowledge as the basis both of Theism and of Christianity. His discussion of the knowledge of man, as a reproduction of the knowledge of God, in whose image he was made, is discriminating and full of interest.

Upon the point, vital to the whole discussion, as to the capacity of the mind to pass over from its own subjective states to the objective reality of things, the treatment is not so satisfactory. Dr. Hopkins uses the word *intuition*, not in the sense, more and more sanctioned by recent usage, of the knowledge of necessary truth, but in the Kantian sense of *direct* or *immediate* knowledge of any kind. To designate necessary truths he uses the term "truth of reason." If we should offer any criticism upon the book, it would be that the necessity of these truths is only claimed to be a necessity of our own minds. If the author holds that this necessity is a necessity of things and not of thought only, he certainly does not hold it, as Hamilton would say, "articulately." On the contrary, he repeatedly describes the "necessity" in the case as resulting from our own constitution. (Page 30.) We believe in *space, time, cause*, etc., not because we see that they are a necessity of things, but because "we are so constituted that we must believe them." (Page 28.)

It is a very remarkable evidence of the power of Kant's "Critique," in which he converted the great entities of the universe into mere "modes of thought," that so many of the ablest and clearest Theistic writers of the past decade have feared to abandon the shelter of subjectivity under which he placed all necessary truths. It would seem a necessary truth, that such an admission is a virtual surrender to absolute agnosticism.

Dr. Hopkins's discussion is in all other respects masterly, and his book will command the attention of all thinking men.

J. P. Gulliver.

NATURAL LAW IN THE SPIRITUAL WORLD. By HENRY DRUMMOND, F. R. S. E., F. G. S. Second edition, pp. xxiv., 414. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1883.

This book has an interesting history. Its author had been accustomed on week days to lecture on the natural sciences, and on Sundays to speak on religious themes. His audience on the Lord's day was largely composed of workingmen. For a time his secular and his religious addresses were widely separated in method as well as in subject. He regarded religion and science as two entirely distinct and independent departments of thought. But as he proceeded lines of interconnection

began to multiply, until at last he found himself, to his own surprise, "enunciating spiritual law in the exact terms of biology and physics." His method is advocated and illustrated in the work before us, which contains an Introduction stating the principles of this *Novum Organon*, and a series of papers in which it is applied to various doctrines of Christianity. The tone of the book is throughout serious and earnest. We are attracted by the writer's evident desire to communicate to others, in their endeavors to find solid ground for a Christian life, a secret which has been of practical advantage to himself, and which he divulges with genuine modesty, but also with personal confidence. The needs of those whom he particularly addresses are forcibly stated:—

"It is recognized by all that the younger and abler minds of this age find the most serious difficulty in accepting or retaining the ordinary forms of belief. Especially is this true of those whose culture is scientific. And the reason is palpable. No man can study modern science without a change coming over his view of truth. What impresses him about Nature is its solidity. He is there standing upon actual things, among fixed laws. And the integrity of the scientific method so seizes him that all other forms of truth begin to appear comparatively unstable. He did not know before that any form of truth could so hold him; and the immediate effect is to lessen his interest in all that stands on other bases. . . . This is an inevitable result of the scientific training. It is quite erroneous to suppose that science ever overthrows Faith, if by that is implied that any natural truth can oppose successfully any single spiritual truth. Science cannot overthrow Faith; but it shakes it. Its own doctrines, grounded in Nature, are so certain, that the truths of Religion, resting to most men on Authority, are felt to be strangely insecure. . . . None but those who have passed through it can appreciate the radical nature of the change wrought by Science in the whole mental attitude of its disciples. What they really cry out for in Religion is a new stand-point — a stand-point like their own. The one hope, therefore, for Science is more Science." (Pages xx. seq.)

"There is a sense of solidity about a Law of Nature which belongs to nothing else in the world. . . . This, more than anything else, makes one eager to see the Reign of Law traced in the Spiritual Sphere." (Page xxiii.)

The new point of view, our author thinks, is gained when we introduce natural law into the realm of spiritual truth. It is not enough to trace analogies between the constitution of nature and religion, nor to show the analogy of religion to the course of nature; we must go further, and show that the identical laws which are solid to us in the natural world exist also in the spiritual, and thus gain an assurance that the one realm is as real and cognizable as the other. This, however, does not imply that the phenomena of the two spheres are identical. A religious experience is not the same as a physical. The identity which is maintained is simply one of law. The same laws operate in both regions, — on matter in one, on spirit in the other, — but this does not assume that there is no radical distinction between the material and the spiritual. Nor does the author claim that natural law covers the whole of the spiritual world. There is a region of the unknown, of mystery. His contention is, that what is sure as law in the lower sphere runs through the higher, and so there is a scientific certainty in matters of religion as really as in secular

things. A clear illustration of this method is given in the essay on Biogenesis. The law expressed in the words: "He that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son of God hath not life," is identical with the law, "*Omne vivum ex vivo*." Spontaneous generation is excluded religiously no less than naturally. Life invariably comes from life. The quality of life differs in the two cases, but the law of life is the same. Therefore the religious doctrine of the necessity of regeneration by the Holy Spirit is not a mere *dictum* of authority, but a law of nature — a solid truth of science. In the same way the author endeavors to vindicate a number of other fundamental Christian verities.

Is this a method to be trusted and commended? We have a keen appreciation of the need our author would remedy. We sympathize with him in his desire to relieve the difficulties of men whose embarrassments he depicts. We are not surprised that his method has met with applause. But is it really serviceable, — or rather, is it a true one? We do not question the reign of law, nor that the advance in natural science offers many striking and helpful analogies between the method of divine operation in different departments of the creation. The naturalness of the supernatural is an important and recognized plea of modern Christian apologetics. Our author brings to view very strikingly a number of important resemblances between natural and spiritual laws, analogies of great practical significance which he uses with no little homiletic skill. His book is worthy of study in this regard. Yet its main contention does not seem to us to be true, and it might easily lead those who are more eager to defend accepted religious doctrines than to find solid grounds of religious faith and life, to the use of weapons which sooner or later will be turned against them.

The identity of natural and spiritual laws, if it is a fact of science or of knowledge, must signify much more than our author appreciates. Thought out, it means an extension of natural laws through the spiritual world, and of spiritual through the natural. Nor merely this. It identifies phenomena as well as laws. For if the phenomena are incapable of transmutation or correlation, if they are generically dissimilar, then the laws which they reveal, which are only discoverable through them, and are but their "ascertained working sequence or constant order," if they are anything more than formal, must be equally unlike. Or shall we resort to the empty saying that in each case alike there is a sequence which may be expressed by a common term, as we may speak of the pain of a burn, and of the pain of remorse? Then it comes to this, that identity of law means simply that words may be used with a double sense, which, indeed, seems to us to be the amount, at times, of the reasoning of this book; that is, the *Novum Organon* is of the nature of a scientific pun. If anything more is really and thoroughly held, anything beyond analogy and type and unity of plan, we reach an identification not merely of law, but of phenomena, as respects their essential and generic character, and thus any radical distinction between matter and spirit, the natural and the supernatural, is abandoned. There are not wanting indications in this volume that such a Monism at times hovers before the mind of the writer, though it is never firmly grasped.

The author rests his case on the Law of Continuity. But the argument is conclusive only on the assumption of identity of known spheres of existence, that is, of the material and the spiritual.

This is a misinterpretation of Continuity, which is a general principle rather than a particular law. It does not require us to hold that every established sequence extends universally. Such an understanding of the principle would abolish the distinction between the organic and the inorganic departments of nature. The curious reply is made, that the laws (that of gravitation is specified) continue, but do not operate for lack of material — the mill-stone goes on revolving though there is nothing in the hopper. Since, however, the law is sequence of phenomena, what the scientific evidence of its operation is, when confessedly it does not operate, is not clear. When it is further said that it is the same law which operates on matter at one end, and on spirit at the other, the question arises why this concession of non-operation should be made, — why gravitation, for instance, should not be held to operate upon souls as upon bodies, just as does the law *omne vivum ex vivo*. When it is further conceded that new laws may arise in particular spheres, the argument from Continuity becomes hopelessly confused.

We have noticed this volume because it deserves to be read for the many pithy and pointed statements it contains of religious truths, and for many striking confirmations it gives of a conformity of the natural to the spiritual, of their true and inward harmony, and of the naturalness of the supernatural. We believe a great work remains to be done in tracing the laws of the spiritual as well as of the natural, and in showing the reciprocal relations and harmony of the two. But it is indispensable to this result (and that this may be said is another reason of this notice) that there be no confusion in this matter, and especially that there be no premature recasting of Christian dogma in scientific moulds. The outcome, in the present instance, of such a method is a doctrine of the loss of life (existence) by the great majority of human beings, and an identification of Evolution and Redemption. We believe there are other and surer methods of commending to “men of science” the truths of spiritual religion.

Egbert C. Smyth.

CAMBRIDGE SERMONS. By ALEXANDER MCKENZIE. Boston : D. Lothrop & Co. 1883.

These are the utterances of a brilliant mind. Coming as they do from a preacher of ability and success, and chosen doubtless by “selection of the fittest,” we may accept them as samples of the effectiveness of the Cambridge pulpit. When we come to seek for the qualities in which that effectiveness lies, we are reminded of the saying of Valerius Maximus, that “a great part of Demosthenes is wanting, for it must be heard and not read.” To get the impressiveness, the force, the unction these sermons doubtless conveyed to their hearers, one must imagine the preacher behind them. They need the personal presence and magnetism to give them their real flavor and significance.

Their effectiveness is not to be found in their structure. The method is often fragmentary, and the thinking discursive. There is intense moral purpose, but it does not cut for itself a straight logical track. We are led sometimes along well-defined pathways, but oftener across tessellated pavements. They are beautiful, but it is beautiful mosaic. It

happens, therefore, that the reader finds himself stumbling over an occasional obscurity, which was not to be anticipated in such a crystal medium. The obscurity is not in the style. There is nothing nebulous in that. It lies in the broken sequences of the thought.

Nor does the effect come from reasoning. The only argument used is the appeal to common sense. An English friend said to us recently, — "I hear very little reasoning in American sermons. They all affirm." The sermons before us are striking examples of the statement. So uniformly are they expressed in that method that the style even, otherwise so sparkling and limpid, becomes seriously clogged. The constantly recurring affirmations grow into a wearisome monotony, and we wonder why the preacher does not enliven his sentences with a freer use of the question, and other more spirited forms.

It is not by these methods that Dr. McKenzie produces his effect. He relies upon the momentum of his theme, his moral earnestness, his strong convictions, his evangelical fervor, his knowledge of men and affairs, his exuberant diction, and his oratorical power. Given such a man as the Cambridge pastor, endowed with such spiritual forces as these, and the discourses before us, however indifferent in structure, must be and would be effective. But they would surely be more so if the missing qualities were supplied.

Looking at the individual sermons, note the felicity and ingenuity with which the theme is drawn from the text and placed before the hearer. No flowery or finical introductions embarrass the pathway to the truth. We can promise the reader too that, unlike the usual arrangement of published sermons, these will improve as he advances. The seventh is better than any that precede it. The eighth, tenth, and fifteenth are better still. The ninth is a capital specimen of accommodation, and is of sterling value. A very ingenious theme is found in "The wayside seed," sermon fourteen, somewhat rambling indeed, but practical and suggestive. The eleventh is the only doctrinal one in the group, and is an impressive discussion of God's love manifested in the atonement. The fifth may be valuable to the friends of the "Good merchant," whose memory it embalms, but otherwise is too ephemeral for preservation. The fourth is a plea for sailors, with a felicitous motto-text; but we wonder that "the son of a sailor" could not enter more keenly into the life and thought and needs of the men of the sea.

The book abounds with delightful and racy passages, sometimes eloquent. For example, the creed which is contained in the text (p. 34); religion weakened by lack of obedience (p. 50); the true ideal of heaven (p. 231); our daily round and daily advance, illustrated by the movements of the earth (p. 163); other notable illustrations (pp. 120, 141); and the occasional happy use of the dramatic element (pp. 235, 259, *et als.*). The spirit of these discourses is thoroughly manly, evangelical, and devout. They are rich with gospel truth and tender feeling. It would be well for the Church and the world if there were more of such preachers and such preaching.

John S. Sewall.

THINGS NEW AND OLD IN DISCOURSES OF CHRISTIAN TRUTH AND LIFE.
By WASHINGTON GLADDEN. Columbus, Ohio: A. H. Smythe. 1883.

When a preacher publishes a book of sermons we may expect to find in it both the principles of his thinking and the conclusions to which they have led him,—the seed of philosophy and theology and the fruit of practical duty. And if the author has written widely and miscellaneously, we may expect to find in such a volume the sum of his various teachings in their finest and most spiritual forms. Dr. Gladden has long been known as an author, an editor, a magazinist, a story-teller, a poet, a critic, a debater, a political economist. Such variety of work might suggest a miscellaneous and possibly inconsistent thinker, but it can safely be said of his work in general, and of this volume, that a severe unity pervades both. Dr. Gladden is an author who has not felt his way, nor worked tentatively, but early caught the spirit of modern thought, and planted himself upon its principles, which he thoroughly mastered. In all his writings, we find the same intense recognition of ethics as a point from which, and an end to which all his thought is directed; but it is ethics drawn from above and not from below or around,—ethics resting on revelation. While there is great variety in these sermons, as their titles indicate, they dwell steadily on life and character; they are bathed in an atmosphere of sympathy with the real and present ills of humanity; they plead for a realization of redemption from the evil and sorrow that press upon society and the individual; they unfold the gospel as a power that delivers from the evil by curing it. Hence they are in the last degree practical,—never outside of the every-day life and needs of the every-day men and women about him. Whether he touches so purely spiritual a theme as that of the sermon, “The Great Voice from Heaven,” or one so purely scientific as that of “The Parable of the Climbing Plants,” the hearer is left with a deep sense of practical duty. Dr. Gladden’s method, as a preacher, is to lay hold of a single truth—large and important, which he has himself first clearly apprehended; he explains it, sets it in its relations, then buttresses it by analogies from nature and society, illuminates it with scriptural illustration, and finally applies it, in a close, suggestive, and helpful way to the very people before him. There is an utter absence of the tentative method,—taking a text and feeling the way, trusting it may lead to some valuable conclusion. This may be a good method for the study, but it is a very bad one for the pulpit. Hence, we note in these sermons a tone of confidence and authority; “I believed, therefore have I spoken.” Dr. Gladden is emphatically a teacher. All his warmth and earnestness and effort run to this end,—to instruct, to get his idea into the hearer’s mind: but no one need open this book expecting to find the dullness of mere didactics; every page is rich with the glow of imagination and the treasures of wide and exact knowledge. It is the peculiarity of these sermons, and their highest merit, that they bring the reader to what Dr. Bushnell called “a first-hand” perception of truth. They do not speak through a system of theology, nor through traditional conceptions, but take one straight up to the truth that Christ or St. Paul uttered. There is, therefore, in them a certain fullness of light and force that is at times startling. In this respect Dr. Gladden is in full accord with the style of exegesis that is coming on, as illustrated in Bruce and Row. They have no higher quality, nor can any sermons have a higher,

than as *interpretative*. As such, they meet in a marked degree the need and conscious requirement of the age. Tell us exactly what the Bible means, is the demand of thoughtful multitudes. Dr. Gladden does not ignore theology, nor is he indifferent to creeds. In the sermon that gives the title to the book, he indicates not only their value but their necessity, and many readers will be surprised at what they will term the *conservatism* of his position on these subjects, but of creed or system they will find little in these pages, but instead truth set in the clear, direct light of its original inspiration. These sermons are eminently rational, though there is no strain to bring infinite things to the level of human reason, — they rather seek to explain divine truth. Still he touches no theme that he does not leave clear and on peaceable terms with our reasonable nature. They are also strong and unwavering in their assertion of what are termed evangelical truths; the personality of God the Father, Christ a divine Redeemer from sin and evil, regeneration by the Spirit, salvation by faith that yields righteousness, personal immortality, good and evil yielding their appropriate destiny; and as such they indicate no drift towards an unsettling of faith, but are rather an assurance of the contrary.

T. T. Munger.

SERMONS PREACHED IN ENGLISH CHURCHES. By PHILLIPS BROOKS. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1883.

Dr. John Donne complained of the average church attendant of his time, "He hears but the logic, or the rhetoric, or the ethic, or the poetry of the sermon: the sermon of the sermon he hears not." Mr. Brooks's hearers hear "the sermon of the sermon." They are caught at once and held by the spiritual quality of his speech. No preacher of our time, of equal literary acquirements, has succeeded so completely in utilizing the literary power of the sermon to its moral advantage. Mr. Brooks's listeners or readers never stop to admire. Not because the flow of speech is impetuous, but because the motive is sincere, and the method consistent with the motive. The mind is not continually drawn off into epigram and figure. The current of feeling is allowed to run as deep and swift as the current of thought.

Mr. Brooks approaches his subjects for the most part through some experience common to men. His approach is not that of the theologian or philosopher, and seldom that of the expositor. His usual method is to connect the text immediately with the experience which the text suggests, or which has suggested the text. Here is the opening of his sermon from the text, "Why could not we cast him out."

"Man's perpetual surprise at his own weakness is one of the most significant and pathetic sights in human history, — sometimes it seems as if the human race, always struggling with evils which it never overcomes, taking up in each new generation the unfinished fights with want and woe and sin and folly, often appearing to lose the ground which the old generations won, and slipping back to the bottom of the hill to begin the toilsome climb again, — sometimes it seems as if man must accept failure as his fate and frankly say, 'I cannot do this which I have dreamed of doing. I was made too weak,' and so abandon the attempt. But no! That time never comes with the race, and hardly ever with the individual. Sometimes the wondering question loses its energy and dwindles into a weak querulousness. But still it continues to be asked; still man,

though prostrate on the ground, keeps sight of his ambitions ; still, though he lets himself grow weak and little, he wonders why he is not great and strong ; still, though he treasures in his heart the bad spirits of idleness and sensuality and selfishness and cruelty, something about him always bears witness that he knows that they are intruders there ; still he goes about asking, ‘ Why cannot I cast them out ? ’ never ceasing to be surprised at his own weakness and to seek for its explanation. It is the most significant and pathetic fact in all our history ; it shows how native and how persistent in man is the conviction of his essential greatness.” (Pages 179, 180.)

The insight into human life, and the evident sympathy with it, revealed in this extract show us the conditions under which Mr. Brooks’s mind is forced to act. His insight and sympathies compel him to think close to life ; they will not suffer him to think, even at that remove from life when most of the theologies and philosophies are thought out. Possibly some minds acting under other incentive and trained to other methods may not fairly estimate the intellectual reach and authority of his sermons. They may, at first, miss in them their own methods, their own forms of statement, the arguments with which they are most familiar, and the more general truths in which their own thoughts are accustomed to range. But the attentive, if not sympathetic, reading of these sermons will discover, even to such minds, the breadth and force of their intellectual movement, and the rich and fertilizing properties of thought which they possess.

Comparing the present volume of sermons with those which have preceded it, one is most impressed with the wider range of motive to which the appeal is made. Mr. Brooks always speaks to the possibilities in men. Here, perhaps, as not before to their weaknesses and sins. Since Canon Mozeley’s sermon on the “ Reversal of Human Judgment,” no more serious or searching sermon has been printed than that on “ The Fire and the Calf,” as illustrating self-deception and self-excuse. The sermon already referred to, “ Why could not we cast him out,” is a graphic picture of the weakness of unbelief, of the feebleness of man independent of God. The sermon on the “ Mind’s Love of God ” is a manly plea for the “ true place of the mind and thinking powers in religion.” How indignant and vigorous is this protest against relegating religion to the emotions.

“ I want you all to feel how thoroughly Christianity is bound to reject indignantly this whole treatment of itself. Just think how the great masters of religion would receive it ! Think of David and his cry, — “ Thy testimonies are wonderful. I have more understanding than my teachers, for thy testimonies are my study.” Think of Paul — “ O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God.” Think of Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Milton, Edwards, and a hundred more, the men whose minds have found their loftiest inspiration in religion, how would they have received this quiet and contemptuous relegation of the most stupendous subjects of human thought to the region of silly sentiment ? They were men who loved the Lord their God with all their minds. The noble relation of their intellects to Him was the supreme satisfaction of their lives. We cannot imagine them for a moment as yielding up that great region of their lives in which their minds delighted in the study and attainment of this truth.” (Page 39.)

But the essential qualities of Mr. Brooks’s pulpit power, which have been manifest in earlier volumes, are conspicuous in this. In common with those which have gone before, these sermons are the utterance of a man who has more than a message — he has a gospel. The tone is unmistakable. The authority, the certainty, the fullness, the exuberance of

the gospel message are here. Here is a man who believes, and whose faith is contagious. Here is a man who so believes that he dares to hope, and other men take courage. The prevailing thought of these sermons is that of the sufficiency of God, a sufficiency made manifest, real, available in Jesus Christ.

It were futile to raise the question as to Mr. Brooks's limitations, to ask for example whether he has the same power to convict as to awaken, to indoctrinate as to inspire. The modern pulpit is obliged to do its work, perhaps its best work, under limitations; limitations growing out of differences in education, in social influence, in the knowledge and experience of life. The present fact is that society is becoming classified in respect to the motives and methods which, under ordinary conditions, determine personal religion. It were the grossest exaggeration to say that any living preacher is reaching equally all classes in any large community. It were the merest assumption to say that any one could. When God makes the heart of a community as the heart of one man, He makes it perfectly plain that his Spirit is producing the unusual effect. At such times He can use any man as his instrument. In other and ordinary times the greatest preacher has his limitations. In some respects the greater the preacher, the greater his limitations. Of the really great preachers of the present hardly any two could exchange pulpits and each hold the other's audience for a year. Let Canon Liddon and Mr. Spurgeon try the experiment.

Mr. Brooks may be a preacher to a class, but the class to which he preaches is as wide as any which the pulpit is *actually* reaching. It is made up of men and women already under general Christian influences, but who are capable of more personal and serious religious thought and religious feeling. The sermons before us illustrate one of the best definitions of preaching yet given: "Preaching is making men think, and feel in proportion as they think."

William J. Tucker.

MARTIN LUTHER, SEIN LEBEN UND SEINE SCHRIFTEN. Von DR. JULIUS KÖSTLIN, Professor u. Konsistorialrath in Halle. Zweite, neu durchgearbeitete Auflage. 2 Bde., pp. xii., 818; x., 733. Elberfeld, 1883.

LUTHERS LEBEN, von JULIUS KÖSTLIN. Mit Authentischen Illustrationen; 59 Abbildungen im Text und 6 Beilagen, pp. xv., 615. Leipzig, 1882.

LIFE OF LUTHER. By JULIUS KÖSTLIN. With Illustrations from Authentic Sources. Translated from the German, pp. 587. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

D. MARTIN LUTHERS LEBEN UND WIRKEN. Zum 10. November, 1883, dem deutschen evangelischen Volke geschildert von D. GUSTAV PLITT, o. ö. Professor in Erlangen, vollendet v. G. F. PETERSEN, Hauptpastor in Lübeck, pp. x., 570, 8vo. Leipzig, 1883.

D. MARTIN LUTHERS WERKE. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 1 Band, pp. xxii., 710. Weimar: Hermann Böhlau. 1883.

DR. MARTIN LUTHER'S DEUTSCHE GEISTLICHE LIEDER. THE HYMNS OF MARTIN LUTHER, set to their Original Melodies, with an English Version. Edited by LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON. Assisted by NATHAN H. ALLEN. Pp. xxvii., 71. New York: Published in Commemoration of the 400th Anniversary of Luther's Birthday, Nov. 10, 1883, by Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

Dr. Köstlin, while Professor of Theology at Breslau, published in 1863 a work in two volumes on "Luther's Theology." It opened with a

sketch of Luther's inner life down to the time of the famous Theses, gave a historical exposition of his writings as a reformer and public teacher, and closed with a systematic review of his theological opinions. The work was written on the basis of a thorough study of Luther's voluminous publications, with discrimination and impartiality. In 1875, its author, who had been transferred to the University of Halle, gave to the public a biography of Luther which has taken rank among the most important historical compositions of recent years. A commission, presided over by one of the most learned students and writers of German history, Dr. George Waitz, awarded its author one of the two prizes bestowed for works in this department issued from 1865 to 1875. The other prize was given to the veteran historian Ranke. This biography now appears in a second edition, which follows the course of the first, but has been carefully revised, with the aid of important special investigations which have been published during the last few years. Dr. Köstlin's aim was to write a biography of Luther which should exhibit all that is known as to the details of his life, and that can help to a right understanding of his writings, and of his place in history. There can be but one opinion as to his qualifications for such an undertaking and the result attained. We trust that this larger work will soon find a competent translator. No other book about Luther compares with it in value.

—The smaller *Life* appeared in Germany early in 1882. It is not a mere abridgment of the larger, but has been composed for readers who may not desire so many critical details, and so full accounts of Luther's writings. It is greatly enriched by numerous authentic portraits, fac-similes, and other illustrations, all subservient to its genuine historical character. The numerous likenesses of the Reformer, with those of his father and mother, are specially instructive. The story of his life is, as it were, epitomized in these faithful representations by Cranach, especially in those executed in 1520 and 1525, compared with a third, apparently much later, introduced into an altar-piece at Weimar whose subject is the Crucifixion. This last is the noblest of all the representations, showing a countenance full of strength and light. Next to this, in some respects with it, ranks the Dresden portrait, also by Cranach. It is not inserted in the smaller German biography, but appears as the frontispiece to the second edition of the larger work. It has been very beautifully photographed by Brockmann, Dresden. The freshness, purity, geniality of the face are very marked. We fancy it is Luther's countenance as his friends often saw it during his table-talk.

—The translation of "*Luthers Leben*," published by Charles Scribner's Sons, is worthy of the original, offering to the public the most trustworthy and valuable biography in the English language. Owing to the different quality of the paper, so far as we can judge, the impression of the illustrative plates is inferior to that of the beautiful German edition. They are, however, all faithfully given, as they are all absent from the translation published by the "*Lutheran Publication Society*." We trust that in a second edition of this very valuable book the printing of the wood-cuts may be made yet more effective, and that a copy of the Weimar portrait will be added from the larger biography. The translation is very well done. Now and then a word, and occasionally a sentence, are omitted which were better retained, but we have noticed no important omission and the style is singularly free from Germanisms. **Are**

Schieferhalden and *Schlackenhausen* names of places? We cannot answer the question, but suspect that the author designates by these words merely heaps of slate and slag.

— Dr. Plitt died leaving a sentence in the narrative respecting Luther's invitation of his friends to his wedding uncompleted. The remainder, less than half, of the volume is prepared by a pastor in Lübeck, on the basis of Köstlin's larger work. Professor Plitt made the study of the history of the Reformation a specialty, and his representation of the Reformer's life and work is written from an intimate knowledge of the sources and in a clear and attractive style. It is highly praised by Professor Kawerau, a prominent German scholar in this department, in the "*Theologische Literaturzeitung*," 1883, No. 9, sp. 208-210. Professor Kawerau's review is worthy of consultation for its statement of points in which the writer differs from Dr. Plitt and other biographers. A translation of the Introduction to Dr. Plitt's "Life" was published in the "*Independent*," November 15, from the pen of the Rev. G. A. Gates, of Upper Montclair, New Jersey.

— The first volume of the new issue of Luther's Works gives promise of an edition which will meet the demands of modern scholarship. The undertaking has received the warm support of the Emperor of Germany and the Prussian Ministry, and is under the general direction of a commission composed of one representative of the government, Professor Weiss, and two delegates of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, Professor Müllenhoff and Dr. Waltz. The editor is Dr. Knaake, who has shown in previous publications distinguished qualifications for such a service. He will be aided, probably, by other specialists in this field.

In arrangement of the materials the topical plan followed in the edition of Walch and in the Erlangen, is abandoned, and the chronological method is adopted. We believe that this decision will commend itself to students of Luther's writings. The arrangement gives three natural divisions, marked by Luther's residence at the Wartburg (1521) and at Coburg (1530). The sermons are presented collectively at the end of the designated year in which they were delivered. Lectures published after their author's death, letters, and the "Table-talk" will appear at the close of the edition. Each work has an introduction, and special attention is given to the bibliography. Other peculiarities of the edition are detailed with precision in the editor's preface. Such a critical edition is much needed, and will receive a hearty welcome. The volume before us closes with the "Exposition of the 109th (110) Psalm," 1518. The mechanical execution deserves special praise. The printing (Hof-Buchdrückerei, Weimar) is remarkably good; the page clear and fair, except that when the heavy semi-barbarous German letter is used the impression shows through, owing to the thinness of the paper. The title-page is adorned with a specially beautiful border from a wood-cut ascribed to Cranach. The initial letters of the several works are from designs of the best artists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Hase's words are quoted: "Luther's works are as much a German national monument as the Cologne Cathedral." This edition proposes to care for these works in the spirit of such an estimate.

— It is one of the merits of Dr. Köstlin's biographies that the versatility and manifold gifts of Luther are duly exhibited. One of his greatest services to the Church was his reformation of its worship. This involved a

masterly appropriation of the powers of music and song. It was a happy and worthy design, on the part of Dr. Bacon and Professor Allen and of their publishers, to honor Luther's memory by publishing a collection of his Spiritual Songs, "with the musical arrangements written for or associated with them." Some of these songs and tunes have a permanent place in worship. Eighteen are included in the Berlin "Gesangbuch," four at least are in common use, and two are general favorites. All have a historical interest, and some of them in a very high degree. This collection is preceded by a spirited introduction from Dr. Bacon, and by a translation of Luther's four prefaces. All the hymns, psalms, and songs are given in the original as well as in translations. The editor has judged, and rightly we think, that an arrangement of the materials in chronological order is most appropriate to the commemorative character of this edition. This is secured to a good degree by following the order of the earlier hymn-books. In one instance, No. V., a date is inserted earlier than that of the book in which the song first appeared. Where so much has been done we would offer no criticism that more has not been attempted; but we would suggest that if the editor, in a future edition, should more fully and precisely supply the dates, and when possible, the history of the individual hymns, the collection would be much increased in value.

Meanwhile our readers may find of service some suggestions in this direction though we have not at hand all the authorities we could desire.

The first composition of which we have knowledge is No. V. of this collection. It deserves to stand first in order, for it suggests the tragic vicissitudes and exigencies out of which this hymnology arose. It is a song of martyrdoms. No. I., "a song of thanksgiving," was composed the same year (1523), as were also the versions of Psalms xii., xiv., cxxx. [See Köstlin, M. Luther, i. 573.] These were published at the beginning of 1524, with four others, making a book of eight "songs, hymns, and psalms according to the pure Word of God, . . . to be sung in the churches as already in part practiced at Wittenberg." Probably some or all of them had been separately printed previously. Later in the same year appeared the "Enchiridion" containing eighteen of Luther's songs, — thirteen besides those to which we have already referred. The first line of v. 3 of Hymn XI., in the work before us, is printed according to Baptst's edition, 1545. In the "Enchiridion" it read: "Tod, sund, leben und auch gnad." The next six numbers, XIX.-XXIV., are credited to "Walter's Gesangbuch, 1525." Leading authorities — Wackernagel, Koch, Irmischer, Köstlin — give the date 1524. It was in this edition that the first of the prefaces, reproduced by Dr. Bacon, appeared. The title which he quotes, p. xxi., alludes to an earlier edition — "erstlich zu Wittenberg," etc. It is an illustration of the energy and power with which Luther addressed himself to supplying the needs of the churches that in one year three hymn-books were published containing twenty-four compositions from his own pen. Dr. Köstlin [*op. cit.* i. pp. 574 *seq.*] gives an interesting account of these productions, which we should be glad to quote, but for which we have not space. No one can carefully examine them, in their historical connection and relations, and not be impressed with the wisdom and genius of their author. Their objective character, their adaptation to common worship, would be remarkable, con-

sidering the marked individuality of their composer, if it were not that Luther's special greatness is nowhere more evident than in this, that he could represent so many other persons.

The hymn "Ein feste Burg" is wrongly dated in this edition, p. xv., *note*. The popular association it has had with the Diet of Worms is natural, but Dr. Bacon rightly sets this aside. The best authorities assign it to the close of the year 1527, or beginning of 1528. [See Knaake, "Luther's Lied 'Ein feste Burg' im Jahre 1527 gedichtet" in Luthardt's "Zeitschrift für kirch. Wissenschaft," 1881, p. 39 *seq.*; Köstlin *op. cit.* ii. 23, 182, 645, 650.] In 1527 troubles pressed upon the Saxon Reformers from every side. Rumors were in circulation of a hostile combination of the German Roman Catholic princes. The pastor of the cathedral church in Halle was murdered. A young clergyman, Leonhard Käser, or Kaiser, a friend of Luther's, visited his dying father in Passau, was arrested, imprisoned, and, on the sixteenth of August, burned at the stake, exhibiting throughout firm Christian courage. Numerous persecutions sprang up elsewhere. Luther's soul was deeply stirred by these events and by what he regarded as the direct inward assaults of Satan. Out of these calamities and agonies came the great hymn of the Reformation.

Hymns XXVII. and XXVIII. are credited by Dr. Bacon to the "Geistliche Lieder" published in Wittenberg in 1533. He also refers Luther's "Third Preface" to Joseph Klug's Hymn Book of 1543. It is now believed to have been prefixed to a collection of "Geistliche Lieder" published by Klug in 1529, and cited by recent writers as Klug's "Gesangbuch." Köstlin refers Nos. XXVII. and XXVIII. to the same year.

The very beautiful "Children's Christmas Song" is rightly connected with Luther's experiences as a father. Professor Köstlin states that the "Susannine" in the fourteenth stanza reminds of the cradle songs which were sung by children at the Christmas manger, and the "springen, singen" of their dancing in rows or couples around the same. No. XXXI. is dated by Wackernagel and Köstlin 1539. In Hymn XXXIII., p. xi., there is a misprint of "Gott" for "Herr." It is correctly given on p. 67. With XXXIV. and XXXV. it belongs to the year 1541. Luther's composition of Hymns, which began with the "Song of the Two Martyrs," closes (1543) with a Christmas song and an "imitation of the Gregorian hymn, O Lux Beata Trinitas."

Dr. Bacon gives the "Frau Musica" from Klug's Hymn Book, 1543. It was first published in 1538.

The vignette on the title-page is from the portrait of Luther which is specially characterized by a shade of melancholy. Remembering Luther's words in the Fourth Preface and elsewhere, respecting singing with joy and delight, we should prefer to see, at least with this, a copy of one of the other likenesses.

Egbert C. Smyth.

AMERICAN COLLEGES, THEIR STUDENTS AND WORK. By CHARLES F. THWING. Second edition, pp. 212. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1883.

This book by Mr. Thwing, a graduate of Harvard, and now pastor at Cambridge, as issued in 1878, brought together with great industry a wide range of facts concerning the American colleges, and was so well

received as to call for this revised edition, enlarged by chapters on endowment, co-education, and the proposed national university. The method is comparative throughout, with no college or clerical bias, and pervaded by a tone of candor which wins confidence, though there are occasional minor slips. It is impossible to represent adequately by facts and figures any college, as an *educational* establishment. A college is more than buildings, libraries, endowments, courses of study, teachers, students, or any or all of these combined. Mr. Thwing's book gives side by side, with abundant statistics, frequent glimpses of this subtle principle, and he does not hesitate to express opinions, and draw inferences, as he discusses the chief points in college organization, administration, and history. Every one interested in our colleges, whatever be the ground of his interest, will value these compact chapters on instruction, morals, religion, sports, societies, expenses, honors, endowments, journalism, woman's education, and the choice of a college.

C. F. P. Bancroft.

THE LIFE AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF EDWARD HENRY PALMER, LATE LORD ALMONER'S PROFESSOR OF ARABIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, ETC. By WALTER BESANT. 8vo, ix., 430 pp. London: John Murray. 1883.

Palmer's life had the fascination of individuality. As a school-boy he preferred picking up Romany from vagabond tinkers and gypsy fortune-tellers to learning Latin and Greek from his tutors. For mathematics he had the linguist's incapacity. So, though he was born in Cambridge, and educated in one of its grammar schools, he passed from school, not to the university, but to a London clerkship.

In such leisure as his duties gave him he fed his language-hunger with Italian, learned from political refugees in cafés, from organ-grinders and image-venders, from sailors of Livorno, Genoa, Messina. As fast as he learned he spoke. In the end he knew not only the Florentine book-language, but the dialects from Piedmontese to Sicilian. In the same fashion he acquired French, *Argot* and all.

Before he was twenty his health broke down, and he went back to Cambridge to die of lung disease. He did not die, but recovered. While leading the purposeless life of a convalescent, and wondering what way in life would now be open to him, he made the acquaintance of Syed Abdullah, who was giving lessons in the Indian languages at Cambridge.

So Palmer became an Orientalist. Arabic, Persian, and Urdee he laid hold of first, and joining to his extraordinary gift for languages the extraordinary industry of genius, he mastered them. No man learns an Oriental language without iron perseverance. The talk about its "coming naturally" is nonsense. Palmer worked at this time eighteen hours a day. But what was he going to do with it? He had a living to make, and Arabic versions of "Lalla Rookh" are not merchantable in England. It was natural to look to the universities. He was matriculated at Saint John's College, Cambridge, in 1863, and in due time got his fellowship.

In 1868 and 1869 Palmer was with the Sinai Survey in the East, and in 1870, with Mr. Tyrwhitt Drake, he explored the plateau of El Têh. Of this expedition he wrote a most interesting account in "The Desert of the Exodus." During these months among the Bedawîn he got that

familiarity with the confusing dialects they speak, as well as that comprehension and sympathy, repaid with confidence, which led to his selection as the one man in England who could undertake the difficult task to which his life was sacrificed. Soon after his return he stood for the Professorship of Arabic at Cambridge, but unsuccessfully. A little later he was elected Lord Almoner's Professor of Arabic with a stipend of £40. After a few years he tired of the drudgery of teaching boys the Persian alphabet, threw up his university employments, and came up to London to try his fortune in journalism. From this work he was called by his country to that dangerous mission to the tribes of the peninsula, whose tragic end is still fresh in memory, but whose history is now first told from Palmer's own letters and journals.

Mr. Besant has written the story of this life with manifest affection and admiration, which he makes his readers share. An Appendix on Palmer's work, as an Oriental scholar, is by Professor Nicholl. It contains specimens of his composition in Arabic, Persian, and Hindustani.

They show that to Palmer languages were living things, with which he was familiar enough to take liberties. If pedantic philologists, to whom all languages are dead, chose to call his liberties blunders, Palmer was not the man to take it much to heart.

One question suggests itself: Why was Palmer an Orientalist rather than a Grecian? Why did he who knew a dozen languages profess all his life to know no Latin or Greek?

About the answer there need be no hesitation. He was required to learn the classic languages by methods by which not even he, with his genius for languages, could learn them. If he had studied French or Italian at school, he would have known no more of them. The outcry against the study of the classics in colleges has some justice. The error of all errors is to think that in teaching of grammar we think we are teaching a language.

George F. Moore.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

THE last number of the "Studien und Kritiken" (Jahrgang, 1884, Erstes Heft) contains an elaborate review of Weiss's "Leben Jesu," by Dr. Erich Haupt. The acuteness of the book and the finish of its style are warmly praised, and its very favorable reception by the general public acknowledged and approved. The reviewer, however, regards the author's success in solving the problems presented in our Lord's life as a matter of serious question. From the same free evangelical point of view occupied by Dr. Weiss the principal features of the book are carefully discussed. The result claimed in almost every instance is that the facts in hand do not all give the information which Dr. Weiss finds in them. To mention some of the disputed points. Dr. Weiss's position regarding the free use which John made of his recollection of Christ's teaching in composing the discourses attributed to our Lord in his Gospel is heartily approved; but the criticism is made, that it is not consistent with this position to undertake to pick out from these discourses cer-

tain sayings which were literally reported. While the acuteness with which Dr. Weiss finds traces of historical connection in the words and deeds of Christ recorded by the Synoptists is most warmly praised, the doubt is expressed whether the evidence is not strained, — at any rate, so far as the earlier part of our Lord's ministry is concerned. Indeed, the reviewer thinks that it is useless to try to make a chronological representation of this part of our Lord's ministry. The representation of Christ as beginning his work among his people with the hope of uniting them to his person and so to God, is objected to as finding no support in the narrative, and as greatly exaggerating our Lord's dependence on Old Testament prophecy for his knowledge of his work. Dr. Weiss is also said by the reviewer to give more weight to the story of Christ's birth in Matthew and Luke than a sound critical judgment would approve. His representation of the crisis which followed the miracle of the loaves, that is, that our Lord's hope of winning the people to God was then broken by their endeavor to make Him the leader of a revolution; and the alienation caused by his refusal is pronounced incredible, in view of the pains he had taken to conceal his Messiahship. The significance of Peter's confession on the day of Cæsarea Philippi is to be found not (as Dr. Weiss maintains) in the evidence it gives that his belief in Christ's Messiahship, formed long ago, remained unshaken; but as proof that he was conscious of having found in Christ the Son of God. The reviewer dissents from Dr. Weiss's view that "demoniacal possession" really implied the special agency of evil spirits, and from Dr. Weiss's disposition to resolve several of the leading miracles recorded in the Gospels into "wonderful acts of Providence." Of the article as a whole, it may be said that its chief value is the illustration it furnishes of a healthy critical spirit united to evangelical faith.

— *The Contemporary Review*, September. — "The Gods of Canaan," by Professor Sayce. An article of special value as throwing light upon the relapses of Israel into idolatry. Professor Sayce shows the spiritual significance of the worship of the Canaanites, explains its doctrine of sacrifice, why, for example, the first-born were made to pass through the fire, and discloses the secret of the fascination of this worship for the Israelites. His description of the "Feast of Tammuz" is intelligent and graphic. We see the reason and the meaning of Ez. viii. 14. Any one reading this article will have a clear idea of the cultus of the Canaanites, and of its temptation to Israel.

In the same number, "The Work of Trades Unions," by George Howell, to be read in connection with an article by Frederic Harrison (October), on "The Progress of Labor." The trades unions of Great Britain are becoming great corporations. Here is an extract from the balance-sheet of seven societies, for the year 1882. Income: \$1,500,000. Expenditures: For sickness, \$300,000; funerals, \$100,000; superannuation, \$200,000; accidents, \$30,000; out of work, \$300,000; strikes, \$30,000. Attention may fairly be called to the small amount paid out for strikes. The statistics given in these papers may be compared with those (less accurate) in respect to trades unions in the United States, given before the Education and Labor Commission of the United States Senate.

November. — "The Future Prospects of Madagascar," by Rev. G. A. Shaw (the English missionary imprisoned by the French). A some-

what disappointing title to an article of considerable worth, as showing the resources of the island, the temper of the people, and the present religious state of affairs.

In the same number, Dr. R. W. Dale, of Birmingham, writes of "The Leeds Conference" of the Liberal party. Dr. Dale is worthy of the rank of a statesman. He is probably the foremost representative of the Non-conformist clergy in the Liberal party. His views are intelligent in regard to its policy and its unfinished work. In this article he discusses the relation of the party to Mr. Gladstone's leadership, and the order of the reforms upon which it will insist.

— *The Expositor*. — Dean Plumptre's series of articles upon "Isaiah as a Man," running through recent numbers, may be compared with Matthew Arnold's article upon "Isaiah of Jerusalem," in earlier numbers of the "Nineteenth Century."

BOOKS RECEIVED.

FROM CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

History of the Christian Church. By Philip Schaff. Vol. II. *Ancient Christianity*, A. D. 160–325, pp. xiv., 877, 8vo.

The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief. By George P. Fisher, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale College, pp. xviii., 488, crown 8vo.

A Popular Commentary on the New Testament. By English and American Scholars of various Evangelical Denominations. With Illustrations and Maps. Edited by Philip Schaff, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Sacred Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. In four volumes. Vol. IV., The Catholic Epistles and Revelation, pp. 161.

Philosophic Series, No. IV. Certitude, Providence, and Prayer. By James McCosh, D. D., D. L., President of Princeton College, etc., pp. 46, 12mo.

The Theory of Morals. By Paul Janet, Member of the Institute, Author of *Final Causes*, etc. Translated from the latest French Edition, pp. x., 490, 8vo.

The International Revision Commentary of the New Testament. Based upon the Revised Version of 1881. By English and American Scholars and Members of the Revision Committee. Edited by Philip Schaff, D. D., LL. D., etc., etc. Vol. IV. The Gospel according to St. John. By Dr. Milligan and Dr. Moulton, pp. xlv., 443, 16mo.

Golden Thoughts from the Spiritual Guide of Miguel Molinos, the Quietist. With Preface by J. Henry Shorthouse, author of "John Inglesant," pp. 135, 16mo.

THE
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THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF PROVIDENCE.

THE Universe has a rational and ethical basis. It presupposes intelligence and benevolence as well as power. There are purpose, plan, and process in creation and history. This, briefly, is the reality of Providence. God creates with reference to an intelligible end. The end is sought in accordance with a predetermined, intelligible plan. It is accomplished through an intelligible historic process. Of such purpose, plan, and process there is a specifically Christian conception. To discuss the Christian conception of Providence from these three points of view is the design of this essay.

There lies before us the astonishing disclosure of revelation that Christianity is, in God's estimate, the supreme practical interest. As such it enters controllingly into his whole plan and procedure. The universe as a whole in its idea, inception, perpetuation, control, development, and end, has a definitely Christian significance. God's loving thought and purpose take relation, from the beginning, with sin and redemption, and they are historically realized through distinctively Christian agencies. Christianity is, therefore, ideally and historically determinative of Providence. In other words, it enters regulatively into the whole plan and history of the moral and material worlds. It is at the very heart of the divine purpose. It is laid into the very root of creation. It determines the world's conservation and controls its government. Providence then, as contained in the world-idea and process, cannot be detached from Christianity as the absolute interest; apart from Christianity, there were no creation and no history. To speak more specifically and concretely, the pre-historic and historic Christ is the central and determinative reality of Providence. He enters into the very life of God's idea. He is the perfect embodiment of his intelligence and love. Already from the beginning, God's loving thought and

purpose find in Him their adequate summation, and He becomes the creative source of the universe. He abides controllingly unto the end in the divine procedure, and is the pervasive and regulative power and final goal of history. In Him, through Him, by Him, and to Him are all things. It is in this Christian conception of Providence, the latest and choicest fruit of the Christian revelation, that the supreme significance and worth of Christ for the universe find adequate realization.

The chief factor in any conception of Providence is final purpose. Why does the universe exist, whither does it move, what its purposed end? The rational and moral impulse forces the question. Respect for our own manhood, as the crown of creation, should keep it before us. The problem of final purpose is a real problem. It cannot be a hopeless one in a universe that forces its recognition. Things as they exist are not in reason their own ultimate end. They are not the solution of their own problem. We understand nothing adequately till we know it in its purpose. All questions of method and process have chief significance in the question of the end. The rationale of existences concerns the why as well as how. No man can care with largest intelligence for the becoming and ongoing of things, who shuts his eyes to their direction and end. Christianity, as a rational and ethical interest, is supremely concerned with this question of the end. A universe without an intelligible moral goal is a hopeless contradiction. It sets at naught and brings into inextricable confusion its highest product. We cannot think without thinking final as well as efficient cause. To affect to ignore it is simply an unsuccessful attempt at the stultification of intelligence. The idea is irrepressible. It demonstrates its significance and validity in the result of every effort to drive it out. It is worse than folly, it is immoral to stand before one of the gravest problems of the universe and affect a mental and moral paralysis for the occasion, from which one recovers with a very easy and suspicious facility. No problem is solved by being summarily suppressed. Genuine humility is not developed from the soil of unreason. Surely if there is a rational starting-point there is a rational goal, there is not only force but method, and method is not a rational conception without purpose. Behind all method that has intelligible significance as method lies a plan, and before it lies an end. Force in a rational conception is not an ultimate fact. There is no reason in the nature of things as such. Necessity is not the ultimate statement of method. There is no reason in sheer force why it should operate thus rather than

otherwise. A methodical energy is an energy inseparable from intelligence. There is something to be accomplished. The forces of the universe are at work, and work is not blind play. The world moves ; it moves methodically, with whatever limited variations. That is to say, it moves intelligibly, and that means not only that it moves somewhence, but somewhither. That something to which it moves is the purposed end of its existence. There is a "far-off divine event," and "the whole creation moves" towards it. The whence and the why are closely related conceptions. Providence is contained in a rational creation. A pantheistic universe has no final purpose and no Providence. But here a methodical energy and the intelligence that recognizes it must both forever remain unsolved enigmas. We see the marks of intelligence and benevolence, with whatever seemings of contradiction. What do they mean? Will creates. But will, so far as we know it, has no significance and no existence apart from intelligence, and will and intelligence have no ethical significance apart from benevolence. Behind the energy that creates are the wisdom and goodness that determine its end. Power is the instrument of thought in a rational and moral universe. The idea is before the act that realizes it. We believe in Providence because we believe that power has rational and moral significance and worth. In the intelligible we find the intelligent. In the ethically intelligible we find the good. There is a highest good, or the universe has no moral order. God is neither malignant nor indifferent. A world well made and well kept must be well governed. Providential government is the control of all substances and forces with reference to the realization of the end for which they exist.

What then, according to the Christian conception, is the final purpose of creation? What in this vast realm of ethical aim and effort is the highest good? Concretely and comprehensively stated, it is the realization of the kingdom of God. The universe exists that the kingdom of God may exist. It has historic development that this kingdom may come to its consummation. This may include many and various subordinate purposes which we may not apprehend, and whose relation to each other and to the final purpose we may not know. But in the uncertainty of the subordinate purpose the final purpose, in the light of revelation, is clear. The kingdom of God is the highest ethical conception. There is nothing beyond as object of moral effort for man, angel, or God. Holiness and happiness belong to the final purpose, but cannot exhaust its statement. God has reference in his work to the goodness and

well-being that are pleasing to Him and possible to us. But there is something still beyond. It is no adequate statement that God ends with an ideal personal character and experience for their own sake. Holiness and happiness cannot be for themselves the ultimate ethical end. The larger question presses, What was this being itself, with all its capacity of goodness and happiness, made for? Moreover, what was the vast material universe made for? We must contemplate the question not from the view-point of the government of a world already existing, but from the view-point of its original creation. Holiness and happiness are, after all, only subordinate ends. They serve in the creative purpose an end beyond themselves. The glory of God, correctly received, belongs to the final purpose. God purposes a universe as revelation of his glory and especially the glory of his love. It is a good in itself, as well as with reference to something beyond itself, to secure outward manifestation and objective recognition of what there is in God. But Christianity enlarges and illumines this conception of the divine glory. For God to show himself, simply for the sake of the satisfaction of the disclosure, cannot be the highest end. Joy in the splendor of the divine self-disclosure cannot be the highest good. The love of God is regulative for creation as it is for redemption, and it is not the chief significance of love, either in creation or redemption, that it manifest itself simply for the sake of the manifestation as an ultimate end, or for the sake of the divine satisfaction in the manifestation simply as such. It is the satisfaction and the end of love that it find objects to which it may communicate and devote itself, and which it may take into conscious fellowship. It is God's final purpose, not simply to show himself to, but to live in fellowship with, his universe; not to illustrate his glories by and to his kingdom, but to communicate the holy energies of his nature in personal, loving relations with it. The glory of God, then, as the end of the universe, in his ethical love revealed and imparted as the life and law of his kingdom.

This wide-reaching Christian conception of the kingdom of God as the ultimate ethical aim of the universe has its practical limit. It may not enlarge itself to the compass of the entire universe. The kingdom of God emerges from the realm of freedom. The grand ideal may not in a universe of freedom completely realize itself. There may remain without an unsalvable fraction. But this does not annul nor compromise the ideal. The final purpose of the universe is still the kingdom of God. The crown-height of apostolic thought is reached in the conception of a universal

kingdom of God. Christ is not only Head of the Church but head of all principality and power, of everything that can be named, not only in this, but in the world to come. The goal of the universe is the gathering together in Him as the head of all things in heaven and on earth. The consummation is affected by breaking down the disharmonies of the universe. The universe has its reconciliation in Christ. This is the ideal. It does not appear in the New Testament as destined to complete realization. There seems to be no unwavering confidence that all the disharmonies of the universe will vanish; but it is unquestionably true that in the apostolic thought there shall be a triumphant consummation of the kingdom of God, and the remaining discords of the universe without shall be reduced to a relative insignificance.

The second factor in this Christian conception of Providence is the plan in accordance with which the final purpose is realized. There is a definitely Christian conception of the divine world-plan. Its nucleus is redemption. It is the Christian idea that the kingdom of God is characteristically a kingdom of grace. It is not so incidentally nor as an after-thought. It is so determinatively and from the first. The divine purpose is accomplished according to a remedial plan. This remedial factor enters into the plan in its inception and remains there. Sin is fore-known and taken into the account. The idea of redemption, therefore, is regulative ideally, as well as historically, for the idea of the kingdom of God. There shall be no universal kingdom of God whose nucleus is not the product of redeeming grace. It is the Christian conception of theodicy that God purposes not only the best that is practicable, but the ideal best. A world where sin is may be the best world, on the whole, attainable. But it is not ethically possible that such a world shall be accepted without further question, as the end and the kingdom of God fail. Beyond this attainable world lies in the divine thought the ideal world, and the two are brought into closest relation in the divine world-plan. The final purpose cannot be a sinful universe, the contradiction and negation of the kingdom of God. Sin is an incident to the best practicable world; that is, in a world of free beings God not only runs the risk of sin, so to say, He knows it as a future reality, and makes provision with respect to it. He tolerates it, while He enters protest against it and refuses for a moment to indorse it as any part of his ideal world-plan. It would be an inferior sort of world where sin were impossible, therefore God tolerates it. But a higher world may be wrought out of a world of sin. It is not ethically

possible for God to be satisfied with a world of sin as a finality. It is the necessity of his nature to want the ideal best, if that be ethically possible. Therefore God aims at a kingdom of holy order out of the discord. The highest good is an ideal good, and not such a fragment of good as God may save out of a world where He allows sin to rule without a single effort at its conquest. So is it that God is not satisfied without a plan of redemption for a world where it has become necessary to the realization of the highest good. Hence redemption enters vitally into the original world-idea. It goes into and becomes part of the plan of creation. The beginning of the realization of the plan of creation is also the beginning of the realization of the plan of redemption. There is no break nor severance. The whole plan of creation would have been other than it is, apart from redeeming grace. The creative and redemptive ideas are practically one. The final purpose unites them. This identification is no doubt the reason why the Christian Scriptures represent the whole Godhead as active and participant in the creative, as well as redemptive, plan and work. We make confession of our faith in "God the Father." The Father-God is the God of grace and redemption. But we know this same Father as "Almighty" and "maker of heaven and earth." The God of grace is the God of creation. It is faith in the Christian revelation that enables us to confess the God of grace before the God of creation, but it is the philosophy of redemption that identifies them. We make confession of our faith in the Holy Ghost as "Lord and Giver of Life," and we do not stop to ask whether it be redemptive or creative life. And we need not. That form of the divine personality which is active in consummating redemption is also active in consummating creation. We confess "One Lord Jesus Christ" and that "we are through Him" as the subjects of his redemption. But we confess also that "through Him are all things" as the subjects of his creation. As in the divine plan the goal of the Church, whose head is Christ, is also the goal of the world, so He who is the source of redemption becomes the source of creation. The pre-historic Christ has in himself both the creative and redemptive ideals and forces. As God's agent in the interest of redemption He brings the world into existence, and it is with definite reference to that redemption whose accomplishment is to be his chief historic significance. The kingdom of God, then, as contained in Christ is predeterminately the kingdom of grace. Accordingly, in the Christian revelation, grace and redemption are carried back beyond the intermediate stages

into the ideal and pre-historic stage. There is a growth in the apostolic conception of the kingdom of God. From a Jewish community it grows into a race community, and from a race community it grows into a universal community of holy intelligences. The thought of broken down barriers that divided men on earth enlarges itself into the thought of broken down barriers that divided the universe. The mystery of an earthly Church existent ideally in Christ "in the heavenly places" before the foundation of the world enlarges itself into the mystery of a universal kingdom of all the time and space worlds existent in the creative and redemptive thought of God, and made concrete in the pre-historic Christ from the first. Everywhere and always this kingdom is a kingdom of grace. Of course it is a kingdom of justice. No principle of unrighteousness can ever enter into a perfect world-plan. But the divine love is from beginning to end regulative of the divine justice. Justice is a principle of administration. Love lies back of it as the ground of the very existence of the universe. The revelation of love in the form of grace has modified men's conception of the divine justice. It is now impossible for us to conceive of a justice unrelated with grace. It is the revelation of grace that not only secures for us an ethical test for all manifestations of justice in the precedent stages of revelation, but takes us behind all history into the original thought and plan of God for the world's redemption. As matter of history, the kingdom of God was a kingdom of grace for the chosen people long before the giving of the law. Grace was regulative for the whole law scheme. It was pledged to this chosen race in the person of its founder long before it received its schoolmaster that was to lead it to Christ. Redemption was in God's thought and purpose in the very giving of the law, and gave it its significance. When once it is settled that the kingdom of God is characteristically a kingdom of grace it is impossible to stop here. And now it is seen that it is a kingdom of grace for the race. Redemption is carried back along the line of history to its beginning, and appears as a race-redemption conterminous with the creation and fall of man. And now the path is open beyond the border of the world and history. The apostolic thought leaps to the centre and broadens itself to the compass of the universe. It is not speculation but revelation that leads from the thought of a kingdom of formal justice to a kingdom of grace, and from a political to a spiritual redemption. It is revelation also that leads from the thought of a redemption in the interest of a particular people to a race-redemption. Not the less

is it revelation and not speculation that leads from the thought of an earthly race-redemption to a redemption whose influence reaches far beyond the border into the higher ranks of the angelic world, and which gathers into the unity of a universal kingdom all the tribes of holy intelligences.

The third factor in this Christian conception is the historic process by which the divine purpose and plan are accomplished. This is Providence in its practical reality. It is synonymous with government. We are in the open field of the world. We deal with actual history. This history must be interpreted. We need the right points of view from which to contemplate it. They are already furnished to our hand. The practical runs out into the ideal Providence. History has no intelligible significance apart from the plan that lies behind it and the end that lies before it. Government is more than police work, more than a barely successful handling of an endless, unprogressive, uneventful movement. It is not God's problem simply to hold his own against the forces He has let loose. The universe is managed. It is not a patch-work manipulation, but teleological management. God is doing more than to keep the world from running down or running wild. Government means historic progress. It is conceivable that there might have been no history. A stationary universe were a possibility. There might be creation without Providence, might be a beginning which is also the end. What God purposes to accomplish He might accomplish at once. Providence might be only the conservation of a completed universe. But we have no such universe, and it would be impossible to conceive the ethical significance of it if we had it. It is the Christian idea that history exists and the world is governed for the sake of the kingdom of God. Without that kingdom there were no history and no creation. In a stationary universe the kingdom of God as we now know it were impossible. That kingdom is a moral realm, a realm of freedom and growth, a realm of ethical aims and efforts and accomplishments. The end to be reached is the ethical consummation of all creative work, and towards it all things move. All things have relation to the realization of the kingdom of God. There is nothing without significance because of its relation with the end. In this vast complex of the historic movement this relation is lost to our apprehension. How things articulate themselves with the ultimate end and with each other we cannot know. Here chiefly, in the Christian estimate, lies the mystery of Providence. It is not the end sought, but the "ways" by which it is sought that are "past

finding out." The end is clear. The history of the world is precisely the history of redemption. Christ therefore is its centre and end. Not only are all things "in Him" and "through Him," but all things "consist in Him" and are "to Him." His conserving energy supports all things, and directs them to their destination. He has all power in heaven and on earth, and the universe moves on under his mediatorial control to the consummation of his work in the completion of the kingdom of God. In the Christian conception, therefore, Providence is universal, special, and particular. It is universal because the universe in the whole complex of its historic movement has relation with the end. It is special because there are striking historic events that have a more than ordinarily decisive relation with the end. It is particular because the individual in all the events and experiences of his history has definite relation with the end. It is a Providence that is holy, not only because the end sought, but because also the means used to secure the end are agreeable with the holy love of God. It is a Providence which is good inasmuch as both in end and means the highest welfare of the rational creature is sought. It is a Providence which is wise because all the agencies used are fitted to the realization of the end. These agencies are, in the Christian conception, partly supernatural and partly natural. There is a Providence that is over the world, and a Providence that is in it. They are not discriminated in the New Testament. God appears everywhere as immanent in the whole historic movement, and the order of the world seems to be caught up into and absorbed in the higher supernatural order. And yet in the Christian conception there is a real world. It has an objective existence separate from God. There are substances and forces that act methodically and with reference to ends. There is Providence in the orderly movement of the world. There is final purpose in general law. God governs largely by the action of orderly forces lodged in the real world. The order of the world cannot be understood out of relation to the end towards which it moves. Sin has not thrown this order into hopeless confusion and cross purpose. It still moves on towards the realization of its original end. God is bringing his kingdom into completion through the action of the potencies that are already and always at work in the world. Supernatural action introduced into the historic movement allies itself with the methods already at work. But Christianity contemplates Providence chiefly from the religious point of view. It emphasizes the supernatural factor. It knows that the real world does not contain the

forces that are adequate to produce the kingdom of God. The Providence discoverable in nature is not the Providence that conducts to the goal of the world's history. It contemplates the God of love as leaving himself something to do personally in the development of his kingdom. He has not made a universe from which He is debarred entrance. It finds the unity of the world not wholly within itself, but in its idea. It is in the plan of God. We see but parts of God's ways in the order of the world. He carries the world on to its consummation by intervention at appointed stages in its development. He who is the source and the end is also the agency of the process. Not only so, but God is perpetually at work. The Christian idea of God's providential activity is not simply an accommodation to the religious point of view. It does not mean that He who creates and supports the forces of the universe must be conceived as governing by the agency of those forces. It means that He governs by an action concurrent with those forces by which they are directed to the realization of the end He seeks, and which these forces of themselves would not effect. It is thus through the immediate personal agency of God that all substances and forces, with all their products in the events and experiences and accomplishments of history, have relation with the end. The material universe is in the historic movement. It finds all its significance in the kingdom of God. It is in process of development from immaturity and imperfection and transient discord into the completed order of a realm consecrated to that kingdom in its triumph. The universe is good, but not complete. It comes to its completion only in the kingdom of God. Its possibilities are to be developed under the agency of free intelligences, in providential guidance, and all are to be brought as a moral possession and made tributary to the glory of that kingdom. The highest significance of labor is in its conquest for the kingdom of God. All industries, all material products of civilization, find their predestined end in that universal temple wrought out of the struggles and triumphs of history for the glory of God, and for the joy of his loving fellowship. All that pertains to free beings has, in minutest details, this relation. We too often make ourselves the end of all Providence. We ask chiefly concerning the significance of the events and experiences of life to ourselves personally. God deals with us as individuals. He has many subordinate purposes with respect to us in his daily dealings. We are apt to fix our attention on what is subordinate, as if it were the final purpose. There are many coincidences in our com-

plex relations with life, and we find no significance in them because we are preoccupied with what is subordinate. But all coincidences have their significance in the complex movement towards the final goal, and all subordinate purpose has relation with the final purpose and can be understood only in this relation. The significance of our life-experiences is determined not wholly by our own personal destination, but by our relation to the consummation of the kingdom of God. We can never answer the question why God deals with us thus and so unless we can answer the larger question, why did He create us at all and why does He perpetuate our existence? This question has answer in our relation with the kingdom of God. To have answered that question thus is to have determined the relation, however mysterious to us, of all that enters into the experience of life. The significance of all good is that it enters productively into the interest of the kingdom of God. It has not its end in the individual, but in the great whole of God's kingdom. The individual has his rights in God's kingdom, but it is not one of his rights to be an end unto himself. The significance of evil is that God forces it to enter correctively into the interest of his kingdom. Evil remains not only an enigma, but a hopeless contradiction in God's universe, apart from its relation with his kingdom. The practical solution of its mystery is that God will use it to make his kingdom the more glorious and blessed. All joy is positively tributary to God's kingdom, and all sorrow and suffering are in intent to be turned to its account. The good men do goes into its stock, and the evil they do is turned against itself. There is no chance in our lives, for all our activities are controlled and made contributive to God's purpose. There is no fatality there, for all our activities are free. The end of all human culture and training is realized in the kingdom of God. The end of all individual perfection is the perfection of that vast community in which the universe reaches its goal, and in which God finds his endless glory and joy.

Christianity has thus given us the grandest ideal conceivable. It is given by revelation. The human intellect is prefashioned to the conception and apprehends it. But it is not given chiefly to the intellect, but to the heart of man. There lingers still in this human heart a longing for the highest good. It is the relic of Eden in our loss. Revelation meets the idealizing impulse of the human heart. The end of all things is disclosed to faith. The root-faith is faith in the highest good. It cannot be demonstrated to the human intellect that the universe does not move towards

the highest (or deepest) evil. There are no mathematics to disprove diabolism to be at the root and in the end of all things. Pessimism is not logically absurd. It is only immoral. It is faith in the highest good, the far-off glories of the kingdom of God, that ennobles our lives. We shall lose the key to all peace and exaltation and certitude, and go into the abyss of pessimism, if we lose trust in that moral postulate of the soul, given as product of the last and fullest revelation, that the consummate good lies far off beyond these tears and groans and sorrows of earth. Knowledge of Providence is the resultant of two faiths, faith in God and faith in the soul's moral postulate, faith in the object and faith in the subject of divine revelation, faith in the revealer and faith in the organ of the revelation, the soul in its God-quickened longings and strivings. This open heart to the highest good here is all of life's solace and all of its exaltation.

The statue of Memnon gave forth its song of joy when the morning sun smote its rugged and solemn face. The Memnon is the heart of man amid the stern and solemn realities of a life beset with much desolateness and darkness. And when God, the eternal light, pours the glories of His revelation in Jesus Christ upon his trusting soul, he will give back his response in utterances of joy and triumph sweeter and stronger than ever the Memnon uttered to the morning sun.

Lewis O. Brastow.

PROFESSOR HARRIS'S CONTRIBUTION TO THEISM.¹

THIS book is as solid as a crystal, and as clear. Students who have attended Dr. Harris's lectures have become familiar with his remarkable power of clear-cut and positive statement; and they will welcome with much pleasure a volume in which these mental qualities, which they have learned to admire, are at length brought to public notice, and put to more general usefulness. Although Professor Harris discusses the profoundest problems of metaphysics, he has succeeded in producing a readable book, simple and animated in its style. We are frequently surprised, as we

¹ *The Philosophical Basis of Theism* : An Examination of the Personality of Man to ascertain his Capacity to know and serve God, and the Validity of the Principles underlying the Defense of Theism. By SAMUEL HARRIS, D. D., LL. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

read his pages, by the variety and aptness of his illustrations and the literary enrichment of his argument. He has something of that power of imaginative grasp upon abstract ideas which is indispensable to high metaphysical reasoning. Often his illustrations of abstract truths are statuesque in their clearness of outline and repose of strength. The highest ranges of metaphysical thought cannot be reached by the mere logical plodder; one of the essential gifts of a master of philosophy is a reason informed with poetic power to seize and give form to the ideas of things. Professor Harris is not wanting in that power of imaginative insight and sympathy which is indispensable to the just apprehension of alien systems of thought, and the lack of which too often betrays writers for the religious press into misunderstanding of deep movements of men's thoughts and harsh judgments of their brethren. Perfect candor requires hearty appreciation of the needs and vital conditions which produce different schools of thought, as well as a correct understanding of their ideas and reasonings. Professor Harris's book is the fruit not only of the large reading of a lifetime, but also of a kindly and appreciative study of the wants of many minds. He is positive and pronounced in his judgments; but the plain positiveness of a thorough thinker, in the calmness of his own reasoned conclusions, is not the dogmatism which gives offense. This book, therefore, in its style and spirit, as well as in its contents, is a valuable addition to the literature of Christian philosophy. It is one of the masterly defenses of theism which agnostics and rash materialists must stop to read, if they wish to maintain their right to a public hearing as teachers who are familiar with the "best that has been thought and said" in modern scientific philosophy.

The contents and scope of Professor Harris's volume are admirably indicated in the title. A discussion of the "Philosophical Basis of Theism" must involve a theory of knowledge, and lead through the profoundest questions of metaphysics. We are invited again to cross the whole debatable ground of philosophy. We do not propose in this review to follow the author along the course of his argument; but, intersecting it at a few points, to inquire how far it meets the present requirements of theistic thought.

If a book shows little or no sensitiveness to certain existing conditions of the intellectual and religious atmosphere in which our faith must show itself able to live, it is a dead book, to be read by us, if we care to read it, as we would study any ancient

philosophy. Professor Harris's thought is alive to the general conditions of our philosophical and spiritual environment. The work, as a whole, seems to us to be a clear advance upon the methods of teaching natural theology, by which theological lecture-rooms were dominated within our own memory. Professor Harris, for example, does not begin with a scholastic definition of God, and then proceed, without any philosophical account of the origin of our idea of God, to prove the existence of that idea of God at the end of a series of inferences. He begins on his first page with the fact that "a Christian man knows God in his own experience;" and then he proceeds to account for this actual content of human experience, to show its rationality, and to expose the intellectual impossibility of either partial or complete agnosticism. Theistic writers have been compelled to take higher ground in order to command the advanced positions of natural science; what gain has been made in the defense of theistic faith may be seen at a glance if we compare this volume with the kind of instruction in natural theology which only a few years ago was deemed ample for the equipment of the evangelical clergy in this country. To any ministers at a distance from centres of learning, and without opportunities to consult large libraries, who are anxious to keep up with the progress of Christian apologetics, this book would be invaluable; it would be well for churches to slip copies of it into home missionary boxes, and let it do needed service against skepticism upon our frontiers.

There are a few cross-questions by which we may test the adaptation of any book upon theism to present conditions of thought. One of these is whether the writer is open-eyed and fearless towards any possible truths of the evolutionists. If a book betrays by its summary treatment of evolution a theological timidity or prejudice unbecoming faith, it is not a book which the world needs, or which the Church can afford to intrust with the defense either of its Scripture or its Christianity. Professor Harris's position towards evolution is unmistakably indicated in the following sentences: "I anticipate that the science of the physical universe is to be established in the line of thought which the theory of evolution opens and in accordance with its general idea. No interest of theology prejudices me against it; for I see no conflict between such a theory within the legitimate limits of empirical science and theology; on the contrary, at various points I find it helpful in removing difficulties and elucidating and vindicating theological truth. The objections against theism which it has

occasioned are not from evolution as a scientific law of nature, but from the materialism of which it has been made the vehicle.”¹ “Any theory of evolution excluding the presupposition, explicit or implicit, of Absolute Reason as the ultimate ground of the universe and energizing in its evolution, must be inconsistent with itself, incompatible with the necessary laws of thought, and contradictory to human reason.”²

Another test-question to which writers upon religious philosophy may be profitably subjected is this: Does the author escape the easily besetting philosophical sin of dealing with some analysis of human nature as though that dissection were the living man? An artificial psychology has been the bane of our philosophy. It is, therefore, a good test-question whether a new writer conceives of man as a living unity of being, and in all his reasoning upon human nature holds fast to that conception. If we observe that an author is still held in the abstractions of an artificial psychology; if he conducts his reasonings upon the expressed or implied supposition that human nature, like the constitution of a state, is to be divided into several departments, each of which is a separate bureau of consciousness; if he breaks man's living unity of being up into a series of sensations, powers, or faculties, and then treats his own logical analysis as though it were man; then we may be sure we shall not escape a vacant nominalism in his reasonings, and spiritual dryness and barrenness in his conclusions. His labored beliefs will never rise in authority above the probabilities of his arguments into the spontaneous self-assurance of real religious faith. His belief in God and immortality, built up by formal arguments from the results of his analysis of human nature and its laws, will stand — to use a favorite expression of one of our older living theologians — so long as there is no positive evidence to the contrary. Such analysis, and these accumulated plausibilities of spiritual and divine truth, are proper and useful in their own place and time; but they are not the beginning nor the end of Christian philosophy. That begins in realities of experience, and ends in assurance of faith. In making for scientific use a dissection of human nature, we should not allow ourselves to forget that in the actual life of man there are no distinct divisions of being corresponding to our formal analysis of faculties and powers. A fruitful cause of confusion and error is the tendency to forget or ignore the fact that man is a living personal unity in all phases and processes of his ever-changing and manifold life.

Professor Harris is outspoken upon this point. He says of some who are intent on the "analysis of personality in man and God," that "they push their analysis to disjunction. They are like the daughters of Pelias, who cut their father in pieces, but waited in vain to see him rise in youth and beauty from the witch's caldron. Hence comes a theology jejune, arid, and in conflict with itself."¹ He remarks that "the Kantian classification of Sense, Understanding, and Reason tends to create and perpetuate this disintegration of the intellectual powers."² His clear conception and constant recollection of the unity of man's personal life remind us of Lotze's clarifying discussion of the unity of consciousness. Professor Harris's grasp upon this truth proves particularly serviceable in his singularly helpful chapters upon the Will. If the elder Edwards had not had his spiritual genius limited by the mechanical psychology and artificial philosophical methods of his times; if he had worked out in his metaphysics some of the spiritual principles which were latent powers in his best religious writing; we should have inherited from him a less formal theory of virtue, and a less discouraging treatise upon the Freedom of the Will.

A third and kindred test-question to be put to any writer who claims a hearing in metaphysics is as follows: Does he help us towards a more realistic thinking? If a man's thought has not shaken itself clear from the dust of philosophical quiddities and abstractions; if it does not help us out of intellectual phenomenalism into spiritual realism; it is only the old, barren rationalism over again, though it comes in the name of faith, and sets up its verbal propositions of divinity in the defense of evangelical religion. The teaching which the world needs, and which the soul of man craves, must be a thorough moral and spiritual realism. We want, that is to say, not merely formal proofs with their probabilities of divinity heaped up before our understandings; we want in our experience the substance of things hoped for; and we need in our religious teaching an exposition and vindication of the faiths really involved in the living soul of the Christian man. We have found the work before us strong and helpful in this direction. Thus it is refreshing to read the following from its introductory chapter: "So far as theologians have allowed abstract thinking to exclude the realistic, they have fallen into false thinking and inextricable embarrassments, and laid themselves open to unanswerable objections. The result has sometimes been that the very concepts, definitions, propositions, and systems intended to reveal

God have become a veil that hides Him ; formulas of doctrine have filled the eye instead of God active in human hearts and human history redeeming man from sin, the letter of a scripture instead of the living Word and the ever-present spirit of God.”¹ Dr. Harris repeatedly returns to the thought that the universe is not abstract but concrete. “Knowledge is correlative to being.” “It is a universe of beings in their various modes of existence.” “Knowledge,” he holds, “at its beginning in perceptive intuition is ontological.” “True theology, from beginning to end, deals always with concrete beings.”² It is a sharp and just criticism which he makes upon Herbert Spencer, when he charges him with hypostasizing abstractions, and falling into the “word-weariness” of the mediæval scholasticism. In religious discussions we are particularly in peril of substituting sound words for spiritual things, — of bowing before images of the schools instead of looking up to the realities of God’s kingdom. Christianity is not primarily a system of doctrines arranged in rational order, but a system of beings in right relations to God, and in harmony with each other. Christian theology, therefore, is not a mere philosophy, but the science of the kingdom of God. It is not merely, or primarily, a systematic knowledge of truths, but it is the science of beings in their real and eternal ideas and relations. The whole tone and temper of religious thinking and reasoning is changed when it is conducted as “the logic of realistic thought,” to quote Professor Harris’s fine characterization of the better way of theology which he has happily followed. This is the common tone of all writers who feel the breath of the “new movement” in theology. They are Christian realists. They wish to escape, as much as possible, from theological nominalism. They seek after moral and spiritual realism in their interpretation of history, Scripture, and the self-consciousness of the regenerate man. They will, therefore, respond gratefully to the healthful and bracing realism of Professor Harris’s theory of knowledge. His assertion that knowledge is ontological ; that it is knowledge of being, and of the real relations of being ; and, indeed, his whole criticism of Kant’s phenomenalism, and Spencer’s self-contradictory agnosticism, are particularly helpful and satisfactory. It is high praise to say that a philosophical writer seems really to have understood Kant. But Professor Harris seems to have understood Kant so thoroughly as to see where he tripped in his thinking, stopped short in his philosophy, and, in sight of the promised land of faith, failed to

¹ Page 6.² Pages 144, 199, 167, 201.

lead thought finally out of the wilderness of Hume's skepticism. Had Kant not lost his way out, and stopped just where he did in his pursuit of knowledge of being, — "the thing in itself," — probably modern philosophy would have been spared its discouraging chapters of Hamilton's relativity of knowledge and Spencer's agnosticism, which fortunately the world seems to have about got through with, so that another and better chapter may be begun.

Professor Harris's work belongs, in the main, to what we regard as the opening chapter, or post-Spencer course, of modern philosophy. It is a question, however, whether, in all directions, he has himself gone as far as is possible in the development of a realistic theory of knowledge, or whether he has embodied in the theses of his book all the truth contained in some of his own reasonings in defense of his propositions. We can judge of this most conveniently by raising at this point this further test-question: How far does our author help us to gain a realistic doctrine of the spiritual consciousness of man? In other words, we want to know whether our moral and spiritual intuitions — those "first impressions" of our being — are only subjective, our reactions in thought, that is, upon ourselves; or whether they are in deed and in truth "the strokes of reality" upon us. The outward world, upon any theory of direct perception, is a stroke, or constant succession of strokes, of reality upon our self-consciousness; can the same thing be affirmed in any sense of that impression of spiritual and divine things, of the kingdom of spirit and of God, which certainly is made upon the soul of man, and which is one of the persistent forces in the life of humanity? The conviction that our theistic thinking needs help in precisely this direction, more than anything else, led us to scan eagerly this new work upon theistic philosophy. We are not satisfied simply with our own inference that there must be a God; we believe, not in an inferential Deity, but in the living God. We find ourselves personally present in the Omnipresence of God. We want a philosophy, not of our inferences up towards God, but of God's impression of his own being upon our being, and his revelation of Himself in the life of man. Any mere reproduction, therefore, of the familiar so-called evidences of the existence of God will not satisfy the intensely earnest demands of reason upon faith, nor be true to the profound significance of our religious consciousness. But has anything better than the presentation of these arguments for God been thought and said? Certainly much more than that has been thought and said by German believers, and it is gratifying to observe that Pro-

fessor Harris's strong hold upon the fact that man is a being in a universe of being, and his thoroughly realistic theory of knowledge, have led him well out of the common natural theology of divine probabilities towards a more assured faith in the immediateness of the Divine presence and working in our thinking, or in God's self-revelation through the spiritual and rational life of the world. Professor Harris advances cautiously in this direction, and walks circumspectly towards German philosophy; but he has gone beyond his own earlier New England teachers, and many passages from this book might be quoted which show that he has taken higher ground upon which to defend properly with our theistic philosophy the lower and ordinary evidences of religious truth. We will quote a few of these passages which indicate the author's sympathy with those theologians who hold that we have in our idea of God an effect of God's own spiritual presence upon us, involving therefore a valid sense of the actual being of God, and not merely a belief in an inferred Deity. "As man," he remarks, "knows himself in contact with the external world through sense, so he knows himself in contact with God through his spiritual constitution. In the normal unfolding of his own constitution he finds himself in the presence of absolute being. In the normal unfolding of his consciousness of himself he finds in himself the consciousness of God." "The development of man's consciousness of himself in his relation to the world is the development of his consciousness of God. As in the experience of life, the unfolding consciousness of man is a continuous revealing to him of himself and of the outward objects of knowledge, so also it is a continuous revelation to him of God." "In our spontaneous religiousness the whole man, intellect, sensibility, and will, responds to the contact of the supernatural and the divine."¹ Soul-contact with God is something more and better than inferential belief in a God, and it imparts reality to our human idea of God. Our belief in God arising from our personal contact with God's being is thus regarded as the reaction of our minds upon the Divine Reality which encompasses us, and is always acting in divers ways upon us. The thinking on our part of God implies the potential presence of God in the being who comes thus to a sense of God. In short, our belief in God and our thought of God are in some sense a revelation of God to us. So Professor Harris says: "Also God reveals himself in our consciousness in our religious experience; especially in the experience of a Christian man, the purest, loftiest, and most comprehen-

¹ Pages 78, 14, 9.

sive experience of God's gracious revelation of himself. . . . God acts on men, and they react upon his influences; and thus they find Him in their own consciousness. They know Him and the spiritual sphere by this action and reaction, in a manner analogous to that in which they know the world of sense. No Christian man will say that the idea of God is an empty idea void of content in his own consciousness. He will say, 'I know Him whom I have believed; not the idea of Him, or propositions about Him, but HIM.' " ¹

But does Professor Harris succeed in keeping his reasoning up to this high plane, and can such statements of the immediateness of human knowledge of the Divine Being be rationally vindicated and maintained?

Our answer to this question requires us to discriminate between two uses of the word feeling. It may be used to denote our emotions or sentiments. In this use a feeling, or sentiment, is simply a reaction of our own thoughts and choices upon ourselves, — a subjective state of consciousness. But there is another and broader use of the word feeling. It is employed as the most general term for those first motions of consciousness which result from the immediate impressions of things upon the life of man. Writers who endeavor to search out the beginnings of knowledge in our first rational and spiritual feeling of things are easily bowed out of the court of our Scottish philosophy by a definition of feeling as emotion or mere sentiment. But there are large outlying regions and facts of consciousness and life which cannot so easily be dismissed from an adequate philosophy of human nature by a summary definition of a word. It is an unthinking and mistaken impression that English and American writers who have been influenced by Schleiermacher and the modern Germans in their theories of spiritual knowledge are willing to reduce all rational and spiritual truth to mere sentiment and subjective individual feelings. Their effort is to discover in man's first feeling after God (as an Apostle with a less rationalistic view of religion than that of much later orthodox philosophy calls it) the point of vital contact between man's life and the living God. They seek thereby to find a real basis for a rational theology. The following definitions may help to render their positions better understood, and to remove from the moral and spiritual realists of the present day the singular charge that they, of all men, are favoring the "dangerous error of subjectivism in religion."

Let it be noticed that they use for man's first consciousness of things the more active word *feeling*, and not the passive word *sensitment*, for they do not mean the emotional states which result from excitations of our sensibilities. To borrow an illustration from physiology, they do not refer to the "formed matter" of consciousness, the resultants of thought; but to the forming matter of consciousness, and the spiritual energy, or principle, involved in its formation. It will be observed, further, that our definitions hold fast throughout to the fact of the living personal unity of man in all the phases and processes of his life. Different human powers and activities are not to be defined in terms of special faculties, which are then hypostasized and held apart; but they are to be described and dealt with always in reference to the living whole of being of which they are the phases and manifestations. We define feeling, accordingly, in the general philosophical use of the word, as man in immediate, receptive relation to the objects affecting him upon any side of his manifold life. Feeling is man receiving the impacts upon consciousness of things. Thinking, or rational knowing, is man in a reflective relation towards the felt objects or contents of his consciousness. Thinking is *reflection*; it is the reaction of man in his mental activities upon the objects which have acted upon him. Feeling is thus incipient knowledge, the first step in the development of real knowledge. A felt object excites mental attention; we grasp it, and hold it reflectively in our thought of it. We gain, thus, our first ideas of things, or our first mental reactions upon things, according, of course, to the laws of being which condition our own rational activity. These rational reactions upon things, or our primitive ideas and beliefs, are so much raw material for intelligence to be taken up into and woven together in the further processes of reasoning. As feeling is thus man in recipient relation towards things, and thinking is man in reflection upon things felt or received in consciousness; so willing is man in active outgoing towards the objects felt and known. There may be a spontaneous action, a hardly conscious willing, towards objects which are but vague affections of our life, as, for instance, in certain instinctive shrinkings of nature, or quick sympathies with things. Willing, like knowledge, may begin thus in feeling. But choice, or willing in the strict sense, like knowledge, is a conscious and defined activity. These distinctions, however, represent only our analysis of consciousness; our living consciousness of ourselves never actually consists of either of these elements to the exclusion of the other. We are at all times, in every mo-

ment of self-conscious life, feeling, thinking, willing beings. Man is a spiritual unity.

From these statements it is obvious that to find the beginnings of knowledge in feeling is by no means to surrender knowledge, but on the contrary to seek to establish our thought upon objective reality. Knowledge must be received and developed according to the capacity and mode of existence of the percipient being, but in all cases, however limited and finite may be our recipient capacity for the impressions upon us of things, knowledge has its source and ground in the real relation of the recipient being to the beings and system of beings in which he exists and by which he is acted upon. This beginning of knowledge in the felt contact with things is generally admitted by defenders of theism in their view of our knowledge of the external world. It is the doctrine of real perception. Sensation involves perception, and objects perceived are arranged and harmonized in the order of reason, that is according to their real relation as they are perceived to be, the order of rational thought answering throughout to the order of things. Professor Harris, in common with most theistic writers, holds stoutly to a theory of presentative intuition, and hence real knowledge, so far as the external world presented to our senses is concerned. Theism has to raise and to answer the further question, Whether there is any corresponding presentation, and any consequent reality, in our spiritual consciousness? Do we in any way come into actual contact with, are we living in real relation to, a spiritual as well as a physical environment? Are the persistent spiritual life and the religious consciousness of man an indication of soul-contact with a spiritual and divine Reality in which we have our being? Can the idea of God, ever forcing itself upon man's thought of himself and the world, be accounted for in any other way than as the impression which the living God is making of his own being upon ours? Is our idea of God only our own thought, — the projection out upon the universe of the shadow of our own self-consciousness, — or is it the Light of God's presence around us thrown in upon our consciousness and diffusing itself through all our thoughts?

In order to a thorough answer to this question, we must investigate further the significance of our rational intuitions.

Professor Harris rightly rejects summarily any doctrine of innate ideas. He calls Locke's argument against this imaginary hypothesis a "philosophical kicking at nothing." He also rules out the idea sometimes advanced of a special faith-faculty. We

have no special sense for duty as we have an ear for harmonious sounds. Conscience is not a special sense, or localized faculty, of the soul. It is idle to divide man's living unity of being into moral and philosophical sections. Dismissing these notions, we find two possible views of our intuitions. The first, and in this country the prevalent intuitionist philosophy, I would call the *statical* theory of the intuitions. Our intuitionist philosophers, that is to say, fall back usually upon our first beliefs as the statics of all rational thought. The necessary beliefs of man are the constants of the world of intelligence. As astronomers use the constants of the solar system in their calculations, so they would employ the intuitions as the constants in all rational speculation. This might also be designated as the constitutional school of intuitionists. These philosophers are the constitutional lawyers of human nature. Their one argument against all philosophical gainsayers is the constitution of man. They reason with legal precision and logic from our mental constitution, and they do not care to go behind the letter of man's constitution. In this appeal to the nature of mind and the laws of thought they are safe, provided no conceivable explanation of how this human nature came to be constituted as it is can invalidate its contents; and provided, also, that believers on their part can rest satisfied with the conclusion that spiritual and divine realities *must* be so, and renounce all hope of being able to say, out of positive spiritual experience, that they *are* so.

The second class of intuitionists hold what I would designate, in contrast with the statical, as the *dynamical* theory of the intuitions. They believe, that is, these constants of reason to be the potentials, in the mind, of the realities, and the real relations, of things. They do not reason that certain things must be to our minds, and therefore they probably are in the order of things; but they affirm that our conviction that they must be is the exponent of their impression of their own reality upon us. They are, and we are in their presence and order, and therefore we cannot think them otherwise. The mathematical axioms, for example, are the rational exponents of our conscious existence among the real relations of things. They are the ordered universe existing potentially in our thought of it. They are not thus mere forms of thought imposed upon things; but rather the real relations of things imposing themselves upon any intelligence capable of receiving them. Every "must be" of rational intelligence has its source in some felt reality of things. So, we may say, the mathe-

matical feeling is before the mathematical ideas; some sense gained through experience of the factual relations of quantity precedes in the development of thought our idea, or generalized knowledge, of the mathematical laws. Hence the real in the universe is the rational in our thought of it. In other words, we must think so, not merely because we are made to think so, but because things are so, and we live in contact with their realities.

The writers of this school do not deny the appeal to the constitution of mind, with which intuitionists generally end all discussion; but they go a step farther back in order to maintain the witness of consciousness to the validity of knowledge. I call this dynamical intuitionism because it is throughout a conception of forces, and their action and reaction. Reason is not a mechanician reading off the figures from its own dial-plate; man is a living centre of force in the midst of a universe of powers which is energized by the living God. Our rational consciousness is the inevitable resultant of the powers, natural and spiritual, among which we live, and which are always acting upon us. We are ourselves personally present in the omnipresence of God. We have our being in Him, and our higher religious consciousness is God's potential presence in the life of man. This is not pantheism, but it is true to the element of spiritual reality which has given pantheism vitality in philosophy. It is not pantheism, but it is not mechanical deism; it is dynamical theism. Our idea of God, in a word, is the potential of God in our self-consciousness. We have thus the conception of man's religious consciousness and history as in part a revelation of God. Man is capable of feeling the power, and becoming conscious of the manifestation, of the Divine Spirit in his heart and life. The Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit is not contrary to nature, however contrary it may be to sinful nature. According to this view of our existence, or personal presence, in God's omnipresence, our religious consciousness and life cannot be explained except as implying the reality of a spiritual environment, any more than man's physical consciousness can be explained without the implication in it of an external physical environment. The moral and rational intuitions and first religious beliefs are the unfolding in consciousness of what is involved in the relations of the person to his whole environment, physical and spiritual, natural and divine. Thought has, and can have, reality only as it is thus the development in self-conscious intelligence of the action of the universe and its energizing reason

upon the living centre of being who can feel it, and think of it, and determine himself by it.

The intuitionist of this faith will frankly confess that he cannot prove these assertions to be true to any one who denies that he has the reason for faith in his own experience. Neither can any man prove to any other man the reality of the world grasped by our senses. We can only affirm that these are the implications of our own individual consciousness and of the general consciousness of humanity. We cannot impose the contents of our own self-consciousness upon any other person. The intuitionist who holds that there is a revelation, or self-impression, of God upon man, in our religious consciousness, if reasoning with one who denies that he has any such sense of super-physical reality, may fall back upon the constants, as I have just called them, of human experience. He may verify the contents of his personal consciousness by an appeal to the common sense of mankind. But the dynamical account of the origin of faith has this advantage that it affords a simple and sufficient interpretation of our natural beliefs when once their existence as factors in the life of man is admitted. Granted these universal rational and spiritual phenomena, this is their significance. They are simply the effect upon us of our total and real environment. They are partial revelations to us of things beyond us. This interpretation of them corresponds to the familiar fact that we are born theists, rather than made theists; that our belief in God usually antedates in memory, and is stronger in fact than, any arguments which we can frame for belief in the existence of God. To admit the potential presence of God in our own self-consciousness, to accept the implication of a spiritual Reality without us in the spiritual life within us, is the interpretation of life which harmonizes and unifies all knowledge. It affords a sufficient philosophy of history. We listen to the harmony which this faith evokes from life, and accept it as evidence that the chords are struck by the master-thought of all our living. Moreover, this interpretation of our own religious life is attested and verified by the fact that it interprets the best and highest life which the world has ever seen. We must be able to comprehend man's consciousness at its highest and its best if we would know what is really involved in it. The truest psychology is that which is based upon the regenerated consciousness of man. That is not an adequate philosophy of human nature which explains only the natural man, and has no comprehension of Jesus' oneness in his perfect humanity with the Father. The more fully

man realizes himself in the world, the more purely and perfectly he becomes man, the more confident does he grow of his spiritual birthright, and the reality in the universe of God.

The dynamical view of our religious consciousness has this other advantage over the common doctrine of the intuitionists. It enables us to go back of the existing constitution of things with the evolutionist as far as he can go with any pretense of science, and wherever he may choose to stop in his inquiry to say, There is a spiritual potency and tendency in the nature of things of which in due season man shall become conscious as it vibrates through nature. The spiritual power must be involved in the course of nature from the beginning, because in its evolution we have now become conscious of it. Though you may break up the present status of things, and go behind all constitutions, you cannot rid the universe of the super-material forces which are working in our life, and coming to revelation in our consciousness of life.

Having thus briefly stated the different theories held among intuitionists, it remains for us to consider further Professor Harris's position towards them. The sentences quoted above are sufficient to show that he frequently transcends the logic of statical intuitionists, and holds to a revelation of God in the experience of man. Such sentences, however, occur here and there in the course of his reasoning rather than in his propositions, or explicit statements of principles. In his attack upon agnosticism he is generally content to stand upon the ideas of reason as the first and last necessity of thought. Thus upon page 287 he affirms that "in every line of thought the knowledge rises self-evident before us that there must be an absolute and unconditioned being." But upon the next page he goes farther and says: "By rational intuition man knows that absolute existence exists." Obviously the belief that a being "must exist" and the knowledge that it exists are not identical. How does Professor Harris pass from the "*must be*" of reason to the "*there is*" of faith? If we understand him correctly he does it through the reality of being given in our idea of being. The advocates of the view that God impresses himself immediately upon our consciousness, particularly, though not exclusively, in our feeling of dependence, have no trouble in making this passage from a "must be" of reason to the assurance of faith that there is a God. For they hold that the Absolute Being is implied in our self-consciousness, not logically or inferentially merely, not simply statically, but vitally and potentially; in other and simpler language, that we do but bring to light in our

thought of God what is already latent in our life. God is, and proves himself in our thought of Him. The content of existence cannot be attached to the idea of God unless it is already implicitly contained in that idea, as we believe that it is. This is the force of the greatly misunderstood ontological argument. It is worthless as a merely formal argument. Logically the idea of a perfect being does not prove its existence outside of the mind thinking it. So neither does the existence of the finite creation prove the existence of an infinite Creator outside of it. There cannot be more in the conclusion than is contained in the premises. But the ontological argument does have worth as a transcript of man's experience of God. The divine Reality is involved in the human experiences out of which the idea of the perfect Being has emerged. Man's belief in God is not a manufactured article. Man never made it. It grew with the growth of human intelligence. Our idea of God is not a logical product of a mind working over things; it enters into the first motions of intelligence, and is life of our rational life. "In his light we see light." He who is an elemental force of our own mental activity becomes evident to our reason as the power by which the creation consists. The Infinite One, in dependence upon whom we become conscious of ourselves, the potential God of our own consciousness, is recognized by us, the more our knowledge grows, as the Power which works through all natural forces. Our idea of God gained from his persistence in our own life proves to be the key which unlocks the creation. There is a divine dynamics of the universe. In our view Professor Harris's argument against the agnostics would have been strengthened if he had made not less use of the necessary ideas of reason, but more use of the truth of God's self-revealing potency in man's thinking and living. We notice in this connection that Professor Harris has given a different turn than that originally intended to an expression used by one of those writers who insist that some real, active relation of God himself to us antedates our so-called proofs of his existence. He quotes (page 171) this saying: "A God proved by us would be a God made by us;" and he remarks, that this is "the fallacy . . . of identifying our own mental process with the real order of the dependence of beings." The epigram, however, has point against the common error of putting into the conclusion of an argument for God's existence more than is involved in the premises. Unless there is some revelation of God to us, our so-called proofs may be only our ideas or images of a possible God. But if God proves

his own presence to us as the sun proves its own existence to the earth by shining upon us, and drawing us, in the very impulse and motion of our life, towards himself, then our arguments about God are the orderly explication of what is really involved in our own being and the existence of the finite world. God is first and we second in everything, even in our first thought of Him. "We love, because He first loved us." In this intention the words just quoted are a protest, as strong as Professor Harris could desire, against "the identification of our own mental processes with the real order of the dependence of beings;" a confusion, we would add, not only "common in agnostic and pantheistic philosophy," but also in the writings of those theologians who are inclined unconsciously to substitute their own logical necessities of God's government for God's personal conduct of his universe.

We have left ourselves no space to review Professor Harris's clear, concrete, and helpful discussion of the vexed subject of the will and its freedom. He has succeeded admirably in saving the living fact of moral freedom from the peril of death by verbal analysis; and this portion of his work is a useful contribution to ethical philosophy.

The theistic argument from æsthetics, or the significance of beauty, seems to us to need further unfolding and interpretation than it has received in this volume, or, indeed, in any writing upon theism which has fallen under our notice, and particularly in relation to the very summary treatment which natural beauty has found at the hands of evolutionists. We believe that there is a higher significance in the beauty even of the natural creation than Darwin's laws can interpret. But without entering upon this attractive subject, we would add a hearty word of commendation of this work of Professor Harris as a whole. In its breadth and power, in its clearness and candor, in its general moral and intellectual helpfulness, it is a noble American contribution to a literature in which much ripe fruit of ripe minds has been gathered in other countries. We trust that besides these fruits of his studies the author may give ere long to the public a volume of his theological lectures.

Newman Smyth.

LAY THEOLOGY.

A NOTABLE characteristic of the religious life of our times is the prominence in it, and the growing prominence, of the lay element. This is true, not merely of the activities and enterprises of the church, but also of its intellectual and spiritual life. Christian thought, philosophy, and literature, the creeds which Christians profess, the hymns they sing, the prayers they offer, are more and more subject to, and shaped by, influences which come from non-clerical sources. This is not the same as saying that religion is being secularized. That may be true, and yet it may not be due to the laicizing tendencies of which we speak. Thought is not necessarily spiritual because it is clerical, nor unspiritual because it is lay. But whatever interpretation may be put upon the increasing importance of the lay element, whether it be welcomed or deprecated, whether it bring hope or alarm, it is everywhere in Christendom, and in all communions, recognized as a fact. It is, moreover, a highly significant fact, the meaning and bearings of which should be carefully studied.

When the Church of Rome emerged from the wreck of the Empire and cast about for measures of security against the barbarism which threatened her ruin, she first asserted the principle that the spiritual order is of right wholly independent of the temporal. This measure not only secured to the church an asylum from the violence of the times, it erected in the midst of a rude and disordered society an institution which, without physical force, overawed the minds of men, and compelled their veneration for itself as the depository and visible source of spiritual authority. Tempted by the opportunity for power thus opened before her, and pushed on by logical necessity from her first position, the church proceeded to assert a new though allied principle which has been to her a source at once of strength and of weakness, in all subsequent times, namely, the sole right of the clergy to legislate and to judge in all matters spiritual. A body was thus created, a corporation with self-perpetuating powers, which asserted its exclusive right to the domain of theology with all its approaches and outlying territories. As education, philosophy, literature, and even physical science, are inseparably allied with theology, affecting men's religious opinions and their dispositions toward religion, these also were claimed as parts of the preserves of the clergy upon

which others might not trespass. For a layman to be able to read and write, especially in the learned language which held all the arcana of theology, was at one time regarded as evidence that he was presuming upon the office of a clerk, or clergyman. Never was there another corporation so exclusive as the church, never a guild that so jealously guarded its own art and mystery. Heresy, the very mention or suspicion of which threw the church into a fever of alarm, was the holding and advocating, not so much a wrong opinion, one contrary to Scripture and reason, as an unauthorized, an uncanonical opinion. No such rigid intolerance prevailed within the church itself as was practiced upon laymen. Inside of her inclosure, the church tolerated considerable liberty of discussion, and to some extent recognized the right of individual reason to seek satisfaction for its doubts and questionings. But the lay intellect had no rights which the church felt bound to respect. It was the duty of the clergy to instruct laymen in the doctrines of Christianity, and it was the duty of laymen to receive the instruction of the clergy. But the church never condescended to convince the lay intellect, much less to dispute with it. The language of the church, that is, of the clergy, to its lay members, was, "My children, it is your high privilege to receive from the church the precious gift of saving truth; but to ascertain, to discriminate, to apportion out that truth, is the high and difficult duty of the church itself."

In later times, when the lay intellect, getting breadth and confidence with the progress of enlightenment, began to challenge the arrogance of its spiritual teachers, the church attempted a logical defense of its position. "What can be more reasonable than that the class who spend their lives in the study of a subject should be allowed to give the law upon that subject? Of all difficult attainments, what is so difficult as the knowledge of the mysteries of religion? Shall an ignorant layman, bred perhaps in some mechanical pursuit, be thought as capable of apprehending these sublime mysteries as he who, by a life of study, and prayer, and abstinence, rises into near communion with God, and receives communications of the truth directly from God himself? But more than this, the church is the divinely commissioned guardian of the truth; she alone has received this revelation; she defends, maintains, cherishes it. From her mankind must receive the truth, if at all. She alone understands it; she alone can interpret it."

This right, thus hedged about by prescription and defended by supernatural claims, the church succeeded in maintaining substan-

tially unimpaired, though not unassailed, until the Reformation. The essential character of this great revolution, the effects it produced on the Christian church and on the human mind, are variously conceived by historians and philosophers according to the point from which they view it. But unquestionably the greatest service it accomplished for religion was that it revived the true idea of the church. The aim of Rome had been to organize the church into a powerful hierarchy ; to keep all the functions of the church in the hands of the priesthood ; to make the laity a subordinate, dependent, instrumental mass. The effect of the Reformation, where it was allowed to run its logical course, was to restore the power of the church to its original and rightful seat, the whole body of believers. The policy of Rome has always been to make the distinction between clergy and laity broad and divisive. The Protestant communions — those that are truly Protestant — have transferred the stress of this distinction to that between believer and unbeliever, and have drawn no hard lines of separation within the church.

The broad and vital question, therefore, which underlies that of the rightful attitude of the laity toward theology, is the true constitution of the church. Is the church one great homogeneous body consisting of all those who have the mind of Christ and are led by the Spirit, having gifts differing according to the measure of faith, and offices proportioned to their gifts, but all brethren, fellow-laborers, many members but one body ? Or is the church a heterogeneous body, consisting of two broadly separate classes, the sacred and the secular ; the one the intermediate source of all spiritual enlightenment, the channel of all divine grace, the depository of all ecclesiastical power ; the other the mere recipients of knowledge and precept and grace from the lips and the hands of the former ? On the answer to these questions will depend the answer to these others : Is Theology a specialty ? Is it the office of the Christian ministry, as such, separate from that of the great body of the church, to adjudicate upon questions of doctrine, and to speak with authority to "the people," that is, to laymen ? Conceding that the only authority claimed by or for the clergy is a delegated, not an inherent authority, the question is whether this authority is delegated by the clergy to themselves, or by the Head of the church to the church in its collective and corporate capacity ?

Protestantism makes clear answer to these questions. It wholly rejects the sacerdotal constitution of the church. It provides for

a ministry, for various ministries, but no priestly caste. The church, in its conception, is one great ministry, requiring service, consecrated service, from every member. At the head of these ministries it places the teaching function. Into this ministry it seeks to place its most gifted sons, and with one accord offers perpetual prayer that they may be endued with the spiritual graces which their high office requires. But the church has many other ministries, gifts of healing, helps, governments, studies, charities, all of many kinds. It claims the full service, and taxes the utmost capacity of every member. It permits no idlers, no exempts, no corps of reserve. Strictly speaking, it admits no "laymen." By analogy from the professions, a layman, an "idiot," as the Greeks called him, is one who takes no part in a calling, and such a one has no place in the church. He is properly "one that is without." All within the church have functions. All have some degree of spiritual discernment, not necessarily that special kind which qualifies some to prophesy, to discern the inner and hidden meanings of the word and to utter them for edification, but enough for apprehending duty and performing service. But there are no sharp divisions into superior and inferior, esoteric and exoteric, governors and governed. There is no class of functionaries, on the one side, who, by virtue of their function, are invested with authority to declare what is the faith of the church; while on the other hand is the great mass of the "faithful," whose chief merit is to believe humbly and obey implicitly what is handed down to them from above.¹ Protestantism does not discover any such classification of believers in the New Testament or in the early church. The power to discern spiritual truth, to search the deep things of God, St. Paul teaches, belongs, not to a certain office or calling, but to the spiritual mind. "He that is spiritual judgeth all things." The first council at Jerusalem, convened for the settlement of a quasi-theological question, consisted, not only of the apostles and elders, but of "the whole church." It was an after-thought to exclude the laity from the councils of the church and virtually pronounce them incapable of spiritual discernment. But lay thought, unchurched though it was, has often proved the mightiest champion of the church, the stoutest foe of error. It is true that God honors the ministerial office by

¹ "Faith and Wisdom are distinct, or even opposite gifts. Wisdom belongs to the perfect, and more especially to preachers of the Gospel; and Faith is the elementary grace which is required of all, especially of hearers." — J. H. Newman's *Oxford University Sermons*, p. 279.

usually sending his messages to men through these his appointed messengers, but who does not know that God has often spoken unto the church words of great power by men whose first and hardest task was to confute and silence the united body of clerical functionaries?

Claiming, therefore, the abstract right and the theoretical capacity of the laity to take part in the formation of theological opinion, we pass now to consider what actual means laymen have for attaining to correct opinions and making them effective in the church.

A recent writer in the "Contemporary Review," urging English Episcopalians to give the laity greater power in church affairs, asks somewhat naively, "Why should we fear the laity? What are they, anyhow doctrinally, to the clergy, but as the armature of soft iron to the magnet? Who have taught them what they now hold, but the bishops and clergy?" Is this so? Or, if it has been so in the past, is it as truly so now, and is it likely to be as true in the future? Consider the means which the laity now have for reaching independent convictions.

I. In having the Bible as their free unquestioned possession, with the undisputed right to use it without note or comment, and to submit all other teachings to its final arbitrament, the laity have a source of independent doctrinal opinion which far surpasses in value any or all from which they may be excluded. Concede the importance of the accessory knowledges and powers enjoyed by the clergy, familiarity with the tongues, patristic learning, acquaintance with the history of the church, and especially of Christian doctrine, general culture and acumen, yet all these are valuable only as helps in interpreting the Scriptures, and are not for a moment to be compared with the simple possession and use of the sacred text as a means of arriving at doctrinal truth. This is shown by the sad errors into which men invariably run when they depend more on these secondary sources of knowledge than on the Scriptures themselves. The Bible, it is truly said, is the one text-book in theology, for all alike, learned and simple, clergyman and layman. But the Bible, considered as a text-book, is unique, first, in that it is decisive on every question it assumes to decide, so that men's minds are not held back from full assent by any doubt of its competency to teach what it professes to teach; and secondly, in that, while it is thoroughly scientific, and the source of all real science in theology, it speaks in popular, and not in technical language, and in a large human way to the whole man, and

not to the intellect alone. It is a thought-provoking book. None can read it habitually without theologizing. The argument drawn from law and medicine in favor of expert over popular judgments loses force when we consider that the popular mind has no such daily instruction in legal or medical science as it has in theology. Think what the effect would be on a community if its members, one and all, should every day, year in and year out, read in some supremely wise book on physiology and hygiene. Would not the people come to have some sanitary and medical opinions worthy of respect?

It is significant also that the daily use of the Bible by the laity is not primarily for doctrinal, but for devotional purposes. Doctrine thus comes into the mind, not directly, and in the form of doctrine, but through devotional channels, and in forms fitted for worship, and for the uses of practical piety. This, so far from being a disparagement of the doctrine so reached, is a presumption in its favor. God's words coming into the soul in their native setting and connections, with the didactic and emotional force which they carry in themselves, not culled in obedience to some polemic purpose, or flung out in the heat of controversy, bring with them the truth they were intended to convey, the lesson they were designed to teach. Their entrance giveth light, it giveth understanding to the simple, — perhaps sometimes better understanding than a different use of them brings to the wise. If there are any who think that a clergy can force a theology on a Bible-reading people, or that clerical learning can ride down convictions born of household piety, let them turn back and learn the lessons of Scottish and early New England history.

II. The Sunday-school, as now conducted, is a powerful means of forming and disseminating lay opinions. So long as it was merely an agency for teaching the Catechism, whether so named or under the form of "question-books," in which proof-texts and references were so furnished that all answers were forestalled and inquiry was cut off, the Sunday-school served merely to fix and perpetuate a purely clerical theology. But as this practice has now been supplanted by the study of the text of Scripture, we may fairly regard the Sunday-schools of Protestant Christendom as engaged in the work of independent theological inquiry. Consider this fact, — for it is of vast moment, — the entire lay intellect of Protestant Christendom, thoroughly awake, vigorous, progressive, educated so as to be fully a match for the clerical intellect on all other questions and fully conscious of this equality, deeply respect-

ful toward the clergy as the commissioned and accredited leaders of religious thought and activity, and yet not looking up to them with the servile reverence of former times, not afraid to have an opinion on a question of theology, or, having one, to declare it, — this bold, earnest, inquisitive, nineteenth-century lay intellect engaged in the study of Scripture, with no intervening catechism, question-book, or even “authorized version!” Such a combined force of intellect, heart, and will does not set about such a work without accomplishing important results. That one result will be some modification of theology is beyond question. The only question is as to the character of the modification. Already we hear expressions of alarm and suspicion from the old-fashioned clerical partisans. Disparaging questions about the work of the Sunday-schools are frequent. In every ministerial convention may be heard regrets over the decay of clerical authority, complaints of the encroachments of the Sunday-school upon the proper work of the ministry, slurs upon lay exegesis and uncanonical instruction, and warnings against the complete secularization of religion. This condition of things becomes more significant when we consider that the position taken by the laity, that they are competent to study the Scriptures for themselves and to instruct the young in the fundamentals of theology, under the guidance of their own chosen teachers, is one they are not likely to abandon. The few churches that are trying to hold out against it are struggling against the religious tendencies of the age, and must succumb. Whatever the fact may mean, or whatever consequences it may entail, it is a plain fact that the Sunday-school is a great lay school of theology, which has taken into its hands an important function hitherto exercised by the clergy alone.

III. The secular Press, the most conspicuous, and, in some respects, the most powerful agent in forming public opinion, is not silent on religious questions. The higher class of public journals well understand that it is their office to minister to all the intellectual wants of man, to furnish information, to stimulate thought, to guide opinion, in all departments of human interest, — to regard nothing foreign which concerns man. It cannot have escaped the notice of thoughtful observers that in recent times our best newspapers and periodicals have been treating religious themes with more seriousness and thoroughness, and that they have not shrunk from attempting the profoundest and most difficult questions of doctrine. It is quite probable that many of these ably and strikingly written articles are the work of clergymen.

None the less are they lay sermons, written under lay supervision, and adapted to the supposed demands of a lay constituency. It may be thought that as men do not go to their daily paper for their theological opinions, such dissertations are out of place, and will have little effect. But the growing prominence given to religious discussion in the leading dailies shows that such discoursing from a journalistic pulpit finds an interested audience. The time was when the pulpit almost dictated opinion on all the secular concerns of man. The time has now come when it is jealously restricted to spiritual matters, and even there has to encounter a formidable rival in this ubiquitous, audacious, persuasive messenger and orator of modern lay thought, the secular press.

Equally noticeable is the changed tone of the religious press of our day. Here at least the right and the ability of laymen to influence religious opinion is fully recognized. The leading religious papers vie with each other in securing contributions from jurists, statesmen, men eminent in science and literature, who, on their part, seem to be quite willing to speak from the "sacred desk" of a religious newspaper. Listening to the clerical sermon in the morning is followed by reading from the family religious paper half a dozen lay sermons in the afternoon. Undoubtedly, the clerical preacher has a great advantage from the legitimate and recognized authority pertaining to his office. But it is equally beyond question that the character of his preaching is modified by the consciousness of rivalry with the lay preacher who is to follow him.

IV. The increased power of the laity in the temporal affairs of the church gives them boldness to claim, and opportunity to assert an influence in matters of doctrine. So long as the church had independent revenues, she could afford to ignore the opinions of the laity. But the series of enactments, of which the statute of mortmain was a conspicuous instance, whereby the growing wealth of the church was checked, curtailed also the arrogance of the clergy in matters of opinion, and compelled them to adopt a more conciliatory policy. The Reformation, by restoring to the laity a voice in the government of the church, gave them, indirectly, a voice also in its counsels. It may be that we are to see, for a time, an exhibition of lay arrogance and usurpation, and that the world will have the opportunity of comparing the old domination of intellectual and spiritual power with a new domination of mere wealth and numbers. But the ultimate issue will undoubtedly be to approximate the government of the church to that of the state,

to give the real power into the hands of those true leaders who can persuade the great constituency of voters, freely and voluntarily, to think and act with them.

If now lay theology is destined to have so great an influence on the theology of the future, it is important to divine, if we can, the nature of that influence. Some of the characteristics of lay theology are obvious.

First, it inclines to lay hold of the *practical* rather than the philosophical side of truth. It thus escapes one danger which has always beset clerical theology, that which grows out of the supposed necessity of finding or forcing a strict logical consistency in a complete theological system, — source of many assumptions, fictions, and absurdities, — but it easily runs into another danger, that, namely, of superficiality. Here is likely to be the weak point in lay theology. Lacking learning, it is likely to lack thoroughness, comprehensiveness, the large survey of truth, the historic sense, scientific patience and accuracy. Some of the practical, every-day questions of theology are profound, difficult questions. These it will be tempted to settle on the general principles furnished by common sense, which are totally inadequate to the task. On the other hand, lying closer to experience it will be more real, more human, more fruitful. It will differ from the technical theology of the schools as the philosophy of Socrates differs from that of Aristotle. It will be less acute, less subtle, less systematic, more narrow, more homely, more available for every-day uses.

Secondly, lay theology is essentially *conservative*. Innovations in any profession originate, not with the lay, but with the clerical members of the profession. Lay theology is not likely to be the “new theology” of its day. It will accept changes of its creed very slowly and reluctantly. And yet, having no fixed system to maintain, which must stand or fall with the fortunes of each separate part, it can at any time accept a well established truth without suspicion of remote consequences. It thus, in our time, mediates between the extremely rationalistic theology of the old school and the extremely intuitionist theology of the newest school. It holds some things as convictions of the reason, but not all that were convictions to Augustine and Anselm, Owen and Edwards, some things as mingled belief and hope, but not all that is so held by Stanley, Maurice, and Farrar. While, on the one hand, therefore, we need fear no revolutionary innovations from lay theology, we do not, on the other hand, look to it for leadership in any advanced movements of Christian thought. In great emergencies, if the

clergy should in the future, as at times in the past, prove recreant to their high mission, there is a reserve force in the laity equal to the task of snatching the trumpet from the hands of the clergy and sounding the note needed by the hour, but in ordinary times lay thought will be cautious, moderate, less inclined to prove things uncertain than to hold fast that which is good.

Thirdly, while lay theology is not originally *progressive*, it is passively so, — that is, it does not resist, as clerical theology is inclined to do, those general currents of thought, those mundane influences, which, coming silently in upon the universal mind, move it unconsciously onward. Clerical theology, always self-conscious and jealous of encroachment, guards its barriers against the beatings of the great sea of thought; lay theology admits these ocean tides into its estuary and blends their waters with its own. This position is well illustrated by the history of toleration. It is the Christian intelligence and the enlarged Christian spirit of the Christian world, it is Christianity working through mundane rather than ecclesiastical agencies, which has brought in the era of toleration. If at any time — say this time — the sum total of human thought in respect to theology should be moving in any particular direction, we should find that direction indicated and the movement registered by the actual position, not of the clerical, but of the lay mind.

In the true church of Christ the laity — if there is any such class — are to be not children in understanding but men. They are to exercise their manly understandings not upon secular matters alone, leaving the highest of all themes to a select class. They are to search the Scriptures, to add to their faith knowledge, to be wise unto that which is good, to be able to give a reason for the hope that is in them. They are, in other words, to have a theology, to know their own minds in matters relating to God, conscience, duty, immortality. Having the means in their hands for attaining to sound doctrine, and being held responsible for such lives as only sound doctrine can produce, they are not implicitly to submit their faith and conscience to any human keeping. But, as God's Spirit has been with the church from the beginning, and thus a body of divinity has, by the concurrence of all Christian minds, cleric and lay, been formed and by the experience of ages confirmed, this substance of Christian theology is a settled and immovable foundation on which all future additions will rest. But theology is by no means a finished structure; neither the fathers nor their sons have had all of God. Even the church which claims infallibility keeps on add-

ing new dogmas from age to age. We who do not claim to have this gift hold ourselves at liberty, not only to add, but to subtract, to amend, to modify, in any way as God shall give us new wisdom. In this work of theologizing, which is the never-ceasing duty of the church, there is a service for all its members, cleric and lay, to perform. The work would be imperfectly done if either should withdraw their hands from it. The special work of the laity at the present time seems to be to humanize theology, to subject its tenets to the tests of the practical Christian life, and thus, by keeping Christian thought from extremes and giving it always a leaning toward that which is old and established, to make it safe to welcome and hopefully entertain that which is new.

M. H. Buckham.

WHAT SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER.¹

IN the latter part of the past year a small volume appeared bearing the title which stands at the head of this article. The author, Professor Sumner of Yale College, widely and favorably known through his economic writings, and noted for his logical power, deals with the subject in a most direct and trenchant manner. His treatment is fearless, his arguments are cogent, and as the reader follows him step by step, assent is the natural attitude of mind. And yet the conclusions leave an undefined feeling of discontent. There is a want of full and entire satisfaction.

In such a case the grounds of the conclusions must be examined with care, and in order to do this, it is necessary to give some account of them. Professor Sumner's book is so compact, so tersely written, that an analysis is exceedingly difficult. To condense it is well-nigh impossible, and within the limits of this article I can only attempt to give a general idea of the line of thought with some of the principal conclusions.

In the introduction Professor Sumner strikes the key-note which runs through his book. He is speaking of the reformers, the men "who are playing the rôle of heralds of the coming duty, and the coming woe," and setting "world-problems" for others to solve; and he asks, Who are these people, and how did they

¹ *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other.* By WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, Professor of Political and Social Science in Yale College. 16mo, pp. 169. New York. 1883.

acquire the right to put hard questions? and who are they who are required to solve them? He answers, "So far as I can find out what the classes are, who are respectively endowed with the rights and duties of posing and solving social problems, they are as follows: Those who are bound to solve the problems are the rich, comfortable, prosperous, virtuous, respectable, educated, and healthy; those whose right it is to set the problems are those who have been less fortunate, or less successful in the struggle for existence. The problem itself seems to be, How shall the latter be made as comfortable as the former? To solve this problem, and make us all equally well off, is assumed to be the duty of the former class; the penalty, if they fail of this, is to be bloodshed and destruction. If they cannot make everybody else as well off as themselves they are to be brought down to the same misery as others." ¹

"The State," whose aid has been invoked by some of these reformers, is in Professor Sumner's view nothing more than All-of-us, and the question what ought the State to do for labor, trade, manufactures, etc., is simply what ought All-of-us to do for Some-of-us. But Some-of-us are included in All-of-us, and hence what Some-of-us do for ourselves may be canceled out, and then the question remains, What ought Some-of-us to do for Others-of-us? or, What do social classes owe to each other? In view of this question Professor Sumner distinctly formulates the work before him. He says, "I now propose to try to find out whether there is any class in society which lies under the duty and burden of fighting the battles of life for any other class, or of solving social problems for the satisfaction of any other class; also, whether there is any class which has the right to formulate demands on 'society'—that is, on other classes; also, whether there is anything but a fallacy and a superstition in the notion that 'the State' owes anything to anybody except peace, order, and the guaranties of rights." ²

I have quoted these passages at length, because, as I say, they seem to me to give the key-note to the whole book. The fallacies of the would-be reformers of society are to be exposed, and the reformers themselves are to be scarified. The doctrine of a paternal government is to be rooted up utterly.

The promise thus given is certainly well fulfilled. The folly of the ordinary method of reformers, by which A. and B. decide what C. shall do for D., is pointed out with keen and well-merited sar-

¹ Page 8.² Page 12.

casm. "C.," says Professor Sumner, "is the forgotten man." His desires, position, character, and interests are not considered in the decisions which A. and B. make. Even the interests of society, as C. affects them, are only partly considered, and C. himself is allowed no voice in the matter. The suggestion is pertinent that C. should not be forgotten, and his views may be as valuable as those of A. and B.

Professor Sumner points out the elastic character of the terms "poor man" and "the weak," and the impossibility of exactly defining them, and the consequent fallacies which grow out of their use. A pauper, that is a consumer who does not earn his living, has no claim to a place in society. He is not a "poor man" in the sense of the deserving poor, but is only a burden. According to the reformers the man who by his exertions has raised himself above poverty is of no account. It is only the man who fails to conquer the difficulties which beset him who is worthy of attention. For him all the agencies of the State are to be set in action, and capital is to be taken from the successful man for his use. The idle or inefficient man thus gets for nothing what the other worked for. Great injustice is done and poverty is a better policy than accumulation.

The ills with which mankind have to contend are of two kinds. The first is the product of natural causes which are beyond man's control. Against ills of this class man struggles for existence, and has slowly worked his way upward from the condition of the savage. The second class of ills grows out of the malice of men, or out of the ignorance and want of adjustment found in human laws and institutions.

The first mentioned ills the reformers of society cannot reach by their methods. They will yield only to a careful study of the laws of nature and an implicit obedience to them. The alleviation of the latter by changes in laws, in administration, in the social forms, or in the organization of society is a legitimate endeavor. Failure to clearly distinguish these two classes of ills has led to great confusion and want of clearness both in thought and in expression.

Professor Sumner also traces much loose thinking to the failure to appreciate that our society organization rests on contract and not on authority, custom, or prescription. According to his view the State is only a creature of contract. It has no power of itself. The contract is not even permanent, but is changed from time to time as circumstances dictate, or rather according to the will of

the contracting parties. He says "It endures only so long as the reason for it endures." "A society based on contract is a society of free and independent men, who form ties without favor or obligation, and coöperate without cringing or intrigue." "According to this view each man contracts to perform his part on condition that every other man will perform his." "It follows that one man in a free state cannot claim help from, and cannot be charged to give help to another." "A free man in a free democracy has no duty whatever toward other men of the same rank and standing, except respect, courtesy, and good-will."¹

In this connection Professor Sumner gives what must be considered from the politico-economic standpoint an excellent definition of liberty; it is, "a status created for the individual by laws and institutions, the effect of which is that each man is guaranteed the use of all his own powers exclusively for his own welfare."² The great duty which every man has is to take care of himself. Then to take care of his family and his dependents.

The question arises early in the discussion why we are not altogether brutes. The relations of sympathy between man and man are postponed for consideration to the last chapter, and from the economic point of view in Professor Sumner's words, "The reason why man is not altogether a brute is, because he has learned to accumulate capital, to use capital, to advance to a higher organization of society, to develop a completer coöperation, and so to win greater and greater control over Nature."³

The principles thus laid down are worked out in the clearest manner. We are shown why it is not wicked to be rich, nay, even it is not wicked to be richer than one's neighbor. The rich men are the captains of industries. They create wealth; they do not get it out of others, but by their plans, energy, and foresight, wealth is made possible. The rich work for themselves, it is true, but in so working they benefit the whole society. There are no men who will work for nothing, out of regard to the good of others alone, and the consideration of the possibility of such a class may be omitted.

The value, as a sociological principle, of the rule to mind one's own business is strongly insisted upon (page 71). This is, in fact, a fundamental principle. It is nearly or quite coincident with the old doctrine of *laissez faire*, which Professor Sumner fully believes in. In its discussion the reformers and social doctors are again subjected to severe criticism. He compares them to ama-

¹ Pages 25, 26, 27, 39.² Page 34.³ Page 69.

teur physicians, "they always begin with the question of remedies, and they go at this without any diagnosis, or any knowledge of the anatomy or physiology of society." "They never have any doubt of the efficacy of their remedies. They never take account of any ulterior effects which may be apprehended from the remedy itself. It generally troubles them not a whit that their remedy implies a complete reconstruction of society, or even a reconstruction of human nature. Against all such social quackery the obvious injunction to the quacks is to mind their own business." "Society needs first of all to be freed from these meddlers, that is, to be let alone." "It no doubt wounds the vanity of a philosopher who is just ready with a new solution of the universe to be told to mind his own business. So he goes on to tell us that if we think we shall, by being let alone, attain perfect happiness on earth, we are mistaken. The half-way men, the professorial socialists, join him. They solemnly shake their heads, and tell us that he is right, that letting us alone will never secure us perfect happiness. Under all this lies the familiar logical fallacy, never expressed, but really the point of the whole, that we *shall* get perfect happiness if we put ourselves in the hands of the would-be reformer. We never supposed that *laissez faire* would give us perfect happiness. We have left perfect happiness entirely out of our account. If the social doctors will mind their own business, we shall have no troubles but what belong to Nature. Those we will endure, or combat as we can. What we desire is that the friends of humanity should cease to add to them." ¹

These meagre quotations will give some idea of the politico-economic side of Professor Sumner's book. It is a model of terse expression and forcible English. It abounds in side lights, and sudden illuminations from unexpected quarters. Some of the arguments are admirably compressed; as, for instance, the argument against protection (page 143); and that against prohibitory, sumptuary, and moral legislation (page 132). The way in which the question of private ownership in land is disposed of is also masterly (pages 50, 51); but this term must be applied to the whole book.

The use which he makes of "the forgotten man" to whom he devotes two chapters, while reminding one of Bastiat's "*cela qu'on ne voit pas*," is a most legitimate and happy extension of the same sort of argument. It has a freshness which is captivating, as well as a strength which is convincing.

¹ Pages 116, 117, 120, 121.

On the politico-economic side, then, there is really little to criticise. Perhaps the definition of capital (page 85) may need slight enlargement. It makes the actual use for purposes of profit the test of what is capital, whereas the true test is the *possibility of use*. Capital may lie dormant. Its use is an accident not a characteristic.

Also the view that the State is simply "All-of-us" is not the highest conception of the State. On this point it may be asked if the memories of the great and good which we inherit from the past, and which rouse the feelings of pride and patriotism as one reads the story of noble deeds, are not worth something to the State. Do not such memories and traditions help to form a lofty ideal of what the State should be, of what the duties of citizens are, and thus do we not get a more complex, and at the same time a higher idea of the State than the simple notion of All-of-us?

But these are minor criticisms. They do not affect the great body of truth which the book contains. Yet this truth, explained as it is with great lucidity, only touches the problems of life on their material or economic side. The great difficulty is that so far the principles stated would apply equally well to a colony of coral polyps as to human beings. In fact such a colony would realize the high ideal of each individual minding his own business to perfection. Each polyp builds on his own foundation, within his own narrow round, and year by year the vast social reef rises.

It is, then, with some anxiety that we turn to the last chapter of Professor Sumner's work, which is entitled "Wherefore we should love one another," and in which, from hints in the other chapters, we are led to expect a treatment of the subject of human sympathy, and its bearing on the problems of life.

This chapter opens with two illustrations which throw much light on Professor Sumner's method of dealing with the subject. He says, "Suppose that a man going through a wood should be struck by a falling tree and pinned down beneath it. Suppose that another man, coming that way and finding him there, should, instead of hastening to give or bring aid, begin to lecture on the law of gravitation, taking the tree as an illustration. Suppose, again, that a person lecturing on the law of gravitation should state the law of falling bodies, and suppose that an objector should say: You state your law as a cold, mathematical fact, and you declare that all bodies will fall conformably to it. How heartless! You do not reflect that it may be a beautiful little child falling from a window."¹

The drift of these illustrations is apparent. Taking the second first, we see that it implies that the laws of sociology are capable of exact statement, like the laws of the physical sciences; that when once formulated and stated by the social philosopher it will be the height of folly for any one to complain that they bear hardly upon him; that if any one really suffers from the effect of these natural laws the rest of mankind may stand placidly by with the calm assurance that it does not concern them. But from the first illustration we learn that this indifference must not be complete. It is evidently out of place for the lecturer to discourse on the law of gravitation to the man who is suffering under the fallen tree. This is a state of the case which requires explanation. Why ought the man who is not under the tree to assist at once his suffering fellow mortal? The reason given by Professor Sumner is that possibly the situations may be reversed. You must help a man whom you find suffering under a fallen tree, because at some time you may be under a tree yourself. This is a very strange reason to give for the *obligation* to do good to your neighbor. It is only a contemplated *exchange of services*. And as no service has been rendered to you, you can, from a business point of view, be under no *obligation* as yet. At most you perform a service with the hope of receiving as much again. A forlorn hope, if the man under the tree is badly crushed; you ought to examine him carefully, to see if he is so maimed that he never can repay your exertion. Political economy will not justify you in making effort which does not bring good to yourself! Amazing reasoning to be suggested in this nineteenth century when the sermon on the mount and the story of the Good Samaritan can be purchased in any bookstore for a few cents! and when an ordinary education requires some apprehension of the significance of the life of Jesus Christ! But this reasoning is the logical outcome of the propositions which Professor Sumner puts forth, and that I may do him no injustice I will quote his conclusions in full. He says, —

“We may then distinguish four things: —

“1. The function of science is to investigate truth. Science is colorless and impersonal. It investigates the force of gravity, and finds out the laws of that force, and has nothing to do with the weal or woe of men under the operation of the law.

“2. The moral deductions as to what one ought to do are to be drawn by the reason and conscience of the individual man who is instructed by science. Let him take note of the force of gravity, and see to it that he does not walk off a precipice or get in the way of a falling body.

"3. On account of the number and variety of perils of all kinds by which our lives are environed, and on account of ignorance, carelessness, and folly, we all neglect to obey the moral deductions which we have learned, so that, in fact, the wisest and best of us act foolishly and suffer.

"4. The law of sympathy, by which we share each other's burdens, is to do as we would be done by. It is not a scientific principle, and does not admit of such generalization or interpretation that A. can tell B. what this law enjoins on B. to do. Hence the relations of sympathy and sentiment are essentially limited to two persons only, and they cannot be made a basis for the relations of groups of persons, or for discussion by any third party."¹

After enumerating these four propositions, Professor Sumner goes on to show that social advance is a product and a growth brought about by progress in the arts and sciences, and not by direct effort. Consequently that laws against corporations and the excessive power of capital are useless. We each owe to the other redress of grievances. We each owe it to the other to guarantee rights. In passing, rights are happily defined as pertaining to chances and not to results. Every one has a right to the *pursuit* of happiness; whether he can obtain it or not is another matter, but he must be guaranteed *the chance to pursue*. The best way to help a man is to open the chances so that he can help himself. In this way new wealth is produced.

We now come to the final conclusion.

"The men who have not done their duty in this world never can be equal to those who have done their duty more or less well. If the words wise and foolish, thrifty and extravagant, prudent and negligent, have any meaning in language, then it must make some difference how people behave in this world, and the difference will appear in the position they acquire in the body of society, and in relation to the chances of life. They may, then, be classified in reference to these facts. Such classes always will exist; no other social distinctions can endure. If then we look to the origin and definition of these classes, we shall find it impossible to deduce any obligations which one of them bears to the other. The class distinctions simply result from the different degrees of success with which men have availed themselves of the chances which were presented to them. Instead of endeavoring to re-distribute the acquisitions which have been made between the existing classes, our aim should be to *increase, multiply, and extend the*

¹ Pages 159, 160.

chances. Such is the work of civilization. Every old error or abuse which is removed opens new chances of development to all the new energy of society. Every improvement in education, science, art, or government expands the chances of men on earth. Such expansion is no guaranty of equality. On the contrary, if there be liberty some will profit by the chances eagerly, and some will neglect them altogether. Therefore, the greater the chances the more unequal will be the fortune of these two sets of men. So it ought to be in all justice and right reason. The yearning after equality is the offspring of envy and covetousness, and there is no possible plan for satisfying that yearning which can do aught else than rob A. to give to B.; consequently all such plans nourish some of the meanest vices of human nature, waste capital, and overthrow civilization. But if we can expand the chances we can count on a general and steady growth of civilization and advancement of society by and through its best members. In the prosecution of these chances we all owe to each other good-will, mutual respect, and mutual guaranties of liberty and security. Beyond this nothing can be affirmed as a duty of one group to another in a free state.”¹

Now there does not seem to be an entire agreement between the illustrations at the beginning of the chapter, the four principles in the middle, and the conclusion at the end. We are first taught that we should help our neighbor as a business matter, that we may be helped in like case. This is supreme selfishness. Then we are told that there is a law of sympathy which teaches that we should do as we would be done by. And finally, that this law, though binding between individuals, imposes no obligations whatever on classes.

There is certainly an incongruity in helping our neighbor on business principles, that is by way of exchanging services, and helping him in accordance with the law of sympathy, at one and the same time. But besides this inconsistency there is a true want of logical connection between the links of the argument, and some of the links will not bear examination.

The implication from numbers 1 and 2 of the four principles is that the laws of sociology are capable of the exact statement which characterizes the laws of the physical sciences. This doctrine is intimated in other parts of the book. But is it true? The laws of political economy have indeed been formulated with some precision, but it would be a misuse of terms to compare these laws

¹ Pages 167-169.

with the absolute certainty of the law of gravitation. Sociology embraces, if I understand its meaning, much more than political economy. It takes in not only those things which relate to man's material welfare, but also all those higher spiritual influences, all the affections and sentiments, which sway man's action, and the impress of which can be found on human institutions. To imitate one of Professor Sumner's own arguments, if the words generosity, virtue, sacrifice, repentance, patriotism, love, holiness, worship, have any meaning in human speech, the ideas they represent have a meaning and a force in human action.

The name of ethics has been given to that department of science which includes most of these things, but he would be a bold philosopher, who should attempt to formulate laws by which the action of ethical forces could be foretold. We have just celebrated the four hundredth anniversary of the birth of Luther. He set in motion an ethical force which widens with the centuries, but who could have predicted its appearance or its effect? Luther himself, when he nailed his ninety-five theses to the door of the church in Wittenberg, could have had no conception of the mighty consequences of his act. As, then, sociology in any proper sense must take account of such forces as this, it may be safely said that all the laws of sociology cannot be laid down with precision. To reason about them as if they could be precisely defined is to reason from an unsound basis to unsound results.

On the other hand, it is not apparent that any gain can be made by excluding ethics from consideration in the solution of social problems. Political economy is only one of the sciences, not even a very exact science as yet; it takes account only of what may be truly ranked as the lower motives, the selfish motives, of human action. The ethical forces are antagonistic to these. The resultant action is a variable, now inclining to one side, now to the other, but to obtain any true view the ethical force cannot be ignored. What would be thought of a physicist who lectured only on the law of gravitation and gave no attention to all the other multitudinous laws of nature; or who, having explained the law of gravity in its action on the heavenly bodies, should omit to state the law of centrifugal force which counteracts gravity and keeps the planet true to its orbit? The charge of such one-sidedness of statement can be fairly made against Professor Sumner; he states the selfish forces and omits to give due weight to the moral forces.

But this is not all. The question is, "What do social classes *owe* to each other?" that is, what *ought* they to do for each other?

Professor Sumner says "there is no injunction, no 'ought' in political economy at all,"¹ and he draws the conclusion that social classes owe nothing, that is *ought* to do nothing for each other. But this conclusion is unwarranted. The only conclusion which can properly be drawn from the premises is that *political economy*, for the reason that it has no "ought," does not say, *and cannot say*, that social classes *ought* to do anything for each other. This conclusion does not touch the real issue. The fact that political economy fails to impose obligation is not conclusive that obligation does not exist. The question which is asked is not a question of political economy. It is an ethical question. It belongs to the conscience and to morals. To attempt to solve it by the laws of political economy, and at the same time say that political economy has no *ought*, is an uncommonly bold begging of the question. It would be as useful to try to measure the relations of value with a yard-stick, and because this could not be done to conclude that there were no relations of value!

Professor Sumner scarcely enters the true field of inquiry. He says that duties owed from one to another lie between two individuals; and in so far as he means that duties are matters to be determined by the individual conscience he is right. As a rule, A. cannot judge what is the duty of B. B. must decide that for himself in the light which God has given him. B. may have no right to demand anything of A., and yet A. may have a duty to perform toward B. Professor Sumner declares that these are all questions between two individuals, and therefore they have no bearing on classes, and may be left out of the account. But classes are made up of individuals. The moment you have several individuals who feel obligations to others you have a class which we will call A, which owes something to a class which we will call B. Class B may not have any right to demand anything of class A, but it is the *condition* of class B which makes the demand on class A. The obligation consists in the perception by each individual of class A of the needs of class B, and of his own ability to minister to them, and of his duty to so minister in accordance with the law of love to our neighbor which our Saviour came into the world to teach and to exemplify. The individual who is trying to do this belongs to that great class who have opened their souls to spiritual light, and are walking in the path which is shown to them by the Divine radiance.

Professor Sumner is right in saying that the feeling of obligation

¹ Page 156.

is an individual matter, but it is impossible to see how this supports his inference that it cannot be affirmed of classes. In his own illustration, a man walking through a wood finds another under a fallen tree; there are many men walking in health and freedom through the wood, there are many others who have been caught under falling trees. We have at once two classes, the strong and free on the one hand, and the bruised and smitten down on the other. If the point is attempted to be made that these classes, and the classes to which I have alluded in the preceding paragraph are not social classes, but natural classes, that is, classes growing out of the natural gifts, physical, mental, or spiritual, of the individual, I reply that I suppose "social," in the sense in which it is employed in this discussion, means simply pertaining to society, and any class which exists in society, whatever may be its distinctive character, is a "social class." Any limitation of the meaning of "social," which would exclude any class actually existing, would only complicate the question without contributing anything to its proper solution. I do not think Professor Sumner intended any such limitation, for in the earliest mention of classes which he makes, I find he includes the virtuous, educated, and healthy, three classes depending on the personal characteristics of the individuals which compose them, as truly as would a class composed of those who feel a sense of obligation toward their fellow-men.

Professor Sumner does not, after all his argument, entirely free himself from the notion that some obligations exist. He affirms that "we all owe to each other good-will, mutual respect, and mutual guaranties of liberty and security."¹ But from what part of his argument this inference is drawn I have in vain endeavored to discover. This inference, according to the doctrine of the book, must have a modifying clause. We owe these things only when by giving them we gain, or expect to gain, some advantage to ourselves. If we see no advantage no obligation rests on us. The inference in this latter case might as well be that we owe malice and hatred instead of courtesy and good-will.

Professor Sumner makes an admirable distinction between the ordinary and the true method of looking at the present condition of mankind. He says, "It is often said that the mass of mankind are yet buried in poverty, ignorance, and brutishness. It would be a correct statement of the facts intended, from an historical and sociological point of view, to say, only a small fraction of the human race have as yet, by thousands of years of struggle, been par-

tially emancipated from poverty, ignorance, and brutishness." This is a fine but just discrimination. It recognizes the fact that the human race is working itself onward and upward by a struggle, and that it has reached a higher plane to-day than it has ever reached before. So far this is well, but if we inquire into the character of this struggle, we shall find that the sense of obligation, and the ethical forces which accompany it, have played a most important part. The struggle has not been for mere existence, nor for mere material welfare. There have always been men who were swayed by the desire to do their duty. Sometimes, through ignorance of what duty was, they have wrought most terrible results, but that does not affect the importance, as a social factor, of the motive which actuated them. To state what the sense of obligation has accomplished would be to write the history of prophets and martyrs, to recount the story of religious wars and persecutions, and to tell how holy men have taught the ways of God to their fellows, and through privation and suffering have preached in public and in secret the gospel of Jesus Christ. The subject is too vast for discussion within reasonable limits, but I may be permitted one or two illustrations.

Take for instance the matter of education, which certainly has a practical bearing upon the welfare of society. Education is mostly given gratuitously. Men who felt an obligation to benefit their fellow-men have endowed universities, colleges, and schools, so that now there is no great institution of learning where the student pays in full for what he receives. He enjoys the bounty of those who have gone before, and he incurs a debt to those who come after. This sense of duty toward the future is not in the nature of a business transaction. The desire to provide education for the children yet unborn is not a selfish desire, but it grows out of the obligation which good men feel, to do what they can to help on the race in its struggle upwards. This sentiment has been so cultivated that now, instead of being felt only here and there by individuals who endow schools or colleges, it is felt universally, and is regarded as a public duty. The obligation to educate the children is conceded, and the State collects a tax for the purpose. What was at first a moral force has become transformed into an economic force, and state education is seen to be for the public welfare, and is carried on for the public good.

Take a more complicated case: India presents to-day a social problem the importance of which can hardly be overestimated. There is a vast continent crowded with ignorant millions. Popu-

lation is limited by seasons of scarcity and famine. Food is produced at very low prices, but the intelligence and ability to turn the surplus of good seasons to profitable account is wanting. Immense quantities of wheat are lost for want of a market. England needs this wheat. She obtains a portion from the banks of navigable rivers, and from the few railroads, but the quantity is very small compared with the possibilities. As a problem of political economy the question is asked, Will it pay to build railroads to get the surplus wheat out? Caution suggests that the wants of the people are very few; traffic in merchandise will be small; ignorant people travel little; it is doubtful if railroads will pay.

Meantime other forces have been at work. Men who felt the obligation to try to improve the condition of their fellow-men have gone to India to preach the gospel and to found schools. The British government has fostered education and encouraged the Christian workers. Slowly but surely the influence has spread, and an educated, Christian class of native Indians now exists in India. Officers and judges of the government are selected from this class, and it has become so important that Lord Ripon's policy by which this class would enjoy the same rights which are possessed by residents of India of English birth has roused the enmity of Englishmen, and the matter is now before Parliament. A representative of this educated Indian class, Lalmohun Ghose, himself a native Indian, recently addressed a meeting in England, at which John Bright presided, and most eloquently pleaded the cause of India, and advocated the passage of Mr. Ilbert's bill, according to which native judges will have the same authority as English judges. Now is it not plain that here is the solution to the Indian problem? The Indian people must be elevated by education, and by the teachings of Christianity. When ignorance disappears the wants of a higher civilization will become manifest, railroads can be built without loss, and commerce will be turned into new channels. Food will be cheaper in England, and the Indian ryot will take a higher place in the social scale.

These last are purely material results, but they are the legitimate effects of that perception of duty toward others which has led so many to leave their loved homes, to sacrifice their own comfort, to go to preach glad tidings to those who were in darkness. They are the effects wrought by a social class which believed they did owe something to another social class.

But we need not go to distant lands for proof of the existence of the belief that we owe duties to our fellow-men. This belief

is a social force which permeates all our society. It is seen in the organization of benevolent societies, in the efforts which self-denying men make to help their fellows, in the secret ministrations to the poor, in the building and endowment of hospitals, in the care of the insane, and in the thousand kind offices which men perform for each other and which are now so common, but which a few centuries ago would have excited the most unbounded astonishment. We must go back before the Christian era to find the law, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." Since the advent of our Saviour, the law of kindness has developed into a law of binding force. The feeling that we owe something to our fellow-men, and the sense of obligation which will not allow us to ignore this feeling, have become a power in the world.

If the question discussed were, "What can one social class *demand* of another?" the answer given by Professor Sumner would be entirely correct. Nothing can be demanded. This is true not only of classes but of individuals. One man has no *right* to demand that another shall even say to him "good-morning." Yet in the matter of politeness the sense of obligation has been recognized, though from a lower point of view than the moral. The French nobleman of the old *régime* would have felt himself disgraced had he treated those about him with discourtesy, and he has handed down to us a motto, *noblesse oblige*. This motto, while it does not place duty on the highest plane, recognizes an obligation which is entirely different from that involved in a mere exchange of services. If we are allowed to translate with a slight change of meaning and say, "Nobleness imposes obligation," we have a really elevated sentiment. When we go still farther and say, "Goodness, morality, religion, impose obligations," we perfect and complete the proposition.

In conclusion, then, it may be said that this book of Professor Sumner's is deserving of great commendation for the clear statement of social problems in their economic relations, and for the able discussion of what pertains to rights. Professor Sumner's real conclusion is that rights are negative. A man has a right to be let alone, to ask that other people shall mind their own business. He has no right to demand positive aid or help. That government will govern best which most perfectly secures these conditions for its citizens. Every man may then work out the chances which are open to him free from interference.

That the line of reasoning followed by Professor Sumner is important cannot be denied. It teaches self-reliance, and incites to

exertion. It shows how the prizes of life are won by those who work for them. The criticism on the sin of indiscriminate charity, though severe, is no doubt healthy. There is danger of encouraging vice and idleness by thoughtless giving, and the truest charity will help a man to help himself. All this commands assent. The time also is very ripe for pointing out that those who receive help have no right to demand it, and that A. and B. cannot decide what C. shall do for D. For these things, and for many others, the book is valuable. It is also extremely suggestive. It will well repay careful study, for much thought is compressed within its narrow pages. But the study must be carried on with the distinct understanding that a full solution of the problem stated in the title cannot be reached by the methods employed. No sufficient account is taken of duty as determined by the individual conscience. From this source proceeds a force which, acting from within, presses outward upon the rigid effects of law, softens their asperities, and substitutes for cold calculations of selfish good; the nobler influences of kindness and good-will. When sanctified by the love of the pure and holy, this force, this sense of duty as felt in the individual conscience, is an element of the greatest importance in our social life. It seems to me that Professor Sumner fails to recognize this fact. It is because he so fails that there is the feeling of undefined discontent with his book. He has propounded an ethical question, and he has not discussed it from the side of morals. He has stated a problem in sociology, and he has left out of view a most important factor.

"What social classes owe to each other" opens a question which every member of society must answer for himself. The answer for the class is made up of the answers of individuals. He alone can answer rightly who with a conscience open to the Divine guidance diligently inquires, "What do I owe to my neighbor?" The conclusion from an inquiry made in this spirit can never be that nothing is owed, and if the ascertained commands of conscience are obeyed, the answer will be apparent in beneficent results. The hope of the world is in the growth of a social class which shall thus obey the monitions of conscience, and the members of which shall recognize the obligations which they owe to their fellow-men.

Rowland Hazard.

THE THEOLOGICAL TENDENCIES IN GERMANY.

THE religious thinking of Protestant Germany cannot be characterized by merely referring it back to its source in Scripture or in the Reformation of the sixteenth century. Besides its source, must be considered the numerous tributaries which pour their contents into the deep and broad stream of German theology and form its various currents; ecclesiastical history, the confessions of the Church, political influence, the national life, literature, philosophy, science, all add their contributions. So great is the variety, and so conflicting are the elements, that we are tempted to speak of separate streams rather than mere currents, and of theologies rather than of one theology. At present the religious thought is still agitated by severe conflicts. There are various schools, with clearly defined tendencies; but each tendency has in it so many peculiarities, that every classification can at best be only very general. What these schools are must be learned from the religious periodical literature of the day, from the lectures in the universities, and the pulpits of the land, as well as from the books of the leaders. There is not room in this article for a discussion of the historical developments which have culminated in the present theological tendencies, and which explain them; even the intense intellectual activity for more than a century, which has so deeply affected the religious thought and life of Germany, can hardly be mentioned. All the depth and breadth of the meaning and influence of naturalism, deism, rationalism, pantheism, pessimism, materialism, and idealism, must be considered in order to form a conception of the struggles through which German theology has passed, and is still passing. A few historical hints will help the student of religious thought the better to understand the character of the present tendencies.

The shallow naturalism and frivolous deism of the last century were concentrated by Kant into rationalism. This was a cold intellectualism, with three articles in its creed: God, freedom, and immortality; and with much moral earnestness and sternness, which were the natural effect of making conscience the source and centre of religion. The influence of Fichte's idealism was of short duration. Schelling made a deeper and more lasting impression on theology, and some profound scholars expected from his system the reconciliation of philosophy and religion. But he was soon superseded by Hegel, whose absolute philosophy of the Absolute

promised to explain and harmonize all things. From 1818 to 1831 Schleiermacher and Hegel were the representatives of two tendencies in the University of Berlin. The former, whose influence on theology begins with the century, again introduced the emotional element, so much ignored both by supernaturalism and rationalism; and he defined religion as essentially the feeling of absolute dependence on God. Though he was speculative, and wrote and lectured on philosophy as well as theology, he wanted to save religion from the influence of metaphysics by making the heart its seat. The stress laid on feeling not only tended to destroy the heartless rationalism, but also to deprive the doctrinal element in religion of the significance assigned to it by the orthodox. During his own age, and down to the present time, Schleiermacher, by means of his conception of religion, and his superior works in nearly every department of theology, has exerted a potent influence on religious thought.

While Schleiermacher was teaching, preaching, and publishing his emotional view of religion, Hegel was the representative of religion as pure thought. He went so far as to declare in his lectures, that, if a feeling of dependence is the essence of religion, then a dog is the most religious of beings. In his "Philosophy of Religion" he makes an effort to construct a purely speculative religion. But, although Christian terms are used, neither the author nor his disciples could persuade the world that in the Hegelian abstractions the concrete, living Christianity of the gospel is found. When, in 1835, Strauss, a disciple of Hegel, published his "Life of Jesus," making the gospel a series of myths, produced innocently and unconsciously by the early Christians, there was much confusion in Hegel's school. This was only made worse when another disciple, Baur, the most learned member, and the leader of the Tübingen school, rejected, with Strauss, all supernatural influence, and attempted, by means of severe, learned criticism, to show that the books of the New Testament, with the exception of Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, and the Apocalypse, were not written by the supposed authors, but in the second century. Feuerbach, another Hegelian, attempted to explain all religion as mere anthropomorphism, a projection and objectifying of man's desires and aspirations, so that the deity he worships is nothing but the fantasies of his own brain.

These conclusions produced bitter contentions in the large school of Hegel, and split it into hostile factions. Many men were filled with anxiety, and seriously asked whether Christianity

or any religion was still possible. The revolutionary efforts of 1848 added to the confusion, and many feared that the treasures of civilization, as well as of religion, might be lost. These were among the principal influences which led men of faith to attempt a reconstruction of theology on a firmer basis.

The fifty years of wild metaphysical speculation ended about 1840. Surfeited by it, scholars turned to other departments, especially to natural science. He who speaks of Germany as speculative, metaphysical, and as occupying the air as its peculiar sphere, views it as it once was, not as it now is. The Germany of to-day is still scholarly, but, at the same time, so realistic that many fear that it has lost its mission to cultivate ideals and to represent the Greeks among the modern nations.

But while philosophy has lost its former supremacy, its influence is still felt in theology. After forty years of philosophical skepticism, eclecticism, and chaos, the cry, "Return to Kant," resounds throughout the land; and not only are theologians in general affected by it, but, in its efforts to reconstruct theology, a vigorous and growing school of thinkers takes its stand on the critical philosophy. Hegel's imperial sway is at an end; but there is not a profound system of dogmatics or ethics of recent date which, in its substance and method, does not show traces of his influence. Schopenhauer's pessimism has affected general literature far more than theology; and its legitimate heir, Hartmann, has created more astonishment than conviction by means of his "Philosophy of the Unconscious." He has also tried to establish a new religion, but it lacks worshipers. Of the recent philosophies, that of Lotze has most points of contact with theology. His idealism serves as an antidote to materialism; he makes the ethical element the heart of his system; and, like Aristotle and his modern disciple, Trendelenburg, he cannot think of the universe otherwise than as controlled by reason, and therefore as embodying design, and intended to accomplish some purpose. His philosophy is too new yet to determine its effect on thought; but theologians are beginning to see in its spirit and principles the possibility of an approach to theology.¹

¹ In Herbart's school a vigorous effort has been made to construct a philosophy of religion which harmonizes with Christianity. Herbart opposed the prevailing monism by postulating a multiplicity of eternal elements as lying at the basis of all existence. See Taute's *Religionsphilosophie*; also that of Drobish, both of which appeared in 1840. Also O. Flügel, *Die Speculative Theologie der Gegenwart*. 1881. In Fries's school there has been but one prominent theologian, namely, De Wette.

German theology has been affected less by materialism than by philosophy, still theologians must take it into account, especially in works on apologetics. Under the leadership of Moleschott, Carl Vogt, Büchner, and Haeckel, a gross materialism, both scientific and popular, has been spread. More cautious scientists, like Du Bois-Reymond and Virchow, warn their fellow-laborers of the limits of natural science, and oppose the hasty conclusions of Darwinism as well as materialism, though they use their influence against religion. Men like Helmholtz devote themselves so severely to their scientific pursuits that even their students do not learn their metaphysical views, if they have any, respecting the nature of the ultimate substance. It cannot, however, be denied that in Germany, as well as in other lands, science is largely affected by the materialistic spirit, which is seen especially in the physicians. Spencer's synthetic philosophy seems to have gained little influence; it is too shallow as a philosophy, too hasty in its conclusions, and too full of contradictions, for the German mind.

From the time of Lessing till the present many of the prevailing tendencies in literature, philosophy, and science have been hostile to Christianity, and it is but too evident that there is a deep gulf between the Church and modern culture. The infidelity which at first assumed a scholastic form in the universities was communicated from the professors to the students, who afterwards as preachers, physicians, authors, and editors spread it among the people. After the evangelical had taken the place of rationalistic professors of theology, the students trained by them became evangelical preachers, but they found their churches empty; and it was no easy task to root infidelity out of the hearts of the people where it had so easily been sown. The influence of the Jews, particularly powerful in the periodical literature, is used against the gospel. The materialistic spirit of the press, coupled with pessimism, has done much to rob the masses of faith and hope, and to encourage an atheistic communism.

The various forms of opposition to Christianity indicate what problems were forced on theology. Never since its origin have the assaults made on the Church equaled in fierceness, in intellectual strength, and in profound scholarship those of this century. In proof of this, only the Tübingen school need be mentioned. And if German theology has surpassed that of other lands in depth and breadth and learning, it is largely due to the fact that its conflicts have been the most trying in history. No wonder

that other churches here find an exhaustless armory to which they can resort in their less severe struggles.

From the ranks of science and philosophy, as well as theology, men have contended earnestly for the faith. Among scientists I shall mention only Fechner of Leipsic, who has written on the "Grounds of Faith," as well as numerous scientific works, and has met materialism on its own physical basis. Philosophers have rendered special service in counteracting the influence of pantheism and fatalism. I. H. Fichte, Wisse, Chalybaeus, Ulrici, and others, have tried to give a philosophical basis for theism. The last, Professor H. Ulrici, of Halle, deserves great credit for his eminent service in the cause of religion. Not only is he a philosopher, but he has also mastered the scientific theories of the day. Taking his stand on the Christian basis, he has ably defended it by means of philosophical and scientific works on the relation of man and nature to God, as well as in articles in his "Philosophical Journal" and in Herzog's "Encyclopædia."

Before attempting to classify the theological tendencies, it will be necessary to indicate the relation of the Lutheran and Reformed churches to each other. The seeds of division were sown in the Reformation itself, but the harvest was not gathered till after Luther's death. Since the Reformation the Protestant Church of Germany has been divided into two branches, the Lutheran and the Reformed. The former professes to follow the great reformer whose name it bears, and its principal creed is the Augsburg Confession. The latter has more Calvinistic elements, and its creed is the Heidelberg Catechism. In 1817, the three hundredth anniversary of the Reformation, a new religious life was awakened in Germany, for which the way had been prepared by the long and, at last, successful wars with France. The memories of the Reformation created a desire to unite the Lutheran and the Reformed into one evangelical church. Frederick William III. of Prussia appealed to the consistories, synods, and influential ministers to form a Union, "in which the Reformed should not become a Lutheran, nor the Lutheran a Reformed church, but in which both should constitute a newly quickened evangelical Christian church in the spirit of its holy Founder." Schleiermacher was specially active in promoting this Union, and numerous ministers and churches agreed to enter it. In Nassau, Baden, Hesse, and other countries the two churches were also united. In 1822 the king of Prussia recommended a new liturgy to the churches, and afterwards attempted to enforce its use. It was intended to

be a consummation of the Union by introducing into all the churches the same form of worship. But it pleased neither the Lutherans nor the Reformed; and a storm of opposition was raised against the Union as well as the liturgy. Professor Scheibel of Breslau became the leader of the opposition. The Union was regarded as an effort to rob the Lutheran Church of its peculiarities of doctrine and worship; and those who adopted the liturgy were denounced as false to their creed, and they were excluded from ecclesiastical fellowship. But this resistance only made the government the more determined, and the ministers who refused to use the new liturgy were summarily deposed. Those who had conscientious scruples respecting the liturgy and the Union withdrew from the state church. A synod of these separatistic Lutherans was held at Breslau in 1834, but not till 1845, under Frederick William IV., did they receive official recognition and toleration.

The fierce opposition to the Union was the occasion of a cabinet order in 1834, which says: "The Union does not desire or signify the abandonment of the creed hitherto held, nor has it destroyed the authority which the creeds of the two evangelical churches have had in the past. By entering it, only the spirit of moderation and mildness is expressed; a spirit which no longer regards the difference respecting certain doctrines as a sufficient reason for refusing outward ecclesiastical fellowship." This order led many to declare that they had a right to retain their particular creed in the Union just as they did before the churches were united. The result of the whole was, that instead of a united, harmonious church, there were now separatistic Lutherans, besides a state church, in which some ministers honestly tried to preserve what is common to both confessions, some wanted to go behind the creeds to the common ground or source of both, others desired to conserve the Lutheran creed, others the Reformed, while still others used the indefiniteness of the Union as an occasion for latitudinarianism. And at present there are in Prussia and throughout Germany four parties, whose position is determined by their relation to the confessions of the Church and to church polity: first, the confessional¹ Lutheran party; second, the Friends of Positive Union; third, the Middle Party; fourth, the Protestant Association (Protestanten-Verein). But this division of parties cannot be adopted in giving the theological tendencies in Ger-

¹ This word is used here as by the Germans, to designate a strict, exclusive adherence to the confession or creed of a church.

many, since the second and third parties have essentially the same doctrinal position, but differ respecting church polity. The following theological classification is therefore preferable: —

1. *The Confessional Lutheran Tendency.*
2. *The Evangelical but not Confessional Tendency.*
3. *The Negative or Neo-Rationalistic Tendency.*

To these must be added a school which is exciting much discussion and is gaining many adherents.

4. *Ritschl's School.*

1. *The Confessional Lutheran Tendency.*

This tendency aims to restore the Lutheran doctrines of the Reformation, makes the Symbolical Books¹ the test of orthodoxy, and opposes ecclesiastical union with those who do not adopt these Books. The general aim of this "New Lutheranism" is a strict adherence to the old doctrines and a severe exclusion of all innovations. At a recent Lutheran conference Professor Luthardt of Leipsic said: "Dear as is to us the gospel which Luther preached, so dear also shall be to us the church which bears his name. By this we mean, that it shall confess his doctrine as that which alone shall have authority in it; and faithfully to keep and cherish that doctrine shall be regarded as the divine mission of the church." But in spite of the effort to establish uniformity of doctrine, there is considerable difference among the leaders, some insisting on a literal adherence to the confession without the slightest deviations, while others admit them on minor points; some favor a development of doctrine, while others oppose it; and some go so far as to denounce the effort to distinguish between fundamental and non-fundamental doctrines in the creeds.

The efforts of the negative criticism to destroy the doctrines of Christianity, and of rationalism to make the Church creedless, have strengthened the determination to go back to the confessions for the reconstruction of theology; but the chief occasion and inspiration of the confessional movement were found, as already intimated, in the establishment of the Union in Prussia and other states, which was regarded as endangering the existence of pure Lutheranism. Professor Scheibel's efforts to preserve the pecul-

¹ The Symbolical Books contain the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian creeds; the Augsburg Confession; its Apology; the Smalcald Articles; the Catechisms of Luther; and the Formula of Concord. These constitute the creeds of the Lutheran Church, of which the Augsburg Confession is the most important and the one most universally adopted.

iarities of the Lutheran confession were seconded by the scientist Professor Henry Steffens and the jurist Professor Huschke. Scheibel said: "I do not declare the Symbolical Books to be equal to the sacred Scripture, but a correct exhibition of its doctrines." Laxity respecting the creeds in these Books he viewed as a denial of the faith. By the leaders in the movement, the doctrine of the Lord's Supper was regarded as the cardinal distinction of Lutheranism, and the Reformed view was held to be a profanation of the ordinance; hence they severely denounced those Lutheran pastors who gave the communion to Reformed Christians. The fact that the Lutheran creed could be maintained and preached in the Union did not satisfy them, and Professor Scheibel said: "The one Church is a unit; a mixture of the Reformed and Lutheran is therefore hypocrisy. And to permit Lutheran and Reformed preaching in the same church is a contradiction, and, what is worse, it is an ecclesiastical approbation of indifferentism respecting faith, which is the same as unbelief." The exaltation of sharply defined doctrines even in what are commonly regarded as non-fundamentals, and the development of dogmatic peculiarities to the utmost, is characteristic of the leaders. Their principles naturally developed an exclusive and intolerant spirit.

The new movement soon gained a number of adherents among scholars. Heubner of Wittenberg and Guericke of Halle, the eminent writer on ecclesiastical history, were of the number; also Henry Leo, the brilliant historian, of the same University. Professor Guericke was deprived of his position in the University from 1835 to 1840, because he favored this movement. In the new tendency to orthodoxy Professor E. W. Hengstenberg of Berlin became one of the most influential leaders, by means of his "*Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*," published since 1827. Originally Reformed, he afterwards favored the Union, then opposed it, though he belonged to it till his death. In his paper a strict orthodoxy in the sense of the Symbolical Books was advocated, rationalism was mercilessly attacked, and also pantheism and the Tübingen school. But the paper became so inquisitorial, so intolerant, that some of its former contributors, among them Neander, would have nothing more to do with it. Some saw in it the effort to establish a new papacy. Such offense was given by Hengstenberg through his works on the Old Testament and his paper that he was abandoned by his former Lutheran friends and co-laborers, Hofmann in Erlangen, Kahnis, Delitzsch, Kurtz, and others. Nevertheless the growth of this tendency was largely indebted to his efforts.

This confessional Lutheranism never gained much strength in Prussia, but in other countries, particularly in Bavaria and Mecklenburg, it became very powerful. This is not the place to follow it through its various phases and conflicts, and through its high-church meanderings and its tendencies to Romanism, as found in its doctrines of the Church, of the ministry and the laity, and of the absolute and unconditional authority of the creeds. Only the most general characteristics can be given.

The watchword of the leaders has been: none but Lutherans shall receive the Lord's Supper from a Lutheran pastor. Rev. Löhe and others in Bavaria insisted that if the Reformed desired to commune at a Lutheran table they must first formally enter the Lutheran Church. Professor Delitzsch, formerly of Erlangen, now of Leipsic, holds that it is "the good old practice" of the Lutheran Church to prevent the Reformed from partaking of its communion. Professor v. Zezschwitz of Erlangen has written a book to prove that the Reformed should not be permitted to receive the Lord's Supper from a Lutheran. Some claim that those who receive the Symbolical Books but belong to a United church shall be treated just like the Reformed. Recently a Lutheran student of theology from Prussia, who was unwilling to receive the communion from any but a pastor of his own faith, desired to commune in Erlangen; but the Lutheran pastor rejected him and told him to go to the Reformed Church — because he belonged to the United Church of Prussia. In this act Professor v. Zezschwitz glories as a proof of decided faithfulness to the confession.

In Mecklenburg this tendency is as rigorous as in Bavaria. Formerly the churches were nearly all rationalistic; and it is said that in 1848 there were two pietistic preachers, and not one representative of the confessional party. The reigning dukes had favored rationalism, but the one on the throne in that year was a pupil of Kliefoth who became quite confessional, exerted great influence over the duke, and attained the most important ecclesiastical position. Kliefoth demanded the strictest adherence to the confessions, and did not hesitate to discipline and depose ministers who in any respects deviated from them. To accomplish his ends, the authority of the state and the University of Rostock were used. Against the learned Professor Baumgarten of this University, who adopted the confessions, the charge was made that on some points he differed from them, and he was summarily dismissed in 1858, without even the usual formalities prescribed for such cases; and in spite of all the protests and appeals from

Lutherans in the land and out of it, he is to this day deprived of his position. Finding his petitions to the government unheeded, Baumgarten appealed to the Church, and a protest signed by six hundred citizens of Rostock was presented to the authorities. These answered by instituting judicial proceedings against the professor and the signers, but they were not convicted. The professor then published two books on affairs in Mecklenburg for which he was fined and also imprisoned for six weeks. During his confinement he wrote a brochure entitled: "To my Friends from Prison," for which he suffered another imprisonment of fifteen weeks, besides a fine of one hundred and fifty *thaler*. No wonder that such measures have branded Mecklenburg as a region of darkness, and as the home of bigotry and intolerance; but the confessional party has triumphed completely. In 1848 the law making the Symbolical Books binding on ministers was a dead letter; but to-day, with a single exception, the three hundred and forty-six ministers are adherents of Kliefoth.

It would be a serious mistake to suppose that all who belong to the confessional tendency favor such extreme measures. Still more unjust would it be to make Lutheranism responsible for these excesses. There are many Lutherans, as sound in the faith as these extremists, who not only condemn such measures, but who do not even belong to the exclusive confessional party. A Lutheran whose orthodoxy is not questioned, and whose ecclesiastical position in Germany is second to none, said recently: "There are three classes of Lutherans; the first accept all the Symbolical Books, honestly live according to their doctrines, and exclude the Reformed from the Lord's Supper; the second class accept the same creed, but enter into fellowship with other believers; the third insist on a rigid adherence to the confessions, but neglect the life. With the last class we find it difficult to get along. They thank God that they have the pure doctrine and are not as other people. In — their churches are empty, and some have actually been closed because there were no worshipers; still the ministers praise God that they and they alone have the pure doctrine. In a certain city there is a parish with many thousand souls, while the services on Sunday are perhaps attended by fifty persons; but the preacher glories in the fact that they have no union with those of another faith."

In many instances the confessional Lutherans have done much for the revival of the Church and the encouragement of learning. They cannot, as a whole, be classed with the dead orthodoxy of

the seventeenth century, though some undoubtedly belong to the same category. The doctrinal character of the tendency may be seen in Philippi of Rostock, one of its writers on dogmatics, who died in 1882. Adhering unconditionally to the confessions, he rejected the view that some of their doctrines are non-fundamental. While some Lutherans claimed that the doctrines may be developed, he opposed their change, as well as the union with, or the least adaptation to, other creeds. Not only did he contend against other churches, but also with Lutherans. The theologians of Erlangen are also confessional. One of their leaders, the late Professor Thomasius, with all his Lutheranism, held that the doctrine respecting Christ needs development. In his effort to give a conception of the historic Christ, he taught that, in becoming human, He laid aside the divine attributes of omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence, but retained those of freedom, holiness, truthfulness, and love. Professor v. Zezschwitz, of the same university, holds that the divine attributes retained by Christ, in his human state, are those of holiness and love. This led to what is called the dispute respecting the Kenosis. (Phil. ii. 7.) Philippi rejected these views, and so there was a division among the confessional theologians themselves. Shortly before his death, when the Lord's Supper was administered to him for the last time, Philippi said: "Accursed be all modern humbug which undermines the Church of God. I will know nothing of synergism, nothing of the Kenosis of the Logos, nothing of those who want to develop the doctrine of our church. God's Word, and the confessions of our church, nothing above, nothing beneath them."

Among the confessional theologians Thomasius is by no means the only one who favors and attempts a development of doctrines beyond the confessions. Philippi's position, that the doctrinal development, so far as embodied in the confessions, must stop with the Reformation, is untenable, and even the confessional theologians are not all content with a mere reproduction of those doctrines.

Bishop Martensen, a Lutheran theologian of Denmark, has gained considerable influence in Germany through his books. His work on Lutheran dogmatics is rather an attempt to adapt the old dogmas to modern culture than to restore them in their original form. Its tone is decidedly mystical, and its speculative portions show traces of the marked influence of recent philosophies and modern research.

Another writer on Lutheran dogmatics deserves special mention, Professor Kahnis, since 1850 at Leipsic. Against the Hegelian school he defended orthodoxy; against the Reformed he defended the Lutheran view of the Lord's Supper; and to this day he opposes the Union, and claims that the Lutheran Church has a right to maintain its peculiarities. He holds that Christian fellowship does not depend on ecclesiastical union. While agreeing with them on so many points, some of his confessional friends were surprised when he asserted that certain doctrines needed improvement and development. His "Lutheran Dogmatics" (the first volume appeared in 1861) was severely attacked by Hengstenberg and others, and he was declared to have renounced the faith. Respecting the confessions, he says that he cannot comprehend how a Protestant theologian can accept them unconditionally: "In the development of three centuries there is a world of experience, a sum of motives, a treasure of truths, which no true scribe, who must know both the old and the new, can leave unused. Thus, in the Lutheran Church, besides the unconditional authority of Scripture, and the conditional authority of the confession, the development of the living consciousness has a right to be heard. . . . It is the present mission of the Church to prove from Scripture the facts of salvation which we confess, and to follow them in their theological development, and, at the same time, to harmonize them with the true results of science." In the third volume of his "Dogmatics" he says: "We are in an age which has a special call to defend Christianity. But as he is a poor commander who, in defending his fortress, concentrates his forces at points which cannot be held, so that theologian has no call to be an apologist who bases the defense of Christianity on points which may at any moment fall." In some of the Lutherans he sees a Romish rather than a Protestant spirit, and he declares that it is "un-Protestant, unhistoric, and even irrational, to assert that the Symbolical Books are what they cannot and do not claim to be, namely, the close of all doctrinal development." Lutheranism, he says, has developed, and continues to develop. He holds that, in substance, the doctrines of the Trinity, of Christ's Person and work, and of grace, are safe beyond all danger of change; but that they need new exegetic, historic, and philosophic establishment, which will necessarily result in a modified statement of doctrine. Those who want to retain only the old, in its old form, will, he thinks, only promote the rejection of the old. He not only claims the right to modify the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper, but proceeds

to do it, and claims still to be a Lutheran, and that his "Dogmatics" is Lutheran. To the other Lutherans who have reduced all doctrine to so small a point that no two can stand on it, he gives this significant warning: "If I am not mistaken, many strict Lutherans, after the trying experience of late years, have felt that if in the future, as in the past, every difference in doctrine is to be made the occasion for division, Lutheranism will, in the end, be dissolved into atoms which at last no one will recognize as Lutheran. I hold, that all Lutheranism which sees outside of its own pale only factions and sects, and has no appreciation for that which is Christian and true in other creeds; which treats with suspicion every effort to test and adapt its doctrines; and which prevents every development of its confession — this, I hold, is unevangelical, and therefore without a future."

These words, written in 1868, show that the extremists in this tendency have gone too far, and that a strong reaction has begun. From the Lutheran Church another significant voice has just been heard, that of Dr. Wangemann, of Berlin.¹ Pleading earnestly for genuine Lutheranism, he warns against bigoted and intolerant Lutherans, with whom "passion is so much stronger than the truth." Instead of leading back to the true doctrine, they disseminate poison; they have been destructive, not constructive; and the time which should have been used in promoting the kingdom of God was spent in devouring one another. This Lutheran doctor also shows that some of the very leaders in this movement in favor of the absolutely pure doctrine, and of an exclusive church, have themselves taught doctrines in conflict with the creed.

The days of the inquisition are past; and there are significant signs that an adherence to the confession, as seen in the light of Scripture, of history, and of modern developments, without condemning other Christians, or refusing them fellowship in worship, or at communion, is gaining the ascendancy in the Lutheran Church over an exclusive confessionalism which rejects doctrinal development, denounces all other believers, and treats fellowship and coöperation with them as an evidence of doctrinal treachery.

The confessional tendency, in its severer or milder form, has

¹ I am anxious to describe this tendency in the Lutheran Church, as represented by Lutherans themselves, not by the statements of their opponents. For this reason I cite Lutherans, not the harsh judgment of others. If any one desires to know what contention and confusion and sad havoc have been made by the extremists of this tendency, let him read Dr. Wangemann's books, entitled, *Sieben Bücher von der Una Sancta*. Berlin, 1883.

not only gained much influence in the churches, but has also become a power in theological literature. Besides Mecklenburg and Bavaria, it is influential in Saxony, Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hesse. Theologically, it is strongest in the universities of Erlangen, Leipsic, and Rostock; but it also has representatives in those of Breslau, Königsberg, Greifswald, and Strasburg. It has done much to awaken a deeper love for the Church, and in restoring to the present generation the treasures of the Reformation. Besides numerous books on liturgies, hymnology, church government, and of a polemic character, it has produced valuable exegetical works on the Old Testament, namely, those of Hengstenberg, Keil, and Delitzsch, and has enriched dogmatic literature by the writings of Philippi, Thomasius, Martensen, Kahnis, Luthardt, and others. In church history Guericke, and in catechetics the works of v. Zezschwitz, are worthy of special notice. Professor Luthardt, also, deserves credit for his popular apologetic works.

The universities of Göttingen, Tübingen, and Kiel are nominally Lutheran, but they do not promote the confessional tendency. We cannot speak of a confessional movement in the Reformed Church, for that Church has almost ceased to exist as a separate organization in Germany. It has been absorbed by the Union.

2. *The Evangelical but not Confessional Tendency.*

Under this head are included all the theologians who are biblical, and accept the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, but do not make the creed of a particular church the test of orthodoxy, or the condition of Christian union. While this tendency is found in nearly every part of Germany, it is specially strong in Prussia and Würtemberg. In the latter country the Church is Lutheran, but, at the same time, liberal. This evangelical party, of course, flourishes wherever the two confessions have been really united into one church.

In the Union in Prussia this tendency is predominant, including the Friends of Positive Union and the Middle Party. The former are the strongest party in the Union, and have taken the name Positive, because some (the *Protestantenverein*) want a negative, creedless union. Sometimes the Friends of Positive Union are called the "Court-Preachers' Party," because the court-preachers of Berlin are among its leaders. The principles of this tendency may be learned from the articles adopted by them in 1876, in which they say: "We stand on the foundation of the confessions

of the Reformation, and also on the basis of the Union, and seek to unite all those who have a living evangelical faith in Jesus Christ, the Son of the living God, the crucified and the risen One, and who, with a churchly independent spirit, are willing to labor with us in promoting the development of the Church on the basis of the constitution." They demand the application of ecclesiastical discipline to those who refuse to accept the doctrine, order, and customs of the Church; which evidently means that the Protestant Association should be excluded from the state church. As far as the state is concerned, they desire as much independence as is necessary for the free development of the life of the Church. They also want the Church to have a voice in the appointment of theological professors.

In the same year the Middle Party said, in their declaration of principles: "We heartily confess our adherence to the gospel of Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, in whose name alone there is salvation; and to the great principles of the Reformation: namely, that we are justified solely by means of faith in the grace of God, in Christ the crucified and risen One, and that the sacred Scriptures are the only source and the highest norm of the doctrine and proclamation of salvation. The confessions are to us a precious inheritance of the Church, and are worthy of being prized; but we hold it to be irreconcilable with evangelical principles to give them the significance of an unimprovable tradition, and to make their letter a binding law for Christian doctrine and practice.

"We declare it to be the aim of all our ecclesiastical efforts to preserve to our people the gospel with its heavenly comfort and sanctifying power, and to promote its fuller explanation and appropriation." It seeks to increase the lay element in the management of churches and in synods, and wants that degree of independence for the Church in its relation to the state which will enable it freely to develop its life. It also expresses its willingness to coöperate with the different ecclesiastical tendencies for promoting the welfare of the Church.

From these declarations it is evident that both parties want to be thoroughly evangelical. But the Positive Union lays more stress on the confessions of the Church, and also demands a doctrinal obligation at the ordination of ministers, and desires those who reject the doctrines of the Church to be excluded from the privileges of the state church. The Middle Party expresses its regard for the confessions, but rejects their binding authority.

Its readiness to coöperate with all the parties in the state church has been interpreted to mean toleration of the Protestant Association. The question between the two parties is not one of orthodoxy, but of their relation to the confessions and to those who reject them. At a recent meeting of the Middle Party one of the speakers said: "If we permit our orthodoxy to be questioned we are lost." In either party there may be men who are Lutheran, or who adopt that wherein the Lutheran and Reformed creeds agree. One of the court-preachers of Berlin (Kögel, Stöcker, Schrader, Frommel) recently said: "All four of us are Lutheran." But they are heartily in favor of the Union and enter into ecclesiastical fellowship with all true believers.

Among the theologians who come under this division the variety in doctrine and method is still greater than among those placed under the first head. They do not stand on the same confession as a common basis and a point of union. Some of them insisted on going directly to Scripture for their doctrines; to its letter and spirit as interpreted by Scripture itself. The most eminent of these purely biblical theologians was J. T. Beck, from 1843 until his death, a few years ago, professor in Tübingen. While others also made the Scriptures the ultimate appeal, they formed their dogmatics from them with the aid of the historic development, or the confessions, or the consciousness of the Christian Church, but Beck, trained in the school of Bengel, Storr, and Steudel, wanted to read the Scriptures only in their own light. Their divine life must be appropriated by faith; and the system of doctrine must be the product of faith permeated by thought. This system must be a spiritual organism, a reproduction of that found in Scripture, not indeed on the surface but in the depths. It is significant, that at the very institution which gave the strongest infidel school of the century its name, the Scriptures, whose authority Baur and Strauss aimed to destroy with their criticism, should be used for the development of a purely biblical dogmatics and ethics without seriously heeding that criticism. Beck's lectures, particularly those on ethics, attracted hundreds of eager students, while the mythical theory of the Gospels had long ago lost its influence in Tübingen. Profound as the lectures were, with a deep insight into Scripture, and with a life and inspiration which moved the hearers, they did not sufficiently take into account the doctrinal development in the Church, and were too little calculated to meet the needs of the present, needs which had been deepened and sharpened by criticism and skepticism. But in many a young

heart and in many pulpits, particularly in Württemberg, the living truths drawn directly from Scripture were proclaimed. Professor R. Kübel, also of Tübingen, a pupil of Beck, essentially follows the same method in his "System of Doctrines" (1873), which is a union of dogmatic and ethical elements. Professor Reiff of Basel, another pupil, also has much of the biblical spirit of his teacher.

Professor J. C. K. Hofmann of Erlangen also seeks to draw his doctrines directly from Scripture. His process (in the "Schriftbeweis") is, however, more exegetical and historical, while Beck aims more at the development of biblical truth into a system, especially into ethics. Hofmann views Scripture as essentially prophecy and fulfillment, with Christ as the subject and centre. He takes the present tendencies into account more fully than Beck, and is more influenced by the Lutheran confession, though in some points he departs from its teaching.

Other theologians felt more the need of adapting the doctrines of Scripture to the age. They aim to harmonize Christianity with modern culture, and theology with philosophy and science; they seek the positive, but also the rational; they desire to retain the result of historical development, but try to adapt it to present needs; they strive to get the biblical, but at the same time all that is valuable in the critical; they want to hold the substance of the confessions, but also aim to be just to the results of modern research. Scripture, history, the creeds, mysticism, pietism, rationalism, and recent speculation are made to contribute to the formation of that system which is intended to meet the needs of the Christian and of the age. They are the men who have deeply felt the value of religion, but also the estrangement of the age from the gospel and the need of bridging the gulf between the Church and modern culture.

The work of mediation (*Vermittlung's Theologie*) was exceedingly difficult, and the efforts to adapt the Christian doctrines to the exigencies of the times bear distinct traces of their origin amid conflicts. The writers on dogmatics generally reveal the powerful influence of Schleiermacher, but they are more positive. Instead of simply emphasizing the Christian consciousness, they also lay the stress on Scripture, and take the historic development and criticism into account. These earnest thinkers have been blamed for not at once attaining the definiteness and positiveness of the confessional party; others have censured them because they do not accept the negations of the destructive criticism. It would

have been easier to follow the beaten track, or to go with the Tübingen school, than to perform the task they undertook, namely, to conserve of the old all that was tenable and to accept of the new all that was firmly established. They felt their way cautiously and critically, otherwise they could not expect to put the truth on a firm basis; much that had been regarded as positively settled now seemed problematical: and to assert it dogmatically would only have repelled; old truth had to be put into a new form and required new proofs; what experience and reason had learned from the age, as well as from Scripture, found a place in their works, which consequently had much which was subjective. When all the circumstances are considered we cannot be surprised that a system could not at once be produced which was in every respect complete, fixed, and final. If there is evident hesitation, some doubt and vacillation, they are explained by the greatness and difficulty of the subjects, and by the desire to teach in the most convincing form nothing but firmly established truth. In some cases the theology of mediation became a theology of accommodation, and the Christian doctrines were compromised. But those who did this do not belong to the theologians classed under our second head. The work of mediation performed by evangelical scholars must be viewed in the light of the crisis through which the Church passed, in order to be fully appreciated.

Besides Schleiermacher, this mediating theology is largely indebted to his colleague in the same University, Neander. Coming from Judaism to Christianity, his life was characterized by an ardent love for the Saviour. He did not emphasize the confessions, nor did he seek to promote strict orthodoxy, but he cherished a living faith in the gospel. In his history this "last of the church fathers," as he has been called, aimed to unfold the inner life of the Church. His "pectoral theology" met with opposition from the old orthodoxy, while cold rationalism received it with a sneer. Too heterodox for some, too orthodox for others, he nevertheless attracted great numbers of students, whom he aroused spiritually as well as intellectually. His position and that of the whole tendency here described is sufficiently characterized when it is stated, that, on the one hand, he opposed Hengstenberg, and, on the other, the Tübingen school and rationalism. His aim was not confessionalism, not the inquisition, not a new hierarchy, not a negative, destructive criticism; but a religion which receives its inspiration and substance from Christ and his word, and which is adapted to the age.

In the same line must be placed the eminent Tholuck, once a colleague of Neander, then for about half a century professor in Halle. His astonishing learning, mingled with pietistic and mystical elements, was used against pantheism and rationalism, and in favor of biblical Christianity. At first sneered at and ostracized when he went to Halle, because he was viewed as a pietist, he afterwards saw the theological chairs and the pulpits of the city, in both of which rationalism had ruled, filled with evangelical men. His lectures, sermons, and books (including works on exegesis, dogmatics, ethics, and history) were largely apologetic. Through his marvelous personal influence he drew hundreds of students nearer Christ. His own conflicts and victories gave him peculiar power over unbelievers, and to many an inquiring soul he became a school-master unto Christ. More learned than speculative, more religious than philosophical, the blending of a deeply devout spirit with his vast scholarship admirably adapted him to the work of mediation between spiritual truth and a generation estranged from it.

In dogmatics one of the leaders of this tendency was K. I. Nitzsch, called to the University of Berlin in 1847 as successor to the Hegelian theologian Marheinecke. He was one of the firmest supporters of the Union; but instead of making that wherein the confessions agree the basis, he wanted to go behind this to the common ground or origin of the agreement and make that the basis of union. His work on the "System of Christian Doctrine" (1826, sixth edition in 1851) includes ethics as well as dogmatics. He held that these belong together, that they are not separated in Scripture, and that by uniting them in the same work the practical character of Christianity is made more evident. He gives special prominence to the idea that Christianity is essentially life, a life of redeemed souls. While the doctrines of the work are based on Scripture, the apologetic aim is everywhere apparent, and the old doctrines are not presented as by the old writers, but in a modified form. The inspiration of Scripture, miracles, prophecy are advocated; but more regard is shown for the demands of reason than by the supernaturalistic school of last century.

Another influential writer of this school was Professor K. Ullmann. He was the author of a book on the "Sinlessness of Jesus," and of numerous other works, and (together with Umbreit) was the founder of the "Studien und Kritiken" (1828). In his "Essence of Christianity" he gives what may be regarded as the principles of the theology of mediation. Both the old su-

pernaturalism and rationalism held that Christianity is essentially doctrine; but he taught that it is "the union of God and man, brought about by the truly divine and truly human personality of its Founder, a personality which was perfectly united with God." Like Nitzsch, he regards Christianity as in its very essence life. It is divine in nature, human in form; divine in origin, human in its realization and development; it transcends reason and nature, and yet it is the highest reason and genuine nature. Its centre and kernel, "the divine love revealing itself to sinful man on the cross, could neither have been discovered by reason nor produced by thought; the life which is wholly absorbed in God did not spring from nature, and yet in our deepest consciousness we must esteem it as the restoration and glorification of the true human nature." It is characteristic of this mediating theology that it seeks the most intimate union of the divine and human in Scripture, in Christ, and in the whole development and history of Christianity.

Among the ablest of the evangelical dogmatic writers we must place Julius Müller, for many years professor in Halle, a disciple of Neander and Schleiermacher, and deeply influenced in his spiritual life by his friend and colleague Tholuck. Together with Nitzsch he contended zealously for the Union at conferences and in books and learned articles. His work on Sin is justly regarded as one of the finest products of Christian speculation; and his review of Strauss's "Life of Jesus" in the "Studien und Kritiken" is among the keenest and most crushing criticisms of that book. With all his speculation he was eminently biblical. To account for man's sinfulness he however postulated the preëxistence of the soul and its fall before entering this world — a view in which he was not followed by others. In his lectures and books he laid special stress on the divine personality, and on man's freedom and responsibility, as well as on the great facts of redemption.

Of the living evangelical writers the most eminent is I. A. Dorner, formerly professor in Tübingen, Kiel, Königsberg, Bonn, and Göttingen, but since 1862 in Berlin. Owing to feebleness and ill health, he has been obliged to suspend his lectures in the University. His works on the "Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ," on the "History of Protestant Theology," and the recent one on "Dogmatics," have placed him in the foremost rank of German theologians. He is profoundly speculative, and his works show that he has been a student of Schleiermacher, Schelling, and Hegel, though he is too independent to be dominated by them. He belongs to the Middle Party in the Union.

Instead of taking his stand on the agreement of the different confessions, he emphasizes, as the basis of evangelical theology, the material principle of the Reformation, namely, the doctrine of justification by faith in Jesus Christ. Such are the power and firmness of this principle that, standing on it, men "can look with composure and confidence at the critical processes, and can fearlessly take an active part in them." These words, in fact, indicate his own position. He looks on Christian truth as having self-evidencing power; through the influence of the Holy Spirit this truth brings its own proof, and faith can rest on it securely, without waiting for the demonstration that the Scriptures are inspired or that the confessions are true. Hence he opposes those who have lost confidence in the direct power of this principle and of the truth of Scripture, and who seek instead "the principle of tradition and Romish ideas of the authority of the Church," and deny "the evangelical doctrine of the sufficiency and perspicuity of sacred Scripture to accomplish the end for which it was given." His hope for the welfare of the Church is not in any external authority, but solely in the power of the truth. He of course has no sympathy with those who with the confessions reject also the distinctive peculiarities of Christianity. Speaking of the positive, evangelical theologians, to whom he himself belongs, he declares that not one of them consented with the negative party to reject all creeds; "even those whose doctrinal views were most indefinite demanded that the development of the individual and the Church should be from Christ and to Christ."

In a recent conversation Professor Dorner spoke of his relation to numerous other theologians who in general occupy the same position that he does; then mentioning a number by name he said: "They emphasize the doctrine of redemption less than I do." His studies have been mainly Christological, and his doctrine respecting Christ is the result of the effort to construct speculatively the scriptural teaching. Whatever may be thought of this effort, there can be no question as to his view of Christ's relation to human redemption. Of the conviction that in Christ redemption is found, he speaks as "the most certain experience of Christendom." To him this doctrine stands immovably firm; hence his strong arguments against Strauss, Renan, and others, who have lived to rob the Church of the historic Christ and his redemptive work.

During the conversation already referred to, Professor Dorner spoke calmly of some attacks recently made on his eschatological

views, and said : " I believe that there is still hope for those who have not definitively rejected the gospel " (diejenigen die das Evangelium noch nicht definitiv abgewiesen haben). To those acquainted with German theology it need not be said that this view is shared by many of the most eminent theologians of the century. It is not peculiar to the theology of mediation. Some go so far as to give hopes for the restoration of all things. Rothe holds that those who persist in remaining unregenerate will be annihilated. The whole subject of eschatology is admitted to be very obscure and greatly in need of fuller development.

Most of the eminent theologians of the century occupy a position between the confessional school and the neo-rationalism. From the few who have been mentioned a general idea of their views, aims, and spirit may be formed. To the same category belong Twesten, Liebner, Sartorius, J. P. Lange, Hagenbach, Ebrard, Olshausen, Oehler, Meyer, Palmer, Christlieb, and scores besides. Its centres have been Berlin, Halle, Bonn, Göttingen, and Tübingen, while in other universities it has also been influential. At present, all the eminent theologians of Halle belong to this tendency ; in Bonn it is also predominant ; in Berlin, since Dorner's retirement, it is represented by Weiss, Kleinert, v. d. Goltz, Messner, Piper ; in Tübingen, Leipzig, Göttingen, and, in fact, in all or nearly all the universities it also has representatives. Its literature is exceedingly voluminous. In learned journals its views have been advocated by the " Studien und Kritiken," now edited by Riehm and Köstlin of Halle ; by the " Deutsche Zeitschrift für christliche Wissenschaft," edited by Schneider, with the assistance of Julius Müller, Neander, and Nitzsch — (ceased in 1861) ; and by the " Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie," begun by Liebner of Dresden, Dorner of Berlin, Ehrenfeuchter of Göttingen, Landerer and Palmer of Tübingen, and Weizsäcker of Stuttgart (1856-1878). To this same evangelical tendency belongs also that monument of learning, Herzog's " Encyclopædia."

J. H. W. Stuckenberg.

BERLIN, GERMANY.

Conclusion in the next number.

EDITORIAL.

EL MAHDI AND THE SŪDÂN.

(WITH A MAP.)

ANCIENT Egypt was the land watered by the Nile as far as the first cataract (*Syēne*, Assouan). Walled in on three sides by the Libyan, Arabian, and Nubian deserts, its extent may be estimated at two square degrees — not far from the area of Massachusetts. The lands lately subject to the Khedive stretch over thirty degrees of latitude and twenty-four of longitude, covering three hundred square degrees — a territory as large as the United States east of the Mississippi and one row of States beyond. The countries south of Assouan, in latitude 24, are known by the common name of Beled es-Sūdân, that is, Country of the Blacks. Dongola, Senaar, between the White and Blue Rivers, and Kordofan were conquered in 1820–1822 by the armies of Mehemet Ali. No considerable further expansion took place until about fifteen years ago, when the Khedive Ismaïl (1863–1879), whose ambition was stimulated by English abolitionism, undertook to suppress the slave-trade on the upper branches of the White Nile, and to annex the equator. Sir Samuel Baker having carried out the latter part of this programme, the suppression of the slave-trade was left to his successor, Colonel Gordon. By the most vigorous operations, in which the Italian Gessi took a leading part, the armies of the slavers were destroyed, the ringleaders summarily hanged, and the business reduced to holes and corners. Upon the return of Gordon and the death of Gessi, the new order yielded place to the old. While the Khedive was showing so much zeal against the slave-traders, in 1874, Dar Fur, a country somewhat smaller than Great Britain and Ireland, with a population of about four millions, was conquered for the Khedive by the prince of the slave-hunters, Zibeir Rahama, at his own charges, as indemnity for a previous offense. In 1875, Harar, in the Somâli land, was occupied by Egyptian troops, and the Khedive's dominion enlarged by the annexation of the triangle east of the Abyssinian mountains (Massowa, Zeila, Berbera, Harar). Thus, under Ismaïl, the Egyptian frontier was advanced in every direction at great strides. The bankruptcy of the Empire was the next thing: the deposition of the too progressive Khedive, and the English and French receivership. The economies of the control soon put an end to grand schemes for developing the Sūdân.

The northern margin of the belt of periodical rains crosses the Sūdân about latitude 15. North of this line is the desert. The province of Taka, in the upper basin of the Atbara, is moderately fertile. Its steppes



produce great crops of durra corn. Lower Senaar, in the peninsula formed by the White and Blue Nile, furnishes the greater part of the grain which is brought to Khartûm. Kordofan is a country of gently rolling steppes. There is not a river or permanent watercourse in the country. The sandy soil drinks up ungratefully the somewhat uncertain rain that falls during three months, and for the rest of the year the inhabitants are dependent on wells, often two hundred feet deep. There is no water for irrigation. The nomad tribes graze cattle; the settled tribes trade. There is almost no agriculture.

Dar Fur is better off both in rainfall and soil. Wheat is grown in some quantity, beside dukhn and durra. It belongs to that chain of Sudanese states which have developed a native civilization. The arts and industries are varied and considerable. The people, partly of the Central African stock, partly of Arab race, are all Mohammedans.

Farther south, in the region of the Bahr el Ghazal, is abundant rain and an alluvial soil of inexhaustible fertility. It is inhabited by various negro tribes. This has been the hunting-ground of the slavers, and they have made the fruitful land a wilderness.

The causes of the present revolt in the Sûdân are various. It may safely be assumed that religious fanaticism is the least of them. The weakness of the present Egyptian government could not but be felt in its most remote possessions. With a ruler vacillating and shiftless to a degree contemptible even in the East, a treasury full of debts, and every revenue sequestrated, and an army good for nothing at its best, but now worth less than nothing, it was impossible that Egypt should long retain its hold upon those wild lands.

The slave-traders, who are the military power of the country, want to get rid of all surveillance and interference, and have found their opportunity. Dar Fur will recover its independence; Abyssinia plainly means to get back the provinces of which it has been despoiled; the Arabs are ready to plunder anybody. At the right moment the pretender appeared. There is a tradition of the Prophet that he foretold that in the last days one should come of his own family, bearing the same name and the same patronymic (Mohammed ben Abdullah), to rule the Arabs and fill the earth with righteousness. This coming reformer is called El Mahdi, that is, the *guide* or *director*, according to the promise of right guidance so often made in the Koran.

By the Persians this prediction is interpreted as referring to the twelfth and last Imâm of the line of Ali, who was born in the year of the Flight, 255, and who is said to be now alive, though concealed till the day of his manifestation, when he shall join Jesus Christ in the conflict with Antichrist, and unite the two religions in one. Many have from time to time undertaken to play this part. In Africa itself two great empires have been founded by such pretenders, namely, that of the Fatimite Kalifs in Egypt, and that of Al Mohades (El Muwahhidi, something

like The Unitarians), in Morocco. The former dynasty lasted from A. H. 296-567 (A. D. 908-1171), when it was suppressed by Saladin. The latter, founded in the early part of the twelfth century by Mohammed ben Tumert, ruled all Western Africa, and Spain as far as the Ebro and the Tagus. It became extinct in A. D. 1269.

The present claimant is a native of Dongola, about forty years of age, who developed out of a ship-carpenter into a derwish, and so, by living in a cistern, into a saint and prophet. There can be no doubt that he has succeeded in raising the whole Sûdân. For this success he is greatly indebted to the prestige gained by the destruction of Hicks Pasha and his army. There is one test of a fighting prophet: he must be a winning prophet, then he will not lack for believers. By this sign Mohammed authenticated his claims at Bedr.

To reconquer the Sûdân is at present out of the question. There is no money beyond what the English bondholders want; and if there were, there are no troops. The only fighting men in the Egyptian army were the Sudanese regiments. To send Fellahin up there is only to furnish food for powder. And if there were both money and troops, the first victory must be won over nature. Between Assouan and Khartûm is a belt of desert eight and a half degrees wide. The usual route is by the Nile to Korosko, between the first and second cataracts, then by camels across the desert to Abu Hammed, 216 miles. There is water at only one place in this distance, and that is so bad that nothing but camels can drink it. Thence the road follows the Nile to Berber, 220 miles, from which Khartûm is reached by boat. To get an army across the Korosko desert is impossible. Nor is the shorter route by the Red Sea to Suakin, and thence to Berber, more practicable. The desert is here two hundred and eighty miles wide; the eighty miles next the sea are through mountains whose passes are in the hands of the Haddendowa Arabs, now hostile. Bad water is found at distances of two or three days, in deep wells. The long road, which follows the Nile, would require thousands of boats, and consume months of time. It is endangered by the hostility of the Arabs, and the prospect of a rising in Dongola. The surrender of most of the Sûdân is inevitable. England demands it, and the new ministry of Nubar Pasha is formed on that issue. The frontier will be at Wady Halfa, the second cataract, the real head of navigation on the Lower Nile. On this line Egypt will have the protection of the great desert, and need not seriously fear anything from the undisciplined hordes of El Mahdi. The serious problem remains, how to get the Egyptian troops out of the Sûdân. They are now 21,000, with 84 guns. Their retreat will be attended with the greatest difficulty. Too much time has already been lost. There are still graver and more important questions which we cannot touch upon.

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN ENGLAND.

SINCE 1839, in England and Wales, supervision of elementary education by the state has been assigned to a committee "composed of the President of the Privy Council and not more than five of its members." The chief executive officer of this committee or department of education, and its representative in the House of Commons, is entitled "Vice-President of the Committee of Council on Education," or more briefly, "Vice-President of the Council on Education." He may or may not be a member of the Cabinet. This important office is now very ably filled by Mr. Mundella, M. P., and we desire to call attention to certain facts of great interest and hopefulness which appear in various speeches which he has delivered within the past six months. A few words may be premised respecting the more recent history of national elementary education in England.

The first strong impulse for popular education was given by Bell and Lancaster, and Robert Raikes. It was not, however, until 1833 that the government made a grant for elementary schools, and for several years its appropriations were divided between two voluntary societies, the British and Foreign School Society, founded in 1808, and the National Society "for promoting the education of the poor in the principles of the Established Church," instituted in 1811. In 1839 the distribution of the grants was transferred to the Education Committee of Council, and the way was opened to an enlarged inspection of schools, and to the beginnings of systematic effort by the government for their increase and improvement. Progress was very slow. For it was only in 1870 that a bill was passed which devolved the work of elementary education directly on the state. Hitherto the reliance had been upon the voluntary system — at first entirely, then as stimulated by grants in aid. Now a step was taken which has often and rightly been styled a revolution, although it was wisely adjusted to what had preceded, and did not involve a clean breach with the voluntary method. Existing denominational schools, which could serve the purpose, and were willing to accept certain prescribed conditions, were recognized, and their services appropriated. Opportunity was given, for a limited period, for the erection of new buildings by government aid. But the education of children was no longer to depend on merely voluntary effort. The bill ordered that, "There shall be provided for every school district a sufficient amount of accommodation in public elementary schools available for all the children resident in such district, for whose elementary education efficient and suitable provision is not otherwise made." Arrangements were instituted for the establishment of "school boards," elected by the tax-payers, and invested with discretionary compulsory powers, which subsequently (1880) were made universally operative and obligatory. Relief was provided for persons unable to pay the fees, and permission was granted

the education department to establish free schools in districts where it was satisfied the poverty of the inhabitants made this necessary. The foundation was thus laid for a national school system, making primary education universal and compulsory, though not generally free.¹

Progress in the direction thus indicated has from the outset been seriously obstructed by the sectarian divisions of the people. And the contest has been embittered by the long-standing conflict between the advocates and opponents of the state church. Again and again the "religious question" has cheated the children of their rights. It was only the appalling statistics of ignorance, for a time shaming all parties into a conviction that something must be done, that enabled Mr. Forster to carry through his great bill successfully. No sooner, however, was it enacted than the sectarian strife broke out vehemently anew, although happily the Rubicon had been passed, and the fight must be on the other side. Canon Molesworth, in his recent "*History of the Church of England*," sums up the outcome in this matter by saying that ever since the conscience clause "was made universal in schools aided by the government . . . there has been an ever-growing tendency to limit parliamentary assistance to secular instruction, not necessarily excluding religious education, but leaving it to be given at such times and places and in such a manner as the parents of the children may direct."

Mr. Mundella's addresses show the progress which is making. In his speech on presenting the education estimates, he stated that "children continue to come into the schools at the rate of 3,000 per week, being at about double the rate of the increase in the population." The number of children upon the roll of the voluntary schools was given as 2,884,250; upon the roll of the board schools, 1,305,362; total, 4,189,612. The accommodation provided was reported as sufficient for 4,538,000. In 1850 the number who could be accommodated was 370,948; in 1870, 1,950,641. In 1850 the average attendance was 197,578; in 1870, 1,255,083; in 1882, 3,015,000. In 1872 the number of schools under "Boards" was only 82, with 11,388 pupils.

The gain in quality is also encouraging. "In 1872 the number of children in the higher standards was, in round numbers, 118,000; in 1878 it was 324,000 by a steady rise year by year, while it had risen in 1882

¹ The legal definition of an elementary school is, "one in which elementary education is the principal part of the education there given, and at which the fees do not exceed ninepence per week." Education is commonly divided into elementary or primary, and secondary or higher. The former alone is made national and compulsory. As compulsory, it applies only to children between the ages of five and thirteen. The instruction includes reading, writing, arithmetic, singing, and a little grammar, geography, and history. The teaching of drill, drawing, and the elements of natural science is encouraged. Girls are taught sewing. Schools in the cities and larger towns are naturally much in advance of the rural schools.

to 599,629." The grade of teachers has much improved. Pupil teachers have been much reduced in numbers. It has become necessary to advance the standard to keep the children long enough in school.

Much work remains to be done. Half a million children are still not on the registers; the standard of education is lower than in other Protestant nations. "Until they had got all the children in they would never get an educated generation, and when they had got them all in, it would take twenty or thirty years before they had an educated generation."

Toward the conclusion of his speech in the House of Commons, Mr. Mundella referred to the effect of the new system upon public morals.

"The adult criminal classes were just as ignorant as they were ten years ago. There was no change. There was, however, one phase of the subject which was cheering. He believed the act had a most beneficial effect on the 'Arab' population. . . . All the information that had reached him led to the conclusion that there had been an improvement in the manners and language of the children. The average number of juvenile offenders in five years, ending 1875, was 1,373; in 1880, 1,084; and in 1881-82, 842."

In more recent addresses Mr. Mundella has spoken of the influence of the Education Act on religious teaching. His assurances on this point will excite more surprise than on any other.

"The first thing I want to impress upon those who do not realize what the school board work is, is the fact that the Education Act of 1870 in relation to religious teaching is doing a work which the country never expected of it, and which religious bodies themselves throughout the country appear scarcely to understand. [Hear.] We are constantly having the question raised in reviews and in speeches in public as to the supposed deterioration of religious teaching in consequence of the existence of board schools. For instance, 'Is the Christianity of England worth preserving,' is the title of an article written by an eminent ecclesiastic, and the conclusion given is that the Christianity of England is endangered by the teaching in board schools. Another eminent person has said that we were a Christian nation in our teaching until the passing of the Education Act of 1870. Now I want to point out what truly has been the influence of the Act of 1870 upon the teaching of religion in Great Britain, and that the board school system has greatly benefited the cause of religious education. [Cheers.] Now the London School Board in the outset of its career . . . passed this resolution on the subject of religious teaching:—'That, in the schools provided by the board, the Bible shall be read, and there shall be given such explanations, and such instructions therefrom, in the principles of morality and religion, as are suited to the capacity of children; provided that no attempt be made in any such schools to attach children to any particular denomination.' Has the London School Board loyally adhered to that programme? I can say for myself, that, having now administered the Education Acts for more than three years, I have had but one complaint. This single complaint was of a father, that he wished his children withdrawn from the religious instruction; but they were not so withdrawn, because the mother persisted on the children receiving religious instruction. That is the sole complaint with respect to the religious teaching I have had since I have been vice-president, and the London Board, remember, deal with 300,000 children. What, then, is the work

that the Education Act is doing with respect to religious teaching, and what is the bearing of the general teaching of board schools upon the religious education of the country? I find that when that Act of 1870 was passed there were in the whole of the elementary schools of Great Britain—in which term I, of course, include Scotland—less than 2,000,000 of children, while the number to-day in the like schools is 4,700,000; and in a parliamentary paper that has been moved for it will be found that practically the whole of these 4,700,000 children receive religious teaching in the public elementary schools of the country. [Cheers.] . . . But this is not the whole of the question, and when any one tells me that there is a danger to Christianity in a widespread system of education I have a still further and better answer to give. During the last few months the Sunday-school Union has done me the honor to elect me as the president, and I have availed myself of my privileges to inquire respecting the influence of our present day-school system upon Sunday-school teaching. I am informed, then, that the Sunday-schools of England and Wales have upon their register more than 4,000,000 of children. . . . Moreover, I have it on the best authority that the increase of day-school education since the passing of the Act of 1870, both in London and the country, has had a most important and beneficial influence upon Sunday-schools generally.” [Cheers.]

At Leicester, toward the close of last December, Mr. Mundella delivered two addresses, one at the opening of a Sunday-school memorial hall commemorative of the centenary of Sunday-school work in that city. In both he spoke of the influence of the new effort for popular education on religious training. He said:—

“There was no stronger conviction in his mind than that the passing of the Education Act of 1870 had given as great an impetus to the religious teaching of this country as it had to the secular teaching. . . . Many people said they were ruining the nation by godless education. It was said that the judgment of Heaven was coming down upon them, and that bad times and bad harvests were simply the judgments of Heaven. Well, he found that, in 1870, there were in receipt of definite religious instruction in day-schools in this country 1,300,000 children, of whom 1,200,000 were in national¹ schools. But what was the kind of religious instruction given? Let their own reports answer. The diocesan inspectors, reporting of church schools in 1870, almost unanimously declared that the religious instruction given was insufficient, mechanical, and indefinite. But at the present moment there were 2,124,000 children getting definite religious instruction, and, with the addition of the children in board schools, there were altogether 4,273,000 children receiving religious instruction, against 1,693,000 in 1870. Thus the Education Act had given an enormous impulse to really definite religious instruction, and an enthusiasm for it not formerly exhibited.” [Loud cheers.]

“THE DEAD LINE OF FIFTY:” OR IS IT FORTY?

If there is a “dead line of fifty,” according to the popular estimates of the ministry, the reasons for it exist at forty, and are apparent to the

¹ That is, schools under the care of the National Society established in 1811.

profession. The decline in the power of impression, which the public remark as taking place at about a certain age, has really little or nothing to do with the question of age. And it is time that this popular fallacy was corrected, even at the exposure of professional habits and methods.

Exception may be made in favor of the common opinion at two points. The decline in pulpit power may be due to the loss in nervous vitality which comes to some men, often unconsciously, as they approach middle life. The power to project thought lies altogether in the nervous energies. When these fail, virtue ceases to go out of the preacher. He may still think as clearly as ever, and often write with great vigor, but he can no longer impress his personality upon an audience. The contrast, of course, is here drawn between the man once possessed of large nervous force and the same man having lost it. The man who does not have it starts on the "dead line." The decline in pulpit power may also be due to loss of faith in men. Midway in life the minister finds himself, through certain experiences, embittered or disheartened. His outlook upon the world has changed. His estimates of men are different. He no longer sees in them the possibilities which he once saw. He can bring to them no words of courage or inspiration. Neither can he speak any the better for his experiences to their conscience. Bitterness against the world is no help to conviction of sin.

These exceptions aside, for we have no occasion to discuss the rare cases of moral and spiritual deterioration, the decline in pulpit power is due chiefly to the expenditure of intellectual resources, or to monotony in the method of preaching. And these causes apply specially to the more earnest and enthusiastic workers in the profession. The early years of a successful pastorate, comparing now the ministry with the other professions, are singularly exhausting, not altogether because of the amount of work accomplished or attempted, but quite as much through the manner of working. When once the habit of production has been formed, production goes on rapidly and with increasing ease. The mind rejoices in its newly-found gifts. There is an exhilaration in the conscious power to give. Preaching becomes a delight and an inspiration. The first decade of one's ministry is usually a period of large creative energy, not only in respect to sermons, but in respect to all those ministries which attend an active pastorate. The minister has found out the use of himself, and tastes the joys of personal ministration. After years of receptive habit, he suddenly learns how much more blessed it is to give than to receive. But after a time there comes the unmistakable sense of exhaustion, sometimes attended with extreme personal dissatisfaction. The man of forty, who has wrought with the ardor and abandon characteristic of the more generous pastorates, is apt to find that his intellectual growths have not kept pace with his activities. He discovers that the power to utilize thought does not signify fullness of resources, and that ease in work does not signify mastery of method. He sees before him

results of which he is not ashamed, but he does not find in himself the promise of greater results. By any fair estimate of his resources or methods, he cannot anticipate continuous advance and enlargement. All honor to the man who, upon such a discovery or after such a reckoning, has the courage to reconstruct and refurnish himself according to the demands of his own future. All honor to the man who, in such circumstances, will not allow himself to be satisfied with any temporary reliefs or renewals, as in rest, or in aimless travel, or in change of pastorate, but who will address himself to the more radical work of self-enlargement and reconstruction. And to any who may be thus disposed to deal with themselves we offer one or two suggestions.

We suggest a gain, to some preachers, in habits of more independent and original investigation. This suggestion does not charge the want of independent and original thinking within the limits of personal knowledge. It does imply the want of sufficient personal research, of sufficient study at the *sources* of professional knowledge. There comes a time when, in the use of himself, every man ought to be wiser than his masters. But some ministers at forty have not at all outgrown their teachers of fifteen years before. They now know no more than these knew then. They are still thinking and reasoning upon the data furnished in the class-room. Meanwhile, and this holds specially true of the last fifteen years, great advance may have been made in respect to the sources of theological opinion and belief. New departments of professional study may have been opened, and new methods of professional study developed. As a present fact, biblical and historical criticism are contributing richly to the pulpit, where there is sufficient insight and learning to use these contributions. It is certain that students for the ministry are being easily furnished with facts and with methods for which the minister of forty must work with no little ardor. But the work will repay him. Possibly the advantage will be the greater because of the arduousness of the work. Biblical theology, for example, as a new study to one of experience in the pulpit will yield nobler results than it can possibly give to the student in training. And, in general, it may be said that the results from such after-study will be greater to the pulpit than from preparatory study. The intellectual and the spiritual will blend more naturally. The broadening and quickening influences will be more immediately felt. The power of absorption, of assimilation, is far greater.

And something of the mental gain which will come from access to the sources indicated will come from access to any fresh sources of knowledge. A new language learned will let one into one more world of thought and sentiment. Robert Hall, when past middle life, thought it worth his while, after reading Macaulay's "Milton," to study Italian. Science offers, in some of its more accessible departments, great quickening and stimulus. And intelligent travel may open to one large studies into

human nature, and into the origins of many things which the preacher, above all men, ought to know. This suggestion, it will be remembered, is for the preacher, for the man who needs constant inspiration, as well as increasing knowledge. The conclusions which he may reach from borrowed facts and from assumed premises may be as true and as great as those gained through original research, but the mental and spiritual quickening lies in the process. There is no inspiration possible like that which comes from contact with first things.

We also suggest to some preachers the personal advantage of a change in the method of preaching. Change at this point will be seen to be radical and reconstructive. At forty the "method is the man." Possibly it may have narrowed him. Perhaps it may be wearing him out. More likely, it is not making sufficient demands upon him. He is doing his work easily, but he is not doing the work of a master. Probably the majority of ministers who may read this note are preaching from manuscript. How many are making use of a manuscript from a sufficient reason, — not from concession to custom, or from fear of an audience, or from the craving for faultlessness, but because of the possession of that literary instinct which justifies the written sermon. The change from the ordinary written sermon to the sermon written because it must be, because of the qualities of style which demand it, would be to most men as great a change in motive as in method. Of course, the change to the extempore method would be greater, and equally a change in motive, affecting the whole man. And it is a fair question whether some preachers do not need such a moral revolution as this change would bring about. This paragraph is not penned in the interest of extempore preaching. The principle involved applies equally to a change from the extempore method to that of the written sermon, provided the sermon be written for a sufficient reason. The entire suggestion in regard to a change of method grows out of the fear that the method formed has become too easy in its working at forty. At fifty the man will lose the power to impress himself, because he is not using all his powers to their full advantage. He is not taking enough pains to impress himself in the interest of the truth, upon men. The art of impression is no longer a matter of study. The cost of production has become too light; and this without assuming that production has become simply reproduction. The extempore preacher has become fluent. The writer has become the sermonizer. The vital forces of the man are no longer at the front. Something must be done to recover the man to the uses of the pulpit. In some cases this recovery can be effected through a more hearty, shall we say a more honest, use of the method in hand. But some men, we are convinced, need a change no less radical and heroic than that in the whole method of preaching. In no other way can they expect to avail themselves of the unused, untrained energies of their nature, and take a new lease of power in the pulpit.

We offer these suggestions as indicating our conviction that every man who has made good "proof of his ministry" at forty may, if he will give heed to himself in resources and methods, pass safely over the "dead line of fifty," and that the ministry which may lie beyond may be broader, more inspiring, more attractive and persuasive, through its very enthusiasms.

The French have a saying which has in it as much of philosophy as of sentiment: "From forty to fifty is to many a man the saddest time of his life, for he is then in the old age of his youth: at fifty he may, if he will, pass over into the youth of his old age."

AN ANCIENT PRECEDENT.

WE published in the preceding number of this REVIEW a recent letter from a Congregational church commending one of its baptized children to the watch and care of a sister church. Through the courtesy of Mr. Hamilton A. Hill of Boston we have received a very perfect heliotype of a letter, found in the archives of the Old South Church, Boston, which shows that the later transaction was long ago anticipated, and by the oldest of all our churches.

The letter before us is dated Plymouth, June 26, 1671. It is a letter of recommendation and dismissal from the church in Plymouth to the Third (Old South) Church, in Boston, of "Mr. John Winslow and Mary his wife," and is followed by an appendix or postscript, which we give entire: "such of their children also as live with you whether adult or in-adult wee commend to your care & watch in the Lord to be received by you according to their capacity desiring of the Lord to accompany the dispensation of his holy word to them for their effectuell regeneration that in the Lord's good time they may become living stones in his holy temple."

The letter is signed by the initial letters of John Cotton, Pastor, and Thomas Cushman, Ruling Elder, and is given "with the consent of the church." John Winslow was a brother of Governor Edward Winslow, and his wife was the celebrated Mary Chilton of the Mayflower, — according to tradition, the first woman, if not the first person, who leaped upon Plymouth Rock.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE LAW OF HEREDITY: A STUDY OF THE CAUSE OF VARIATION AND THE ORIGIN OF LIVING ORGANISMS. By W. K. BROOKS, Associate in Biology, Johns Hopkins University. 12mo, pp. 338. Baltimore: J. Murphy & Co. 1883.

If "instinct is a great matter," and hereditary habit its best definition, heredity is a still greater matter, and, indeed, its largeness suffers no

diminution under Mr. Brooks's treatment. The word itself is new, is nowhere used by Darwin, who had much to say of the thing, and is only now acquiring a place in the dictionaries, in place of the older and better, although longer and rare, word, hereditability. In scientific use it notes the fact that qualities are transmitted by generation from parents to offspring, that like reproduces like. But our author, whose first chapter discusses the question, What is heredity? extends its meaning to the production of unlike as well, and would have it cover and explain, not merely the resemblances of progeny to parent, but also their differences, — the origination of the new, as well as the reproduction of the old qualities, — in general terms, the whole phenomena of reproduction and of variation. This is a heavy load for so young a word to carry. It is true that, here and there, he speaks of "heredity and variation," just as we are accustomed to do. But, on the first page, he says that, to the breeder, "heredity is the law which enables him to modify his animals and to build up and perpetuate new varieties." Meaning, we suppose, that when an animal is born with some desirable peculiarity, "the law of heredity" (here a more sonorous expression for the fact of probable hereditability) may secure its reproduction in another generation; and that the cause, whatever it be, which originated the peculiarity is likely to continue and increase it. Again, "To the naturalist . . . the word . . . brings before him the most marvelous of all the phenomena of the material universe, the production of a living animal from a simple egg, with the intricate structure and complex bodily and mental functions of its proper species."

Here heredity is synonymous with reproduction, in which hereditability is a factor. What is gained by substituting an unfamiliar for a familiar term? True as it may be that "no theory of heredity has any value unless it explains the way in which new features, which may become hereditary continually [surely not continually] make their appearance as congenital variations, at the same time that it accounts for the way in which established peculiarities are handed down from generation to generation," it does not follow that reproduction, inheritance, and variation are equivalent or interchangeable terms; nor does it conduce to clearness to class them all under the new-fashioned term, heredity. In our view, what the author describes as "one side of the problem of heredity, the transmission from parent to child of the established congenital hereditary characteristics of the race," or of the individual, is the whole of it. The two characteristics of living organisms, the transmission of likeness and the origination of differences, ought not to be confused under a common appellation; and whenever they come to be synthesized as contrasted effects of a common cause, heredity will hardly be the appropriate name for the product.

With this distinction in mind, it will be seen that Mr. Brooks hardly offers any contributions to our knowledge of heredity, in its proper sense. *Il va sans dire*, at least it goes without explanation, that progeny is like parent; while, as to how the transmission of likeness takes place, and what it is that is transmitted, we carry our knowledge down to minute reproductive cells, or their contents, and our conjectures down to the myriad molecules, endowed with the requisite potentialities and proclivities to combination; with which the minutest of these reproductive cells are supposed to swarm. The hypothesis of pangenesis which Mr.

Darwin invented as a mode of conceiving how peculiarities may be transmitted, however it might serve for explaining likeness to parents and ancestors, Mr. Brooks justly regards as of small use for explaining the evolution of variations. And it is especially, or even exclusively, the latter that this book is concerned with. It is, literally, "A Study of the Cause of Variation and of the Origin of Living Organisms," a speculative supplement to the "Origin of Species" of Darwin, to whose memory the volume is dedicated.

An essay which aims to succeed where Darwin failed, to correct some of his judgments, to explain away difficulties in the theory of natural selection which he confessed his inability to meet, and especially which is to account for variation, which, if we remember rightly, Darwin thought unaccountable, is certainly a very ambitious undertaking. But the attempt is made with a full knowledge of the actual condition of the questions involved, and the case is argued with real ability by a naturalist who has already made a mark in investigation and shown aptitude in speculation. One sees the handiwork of a trained and accomplished zoologist, not of an amateur, who usually shows his want of mastery of the subject alike when he hits and when he misses the mark. As the author modestly has "little hope that [his] views will be permanently accepted in the form in which they are here presented," but yet may be expected "to incite and direct new experiments," and "thus ultimately help us to a clearer insight into the nature of the forces which have acted, and still act, to guide the evolution of life," a reviewer who has given his book a cursory examination may truly say that he shares equally his doubts and his expectations. For, when we come to his "new theory of heredity," we find that it is only a hypothetical modification of Darwin's hypothesis of pangenesis, an hypothesis in which Darwin himself seems to have taken little stock and to have had diminishing confidence. At which we need not wonder, the incongruity is so patent between the theory of natural selection, so happily based upon known causes and actual operations, and pangenesis, which invokes imaginary entities and endows them with just such qualities as may serve the occasion. The one stands on the solid ground; the other is in the air, and that of the thinnest. Yet it is not becoming nor safe to disparage hypotheses, for some that seemed to be tenuous are found to do real service. And that of Mr. Brooks has the great merit, — which he points out, — that it is capable of being tested by experiment, if not in animals, yet upon plants.

Pangenesis "implies that the whole organization, in the sense of every separate atom or unit, reproduces itself; . . . that ovules and pollen-grains, the fertilized seed or egg, as well as buds, include and consist of a multitude of germs thrown off from each separate atom of the organism." It supposes that "everywhere the visible cells which make up the structure of plant or animal throw off minute granules or atoms, which circulate freely through the system, and when supplied with proper nutriment multiply by self-division, subsequently becoming developed into cells like those from which they were derived. . . . They are supposed to be transmitted from the parent to the offspring, are generally developed in the generation which immediately succeeds, but are often transmitted in a dormant state during many generations, and are then developed." They have a mutual affinity for each other, leading to their aggregation, like combining with like to form every particular part. And

so, to account for the transmission of the likeness of children to parents and grandparents, or remoter ancestors, we are to imagine a practically infinite number of specialized particles, of very many sorts, and of inconceivable minuteness, endowed with special elective affinities, in virtue of which each develops only at the proper time and place; the characteristics of each of the parents and grandparents, mingled in the child, being regarded as the product of a struggle for existence among the infinitesimal particles, resulting in the selection and development of the fittest. This is very *fine*, in more than one sense of the word, but it is not quite what we mean by exact science; yet science nowadays is nothing if not molecular. While it may give a conception — whatever such conception may be worth — of the way in which likeness may be transmitted, and so form part of an explanation of heredity, it is nowise helpful to the understanding of variation and the diversification of like into unlike forms.

Here comes in our author's modification of pangenesis. The variation of offspring from parent originates somehow and somewhere in the process of reproduction. "The union of two sexual elements gives variability." "The ovum is a cell which has gradually acquired a complicated organization, and which contains material particles of some kind to correspond to each of the hereditary characteristics of the species." By the development of some of these material particles the ovum reproduces its like; the ova of the offspring are cells so produced, or are the direct unmodified descendants of these. The ovum is conservative; its business is to reproduce its like. Left to itself, it would go on to do this perpetually. But the fertilized ovum has developed the cells which compose the whole structure of the individual. These structural cells produce and contain infinite numbers of their own special particles, which, if we rightly understand it, they keep to themselves, so long as all goes well. Each holding to its own, "so long as these [*i. e.*, the favorable] conditions remain unchanged, it performs its proper functions as a part of the body; but when, through a change in its environment, its function is disturbed, and its conditions of life become unfavorable, it throws off small particles which are the germs or 'gemmules' of this particular cell. These germs may be carried to all parts of the body. They may penetrate to an ovarian ovum or to a bud; but the male cell has gradually acquired, as its especial and distinctive function, a peculiar power to store up germs." "When the ovum is fertilized, each germ or gemmule [*i. e.*, specialized minute particle] unites with, or conjugates with, or impregnates, that particle of the ovum which is destined to give rise in the offspring to the cell which corresponds to the one which produced the germ or gemmule; or else it unites with a closely related particle, destined to give rise to a closely related cell. When this cell becomes developed in the body of the offspring, it will be a hybrid, and it will, therefore, tend to vary."

So, "the male element is the originating, and the female the perpetuating factor; the ovum is conservative, the male cell progressive." The female would go on reproducing like; but the male element brings in disturbance, and disturbance gives rise to unlikeness, that is to variation. This might occur without the disturbing male factor; for the male cells, as we have seen, are not the breeders, but the gatherers and carriers of disturbance. The common cells of the structure, which peaceably perform their proper functions as a part of the body while the conditions suit

them, become pangenetic upon provocation by any unfavorable change in the environment, and wildly "throw off small particles." These missiles may, perchance, hit an ovum-cell; and this explains why parthenogenetic and budding reproduction occasionally, yet rarely, give rise to varieties. But the male cell, "as its special and distinctive function," gathers and stores up these multitudinous and vaguely ejected particles, conveys them directly to the ovum, and thus, in all times of disturbance, secures a plentiful crop of incipient variations. This explains why changed conditions promote variations, as is well understood to be the case; we did not suppose that the change need be an unfavorable one, and we elsewhere gather that our author would not insist upon this.

The new hypothesis correlates, if it does not explain, various outlying phenomena and avoids certain objections to ordinary pangenesis. Moreover, it has the great merit that one of its leading assumptions may be tested by experiment, namely, the assumption that in reproduction the male element imparts variability. As our author shows, something like proof or disproof of this may be reached by a properly devised course of experiments in the cross-breeding of plants.

One or two among the facts and inferences with which this volume teems may be noted.

Much is made of the supposed, and, in one sense, obvious, fact that plants and animals are far more variable under domestication or cultivation than in nature. The variations which appear are said to be caused by a change in the external conditions, acting directly upon the organism, but indirectly and more profoundly upon the reproductive system, and bringing forth its principal effects in the progeny. But it may be that the changed conditions are the occasion rather than the cause of the variations. The case is best tested in annual plants. When a desirable one is introduced into cultivation, all the seeds of the first and following generations are sown, and the progeny cared for. A few incipient or more marked variations appear, even in the first and second generations; the whole result is seen, the varied forms probably more noticed than the unvaried. In wild nature probably only one of a thousand of these seeds would get opportunity to germinate, and only a tithe of these seedlings come to maturity. What is the chance that any of the variably disposed will be among the few survivors? And even if the variation survives in one or few individuals among the numerous unvaried, what chance has it to hold its own, where cross-fertilization is the rule and close fertilization the exception? The majority will probably prevail, and the aberrant form be bred back at once to the common level; whereas, under cultivation, the variant forms are far more likely to be continued by close breeding or to be particularly cared for.

The chapter on the causes of variation opens with the statement, that while some authors hold "that it is determined by something within rather than without the organism, Darwin, after long and careful study of the subject, reaches the conclusion that each variation is excited by some change in the environment." Darwin might, and probably did, hold to both members of the antithesis, — that variations are in some way *excited* by change of external conditions; also that they are determined by something within rather than without the organism. Although he does not expressly say so, his whole exposition of the subject, in his later as well as his early writings, appears to regard the changes and actions of the

organism as a response to the influences of the environment. We should say this is also the bent of the teaching of the present volume.

"The origin of new variation is neither purely fortuitous nor due to the direct and definite modifying influence of changed conditions," says Mr. Brooks. When he implies, and in some places states, that Darwin regarded variation as fortuitous, his readers should bear in mind the latter's explanation, that "This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expression, but it seems to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular variation." Darwin is doubtless correctly represented as believing that the variations are perhaps fortuitous so far as their usefulness to the organism goes; but his well-known illustration suggesting this was in reply to the proposition that variation might proceed upon more or less definite lines. If he really meant, as Mr. Brooks supposes, that variations have no relation to the needs and even the future of the organism, he would thereby damage his theory of natural selection, and take a direct anti-teleological position, which he always declined to assume.

Since we have come upon this word, teleology, we may as well note a sentence in an early page of this book: "Wonderful and various as the attributes of each animal are, however, they are not mysterious; for, at the same time that we discover in an organism the power to do wonderful things, we also find in it a material organization, a mechanism adapted to do these very things." No one supposes that the most recondite phenomena of organic life are mysteries in the sense of being something hidden from us which we are not to seek to know. The sentence has an uncertain sound; but it can hardly be an echo of Mr. Huxley's fling at teleology, when he opines that there is little use in demonstrating that an animal or a plant is fitted to do that which it does. To some of us the question, whether there are *fittings* or ends, or only *happenings* in nature, is not an idle one.

As has been already intimated, the scientific positions held in this volume are wholly congruous with the idea of ends in nature, and with the conception of action by the organism in reference to surroundings, instead of plastic reception of impressions from the surroundings. It even asserts "that natural selection is in some way provided with variation in those parts where change is needed;" of certain cases and modes of variation, it declares that, "I cannot imagine a class of facts better adapted to force on our minds the conviction that what we call the external conditions of life are quite insignificant, in relation to any particular variation, in comparison with the organization or constitution of the being which varies;" and that, "an animal is what it is because it has the power to hold on to the experiences and adaptations which fitted its parents for their place in nature, and the parents acquired those peculiarities in virtue of their powers gradually to adjust their structure and habits to their environment."

Our cursory account of this book, addressed to other than scientific readers, and touching only the general question in an untechnical way, must not be regarded as an adequate exposition of its scientific merits, nor of the wealth of knowledge which it contains. The longest chapter in the book, which treats of secondary sexual characters, is full of original illustration, pertinent to his hypothesis. The chapter on the intellectual differences of the sexes, which "should put an end to all discussion as to the relative intellectual rank of men and women" (a consummation de-

voutly to be wished), was separately published four or five years ago in the "Popular Science Monthly," and is reprinted without essential change.

Asa Gray.

THE THEORY OF MORALS. By PAUL JANET, Member of the French Academy, author of "Final Causes," etc. Translated from the latest French edition by Miss MARY CHAPMAN, under the supervision of President NOAH PORTER. One vol. 8vo, pp. viii., 490. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

M. Paul Janet was introduced to the educated public of Great Britain and America by the publication in 1878 of the translation of his work on "Final Causes." The disciple of Cousin and his successor in the *Faculté des Lettres*, he had already achieved a wide reputation in his own country. The "Final Causes" was a timely work. It immediately became a standard, and has done perhaps more than any other writing of its class to check and overcome the materialistic tendencies of our prevalent scientific thought. "The Theory of Morals" (*La Morale*) was published in France in 1873, three years before the "Final Causes," and now makes its appearance for the first time in English. It will add to the reputation of its distinguished author. In thought, arrangement, and style it is admirably clear. The "expository talent" which Professor Flint praises in the "Final Causes" is manifest here. The author has thought out his system before composing his treatise and gives results rather than processes, or processes only so far as they are necessary to elucidate the results. To one who is accustomed to German philosophical books the contrast is refreshing. Some of our recent American writers who have thought it necessary to add to German research German perversity of method and ponderosity of style, might learn from Janet that it is possible to be at once simple and profound, clear and philosophical.

As might be expected from the pupil of Cousin, Janet is an eclectic. The nature and extent of his eclecticism may be gathered from the following extract from the Preface : —

"Kant's morality should be retained in science ; but it should rest upon the morality of Aristotle, which it ought not to cast aside : and in the reconciliation of these two systems, a noble and enlightened Utilitarianism, like that of J. S. Mill, should find full satisfaction."

He calls his system "a sort of *rational Eudæmonism*, opposed on the one hand to utilitarian Eudæmonism, and on the other to the too abstract formalism of Kant's morality, yet at the same time reconciling the two."

The fundamental principle of the work may be stated in the maxim of Leibnitz, "*Bonum mentis naturale, quum est voluntarium, fit bonum morale*." Or, as the author puts it, "Moral good presupposes a natural good, which is anterior to it and serves as its foundation." In other words, virtue or subjective morality derives its moral character from an objective standard. There is a good proper to human nature, and when this is realized by the will in personal choice, it becomes moral good. This natural good is an ultimate idea intuitively perceived, but it manifests itself in the two forms of perfection and happiness, indeed it may be defined as the identity of perfection and happiness. By perfection is

meant the highest and most excellent state of activity possible to man, as a member of the race and a creature of God. It is to this that the moral law affirms obligation. By happiness is meant the pleasure or satisfaction inseparable from the highest excellence or perfection. It is an objective, ideal happiness, realized in the individual sensibility only in proportion to the realization of the ideal perfection in the will.

This we suppose to be in substance the position of that large school of New England theologians and philosophers, much criticised and misunderstood, of whom Dr. Nathaniel Taylor was an eminent representative, and whom President Porter defended so ably nearly a quarter of a century ago.

To those who are accustomed to the terminology of the so-called rational Intuitionism, which makes moral good or right an ultimate, indecomposable idea, this system will seem of doubtful validity. That, however, it is truly intuitionist in principle, Jouffroy has clearly shown, and more recently Professor Sidgwick in his suggestive work on "*The Methods of Ethics*." But it is to be regretted that Janet has not followed the example of Jouffroy by more carefully discriminating between the meanings of that most ambiguous word *good*. The neglect to thus discriminate is a fruitful source of misunderstanding in treatises on Ethics, as *e. g.* in President Hopkins's otherwise admirable works. *Ideal* or *absolute* good would express Janet's meaning better than *natural* good. Perhaps it would be better to employ the term *right* for the subjective, and *good* for the objective, morality. Certainly there ought to be no quarrel between this theory and that which Professor Harris has presented in his recent noble book on "*The Philosophical Basis of Theism*." Making allowance for the difference of terminology, there is substantial identity between the latter's "real principle" of the moral law and Janet's natural good.

The term perfection, though it has the sanction of Cumberland, Leibnitz, and Wolf, is too vague and lacking in content to be satisfactory. One naturally looks here for a fuller exposition of its meaning, and is disappointed not to find it. Nor is the author's account of the relation of happiness to good altogether clear. Here on the perilous edge of Hedonism great care is necessary to avoid misunderstanding, and it cannot be said that it is exercised in this treatise, though if we understand Janet correctly he is opposed to Hedonism in every form. The danger of misconstruction is enhanced by the designation of his system as Eudæmonism, a term which Janet's desire to mediate between the different ethical theories seems to have led him to choose. It is true that the Aristotelian *εὐδαιμονία* is directly opposed in its meaning to the Epicurean *ἡδονή*. It is much to be desired that Eudæmonism and Hedonism should be carefully distinguished. But they are so commonly confounded by modern ethical writers that Janet might wisely have guarded his system by the use of a less ambiguous name.

As the book was written ten years ago, it is not surprising that the Evolutional Ethics are barely mentioned, and this merely in connection with the question of the origin of the moral law. The author's later and better known work shows that he can deal with Evolution boldly and successfully. One has but to read such a book as Leslie Stephen's lately-published thoughtful "*Science of Ethics*," to see how many new questions this theory has raised and how much new light it throws upon the fundamental problems of Ethics. It behooves the Intuitionist Moralists to face

these questions and to avail themselves of this light. It is to be hoped that M. Janet will do this in a later edition.

The method of the work is that introduced by Schleiermacher into Ethics, namely, the threefold division into Good, Virtue, and the Law, except that Janet transposes the last two, treating Duty before Subjective Morality. The chapters on the Conflict of Duties, the Moral Consciousness, Liberty and Sin are especially interesting. The author, as might be expected, takes strong ground against the sensational philosophy in all its forms. He everywhere gives due weight to the religious element in Ethics.

Altogether the "Theory of Ethics" is an admirable book. President Porter and Miss Chapman have done good service in introducing it to English readers. It deserves to be widely read, and whoever reads will find it stimulating and helpful.

Lewis F. Stearns.

THE GROUNDS OF THEISTIC AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF. By GEORGE P. FISHER, D. D., LL. D. Pp. ix., 488. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

The nineteen chapters of Professor Fisher's book do not constitute a treatise of connected argument, but are a collection of essays, each of which is a separate whole, not dependent on the others for intelligibility or completeness. They have, however, an organic, though not a formal unity, by coming upon the same great subjects from various sides and by mutually strengthening each other. The author plants himself at controverted points, where the defense of truth is supposed to be weak, and succeeds in discovering at those very points the strongest supports of theistic and Christian belief.

The method is direct. Results, rather than processes of thinking, are given. Progress is not vexed by meeting numerous preliminary canons of criticism or of argument, but the heart of the subject is reached at once. We find ourselves, not on the circumference, but at the centre of things. The book is of great value as presenting the mature conclusions of one of our ripest scholars and most candid thinkers.

It is enough to say of Professor Fisher's views on the theistic argument that he considers the citadel of theism to be the consciousness of our own personality; human reason interpreting thought in the universe and in man, and human conscience responding to the authority of a Supreme lawgiver. At the same time, he defends the argument from design and restores it to its legitimate place, showing at length that the manifest traces of intelligent purpose in the constitution of the world prove the personality of God, and that design is not inconsistent with evolution.

The defense of miracles is on the lines followed in his "Supernatural Origin of Christianity." The miracles of Christ are constituent part of revelation, inseparable from the nexus of events and from the discourses of Jesus. The evidence is independent of the authority of the Bible. As miracles are integral parts of revelation, they are first to be proved before they can be used evidentially. Miracles cannot prove the gospel till they have themselves been established. Miracles and doctrine are witnesses which corroborate each other. The resurrection of Jesus is a miracle which cannot be explained away on any theory of deception or of visions.

The apostolic authorship of the Fourth Gospel is cogently maintained.

The last three chapters are of special interest as indicating the author's opinions on questions which just now are hotly debated. His plea for the Higher Criticism of the Bible, his statements concerning the formation of the canon of Scripture, and his conclusions concerning the biblical account of creation, leave no room for doubt as to his views on inspiration. The following quotations have an unmistakable meaning: "The persons and transactions through which revelation is made, one must remember, are anterior to the Scriptures that relate to them."

"The oldest writings in the New Testament collection are certain Epistles of Paul, which were called out by his necessary absence from churches, or by special emergencies. Yet the Christian faith was in being; the Church was in being; the gospel was preached; the testimony of the Apostles was spread abroad; numerous converts were made. Christianity was not made by the Christian Scriptures; on the contrary, the Scriptures are the product of the Church."

Again, "The consideration of divine revelation as having for its end the building up of a community or kingdom, and as made through the vehicle of a history transacted on the earth, lifts us upon a plane where critical problems, within a certain reasonable limit, may be regarded with comparative indifference. Within that limit, literary questions having to do with the authorship of books, as, for example, whether it be simple or composite, and whether traditional impressions as to authorship are well founded; questions having to do also with the correctness of the text which has been transmitted to us; questions as to the order of succession in the stages through which the community of God has passed; questions as to the accuracy of details in historical narratives — are no longer felt to be of so vital moment. They are not points on which the Christian religion stands or falls. The timidity which springs out of the idea of Christianity as exclusively a book religion, every line in the literature of which is clothed with the preternatural sanctity ascribed by Mohammedan devotees to their sacred writings, is dissipated. The Christian believer, as long as fundamental verities and the foundations of belief on which they stand are unassailed, is no more disturbed by the disclosure of the human factor in the origination of the Scriptures, and by finding that it played a more extensive part than was once supposed. The treasure is not lost because it is distinctly perceived to be held in 'earthen vessels.'" "The seventeenth century was far less favorably situated than the nineteenth as regards the discrimination between the human and the divine factors which conspire in the production of the Scriptures." Of attempts to reconcile the details of the first chapter of Genesis with unquestioned facts, the author says, "Not a few learned naturalists regard the alleged correspondence in the order of events as unreal or as effected by a forced interpretation of the narrative. . . . The matching of the narrative to the geological history is thought to require a more flexible and arbitrary understanding of words and phrases in the former than a sound method of hermeneutics will sanction."

Room is made for modification of hard and fast theories of the Bible by bringing into their preëminent place the great constructive periods of sacred history, and the positive, saving truths of revelation. The perspective is preserved and we are aided in distinguishing the essential from the incidental.

A writer is to be judged by listening to his entire statement. One could imagine a critic reading this book (although Professor Fisher's reputation and wit make even such a critic cautious) with the purpose of noting departures from accepted theories of inspiration, who, by quoting detached sentences suited to the purpose, and dishonestly keeping silence concerning all besides, might make the impression that Professor Fisher holds "loose" views and is little better than an infidel. Such *suppressio veri*, which is a species of libel, has been too frequent in some recent book notices to pass without rebuke.

The reasonable concession made by the author to the Higher Criticism, or rather the glad welcome accorded it, gives all the more weight to his decided opinions concerning the person of Christ, miracles, prophecy, the real inspiration and authority of the Bible, and the living power of Christianity in the world.

George Harris.

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. By PHILIP SCHAFF. A new edition, thoroughly revised and enlarged. Vol. ii. Ante-Nicene Christianity, A. D. 100-325. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

This is more than a new edition, it is almost a new book. The space accorded to this period in the author's earlier edition (1858) is more than doubled in the volume before us. It is not only "thoroughly revised and enlarged," but brought down to date in its discussions, opinions, and references, with a diligence and an accuracy which leave little to be desired. Several chapters, notably those on Christian Art, and the Catacombs, are wholly new. Many sections also have been added: those on Stoic morality, eschatology, and the "Octavius" of Minucius Felix deserve especial mention. Where but little wholly new matter has been added, the marks of careful revision are constantly visible. The lists of authorities prefixed to each section form a most valuable feature of the work. Nowhere else, so far as we know, are such full and accurate lists to be found, and they are especially complete in recent literature. Every one is aware how intense has been the activity with which the first three centuries of Christian history have been studied during the twenty-five years between Dr. Schaff's two editions. That activity is memorialized in his lists and made tributary to his text. Indeed, he has brought things down to date with such zeal, that (p. 653) he includes Bishop Lightfoot's edition of Ignatius, which, however, according to a recent communication direct from the publishers, will not be issued "for months!" But, with the exception just named, any one at all familiar with the subjects will see that these lists of names are no mere empty preface, but precede well digested summaries of what is known on the matters under consideration; summaries demanding a careful study of these sources before they could be written. Many a smooth sentence is like the road-bed of a Colorado railway, a triumph of engineering skill over great difficulties has been wrought, and expresses the result of much study of many minds. Not many original views are propounded, but Dr. Schaff has sagaciously grasped the salient features of each question, and has generally given utterance to the wisest and most probable solution of each problem. "*Medio tutissimus ibis*" is his motto, and while he sometimes seems hardly to reach a decision at all, yet, on the whole, he is a very safe guide. The desire to be original has vitiated the work of many a church historian.

There is no history of the Ante-Nicene age containing so much in so few words, and, while absorbing all the new light thrown upon the period by recent investigators, committed to none of their extravagant theories or one-sided views.

The chief faults of the book seem to us to be inherent in its plan, which is substantially unchanged from that of the first edition, and therefore lies beyond the scope of the present notice. We shall be content with pointing out a few minor errors and defects. The doctrinal part (c. xii.) is the least satisfactory, and the section on Anthropology is particularly meagre, doing scant justice to Irenæus, still less to Tertullian. The doctrines of the Church and of the two Sacraments belong in this chapter, but they are assigned: the Church to "Organization and Discipline" (c. iv.), under the caption, "The Catholic Unity," while the Sacraments are *doctrinally* treated under the head of Christian worship (c. v.). The treatment of Infant Baptism (p. 258 *sq.*) is a great improvement on Neander's well-known failure, but it needs to be read in connection with what is said on the same subject by Dr. Schaff in vol. i., or the completeness and cogency of the argument will not be appreciated.

In examining the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, the author appears to lay too much stress on the diversity of views in the Ante-Nicene age, and does not sufficiently emphasize the essential unanimity of the early Fathers in holding the doctrine of the Real Presence.

It seems an invidious task to call attention to any defects in lists of "literature" so good as Dr. Schaff's, but there are some cases in which he has missed valuable material which is not included, even by other lists to which he refers, as supplementing his own. Thus, on Irenæus (p. 746 *sq.*), he entirely passes over the important essays of Erbkam and Wolff as well as several others of less value,¹ while the treatises of Semisch on "The Lord's Supper in Irenæus," and of Powers on "Baptism according to Irenæus," are mentioned under those heads, but not again in connection with the Church Father. While speaking of Irenæus, we may take exception to one of Dr. Schaff's statements regarding this Father. He says (p. 149) of the episcopate: "This Father (Irenæus) represents the institution as a diocesan office." Now it may be that during the lifetime of Irenæus some episcopal sees were assuming diocesan proportions, either because in centres of population the communicants became too numerous to be gathered into a single congregation, or because, on missionary ground, the scarcity of laborers would give to each a large sphere. But I have failed to find, *expressed* in Irenæus, any hint of a diocesan episcopate, nor do any of Dr. Schaff's references suggest it.²

¹ Erbkam, H. W., *De Principiis Ethicis, S. Irenæi*. Regiomonti, 1856. Wolff, L., *Die Lehre des Irenæus von der Tradition und der Natur des Menschen*: Zeitschrift f. d. gesammte Luth. Theologie u. Kirche. 1842. Heft iv. s. 1-28. Of less value are—Kayser, A., *L'Opinion d'Irenée sur le siècle Apostolique*. Revue de Strassbourg, vi. 321, *Irenæus, etc.* Brit. and For. Evangelical Review, January, 1869. Alexander, John, *The Primitive Doctrine of Christ's Divinity, or a Specimen of a Full View of the Ante-Nicene Doctrine, in an Essay on Irenæus*. London, 1727. Schmidt, J. A., *Études sur Irenée et les Gnostiques*. Bruxelles, 1855.

² On this subject the reference iii. 293 is given, probably a misprint for iii. 2, § 2 (p. 149, n. 2). Dr. Schaff also prints Herzog² for the second ed. of Herzog. But the superior number is the same used elsewhere to refer to note 2 at the bottom of the page, and thus creates confusion. The volume is very carefully printed, on the whole.

Many students of church history will not agree with Dr. Schaff as to the probability that the Apostle John was acquainted with Philo's Logos-Doctrine (p. 548, n. 1), or that the famous Presbyter John is to be identified with the Apostle (p. 698), or that the Apostles' Creed, the *Te Deum*, and the Gloria in Excelsis are "the product of a secondary inspiration" (p. 533).

In the section on the celibacy of the clergy (p. 409), Dr. Schaff says:—

"At the same time, the tendency towards clerical celibacy set in very early, and made steady and irresistible progress, especially in the West. This is manifest in the qualifications of the facts and directions just mentioned. For they leave the impression that there were not many *happy* clerical marriages and model pastors' wives in the early centuries; nor could there be so long as the public opinion of the Church, contrary to the Bible, elevated virginity above marriage."

Now this conclusion, "that there were not many happy clerical marriages and model pastors' wives in the early centuries" seems utterly unsustainable by the evidence adduced. What are "the facts and directions just mentioned?" To begin with, most of the evidence given does not belong to this period, or volume, at all, and further, its weight is all in favor of the prevalence and sanction and, for the most part, approval of clerical marriages in the Ante-Nicene church. Polycarp speaks of a presbyter and his wife who were avaricious. Irenæus mentions a deacon's wife who was unfaithful to her husband, and Cyprian charges an opponent with a violent assault on his wife. Tertullian seems to have taken both sides, but lived very happily with his wife, and Clement of Alexandria insists upon married life as necessary to complete the ideal Christian. This is all the purely Ante-Nicene evidence adduced, though some other testimonies *in favor* of clerical marriages might be counted in. Are the three couples first mentioned to serve as a sample of early clerical wedded life? Better might the divorce court docket in one of our States be taken as exhibiting the standard of married life amongst us. These are the exceptions, manifestly, and therefore recorded, and their paucity suggests rather the purity and felicity of clerical wedded life in the early Christian Church.

A similar false impression is created by a statement Dr. Schaff makes about the Lord's Day (p. 201, note 2): "After Constantine, the Jewish term Sabbath" ['was used as a designation of the Christian Sabbath']. Now, this gives the idea that the Lord's Day was called "the Sabbath" from the time of Constantine down. Nothing could be more erroneous. The analogical use of the term Sabbath, based on the fact that the Lord's Day manifestly serves a purpose similar to that of the Sabbath, is not referred to here, though even this is probably only rare and exceptional for long after Constantine. But what is meant is calling Sunday the Sabbath as we do in New England. And this was an unknown thing for several centuries after Constantine.

Yet all these criticisms are but motes in the sunbeam. The book is the fullest and most accurate summary of the facts of church history during the Ante-Nicene age which we possess, and the author deserves the sincerest gratitude of all Christian students.

C. J. H. Ropes.

A POPULAR COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TESTAMENT. By English and American Scholars of various Evangelical Denominations with Illustrations and Maps. Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., LL. D., etc. Vol. iv. The Catholic Epistles and Revelation. Pp. 161. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

This ends a work by which the editor has deserved better of the Anglo-Saxon churches than even by the Lange series with its ponderous wealth of remark. This commentary is such as Anglo-Saxons will not find oppressive, but will find sufficient. It is not popular in the sense of fifty years ago, when slipshod exegesis was merely the foundation of pious edification. Even yet we doubt whether the laity at large are up to the use of these truly exegetical commentaries, which give the ripe results of the latest study, omitting only the tediousness of long processes of comparison. But the people ought to be brought up to this higher standard, and will be in time. The immediate work of these commentaries is likely to be done through the laics among the clergy, those who, theologically, may be said to be in "minor orders." And what is good enough for them is good enough for any one, except as he may be professionally called to teach the teachers.

Dr. Angus, on the Hebrews, treats too slightly the strong congruity between what we know of Apollos and the powerful, flowing rhetoric, carefully balanced style, more taking, but less profound, treatment of the theme, as compared with Romans and Galatians. Thoroughly Paulinistic, yet not Pauline, is likely to be the final verdict. Yet the tone of assured apostolic authority does not suit Apollos. The enigma is not yet solved. But Apollos never disdained to work under the auspices of Paul; why may he not have written under the auspices of Paul?

The epistle is soundly, though not glowingly, developed. The "dreadful texts," concerning the irrecoverableness of apostasy, are admirably handled. They are treated as categorical, not conditional, while yet it is sufficiently shown that the strongest expressions of being "made partakers of the Holy Ghost," and the kindred ones, every one of which might have been applied to Judas, leave untouched the question, how far such persons had yielded their true being to the mighty efficacy of life which was working in the body of which they had been fully accepted as members. The energy of reality in the apostolic church, and its sharp distinction from the unregenerate world, would have made it impossible, as Dr. Angus well shows, to have spoken of apostates, whatever they might have been in heart, except as having fallen from a true place in the true body.

Dr. Gloag takes the Epistle of James, whose personality he separates, we doubt not for good and all, from that of James the Less.

James's doctrine of Faith is very well expressed, as setting forth a truth, but one so differently conceived from Paul's doctrine, that the Bishop would not have found himself well at home in the Apostle's view, nor the Apostle in the Bishop's. "Something strained and formal" in the relations of the two men, as Farrar remarks, is plain enough from the Acts and Galatians. The distinction between the *fides formata* and the *fides sola* goes back to the beginning, both views, therefore, having a right to be in the Church, and the deeper view being now, as of old, peculiarly liable to abuse.

We think Dr. Gloag right in viewing the final denunciations as passing from inconsistent believers to haughty persecutors, and as glowing with the consciousness of the great catastrophe at hand, the awful type of the last great consummation.

1 Peter is treated by Professor Salmond with such a glow and condensation as fully answer to it. Pauline in doctrine, yet Petrine in concreteness, laden with the manifest fruits of a salvation whose deep roots in the purpose of God and the depths of experience it is left for Paul to develop, written with the mild superiority of one whose authority was never disputed, it is here worthily apprehended, comprehended, and developed by a countryman of "the saintly and white-robed archbishop," whose name is almost identified with it.

In his exposition of the vexed passage concerning "the spirits in prison," the author evidently feels himself "aground where two seas meet." Exegetical candor seems to give a drift one way, and established doctrinal propriety another. In this stress of circumstances, the author seems disposed to compromise by surrendering his premises to the former, and reserving his conclusion to the latter, and evidently breathes more freely when he is well over the dangerous place.

For the genuineness of 2 Peter, Professor Salmond makes, we dare say, as good a plea as the case admits of. But Dr. Angus rightly vindicates the originality of Jude as to the common element.

Professor Milligan takes The Revelation and treats it rationally and worthily. Being always of the last opinion (not being too outrageous) that is broached concerning the Apocalypse, we shall strongly commend this until we have met with the next.

Charles C. Starbuck.

BIBLISCH-THEOLOGISCHES WÖRTERBUCH DER N. TESTAMENTLICHEN GRÄCITÄT. Von HERMANN CREMER. Dritte sehr vermehrte u. verbesserte Auflage, Gotha, Perthes, 1883.

BIBLICO-THEOLOGICAL LEXICON OF NEW TESTAMENT GREEK. By HERMANN CREMER, D. D., Professor of Theology in the University of Greifswald. Translated from the German of the second edition (with additional matter and corrections by the Author), by WILLIAM URWICK, M. A. Third edition. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh.

This work of Cremer is one of the most valuable contributions, not of recent years only, but of all time, to the exegetical study of the New Testament. It is not a lexicon in the ordinary sense of the term, *i. e.*, it does not contain a complete list of the words used in the New Testament. Its aim is indicated in the title "Biblico-Theological," and the range of the work is limited by the "language-moulding power of Christianity." All words which Christianity animated with a new spirit, and consecrated to nobler uses, receive here a more painstaking and exhaustive examination than has been granted them heretofore.

The words which the New Testament adopts unchanged from classic and contemporary speech must still be sought for in the regular dictionaries; but those which, through the working of the Holy Spirit, were transformed to become the bearers of the new message of redemption, those which are the "key to the essential and fundamental ideas of Christendom," can be studied more satisfactorily and profitably in this lexicon of Cremer than in any other work.

The work was begun at the suggestion of Tholuck, to whom the first edition, issued in 1867, was dedicated. Its value was at once recognized in Germany, and the author was appointed to a professorship in the University of Greifswald. A second edition appeared in 1872, and the third was issued last spring. These later editions are not mere repetitions of the first. The work has been steadily growing. In the second edition 120 words were added, and in the third about 300 more, while nearly as many articles have been thoroughly revised, so that the book is much improved in quality as well as increased in quantity. This latest issue does not include all the Greek words into which Christianity infused new life, there is room for a fourth enlarged and improved edition; but all the most important words have already been treated. An English translation of the first edition was published in 1872 by T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, and that of the second in 1878. It is a source of regret that the third English edition, issued the present year, is not based upon the latest German. It is to be hoped that the copious additions which so greatly enhance the value of the third German edition will soon be made accessible in English.

This work is the product of accurate scholarship and indefatigable industry. The opinions advanced may not always be correct. Doubtless the author himself will modify some of them, and the labor of future generations of scholars will render the work more accurate and authoritative. But the author shows admirable fitness for his task and is possessed of a spirit of Christian, no less than of scholarly, enthusiasm; and, in spite of the imperfections which necessarily adhere to first efforts in a new field, this biblico-theological lexicon is absolutely indispensable to every student of the Greek New Testament.

F. E. Woodruff.

SOURCES OF HISTORY IN THE PENTATEUCH. Six Lectures delivered in Princeton Theological Seminary on the Stone Foundation, March, 1882. By SAMUEL C. BARTLETT, D. D., LL. D., President of Dartmouth College. Pp. 247. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co. 1883.

The aim of this volume is not to defend the historical character of the Pentateuch, but "to set forth in the direct and affirmative aspect the claims of the Pentateuch as a book of origins, containing the sources of all our earliest consecutive knowledge, and alone solving those great questions concerning the human race which must be asked, and which lie otherwise unanswered."

The several lectures are upon The Earliest Cosmogony, Early Man, The Early Arts, The Early Consanguinities, The Early Movements of Nations, The Early Documents. An appendix contains a translation of a considerable part of H. L. Strack's article *Pentateuch*, PRE² 11, 437-460. As will be seen from the chapter titles, the Sources of History here opened are found almost wholly in the first twelve chapters of Genesis. In the first lecture, the observations on the nature, end, and method of the narrative (Gen. i.) are particularly worthy of attention. They lay down with admirable clearness the conditions of understanding this cosmogony, and sweep away a great many difficulties and objections. The author rightly rejects as absurd the abuse of language which would call this chapter a parable or a psalm of Creation. The astronomical and geological facts are marshaled anew, and the positive method and liter-

ary skill of the array give a fresh interest to a somewhat hackneyed subject. In the second lecture, the geography of Eden is discussed at some length. The Gihon is the Araxes. The old difficulty about the land of Cush is rather too easily disposed of.

Granted, what is by no means established, that the Hebrew Kûsh may be connected with the Kash, Kashshu, whom the Assyrian monuments place in Lower Babylonia; granted further, that the Babylonian Kashshu may be connected with Kossaeans or Kissaeans of the Greeks (Herod. 3, 91; Ptolemy, Geog. 6, 3), it is hard to see how this helps us to the Araxes, for Herodotus distinctly identifies his Cissia with Susiana, a strip of country between the Tigris and the Zagros mountains, having the Persian Gulf on the south, and Assyria on the north. Its northern limit was apparently about the modern Senganan, and between it and the Araxes lies the whole breadth of Assyria.

In regard to the formation of woman (Gen. ii. 21 f.), Dr. Bartlett rejects the view that would make it a "parable;" he is more favorable to Delitzsch, who regards it as a "symbolical" narrative. If we understand what *symbolical narrative* means, it is a euphemism for *myth*. His own suggestion is that the transaction may have been a vision in Adam's deep sleep, "whereby God signified to him the indissoluble union with the wife."

The last lecture, on the Early Documents, is the most exposed to criticism. The author admits the existence of various documents or sources in Genesis; he himself points out some which he thinks older than Moses. But "nothing can be more dreary and bewildering" than to try to keep up with modern criticism, with its two Elohist, its Jehovist, — by a slip of the pen, Dr. Bartlett has written *an Elohist, two Jehovists*, — a Deuteronomist, and one or more "redactors" (p. 188). It is in his eyes a fault to attempt to determine precisely the limits of the documents employed (p. 189 n.); which is much like saying: There are doubtless different strata of rock, but it is one of the chief faults of geology that it tries to find out precisely where one stratum ends and another begins. He belittles the results of criticism by saying that there is no absolute or general agreement among the anatomists of the Pentateuch as to the number of the parts of which it is formed, and still less agreement in the assignment of the several portions to their supposed originals. Had Dr. Bartlett submitted to the dreary and bewildering labor of tabulating the present state of the critical analysis, he would have found it necessary greatly to modify this statement. Strack truly says that the wide differences of opinion which now exist relate less to the analysis than to the order and date of the sources. The proof of the disagreement of critics, which is obtained by comparing the analyses of Davidson, Knobel, and Dillmann (p. 190 n.), makes no more than a "show of a case," since these are not contemporary.

It is certainly an exaggeration to say (p. 195) that the undoubted quotations from and allusions to the contents of the Pentateuch, specifically in the later books, can be enumerated by the hundred.

The view ascribed, on the same page, to F. W. Schultz, that Moses was both Jehovist and Deuteronomist, is one which Schultz, who gave up the Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy as long ago as 1865, ought not now to be held responsible for. The critics catch it for arguing from the violation of a law to its non-existence. But the argument for the non-

existence of a custom from the unchallenged existence of an opposite custom is a different thing. Take Samuel's attitude to the village worship, and the Deuteronomic law of the central sanctuary, for example.

The translation of Strack's article is faithfully though mechanically done. "Oral tradition had been of value not to Talmudic Judaism for the first time" (p. 228) is painful. Here and there are slips: *deuteronomistische Bearbeitung* becomes "work on Deuteronomy;" *geistvoll*, is "spirited." The worst faults are in the translation of titles of books. "Nöldeke's Untersuchungen zur Kritik des A. T.," is rendered, "Nöldeke in his investigations upon the criticism of the O. T." Luthardt's "Zeitschrift für lutherische Theologie" is transformed into "Delitzsch's Papers for Lutheran Theology." There are also numerous misprints.

Notwithstanding the faults we have pointed out, the book is one which will be widely read with interest and profit.

George F. Moore.

KADESH-BARNEA. BY H. CLAY TRUMBULL, D. D. Editor of the Sunday-School Times. 8vo, pp. 478. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

This work is a positive and permanent contribution to sacred geography. It is at once popular and scholarly in its tone. To one class of readers the breezy vacation air of travel will appeal. Another class, "fit though few," will delight in the exact citations and copious indexes. Both will be charmed with the tasteful binding, the broad margin, the clear typography of the book, and with a map of the NEGEB and its surroundings that goes far to atone for many sins of Sunday-school editors in the same field. With well-known modesty, the author deprecates the size of the volume. The public will hardly agree with him here. For each of the 478 pages is a link in a strong and beautiful chain, not one of which can be severed without harm.

The contents are divided into chapters as follow: I. Kadesh-Barnea, its Manifold Importance; II. Biblical Indications of its Site; III. Ancient References to it outside of the Bible Text; IV. Later Attempts at its Identifying; V. Story of a Hunt for it; VI. The Sites compared; VII. Route of the Exodus a Special Study. These are prefaced by a graceful and hearty dedication which we subjoin: "To the Rev. John Rowlands and to the memory of Professor Edward Henry Palmer and the Rev. F. W. Holland, the earliest, the most eminent, and the most widely experienced of English explorers in the search for Kadesh-Barnea, this volume is dedicated by an American follower in their track, and admirer of their spirit and work." Dr. Trumbull's fifth chapter gives a vivid story of his search for the site which Thompson, Palmer, and Bartlett had groped after in vain. How he penetrated into the heart of the land of the jealous and violent 'Azâzimeh through the absence of Shaykh Sulaymân and the imprisonment of Shaykh Hussan, how he made the reading of President Bartlett's "Egypt to Palestine" a spell to amaze and to control his too ignorant Teeyâhah guide, how he won the enthusiastic coöperation of the ambitious Muhammad Ahmad Effendi Hedayah, 8 *Silk Bazar*, Alexandria, by the promise to put him in his book, if he reached 'Ayn Quadees and 'Ayn Quadayrât, is drawn out with lights and shadows of pictorial detail. Past a terraced peak in the morning, over a solitary, irregular plain, amid scattered cairns and cisterns, under the

sun of mid-day glaring from chalk-hills, thirsting, fearing, hoping, the little party pushed on, and burst at last on the long-sought wells. Dr. Trumbull makes us enter with them into the loveliest oasis since Wady Fayrân, with its "New England look" in grass and flower. For the moment, humming bee and fitting bird and fig-trees as of Paradise, and rippling, gurgling water, sweet as father Nile, in runlet, in wells, in pools, in streams, rest and greet us too over against "the large single mass of solid rock" smitten by Moses of old. In 'Ayn Quadees Kadesh-Barnea is found!

Dr. Trumbull is no less cogent in argument than graphic in narrative. Very judiciously he reduces the eighteen contesting claimants to Kadesh to two, 'Ayn-el-Waybeh in the 'Arabah near its upper end, and 'Ayn Quadees on the plateau of the desert et Teeh, 1,000 feet higher. The arguments in favor of 'Ayn-el-Waybeh, on the score of road, country, and surrounding scenery, are summarized fairly, and refuted concisely. Kedor-la'-omer would never have led an army up the rugged passes leading from the 'Arabah, nor could he thus have struck the field of the Amalekites before he reached En-gedi (Hazon-Tamar). The Israelites would not have crossed the great and terrible wilderness, had they skirted the eastern peninsula into and along the 'Arabah. In journeying by the way of Mt. Seir, they simply took the easternmost road out of the Mt. Sinai group, that is, a road bearing the name and trending in the direction of Mt. Seir. The 'Arabah was no natural highway between Sinai and Canaan, but a defile between frowning mountains, exposing to attack from flank and rear, fronting the strongest natural bulwarks of the foe. "The idea of such a host as Israel's settling down at a prominent watering-place in a common thoroughfare, to abide there many days, and that in such a torrent-swept and yet permanently barren region as the 'Arabah, is utterly at variance with any fair conception of the prudence and foresight of Moses and Joshua, or of the unfailing wisdom of their Heavenly Guide. 'Ayn-el-Waybeh has no rock, no city, no stronghold, no neighboring mount toward Canaan, no name corresponding to Kadesh, no place on the boundary line of Southern Judah or midway from the Dead Sea to the Mediterranean, corresponding to the Scripture indications.

Then follows a vigorous, fivefold argument for 'Ayn Quadees as Kadesh-Barnea. As a strategic post, as the centre of the obvious natural boundary of Canaan on the south, as the key to the identification of the sister landmarks of the southern border, as the guide to the Israelitish camps and marches toward and from S. Canaan, as a city with biblical name and biblical features, Dr. Trumbull shows that 'Ayn Quadees alone meets all the requirements of the case. What Tuch, Winer, Ritter, Fries, Kurz among Germans, and Alford, Palmer, Tristram, Geikie among Englishmen, had believed, is demonstrated beyond a peradventure.

The spirit of Dr. Trumbull's book is worthy of its matter. With unselfish justice he magnifies Rowlands the original discoverer, with modest resolution and good-natured irony he exposes Dr. Robinson's misstatements and oversights. There is manly breadth in his homage to the critical, thorough, and impartial German scholarship, and fearless simplicity in probing the errors of Speaker's Commentary and Bible Atlas, of Smith's Dictionary, and Teachers' Bibles, of the Oxford University Press, and of the Queen's Printers. He has the candor of the soldier, the charity

of the editor, the faith of the teacher, for disentangling the route of the Exodus. His monograph is a model for American students, and a light on Bible lands.

John Phelps Taylor.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

The Nineteenth Century, January. — The opening article is by Herbert Spencer, and is entitled "Religion: a Retrospect and Prospect." It is chiefly prophetic. He reiterates the opinion that belief in the supernatural originated in the belief in ghosts. Dreams concerning the dead meant that in invisible form the dead were active secretly, and only when the living ceased to dream about them were they finally dead. From this belief in the invisible Mr. Spencer thinks religion has been developed until it has assumed a relatively spiritual character in monotheism and Christianity. His prophecy is that all conceptions of God which are cruel or irrational will disappear, among which he classes eternal torture of the vast majority of mankind, punishment of the race for Adam's sin, reconciliation of men to God by sacrificing a son who was perfectly innocent, and craving for praise from earth's inhabitants on the part of a Power present in innumerable worlds through infinite space. Nearly all of these misrepresentations of Christian doctrines are in the style of travesties common years ago, but which no intelligent opponent of Christianity thinks of condescending to now. The prophecies, in the form in which he states them, have just as much value as any prophecy has which is made after the event has occurred. The important part of the article is the admission that a germ of truth was contained in the primitive conception. Man was conscious of his own energy in producing effects, and attributed effects which he did not produce to energy in some invisible things, as the ghosts of dead men. He was right in the conviction that Power, in some respects like his own energy, acts in the universe. There is such a Power. Science is everywhere confronted by it, and "leaves us in the presence of the avowedly inexplicable." The discovery of incredible powers in matter supposed to be inert is illustrated in several fine passages: "As instance, the ability of a mere iron plate to take up the complicated aerial vibrations produced by articulate speech, which, translated into multitudinous and varied electric pulses, are retranslated a thousand miles off by another iron plate, and again heard as articulate speech. When the explorer of nature sees that, quiescent as they appear, surrounding solid bodies are thus sensitive to forces which are infinitesimal in their amounts, there is forced on him the inference that every point in space thrills with an infinity of vibrations passing through it in all directions; the conception to which he tends is much less that of a universe of dead matter than that of a universe everywhere alive." "The necessity we are under to think of the external energy in terms of the internal energy gives rather a spiritualistic than a materialistic aspect to the universe." He shows eloquently that knowledge does not diminish, but increases wonder; that

the biologist is more perplexed by the hatching of a chick than the rustic or the artisan or the trader is ; that the astronomer is more amazed than those who in ancient times exclaimed, "The heavens declare the glory of God." "This feeling," he says, "is not likely to be decreased, but to be increased by that analysis of knowledge which, while forcing one to agnosticism, yet continually prompts him to imagine some solution of the Great Enigma, which he knows cannot be solved." And so he comes around to his old conclusion, that amid deepening mysteries "there will remain the one absolute certainty that he is ever in presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed." The absurdity of holding that a Power is unknowable, of which at the same time it can be affirmed that it is infinite and eternal, that it is energy, and that all things proceed from it, has been sufficiently exposed over and over again.

A noticeable article is one on "Our Growing Australian Empire," by Sir Henry Parkes, late Prime Minister of South Wales, giving a picture of the resources, population, and products of Australia, contending that the colonial condition should give way to "The British States of Australia," and hinting that at such a distance loyalty to England could not easily survive slight and neglect.

There is also an article by Sir Richard Assheton Cross on the topic at present so vigorously discussed in England, the "Homes of the Poor."

— In an article in *The Contemporary Review* for December, entitled "Evolutionary Ethics and Christianity," Mr. Goldwin Smith defends the Christian conception of life against the Evolutionary, as set forth in Mr. Leslie Stephen's "Science of Ethics." Starting with Mr. Stephen's admission that "there is not an absolute coincidence between virtue and happiness," he draws from this the inference that "it is impossible to construct a rule for individual conduct, or for the direction of life, by mere inspection of the phenomena of Evolution, without some conception of the estate and destiny of man." And we have, he argues, a yearning to know our destiny, which makes it impossible, "without a satisfactory solution of that question, to attain the happiness to which it must be the aim of any science or system concerned with human action to light mankind." "The highest of our joys is affection ; and the more intense affection becomes the more bitter will be our reflection that, if this is all, love must die." Mr. Smith's inference is, that, if existence is to end at death, no motive can be found to sustain continued well-doing, and that therefore evolution cannot be the basis of a satisfactory system of ethics. "Who would endure pain and labor ? Who would give up his dinner merely to increase the expensiveness of the final crash ?" Besides, evolution eliminates freedom, which is essential to morality. Assuming it to be proved that from nature, considered as a mechanical system, it is impossible to draw a tenable theory of life, Mr. Smith goes on to say that "if a clew is to be found, it must be in history," which "great physicists neglect ; they call it gossip, and plume themselves, not without justice, on their superior ignorance of the subject." Setting aside miracle, the proof of which he believes to have failed, Mr. Smith finds that Christianity received and assimilated what was permanent in the civilizations of Judæa, Greece, and Rome, and enshrined them in the only universal religion of the world. With this new religion began a new moral life for the race. Its moral ideal is defended against the objections of evolu-

tionary moralists. The argument is summed up in the following sentences. A scientific hypothesis is verified by comparison with facts. A moral ideal is verified by practical experience, individual and social. Each inquirer must judge for himself whether the characters and lives of the best Christians, — those who have most distinctly proved themselves on the gospel model, — the state of the communities in which the ethical mode of the gospel has most prevailed, and the general advance of society under the influence of Christianity, have not been such as to render it credible that the Christian ideal is the true ideal; that it fits the facts and meets the requirements of man's estate; that the attempt to realize it is the right line of progress for us individually and for mankind at large. This is the main question, the question by the answer to which it must be determined whether we shall adhere to Christianity or look for some other guide of our moral life.

It is interesting to find one who has been called a free-thinking historian claiming the authority of his science for these familiar arguments for the truth of Christianity.

— The last number received of *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (October, 1883) contains a lecture read by Mr. F. B. Sanborn last summer, at the Concord School of Philosophy, on "The Puritanic Philosophy and Jonathan Edwards." The Essay is pleasant reading, anecdotal, excerptive, and eulogistic of Edwards's extraordinary speculative genius. It charges, not unjustly, that Edwards approached philosophy too exclusively from the side of the received theology, recognizes that his treatise on the "Freedom of the Will" was not "drawn from the well of Scripture undefiled," and finds in it reminders of the "distinctive negative criticism first initiated by Locke and Hobbs in England," and afterwards put to such fatal uses by Hume. The genesis, character, and growth of Edwards's philosophy is a subject that deserves special investigation. Mr. Sanborn does not attempt a severe or thorough discussion of it, and assumes quite too easily that Edwards's thinking is to be considered as the culmination and close of Puritan theology. We are grateful to him, however, for calling attention to the theme, and for its attractive presentation.

— *The Catholic Presbyterian* for December contains an interesting account, written by the Rev. Donald Miller, of Genoa, of a visit made by himself and the Rev. Professor Comba, of the Waldensian Theological College of Florence, to the Protestant Italian churches in the Grisons, in the month of July, 1882.

These churches are situated in the southern part of the southeastern canton of Switzerland, which also includes the beautiful Upper Engadine, so attractive in recent years to tourists from our own country, as well as from all parts of Europe. This canton has a population of about 100,000, three fifths of whom are Protestants. Of these, not more than 7,000 speak the Italian language. They have nine churches, the only fruit which remains of the Italian Reformation of the sixteenth century. With one exception, they are connected ecclesiastically with some ninety other Protestant churches of the canton in a Presbyterian organization. Candidates for the ministry are educated in the German language, and it has long been difficult to find preachers sufficiently familiar with the Italian tongue to minister to these few churches. Shortly before the visit described in this article, the church in Brusio, in the Val Poschiavo,

sent a request to Professor Comba that he would name to them some one from among the Waldensian ministry who might serve them as a pastor. Mr. Miller tells us that he had for some time been desirous of bringing these Italian churches in the Grisons into more intimate fellowship with the Waldensian church, and that Professor Comba and himself gladly embraced the Providential opportunity opened by this letter for furthering these desires. If we had space, we should gladly give a full abstract of the history of the days spent by these gentlemen in fraternal intercourse with these churches of the Val Poschiavo and the Val Bregaglia. They were most cordially received by pastors and people, welcomed to their pulpits, and listened to with utmost attention. Satisfactory steps were taken at Brusio for the calling of a Waldensian pastor, and encouragement given that such ministers would be favorably recognized by the Synod whenever elected by the people.

The moral condition of the people is said to be very good. They are industrious and prosperous, and their attachment to Protestantism is hearty. Mr. Miller's impression is that their religious life is somewhat formal, and that they need and will welcome spiritual sympathy and help.

The statement is made that the theological seminary at Coire has been recently abolished, and its funds converted into scholarships for the aid of students who may attend classes in the Swiss and German universities. Would it not be well for the churches of the United States, if a number of our one hundred and forty-two divinity schools should learn a lesson from the seminary at Coire?

An article in the same number, on the "Latin Hymns of the Celtic Church," gives metrical translations sufficient to show the general character and spirit of this ancient and remarkable hymnology.

We regret to read the announcement of the discontinuance of this periodical. Its editor, the Rev. Dr. Blaikie, brought to it a large intelligence and a truly catholic spirit. No other magazine has done so much to broaden the range of Presbyterian vision, and promote coöperation and union between the different denominations which bear this name. The movement which has begun may be retarded, but cannot be stopped. The promoters of what is truly catholic will not fail of their reward.

— In the *Revue de L'Histoire des Religions*, Ernest Renan is quoted upon these hideous accusations against the Jews, lately revived from the Middle Ages, of moistening their paschal bread with the blood of murdered Christians. He asks whether such a thing is to be believed of the wildest fanatics of a people whose law makes it a mortal offense to taste a drop of blood under any circumstances, a people which has repeatedly furnished martyrs who have surrendered their lives rather than touch flesh which had not been bled white. "The human imagination," he remarks, "has no great variety in the character of its calumnies." The early Christians were likewise often the victims of these accusations of Thyestean banquets. But as assuredly, M. Renan remarks, no Christian Agapé was ever so polluted, so assuredly no Jewish Passover has ever been so polluted. And he calls on Christians, remembering their own past, to save the Jews from the same calumnious madness in the present.

— In the *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* for December, the inhabitants of the whole Congo Valley are described as belong-

ing, with the possible exception of some pygmy races, exclusively to "the great Bantu family, which is so distinct from the true Negro." Whether this race, towards the western coast, degenerates into the negro, or is mixed with him, the writer leaves undecided, though he inclines to the latter opinion, remarking that the Kabinda-Loango tribe, near the coast, shows two types, "the Bantu, a fine, upright man, with delicately-made hands and well-shaped feet, a fine face, high, thin nose, beard, mustache, and a plentiful crop of hair," and an ill-shaped, splay-footed, blubber-lipped negro, with retreating chin, no beard, and crisp wool. "The farther you go into the interior, the finer the type becomes." The Bantus, he says, have little religion except ancestor worship and propitiation of demons, although their languages show that, like most low tribes, they once had a complicated theology, from which they have come, by mixture and migration, into what he denominates "their present state of genial agnosticism."

BOOKS RECEIVED.

FROM CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

Among the Holy Hills. By Henry M. Field, D. D. Crown 8vo, pp. vi., 243. 1884. \$1.50.

Kadesh-Barnea. Its Importance and Probable Site. With the Story of a Hunt for it. Including Studies of the Route of the Exodus, and the Southern Boundary of the Holy Land. By H. Clay Trumbull, D. D., Editor of the "Sunday-School Times." 8vo, pp. 478. 1884.

A Day in Athens with Socrates. Translations from the Protagoras and the Republic of Plato. Pp. xix., 145. 1883. 50 cents.

FROM FUNK AND WAGNALL, NEW YORK.

Foster's Life and Thoughts. By W. W. Everts, D. D. 12mo, pp. 203. 1883. \$1.00.

Oehler's Old Testament Theology. By Prof. George E. Day, Yale College. 8vo, pp. viii., 569. 1883. \$3.00.

My Saint John. By James M. Ludlow, D. D. Pp. 44. 1883. 10 cents.

Biblical Lights and Side-Lights. By Rev. Charles E. Little. 8vo, pp. iv., 632. 1883. \$4.00.

Is Romanism good enough for Romanists? By Justin D. Fulton, D. D., author of "Roman Catholic Element in American History," etc., etc. Pp. 24. 6 cents.

FROM N. J. BARTLETT AND COMPANY, BOSTON.

Lamps and Paths. By Theodore T. Munger, author of "On the Threshold," pp. viii., 165. 1884. \$1.00.

FROM GEORGE M. ELLIOTT, LOWELL, MASS.

Four Pastorates. Glimpses of the Life and Thoughts of Eden B. Foster, D. D. Consisting of a Biographical Sketch, Eulogies, and Selections from his Writings. Edited by his Son. Crown 8vo, pp. 452. 1883.

FROM HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY, BOSTON.

A Roundabout Journey. By Charles Dudley Warner. 12mo, pp. 360. 1884. \$1.50.

How to Help the Poor. By Mrs. James T. Fields. Pp. 125. 1884.

Beyond the Gates. By Elizabeth Stuart Phelps. 16mo, pp. 196. 1884. \$1.25.

Tennyson's In Memoriam : Its Purpose and its Structure. A Study. By John F. Genung. Pp. 199. 1884. \$1.25.

History of Prussia to the Accession of Frederic the Great, 1134-1740. By Herbert Tuttle, Professor in Cornell University. Crown 8vo, pp. 498. 1884. \$2.25.

Excursions of an Evolutionist. By John Fiske. 12mo, pp. 379. 1884. \$2.00.

FROM ROBERTS BROTHERS, BOSTON.

Autobiography and Letters of Orville Dewey, D. D. Edited by his Daughter, Mary E. Dewey. Pp. 366. 1884. \$1.75.

Christian History in its Three Great Periods. By Joseph Henry Allen, Late Lecturer on Ecclesiastical History in Harvard University, Author of "Hebrew Men and Times," "Our Liberal Movement in Theology," etc. First Period. Early Christianity. 16mo, pp. vii., 284. 1883. \$1.25.

Second Period. The Middle Age. 16mo, pp. 316. 1883. \$1.25.

Third Period. Modern Phases. 16mo, pp. vi., 319. 1883. \$1.25.

FROM THE AMERICAN UNITARIAN ASSOCIATION, BOSTON.

The Works of Orville Dewey, D. D. With a Biographical Sketch. New and Complete Edition. 8vo, pp. xii., 804. 1883. \$1.00.

FROM A. H. SMYTHE, COLUMBUS, OHIO.

Things New and Old in Discourses of Christian Truth and Life. By Washington Gladden. Pp. iv., 288. 1883. [For sale by W. F. Draper, Andover.]

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SOME PRESENT QUESTIONS IN EVANGELISM.

IN representing to our own minds the aggressive work of the Church it is not wise to discard the words through which Christianity announced its presence and purpose in the world. The spirit of Christianity resides in them and cannot be transferred without loss. In the exigencies of Christian doctrine new terms may be adopted for greater security. Orthodoxy is doubtless a stronger and firmer expression, in the thought of some, a better intrenchment of the faith, than any term which is simply expressive of what is evangelical. But no term can suffice in Christian service which loses anything out of the thought of Christianity as an evangel. The joy, the hope, the courage, the obligation which came in with the Christian message must be perpetuated in the common and familiar speech of the Church. The words which guard Christianity in its spirit and purpose are as necessary and sacred as those which guard its doctrine. Let Evangelism be kept in its place in the Christian vocabulary. We have no broader, more courageous, more hopeful word, none which expresses so well the intention of Christianity.

We are not, however, specially concerned with the defense of names. Evangelism has been taken as the most comprehensive and fit term to represent the outward and aggressive work of the Church, including missions.

It is evident that many of the more perplexing and sensitive questions which now occupy the Christian thought lie within this department. Some of these are questions purely of method; others reach back into the sphere of doctrine. We can hardly hope to do more within the limits of this article than to indicate the direction and scope of some present questions in Evangelism.

According to statistics, with which the Christian public is be-

coming thoroughly familiarized, we are living in a period of unprecedented growths to Christianity. The facts cited are quite overwhelming. But statistics do not and cannot accurately tell us what part of the gain of the Church is from expansion and what by aggression. And unless this question be raised, we shall naturally give too much credit to the evangelistic or missionary temper of the present generation. By far the most important fact since the Reformation, in its religious bearings, is the increase of the Anglo-Saxon race. Numbering about seven millions at the landing of the Pilgrims, and having but little more than doubled the number at the American Revolution, to-day there are a hundred millions, —

“Who speak the tongue

That Shakespeare spake ; the faith and morals hold
Which Milton held.”

Christianity is in possession of this race. Not only does it take its natural increment, it has the advantage of its adventurous, migratory, organizing energy. Christianity goes everywhere with its speech and laws. Its colonies take with them their religious inheritances, and the peoples which come under its rule are at least made familiar with Christian institutions. No one can doubt the present advantage to missions from the presence of England in India.

Such a fact as this of the natural increase and spread of the race which now carries Protestant Christianity cannot be overlooked in any large discussion of the subject of Evangelism. That Christianity is at present under great momentum, and that progress is going on in all directions, no one can deny. The immediate question, however, is, whether the Church is making equal progress at those points which can be carried only by aggression. The sharpest problems of Evangelism lie just where the line hesitates and wavers. Here the questions of method are most urgent.

Let us look, to begin with, into the evangelistic work of the Church in cities. That the church of the city should be strong and influential follows almost of necessity. It grows with the better growths of the city itself. But what of the gains beyond these growths, and by what methods are they secured. The chief reliance thus far has been upon the mission. A church establishes and in part supports a chapel in a needy neighborhood, or a larger organization, usually denominational, carries on the work through a system of chapels. The results of this method have been most

satisfactory to the Church and to the city. No inconsiderable part of the membership of the Church is to be found in these chapels, and wherever they have been planted the character of the neighborhood has been radically changed. So thoroughly has New York been enveloped by this net-work of missions that no large localities can longer be found corresponding to the original Five Points. But manifestly, this method is becoming quite insufficient. It will remain a permanent factor in Christian work, but it must be supplemented from above and from below. The city is fast developing a population which falls socially between the church and chapel. The chapel cannot reach up to it. The church must reach out to it, if it is to be reached at all. But even the stronger churches are not prepared or furnished for this work. The ministry is not sufficient for it. Protestantism is becoming lavish in its institutions, but it is niggardly in its employment of men. There is a waste here, a want of economy, which needs only to be stated to be seen. A city church well placed represents a valuation of from fifty thousand dollars to a half million. But for the use of this property one man is employed. What can he do beyond ministering to the spiritual wants of a stated congregation, through the two preaching services of the Sabbath, with a corresponding amount of pastoral service during the week? Such a disproportion between the capital invested and the force employed to make it available, would not be tolerated in any business. And while this disproportion remains, the churches cannot become in any large sense evangelistic. Remove the disproportion by the increase of service, and the churches become of necessity evangelistic. Let any church of large property be furnished with a ministry corresponding to its investment and it will straightway become a centre of evangelistic influence. Preaching can be carried on continuously, supported by all proper agencies and activities. It will not be necessary for the Church to go out into halls and tabernacles when it has learned how to use its own property and its own advantages. Romanism maintains its power over the masses because it employs a force sufficient for its work. The Episcopal Church is growing in numbers and influence in the cities through the same wise economy in the use of men. If it is to become, as some predict, the church of the city, it will not be because of its social position, or from the attractions of its liturgy, or for the freedom of its faith, but because it is organizing itself more thoroughly, studying more carefully the use of its means, and providing a

more abundant ministry than any other Protestant denomination.

But the mission work of the Church needs also to be supplemented from below. The city is beginning to discover a deeper depth than that into which the mission has reached. "The bitter cry of outcast London" is more bitter than the cry which comes up as yet from the outcast of our own cities. But there is a cry in the air to which we cannot close our ears. We have not reached the question which the "London Spectator" has recently discussed in all seriousness, whether there is an "ultimate residuum" in our cities, a class intent on returning to barbarism, in respect to which the "chief hope is that as civilization filters down it will die out." But there is "a residuum" among us, and it is increasing. Civilization in its processes of refinement is precipitating too many dregs. The lowest are falling lower just as fast as the highest are rising higher. We have now a social grade in our cities, hardly a remove from the level of barbarism, with the disadvantage of a grinding civilization above it. Religious effort by the ordinary methods is useless on this grade. To separate a child for a few hours on the Sabbath from his vile surroundings is only playing with the problem. The religious duty here is nothing less than the systematic and permanent invasion of the tenement house. Every tenement house must be made a parish. Philanthropy may build better homes, but men and women must be taught how to live in them. As far back as 1866, Miss Octavia Hill laid down the general principle which all competent testimony has since confirmed, — "You cannot deal with the people and their houses separately. Transplant the people to-morrow to healthy and commodious homes and they would pollute and destroy them. The principle on which the whole work rests is, that the inhabitants and their surroundings must be improved together." The "improvement of the inhabitants" is the work of the Church. It cannot be effected by agents. It requires missionaries. The call is of precisely the same nature as that which summoned men and especially women at the close of the war to work among the freedmen, as that which summoned those of an earlier generation to work among the tribes of the Pacific. The work to be done is precisely the same, — to create the home. The most serious interference of the city with the religious life is by the disturbance of the home relation. Among the lowest classes it is obliterating the home. Christianity must restore it or confess its failure in presence of the rapid and ruthless march of modern civilization.

Turning our attention to the evangelistic work of the Church in the country at large, we find a like change of conditions. The Home Missionary movement was originally simply the extension of the Church to meet the expansion of the country. Societies were organized to follow up the emigration into new fields. These societies were protective associations — sometimes so administered as to guard from other denominational foes quite as much as from the world. They were great constructive agencies. They laid the foundations of society and of state. They built schools and colleges. They were the formative and shaping influence in the new country. And all this work was one of sacrifice, attended with hardship, and not infrequently illuminated with acts of heroism. But it was not strictly evangelistic. The movement was within the Church, utilizing its growths in numbers and wealth, reproducing its doctrine and polity and life. It was a work upon the native stock, trained for the most part to habits of religious thought and belief. The change which is now taking place is toward more direct evangelistic effort. The religious occupancy of the country has been practically settled. There will probably be little change in the relative position of the various denominations. The struggle for position will naturally become less violent. Competition will grow less as the country thickens in population. It may yet be found that none too many churches have been organized, when the skeleton army which now holds the vast Western field is filled up to its natural proportions. Comparing the number of church organizations in the Congregational body with the entire membership, the comparison taken between the years 1860 and 1880, it appears that, on the whole, a church represents more members now than then.

The demand for an advance from a constructive to a more aggressive policy comes from the introduction of entirely new elements into the population. In a sermon entitled, "The Modern Migration of Nations," preached shortly before his death by the Rev. Charles Terry Collins, of Cleveland, Ohio, the "danger and duty" of the Church is set forth with great distinctness. The danger from the foreign population distributed through the Western cities and states is not simply from numbers, though the increase is far greater than it is commonly understood to be. The danger is from habits of irreligion and immorality, from false theories of duty and life, from secret organizations which perpetuate these theories and habits, and from a press hostile to religion and morality. It is a hopeful sign that the moral senti-

ment of the Church can be so fully aroused as in the present temperance movement throughout the West. It is a still more hopeful sign that the Church is seeking, through its national societies, to penetrate this outside mass, that schools are being established, missions formed, and competent men set apart for the special direction and furtherance of the work. American Christianity is evidently about to pass through its severest test. Can it meet and overcome this invasion of the irreligion of Europe? Will it be able to convert and assimilate the new and alien elements which endanger its supremacy? The question is one of disposition and purpose. It is also one of method.

In reference to the evangelistic work of the Church abroad, its foreign missions, it were futile to enter here into any discussion of method. Each mission has its own problems, requiring accurate and technical knowledge for any intelligent discussion. A general suggestion may have an indirect bearing upon method. There is a growing desire and expectation among many of the most ardent friends of missions that Christianity may soon declare itself more manifestly as a power from *within* some one of the greater races. It is not expected or desired that Christianity may possess itself of these races as Mohammedanism is possessing itself of the feebler races. Nor is it expected or desired that Christianity should repeat the history of its own earlier conquests. The conversion of India or China by existing methods is a far deeper and holier work than the present conquests of Mohammedanism or the past conquests of Christianity. But the process of growth by individual accretions to the Church always waits to be taken up into some movement of a race toward Christianity. Missionaries from without precede, but cannot long fill the place of an apostle from within. Certainly Christianity must be naturalized before it can be permanent. Christianity cannot hold the race which it does not thoroughly possess.

Doubtless something of the interest which has been taken in Chunder Sen and in the Brahmo Somaj is due to the hope of seeing a native Christianity in India. Judged by any ordinary estimates, the results of the Somaj are unsatisfactory. They are uncertain and insufficient. Even the authorized utterances of the able exponent of the movement, recently in this country, left one in doubt as to its direction and issue. But the fact that Christianity in the person of Christ has been able to impress itself so strongly upon the Indian mind is most significant. It raises the hope that Christianity may yet make its own way into the life of

India and work out through the vast spiritual energies of its people. Of course, the indirect bearing of this hope upon the method of missions is toward the largest development of the native mind, and the largest trust in its capacity for Christianity. The position of the mission boards in matters of detail is not unlike that of the English government in reference to the civil service of India. The tendency of events in either case is toward a larger share on the part of the natives in the administration of affairs.

The relation of Evangelism to current investigations and discussions in Christian doctrine cannot as yet be fully measured. But there are certain considerations affecting it which it is time to state and emphasize. The large question here is that of adjustment. The relations of Evangelism to Theology are not arbitrary but natural.

One consideration is to the effect that Evangelism may not wisely assume to direct theological investigations or discussions, or to prescribe their limits. The attempt is made whenever the argument from effect or impression is used too freely in the supposed interest of Evangelism. The argument from effect is an argument from opinion, not from fact. The fact is that piety has always adjusted itself to "improvements in theology." The most earnest and serious thinking leads the way into more natural believing and working. It is not long since the majority of devout Christians held, and were content to hold, the doctrine of verbal inspiration. To-day the majority of Christians, equally devout, are able to pray better and to work better under a broader and more natural theory of inspiration. To affirm, therefore, that biblical criticism, in its present work, is hostile to Evangelism is simply to express an opinion against the argument from analogy. More serious use may be made of the argument from impression, because the appeal can be made to actual results. Popular impression is easily created. It is an echo which, under favorable conditions, reverberates according to the strength of the cry which starts it. If the alarm raised is just, it will prevail to largely avert the danger; if it is unjust, it will react. And the result will depend entirely upon the fact whether the belief which has been disturbed or the doctrine which it is sought to modify was producing upon any number of minds a wrong or insufficient impression. The argument from impression is a two-edged argument. A given belief, as stated in doctrine, may be so held as to suppress some necessary factor of belief in the Christian consciousness. Nothing is more harmful than such a suppression. It invariably pro-

duces a partial and one-sided development in faith and in works, if persisted in after the suppressed element begins to clamor for expression and recognition. The question is, then, not simply what impression will be produced if the given doctrine is restated, but what impression will be produced if the doctrine is not restated; what will be the effect upon the Church of the attempt to hold down or to hold back any truth, however related to its activities, which demands a fair and patient hearing. We cannot understand too plainly that any truth, however antagonistic it may at first seem to be, to any existing doctrine or motive, is far less dangerous, when once declared and acknowledged in its rightful place, than when ignored, evaded, or ecclesiastically suppressed. Here was the moral ground of the discussion of the last year upon "Essential Christianity," which some friends of missions at the time deprecated, but of which many now see the bearing, if not the value. No better, and, as it appeared from the result of the Council, no more acceptable statement has been made upon this point than in the paper submitted as supplementary to his statement of faith by the Rev. Edward A. Lawrence, at his recent installation at Syracuse, N. Y.

"The Christian consciousness of the Church seems to be adjusting itself between two different truths unreconciled, but not irreconcilable. One of these is the urgency of the gospel, by which the necessity of an instant decision and the danger of delay are pressed upon all who hear it. The other is the universality of the gospel, according to which Christ comes as the Saviour of the world, and the gospel is destined to be offered to the world. It is not long since the Christian consciousness of the Church was occupied in adjusting itself to two other truths which are hard to reconcile, — to the free will of man and the supreme predestinating will of God. The former of these was a matter of immediate, practical importance; the latter was essential to a correct idea of the sovereignty of God. The adjustment has been reached not by ignoring or weakening either truth, but by firmly holding each in its own sphere, and seeking the reconciliation in the life rather than in the mind. Dangerous as is either, if held alone, if held together they correct and supplement each other. It is something the same with these truths of the urgency and the universality of the gospel. The former is a pressing, practical truth; the latter is essential to a correct understanding of God's character and the gospel's mission. The former is insisted upon throughout the Bible; the latter is implied in its whole drift and spirit. Christ is presented as the Saviour of the world, the cosmic Saviour, the only, and, in spirit, the universal Saviour. I regard his work, therefore, and the gospel's mission as coextensive with God's system of human probation. Not that

all men necessarily are put upon probation, as, for instance, infants and idiots, but that every human probation culminates as a gospel probation here or elsewhere. . . . The gospel appears to me from its whole character to be sufficient for all, provided for all, destined for all. And no one can live in the spirit of Christ without seeking to contribute this offer of the gospel to all men."

The author of the statement from which this extract is taken concludes by saying that, as a minister, he should use it apologetically rather than aggressively. To which the remark may be added, that in times like our own the apologetic and aggressive work of the Church go hand in hand. There is an evangelism of the school, as well as of the field. Scholarship has its conflicts as real and as serious as those which are waged on more conspicuous battle-fields. And the same liberty in the choice of ground and weapons should be allowed here as elsewhere, without dictation and without interference.

A second consideration is that Evangelism has never followed the theology of any sect or school independent of circumstances. Sometimes it has worked in harmony with the ruling theology; sometimes it has antagonized it. More frequently than otherwise it makes use of the unaccepted, unacknowledged, unrecognized truth. Whenever a belief becomes hard and formal, Evangelism goes over into the belief which is free and vital. And the earnest men of the sects and schools follow it, though they thereby cross their own doctrinal paths. Consistency gives way before necessity.

The Calvinist ceases to be such in the presence of a dead Calvinism, and the Arminian, in the presence of a dead Arminianism. John Wesley, coming in upon the naturalism and formalism of the English Church, preached everywhere and continuously the necessity of the power of the Holy Spirit. Standing for the last time in the university pulpit at Oxford, he repeated and repeated the direct, personal question to his audience: "Are you filled with the Holy Ghost? In the fear and in the presence of the Great God, before whom you and I shall shortly appear, I pray you that are in authority over us, whom I reverence for your office, to consider, are you filled with the Holy Ghost." Charles G. Finney, coming in upon the formal and helpless Calvinism of his time, preached as continuously the responsibility and power of the individual sinner. His course through the Middle States was a campaign against the doctrines of human inability and original sin. His favorite text was, "Make to yourselves a new

heart and a new spirit; for why will ye die?" And Dwight L. Moody, coming in upon a generation permeated with ideas of law, with its religion tending to legalism, is himself aflame with the idea of personality. His theme is not simply the love of God. It is God — God living, working, sacrificing for man, searching after man, a persistent, personal presence round about every man's life.

The history of Evangelism is that of consistency with a principle rather than with a doctrine. And the bearing of this fact upon present issues is that the theology of Evangelism is not to be determined by the traditions of any school, but by immediate necessities. The appeal so often made to the past is misleading, because indiscriminating. The "old ways" are various. All that can be said is that Evangelism is always to be found in the truth or doctrine most necessary to the time. And applying this principle to our own time, few will doubt the fitness of locating its power in those truths which centre in the personality of God.

A third consideration is that Evangelism, specially as it finds expression in missions, demands the support of the most Christian motives.

The supreme question in missions is in regard to the motives which are to rule the churches of England and America. Missionary organizations may live upon organization. But the missionary spirit lies back in the region of motives, in the spiritual truths which actually control the Christian consciousness. Where are we to look for the motives commensurate with the present demands of Christian missions? Not, if we may judge by the recent utterances of its authorized exponents, within the sphere of natural theology. In a book which has passed into several editions and been indorsed by many writers of most pronounced beliefs — a book certainly of great force and beauty of argument — we have this as the conclusion of a theology which is after the "analogy of nature."

"The broad impression gathered from the utterances of the Founder of the Spiritual Kingdom is that the number of organisms to be included in it is to be comparatively small. The outstanding characteristic of the new society is to be its selectness. 'Many are called,' said Christ, 'but few are chosen.' And when one recalls on the one hand the conditions of membership, and on the other observes the lives and aspirations of average men, the force of the verdict becomes apparent. The analogy of nature upon this point is not less striking, it may be added, not less

solemn. It is an open secret, to be read in a hundred analogies from the world around, that of the millions of possible entrants for advancement in any department of nature, the number ultimately selected for preferment is small. Here also, 'Many are called and few are chosen.' The analogies from the waste of seed, of pollen, of human lives, are too familiar to be quoted."¹ This is the theology of exclusion for the multitudes, of despair for the race. There is no more gospel here than in Mr. Darwin's words, — "Multiply, vary, let the strongest live, and the weakest die."

The "analogy of nature" may put a deist into a dilemma, but it cannot inspire a Christian believer. Christianity refuses to be caught and expressed in analogies. There is no equivalent in nature for redemption. There is no suggestion of it. The tendencies are opposite. Interpret nature as a final system and there are more contradictions than resemblances. Nature is partial; it loves the best. Christianity is impartial; it loves all. Nature wastes; it deals with men as with "seed and pollen." Christianity conserves; it seeks to save the lost. Nature works toward a far off end, in the "survival of the fittest." Christianity works by the way, and keeps its gains. "Those that Thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost save the son of perdition." The motive to missions evidently lies, not in the conclusions of nature, but in the hopes of the gospel; not in the indifference of law, but in the anxieties of love. In the interest of missions we need the most Christian conception possible of God and of man. It is a serious question whether we have a theology Christian enough to maintain and complete the work before us. Certainly the conception of the person and work of Christ, upon which the New Testament bases its commands and its predictions, is greater and more glorious than that which finds expression in the common thought and speech of the Church. As the New Testament carries up and carries back the thought of Christ from his humanity to his divinity, from the scenes of his earthly life to those of the heavenly, it nowhere breaks his connection with man. He was identified with the race before He was born into it or suffered for it, for He made it. All things, including man, were created in Him and by Him and for Him. And having now returned to the sphere of his creative energies, He is at work with the same authority and power in the building up of his kingdom.

If Christian missions are to stand forth as the chief representa-

¹ Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, pp. 410, 411.

tive of Christianity, they must represent to the Church and to the world the fullness of its idea, the reach of its power, and its unconquerable hope.

Wm. J. Tucker.

OF THE HOLY LAND.

WHEN our Lord said that the hour was coming in which the Father should be worshiped neither in Gerizim nor in Jerusalem, there was a strange sound in the words, and it seemed unlikely that they would be proved true. The years have brought their fulfillment. The mountain has been deserted by worshippers, and in the city the mosque casts its baneful shadow over all the altars. He meant more than this. He did not propose to exclude these places from the kingdom which was coming, but that worship should no longer be rendered exclusively or especially at these conspicuous and contending shrines, but should be extended through the whole earth. This design has been to a large degree accomplished, and its completion is the duty which now presses upon those who are called after his name. The work would be far simpler and easier than it is, if the spread of Christianity had been its extension merely, and not its removal from the places where it was first established. In widening the circumference the centre has been abandoned, until now a great part of our missionary work is the recovery of ground which has been lost. It is not meant, of course, that Christianity was ever in complete possession of the lands in which it was first received; but that it had a prominence and power, a life and hope, which have been surrendered, to the incalculable harm of the Church of Christ. It is with sadness that we think upon the needless losses, the unwarranted surrender of ground, the reproachful decline of strength and influence, which have marked the centuries by which we are separated from the time when the Church was young and full of spirit. It is with deeper pain that one goes from a country into which Christianity has reached, and where it is visible and dominant, strong in itself and imparting strength to others near it and in the regions beyond, to the land which, in his thought, is associated with the sacred names and sacred events in which his faith rests. "Neither in this mountain, nor in Jerusalem," seems to be written over all the land. Yet we still call it the Holy Land. We connect the Book which we reverence with the land in which

it had its origin. Perhaps we overestimate the closeness of this connection. The two men whose life and work hold the chief place among the men of the Bible did not live in Palestine. One of them did not enter Palestine, and the other had his principal work outside of that country. Yet that was the country of our Lord, and within its boundaries his earthly life was passed, and there his teachings were given and his works were wrought, and there, too, He redeemed the world. All parts of the land were hallowed by his presence. In Judæa were his birthplace and his grave. There He was crucified, and there He rose from the dead. In Galilee most of his years were spent; while in Samaria He made himself known and declared his promises of grace. His ministry reached to the borders of Tyre and Sidon, and He crossed the Jordan that He might teach in Perea. These facts are sufficient to endow the land with an interest which no other can claim. It is not an extravagance of rhetoric to term it the Holy Land. Its natural features remain as in the days to which the mind reverently reverts. The mountains keep their old places and the same valleys lie among them. The river still hurries from sea to sea. The waters of Galilee are among the hills as when they were trodden by the feet of the Christ, and quieted by his voice. But beyond the things which are not readily changed little of the old remains. Many places which were made renowned by his presence cannot now be identified. Three places claim to have been the site of Capernaum. Two places assert their right to the name of Cana and to his first miracle. More than one mountain is pointed out as that upon which He sat when He spoke his Beatitudes. Some places have perished. A few ruins only can be found where Capernaum and Bethsaida stood. Some towns preserve their name and keep their ancient place, while the glory of the place and the name has departed. Bethlehem is a town of five thousand inhabitants who live by agriculture, and by the manufacture of wood and stone and pearl into crosses and rosaries. But there is no sign of angels in the air, and no star rests above the hill. In vain would wise men from the East seek there the King of the Jews. A church stands over the cave in which the infant Saviour was laid, and infidel soldiers keep peace between the disciples of the Prince of Peace.

Nazareth is a busy modern town, with its telegraph, its steam mills, and its road to the sea-coast. Its appearance is far more pleasing than that of other places. Its white houses present a fine picture as they stand among the trees. But the things which one

would wish to see there are not to be found. The house of the Virgin was saved from Moslem desecration by the angels, who carried it to Dalmatia, and then to Italy. It is not certain that she sat by the pillar which remains, when the angel of the annunciation found her. It is difficult to believe that the small cave beyond was a part of her house. The women who are now found with their pitchers at the Virgin's fountain do not resemble the image of her which art has delighted to depict.

Bethany consists of some forty hovels which are occupied by Moslems. The streets are filled with importunate beggars, whose appearance seems to justify their claim to charity. All which makes the Bethany of the Gospels attractive has long since disappeared. The house of Mary and Martha has gone and no other is in its place. The tomb of Lazarus is exhibited, but it is by a weary descent that it is entered, and little is found to reward the pains. The Mount of Olives retains its place and its name, and a few trees, covered with gnarled and wrinkled centuries, grow where the garden was in which the Lord endured his agony. The summit from which He ascended is now crowned with imposture and impiety.

It has fared even worse with Jerusalem. The great and proud city of better days is under ground. A motley throng is in the streets of the new town, and there is little in the people or their pursuits to remind one of the men of the older day and the thoughts which engrossed their minds. There are few things, besides the hills and valleys, which are truly named. Devout Jews mourn over the desolation of their city and wet the stones of the temple-wall with their tears. But there are none to sing, "Beautiful for situation, the joy of the whole earth, is Mount Zion, on the sides of the north, the city of the great King." The crescent is true where so much is false, for night is brooding over the city.

It is certain that our Lord did not wish to connect himself closely with places. What He did on the day when he wrote upon the sand He was doing every day. He passed through the land, but He left few footprints. He is not found amid the scenes which once knew Him. Jacob's well is still seen, but He is not there. The snows are glittering on Hermon, but there is no transfigured Christ. The Jordan rushes on its way as when He was baptized, but the heavens are not opened above it. The hills remain about Nazareth, but the boy and the man cannot be seen wandering over them, and gazing off towards Carmel and the great sea beyond. Clearly He did not mean to make Palestine the altar

and sanctuary of the world, where He was to be found and worshiped. He lives, but "He is not here, for He is risen, even as He said."

Is it, then, of any advantage to visit the Holy Land? Does it add anything to the sum of useful knowledge, or deepen religious impressions, or bring one into closer fellowship with Him who chose that land for his own? All this it may do; all this it may fail to do. The result depends largely upon a right understanding of the purpose of his life and a true conception of the conditions under which He sought to accomplish it.

It is of great interest to visit the Holy Land. It is an old land, which has filled an important place in the history of the world. From it have come forth influences which are now felt in all the earth. Men who have impressed themselves deeply upon human thought have been born there. If we trace to its sources that which we proudly call civilization, which includes our liberty and our hope; our homes, schools, governments; our art, science, business, we are carried back, past Italy and Greece, to the narrow land which lies between the Jordan and the Sea. Small in extent it is, as we see it on the map, but large, as we mark its position in the life of the world. History is studied to little purpose unless the study includes that which was done in Palestine. It is a significant fact, which may serve as an index-finger in our reading and thinking, that every book of history must reckon the time of its events from the day which made Bethlehem great. The merchant dates his invoice, the government its treaty, the mother her letter, from that time when He was born who was to be a light for the Gentiles and the glory of Israel. It must always be, therefore, with a peculiar and profound interest that an intelligent man journeys from the West to stand in the midst of Jerusalem, or to tread the narrow streets of Bethlehem and Nazareth. He should be able to see through that which now is to that which was. Little disturbed by the men of to-day, he should be able to see those of a better generation, and to hold communion with them and with their deeds. What is seen now should not destroy or conceal the reality and importance of that which, in other times, was of larger consequence. To be thus independent of his surroundings must characterize the thought of one who would find in Palestine that which would repay him for his journey.

Whatever he may seek there, he should not expect there to find the Christ. It is not merely that He has returned to the skies,

for He might have left unchanging memorials of his presence, so that He would seem nearer than in any other land. But in truth there are more memorials of Him in many other lands. His name is more common, his influence more potent, his spirit more prominent, his words more familiar, his friends more numerous than they are where He made his home on earth. The record of his life is in our hands, and while we read it we hear his words and behold his miracles. He is not teaching and working in his visible presence now, and the past is as near to us here as to those who dwell where He was, or wander along the roads over which He walked in his ministries of mercy. Indeed, we have around the record of his life associations which are far more favorable to the understanding of his words and the appreciation of his wonderful works than those which would be found in the places where He lived and blessed. In our churches, which bear his name, in our Christian schools and homes, in our Christian charities, are found the conditions which make reading and believing easy and pleasant. The incidents of our Lord's life are more impressive as we study them here, where his power is felt, than even in the scenes where they had their place, and where a change has passed upon everything.

We read with solemn interest the account which is given of the raising of Lazarus. We enter into the feeling of his sisters when they send to the one friend who could help them the tidings that their brother, whom He loved, was sick. We come with the Lord to the overshadowed home. We listen to the despairing cry of Martha, and mark the quiet spirit of Mary. We go out to the grave and stand with the mourning company. We see the tears of Jesus. We hear Him cry with a loud voice and summon the dead to life. The dead comes forth as we watch, and takes up life again. And still we hear his voice beside the bed of death, and before the closed sepulchre, where our heart is lying, dying or entombed, and the words are full of promise and of triumph, "I am the resurrection and the life."

But try to recall this incident, which is so rich and precious, on the spot to which the narrative conducts us. "This is the tomb of Lazarus," is the formal announcement of the guide. For a price the door is opened above the stone stairs, and the visitor, with a candle in his hand, gropes his way painfully over the worn and broken steps to the rude chapel where Moslems and Christians come for prayer; and bending low, he creeps through a narrow passage into the small chamber where Lazarus was laid, — if

tradition is to be credited, — and out of which he was called. It may have been his resting place, but he is not in it now, and he is not issuing from it. The dreariness and discomfort of the place and the access to it are not favorable to devout contemplation; and when the visitor has found his way back to the light, he is not greeted with the strong words of the Christ, or the rejoicing of the women, but with the harsher sound which from many lips breaks the silence of Bethany, “Bakshish, Howadji; Howadji, Bakshish.” Is it, then, of any advantage to see the tomb of Lazarus? The place has its interest for any thoughtful person. But he must not expect to find the miracle there to-day, or the record of it on the rock, or the persons who witnessed it, or any memorial which adds anything to the simple narrative which an eye-witness wrote, and which has been preserved for our comfort and instruction. The visitor should begin with that. He should understand that which is essential and permanent in the miracle. With a clear apprehension of this, he will find profit in standing where this miracle, in which our life rests with assurance of hope, was wrought for our solace and support. For its actual benefit the Book is more than Bethany, and in its pages we find the days when the village of hovels was a village of homes. He should enter its steep streets with the Testament in his hand, as the only sufficient guide to the past which he seeks, and which lies far back of the dreary present which conceals it.

This which is said of one town may be said of all. It is the past which is sought and is not readily found. What the past was must be learned elsewhere. If it be true that the traveler there seeks the Christ, it is evident that he should be able to recognize Him when he sees Him, and that with confidence in the story of his years, he should search out the places where the life was made up. Let Christ be first known, and the land will be known in its turn, and the sight of the land will abound in interest.

It is with difficulty, however, that the Christ is set again in the places where he once moved. With our admiration of Him, and our conception of the beauty of his character; with our reverence, which surrounds his head with a halo, and makes his garments glisten, it is difficult to imagine him in Nazareth, walking day by day in its streets, wearing the garb of its citizens, mingling with them in the affairs of the world, reckoned by them as the carpenter's son. He seems out of place. The more fully we realize that He was there, and in this estate, the more do our admiration

and adoration suffer a shock. He seems to be brought down to the level of the men who are now seen in the city where he lived, and we ask if one good and great could have come from Nazareth. To the calm, enlightened mind the trouble is but momentary. The record of his life adjusts all that we see to all which we have believed. Doubtless one great and good could enter into Nazareth, and it is that which history asserts. He is presented, not as the outgrowth of Nazarene life, but as one who came down from heaven to dwell among men.

Our imagination may have created an ideal world for his dwelling-place: a fair setting for so fair a life. But nothing of this is taught us in the Book. He came down into the real world. He sought no smooth places for his feet, nor beautiful fields for his eyes. There was beauty in the land then, as now; and there was barrenness, too. He saw the wilderness and the fruitful fields; the thorns and the flowers; the good ground and the rocky hills. He changed none of these things by coming among them. The people were like their country. He found them in all their variety. Some were as rude and rough as the streets of Nazareth, and some were as pleasant as its vineyards. The spring clothes the land in living green. The autumn shows it bare and desolate. The spring and the autumn were many times repeated in the years which He spent there. What He saw in the country He saw in its people. If there was a greater desolation, it was in the people. Of the land we have had glimpses in his words; but the people are many times described. They were poor, captive, blind, bruised, as He named them in the synagogue at Nazareth. To John the Baptist He presented them as the blind, the lame, the lepers; as deaf, dead, and poor. He said that He had come to seek and to save that which was lost. He called sinners to repentance. He commanded that his gospel of deliverance should be preached to every creature. Why should one be surprised when he finds the blind and the lame, the leprous and the poor, the guilty and the dead, where He found them? Or offended because the land is like the men? The sight upon which the traveler looks to-day, the men and women whom he meets, the conditions under which the course of life is run, even now demand the coming of such an one as came in the time which has made the land holy. The need is clear. The want cries out from the ground. It is some help to a present faith to know that once there came a Saviour who was Christ the Lord. It is some help to the right apprehension of his coming to behold the need of Him; to see the wants

which He alone can meet. Thus the faith which was staggered as it looked hastily upon the people and their lives gathers confirmation to itself as it gazes into their poverty and remembers that He came to heal and to save.

In such surroundings, He stands forth in the grandeur of his presence and the glory of his power. He has no rival. There is no one with whom to compare Him. The world has raised up for itself no one who is like Him in holiness and strength. His acts are wonderful. The lame leap at his word, and from his fingers light flashes into nighted eyes. The dead hear Him and awaken. The sins of men are forgiven them. His words are wonderful. Abraham had rejoiced to see his day. All power He claimed for himself. "I am the Truth, I am the Life," He said. "I and the Father are one." He said that He would come in his glory and all the angels with Him. Think of Him in Bethlehem, Nazareth, Samaria; among the fallen stones of Capernaum, or above the buried streets of Jerusalem; saying such things in meekness and sincerity, and attesting the words by works which were in keeping with them! The history is clear, the land remains: this history and this land. To read the story of the life where the life was lived raises his character into grander proportions. We feel how great He was as we mark how high He towered above the country and the people.

It was into the world that He came. He did not seek to hallow places, but to save the world. He was not to restrict his mercies within the bounds of Palestine. He erected no barriers; He set up no landmarks. He even declared that the Temple should fall, and that the city which it adorned should be destroyed. What He taught was for all lands. In his miracles was a blessing for all men. His redemption was for man, and He was the Son of Man. The traveler in Palestine remembers this, and is not disturbed because he cannot find the writing on the ground, or the boat from which Jesus taught the multitude upon the shore of Gennesaret. He knows that the Christ was in the world, and of the world this is but a small portion. He looks abroad to find the signs of his presence.

He remembers, also, that it was chiefly a spiritual power which Jesus asserted. His rule was to be in the hearts of men, and his kingdom was not of this world. He taught that God is a spirit and that man is a spirit. He promised living water which should spring up in the souls of men. He promised life itself. He traced actions back to the heart out of which they sprang, and

bade men be born anew that they might enter into the kingdom of God. For when He should come in his glory He would render unto every man according to his deeds. He said that it was expedient for his disciples that He should go away, and He promised them his presence after He had vanished from their sight. He would make his abode in their hearts. They were to repeat his gracious words everywhere, that all men might know the good-will of God. He loosed men from the material to set them in the spiritual. Not in Gerizim, but in spirit, not in Jerusalem, but in truth, was the Father to be worshiped. Thus did He widen his ministry and establish its blessings in the hearts of men for all lands, for all times. He who recalls these broad purposes is not amazed that he does not find the Christ transfigured upon Hermon, walking the waves of Galilee, resting at Jacob's Well, dying on Calvary, ascending from Olivet. These facts of the Lord's life remain, and retain all their truth. It is not necessary that He should be seen in them again. The spiritual intent of them is in Palestine and all lands. The power which worked for man's recovery is working now in all willing hearts. The power of the cross is not centred in the wood He died upon, but is everywhere present for the saving of the penitent. The promise of the angels still glorifies the mount from which He rose into the clouds. "This Jesus shall so come in like manner as ye beheld Him going into heaven," and that coming will be into the world and for the world. He who reads the New Testament learns these things and sees in them the purpose of the Christ. He knows for what to look when he is in the land where Jesus lived. If he is himself his disciple, the Lord goes with him in his journeying and repeats the familiar truths where they were first taught, and the man hears them with an attention enhanced by hearing them there. He has the secret of the Lord, and it is with him wherever he wanders. It hallows the land where the Lord walked. For him the land deepens the impression and enlarges the power of the truth which he holds, whose reality he knows.

It comes to this : to have the Christ in Palestine one must carry Him in his heart. The years since the Lord ascended have given the Spirit of the Lord to the world. He takes of the things of Christ and declares them unto men. In this way men come into the knowledge of Him. The might is not in mountains, the power is not in streams ; the might and the power are in the Spirit of God. From Him they are to be received. The Lord left Palestine that He might be everywhere. Everywhere, therefore, can He be found.

But the spirit must find Him and receive Him, and He himself is spirit. Then with Him will it be good to visit the scene of his earthly years, and to hold communion with Him where once He was seen and was not known. Then, with the Christ in the heart, the land will be holy. The events of his life, in their spirit and truth, will be repeated for our advantage. Faith will have "its Olivet, and love its Galilee." To have this spirit and this word here would make this ground holy. To have them in all our wide domain would make this the Holy Land. Then there might be heard, above the clamor of men and the sounds of the world, the voice of them that cry, "The Lord bless thee, O habitation of justice and mountain of holiness."

Alexander McKenzie.

WEISS'S THEOLOGY.

DR. BERNHARD WEISS, of Berlin, is the first New Testament scholar of Germany. Many years ago Meyer, on being asked by a friend of the writer to mention some of the most promising of the younger exegetes, began with his name. Time has amply justified the great scholar's selection. Dr. Weiss has made contributions to the critical literature of the New Testament which, though in quantity and massiveness of learning falling short of those of Meyer, surpass in these respects those made by any living critic, and in scientific exactness have no superiors.

His "*Marcusevangelium*," and his "*Matthäusevangelium und seine Lucas-Parallelen*," apart from the distinctive value which they have as showing the relation of the synoptic Gospels to their common sources and to each other, take a high rank as commentaries. The lucid arrangement and the stimulating quality of his "*Biblical Theology of the New Testament*" (his most important work) prove the writer's mastery of his material to its most minute detail, and the exegetical discussions in its foot-notes show a master's hand. The fact that Dr. Weiss has been chosen by the literary executors of Meyer to revise, for the latest edition of the latter's Commentary, the volumes which embrace the books from Matthew to Romans inclusive, is in itself no insignificant proof of his position among critical students of the New Testament.

But Dr. Weiss is much more than a commentator. His most

valuable services to Christian science have not been rendered in elucidating the text of Scripture, but in combining its manifold teachings into a Biblical Theology which is, to use the language of a rectoral address which he delivered at Kiel in 1876, "the historical setting forth of those religious representations and teachings, which show themselves at the various stages of the history of revelation, out of the sources of this history." "These must not only show," he goes on, "a gradual development corresponding to the sources of this history; they must also be different from each other, since it belongs to the conditions of the spiritual life of the authors to vary. But because the religious life which comes to consciousness in these representations and teachings is begotten through the one progressive revelation, they must lead back to the one source, and so to the one being of God shown in the revelation, and to the conditions of the normal relation to Him; that is, the religious truth, as such, must show itself in them."

This representation of the biblical teaching in its historic connection and unity is a task which requires, besides exegetical skill, such historical gifts and training as will enable its possessor to trace the main thought of the sacred writer in its connection with his personality and the occasion of his writing, and, in the New Testament scholar, such powers of detecting and weighing delicate historical evidence as are required by that knottiest of problems, the composition of the synoptic Gospels. Dr. Weiss has said, in one of his published addresses, that a strong inclination drew him to this work in early youth; he has given to it the best energies of his life (he is now fifty-five); that his early predilection was a divine call, his published works bear witness.

His "Biblical Theology of the New Testament" is the only work in its department which adequately represents the branch of science to which it belongs, and is both in execution and design a work of the highest scientific value. His "Life of Christ" has a unique position, as being the only one based upon a thorough criticism of the Gospels; the author says, in the preface, that he has "for more than twenty years occupied himself (myself) with the sources of the gospel history; I have tested in all directions the methods of criticism which are often so intricate, until I have forced my way to perfect clearness regarding the history and the character of our evangelical tradition." Thus prepared, Dr. Weiss has undertaken to write what has certainly never before been written, a thoroughly historical representation of the life of our Lord. A critic in the January number of the "*Studien und Kritiken*"

has said that it has already won in Germany the first position among the biographies of Christ. Whether this indicates the verdict which the mature opinion of the theological public will pass upon the work is, perhaps, somewhat doubtful. It may be doubted whether Dr. Weiss has given its due place to that in our Lord which cannot be included in the materials of an historical sketch. The belief that his earthly career can be fully represented in its inception and progress from the inside, as well as in its external incidents, requires as its foundation a conception of his person, which certainly seems to conflict with some of our Lord's declarations about himself. Any attempt at writing his biography, in so far as it does not recognize something in our Lord's developing life beyond human analysis and delineation, is unscientific. Besides, as the German critic just alluded to rightly says, Dr. Weiss finds more evidence of historical connection in the words and deeds of Christ preserved in the apostolic tradition than actually exists. Yet, though the "*Leben Jesu*" may not be considered a successful undertaking, a fair criticism will assign to it a great value. Apart from the importance of its discussions of the "synoptic" problem and the authorship of St. John's Gospel, the Church is placed in a better position now than Strauss, Renan, and Keim have been followed by a writer of finer biblical scholarship than they, and at least equal critical power, who, while avowedly holding the evangelical instead of the rationalistic presupposition, applies to the sources the same laws of historical criticism which they claim to obey, and from them produces the picture of a divine Christ. And certainly Dr. Weiss's constructive skill and power of expression have enabled him to give the Christian reader a firmer and more bracing sense of reality in following Christ's life.

The aim of this article is to give a succinct account of Dr. Weiss's theology, if the term may be properly applied to the writings of one who confines himself to the historical sphere. The main results to which this leading evangelical scholar has been led by his long study of the structure and contents of the New Testament may be presumed to have some interest for the Christian public. Of course, these results are not presented as doctrine, in the strict sense, that is, as the absolute Christian truth. This is not possessed until the result of scriptural study has been tested and verified by the Christian reason, guided by the experience of the Church, — a task which lies outside of Dr. Weiss's department.

Nor is it assumed that this eminent scholar's views in all respects correctly represent the New Testament teaching. On the contrary, I believe that they are wrong in several important particulars. Yet it is claimed that they are well worth examination as indicating in a general way the nature of the contribution to the now rapidly crystallizing Christian theology which the Biblical study of the day is making. A word as to the method of presentation may not be out of place. It seems inexpedient to introduce here references to chapter and book. Accordingly, the writer ventures to ask confidence in his fidelity in giving a *résumé* of Dr. Weiss's conclusions as found in his "Biblical Theology," his "Life of Christ," several minor works and unpublished notes of his course of lectures on New Testament dogmatics, which a friend has kindly placed at my disposal.

To begin with our author's *ποῦ στῶ*. What are the New Testament Scriptures to this student of Christianity in its living sources? For a general answer we have this statement in his biblical dogmatics: "The sources of the divine revelation of salvation are the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. These not only serve to give us authentic information about the facts in which the revelation takes place, but also to bring us into living contact with those facts; they are, therefore, God's Word to us, which is itself the only adequate testimony to us that it is God's Word. This does not imply that every separate book of the Bible belongs to this category. This can be definitively settled only by historical criticism."

Turning to Dr. Weiss's published writings to find his views of the several New Testament writings, we ask whether he accepts all the canonical books as authentic, and find that all are pronounced so, except the Second Epistle of Peter and the pastoral Epistles of Paul. As regards the former, Dr. Weiss considers the question as to its genuineness as still unsettled. That he believes the probabilities to be in its favor may be inferred from his giving its contents a place in his "Biblical Theology." With regard to the pastoral Epistles, he holds that to believe them to be genuine involves belief that certain events occurred in Paul's career (notably his release from his Roman imprisonment) and in the life of the Church, of which we have no evidence outside of the Epistles themselves; and that these are not so unmistakably Pauline as to establish both their own authenticity and the reality of the events whose existence they imply. Dr. Weiss believes, however, that if they are not from the Apostle's hand, and are there-

fore to be assigned to one of his disciples, they are written so fully in the spirit of his teaching as to be entitled to a place in the New Testament, having, for example, such a claim as that possessed by the Epistle to the Hebrews. I will say, *en passant*, that Weiss accepts the traditional view of the authorship of the Apocalypse, and believes that the peculiarities of the Epistle to the Hebrews can be best explained by assigning it to Barnabas.

In trying to enter more fully into our author's view of the connection between the canonical Scriptures of the New Testament and the life of the Apostolic Church, we find ourselves obliged at the outset to recognize a distinction between the didactic and the historical books. The former, as the composition of men who were qualified, by a special endowment of the Spirit, for the edification of the Church, bear the impress of the Holy Ghost in their structure, as the latter do not. The first class are inspired utterances; the second, narratives of fact. As regards the former, we have not to discriminate between the inspired teaching and the written composition, for the written composition is the inspired teaching; our task is simply to ascertain, if we may, its connection with God's redemptive Revelation; in regard to the latter, we have to separate between such spiritual teaching as it may contain and its narration of facts, and subject the latter to the same tests which historical service applies to all narrative.

Taking the second of these two kinds of sacred literature first in our discussion, Dr. Weiss finds in the synoptic Gospels, and, of course, in the Acts (St. John's Gospel, being a doctrinal treatise, stands in a different category), no further guaranty of accuracy than is furnished by the evident fidelity with which their authors used the means of information at their disposal (both oral tradition and written documents), and by their inner life being in such harmony with Christ, through the indwelling of his Spirit, as to make it impossible for them to attribute to Him any utterance discordant with the spirit of his teaching. This conclusion arrived at by a careful analysis of the process by which the synoptic Gospels, and, speaking broadly, the Acts, were put together, is confirmed by unessential yet unmistakable discrepancies in the several narratives. We have, indeed, no valid *a priori* reason for denying that the tendency which must have existed in the Apostolic Church to explain and fill out the miraculous facts of our Lord's life with legend has left signs of its existence in the gospel narratives; but we can trace the date of their composition to such near proximity to the facts (within thirty or forty years), as to feel confident that such evidences, if found at all, must be inconsiderable.

As regards the didactic literature of the New Testament, Dr. Weiss regards it as inspired in the strict sense, that is, written out of that endowment of the Spirit by which Christ qualified his servants to convey to men the salvation of which He was the centre and the goal. There is no distinction between their oral and their written utterances, except in so far as the act of writing might give the latter a more methodical and finished form. Each author's idiosyncrasy qualifies him to apprehend a separate phase of the revelation made in Christ, so that we have a distinct type of Christian doctrine in his teaching. This, of course, is not to be said of our Lord himself, whose flawless nature gave forth a perfect reflection of the truth. But this truth could not be presented by (Dr. Weiss thinks, as we shall presently see, that it could not have been fully disclosed to) Him before his resurrection. After his ascension the divine teaching which had Him as its sole source during his life parted into several streams. From each the water of life can be drank, none of them is absolutely purified from human imperfection; that is, the Scriptures present the revelation made in Christ fully enough to give to every unprejudiced reader of their contents a clear knowledge and full appropriation of it; at the same time they contain defective exegesis of Old Testament quotations and imperfect applications of spiritual laws to current events, such, for example, as St. Paul's identification of certain contemporaneous social phenomena, with the signs which usher in the second coming of the Son of Man. Though the several types of New Testament teaching complement, they do not correct, each other. They all set forth the same truths, viewed, in the case of each, from a different point of view, and together form a "documentary attestation of the revelation of God made in Christ's person and work, as it ought to be understood, and in its full saving value, — an attestation which is normative for all time." As regards St. John's Gospel, which, as has been said, Dr. Weiss classes with the doctrinal Scriptures of the New Testament, its authenticity can only be successfully defended by admitting the existence of a subjective element in it. And indeed the Gospel itself furnishes sufficient evidence that the author did not claim nor care always to report Christ's teachings in their historical form and connections, nor, indeed, to discriminate with absolute accuracy between that which he learned of Christ from our Saviour's lips and that which he was taught by his ascended Lord through the Spirit. In narrating the events which form the setting of the discourses which he attributes to our Lord, the Apostle is very accurate, so that his

Gospel, apart from its doctrinal value, is of inestimable service in harmonizing and correcting the synoptic Gospels into a consistent narrative.

We go on now to those great facts which at once underlie the Scripture and are the subject-matter of its teaching. Beginning with the chief and central one, we ask what, in our author's view, do the New Testament writings teach by their existence as historical products, and by their utterance concerning the person of Christ? That He was a divine Being, the second person of the Trinity, who entered into a human life by a miraculous act to work out the redemption of the race. Dr. Weiss finds the elements of the doctrine of the Trinity in the New Testament. The revelation of God which it contains professes to be a revelation of God, the Father, made through the Son. The Father is declared capable of being known, because the Son, his exact image, is the organ of his self-revelation. To give to man, who had lost his native knowledge of his Maker, through sin, a living fellowship with God, the Son became incarnate. This means that he subjected himself to the limitations of the human nature, as well as to the vicissitudes of an earthly lot. He not only toiled and suffered as men do, but thought and knew as they do. He possessed, to be sure, a unique knowledge of God; but it was a knowledge of the divine character resulting from his own purity, not an absolute knowledge of the divine essence such as the Eternal Son had before the incarnation. He had a supernatural insight into the human heart, but it was only one of the prophetic gifts bestowed in its highest degree on Him, to whom the Spirit was given without measure. He could see farther into the future than other inspired men; but this was not because he shared God's omniscience, but because he had a higher degree of the prophet's supernatural insight into the providential laws by which history shapes itself. He knew what would take place, not immediately, but by forecasting the result of moral and spiritual forces which were operating in and about him. Hence, his prescience was limited in degree as well as in kind, because the operation of moral and spiritual forces is conditioned upon man's free acts, which, lying as they do, outside the chain of causation, are foreknown only by God. He did not foresee Judas' apostasy when he chose him to be an apostle. He did not know, when He began his ministry, that his countrymen would reject Him. Indeed, Dr. Weiss holds that he could not have engaged in this labor with the zeal which it demanded, unless he had hoped that it would succeed; when the obduracy of his countrymen had

shown Him that they were not to be won to God by his preaching, and the fury of the Pharisees had taught Him that his fidelity to the truth would cost Him his life, the other way of setting up God's kingdom disclosed itself to Him. He saw that his death would have a power to win the people which his life had not, and that those of them who were susceptible to spiritual impression would be won by the preaching of his cross, and would be the true Israel, the centre of the divine kingdom, whose boundaries would eventually embrace all nations. It should be said that the limitation to which our Lord subjected himself does not, in Dr. Weiss's view, involve imperfect communication of the truth. As sinless, and so in absolute harmony with the mind of God, He could not believe error to be truth, much less represent it to be such.

Christ, as a real and proper man, must, in Weiss's view, have had to gain full moral symmetry and fixedness as other men gain it, by holy obedience to God. He never sinned, even in wish, but He became more truly holy as He went on resisting temptation and doing his Father's work. In saying to the rich young man "Why callest thou me good? No one is good save one; that is God," He puts his own ripening character below the absolutely and immutably holy divine nature. His agony in Gethsemane showed that He could not without a struggle be and do what his Father wished. The complete identification of our Lord's divine nature with his humanity appears in his conception of his relation to his people. He felt himself to be their Messiah; the member of the nation foretold by the prophets, in whom God's will should be perfectly fulfilled, and therefore capable of being, and called to be, the organ of God's full revelation and the centre of a true theocracy in which the divine will should be done as in heaven. This consciousness of his Messiahship was the most prominent feature of his self-consciousness. It was even the ground of his belief in his preëxistence; for as He had laid aside the immediate knowledge of the divine essence which belonged to the eternal Son, He could only know that his existence did not begin with the earthly state by reflecting that as He had been consciously from childhood the object of God's special love, and, as such, chosen to be the organ of his revelation of himself to his people, he must have known God and been known by Him in another state of being.

As Christ's Messiahship was the central point of his consciousness, it must have been the central and dominating theme of his teaching. We are to bear this in mind in interpreting his words, and guard against putting an absoluteness into them which

they were not meant to have. So far as they contain principles, they are of eternal significance; but this significance is found by detaching the principle from the temporary and local investiture. Christ's predictions must be interpreted from his own point of view. As He told his disciples to expect his return to judge the world before the contemporaneous generation should have passed away, we cannot read in the parables of the tares and the mustard seed the prediction of a process of development to last for ages.

When our Lord had risen from the dead and laid aside the limitations of the earthly state, God's revelation in Him entered upon a new stage, and Christian truth was spoken by the Spirit through the Apostles with a fullness which should both stimulate the study and exceed the knowledge of the Church till the end of time.

It is this full disclosure of God's redemptive purpose in Christ which makes, strictly speaking, the gospel. The preaching of salvation through faith in the atoning death of a Divine Redeemer, rather than the setting forth of the earthly life and the words of Christ, has been "the power of God unto salvation" from the day of Pentecost until now.

"The fundamental facts of Christ's gospel," says our author, "can neither be contested nor established from the facts of the life of Christ. The central point of the apostolic preaching always remains this, that the expiatory significance of his death forms the fundamental presupposition for the new relation of the believer to God; that the abiding communion with the exalted Christ which is brought about by the communication of his Spirit fits the believer for a new religio-ethical life; that his rising from the dead is the pledge of our resurrection, and his approaching return the condition of the heavenly completion of salvation. These statements, however, are and remain quite independent of the historical question, whether and how far Jesus asserted or predicted these things."

In the Epistles of the New Testament, and especially in those of Paul, this apostolic preaching in its most fully developed form is preserved, and we go on to examine, with Dr. Weiss, the leading features of its presentation of Christ and the truths which centre in his person and work. It is natural to begin with Christology. What is the teaching concerning his person by which the risen Christ sums up, explains, and completes the lessons given in the deeds and words of his earthly life? That the eternal Son became the Son of Man, the divine nature uniting itself to the phys-

ical life of Jesus and subjecting itself to the intellectual and moral, as well as physical limitations which belong to every human life. In Dr. Weiss's penetrating representation of the Pauline Christology, our Lord is said to have had a human body and soul; while the higher element which the Apostle finds in man (the *voûs*) is replaced in him by the divine Spirit, dwelling in him as a divine substance. There is, however, during his earthly life, a contrariety (*ein relative Gegensatz*) between the divine and human natures which is not done away until the resurrection, when the divine (*πνεῦμα*) gains entire possession of and appropriates to itself the manhood, and Christ becomes, in the absolute sense, "the spiritual man."

This construction of the Pauline Christology would bring it into affinity with the kenotic view of the incarnation (that which regards it as consisting of a temporary humiliation of the divine Son into our condition, rather than as a full incorporation of our nature into his being). For the latter view has, as its presupposition, an assumed affinity between the Divine Being and the human soul which would make an essential union between them congenial to the nature of each. A "contrariety" between the human and the divine in Christ, requiring removal before our Lord can become the absolutely ideal man, implies the existence of perishable elements in the structure of our being. This inference is confirmed by Dr. Weiss's interpretation of Paul's anthropology, in which the human soul appears, not as in the Old Testament and the rest of the New Testament Scriptures as the immediate product of a divine creative act, but as propagated with the body, and so tainted with original sin. To be sure, in regeneration the soul receives a principle of life from the divine Spirit which ultimately dominates it, so that it reflects the image not of the first and earthy, but of the second and spiritual man. But our natural constitution is so identified with sin and corruption (if it be purely an inheritance) that this change involves rather being swallowed up in something better than ourselves than being freed from the taints and imperfections which mar the present self. The hope of immortality through Christ looks not toward such a change as this, but toward a recovery of all the faculties and powers which were our original birthright, and their full and harmonious development. And it is only as we see our whole nature to be immortal that we can see why Christ's humanity should exist in its completeness always. So this interpretation of Paul's teaching about man and man's Redeemer rules out the doctrine of an abiding union of perfect man-

hood with the eternal Word in one personality. We are told, it is true, that the body which the disciples saw and handled after the resurrection will be the organ through which Christ will continue to reveal himself, but the higher side of our nature will, it is implied, have been merged in the deity.

Without stopping to discuss this theory of the mode of the incarnation (a task entirely outside the purpose of this article), I would simply suggest that it is in great part based on a view of the Pauline anthropology which is chiefly supported by an inference made to construct the Apostle's teaching into a symmetrical whole. It may be added that defective though this Christology be, from the orthodox point of view, its defect lies on the human, not on the divine side. The limitations in our Lord which are spoken of above have no necessary connection with it. The doctrine of a full and eternal union between the human and the divine as expounded by Dorner does not exclude moral and intellectual limitations in Christ during his earthly life; rather is best maintained on the supposition of their existence.

We go on to examine our author's view of the apostolic teaching respecting Christ's sacrificial work. This is a development of our Lord's declaration that the new covenant is founded in his blood shed for the remission of sins. Christ's death, says Paul, was the propitiation by appointing which God made it evident that He had not been unholy in leaving human sin unpunished during the ages since the fall. By this is meant, of course, that as an act which revealed the morality of God's government in this respect, it vindicated its morality; not that it was a mere fact declaration — an acted apology which would have left the imputation unremoved. In what way Christ's death justified and so explained God's conduct in forgiving the sinner, Paul does not teach; he gives, however, a hint in this direction by calling it, in connection with its atoning virtue, an act of obedience. ("By the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.") If the Apostle does no more than intimate that the atoning virtue of Christ's death lay rather in the moral qualities which characterized it than in the amount of suffering which it involved, he does teach that in substituting this propitiatory sacrifice for the punishment of sin, God remitted that penalty. The theory that it was inflicted upon a substitute is excluded by a correct interpretation of the Apostle's language. The propitiatory effect of Christ's death was not, of course, in the Apostle's thought limited to the sins of the anti-Christian world. It effected a change in God's relations to the

race: "Now that Christ has died God has given up his enmity to men, which is, as it were, forced upon Him by the sin which rouses his wrath;" "the death of Christ stands for the death of all, save only those who reject the message regarding the reconciliation." Christ's redemption thus stands over against the ruin wrought by Adam, in respect to its universality, as an objective fact.

This is made vividly apparent by Paul's representation of the cosmical significance of Christ's redemptive work. In teaching "that the mystery of salvation was hid from eternity in God, who created the universe," he indicates "that the purpose of salvation is most closely connected with the plan of the world which began to be realized in creation, and that that purpose having been formed by the Creator before the creation of the world, was regulative even in its creation. Then the world must be grounded in Christ, the Redeemer; not only made by Him, but for Him, who is to bring to completion the saving purpose of God, as well as the whole historic development which tends towards the realization of this divine purpose."

As Paul teaches that redemption, so, according to our author, does he teach that sin, is a race fact. As regards its generic relations, our author in his acute and thorough exegesis of the one passage in which the matter is discussed shows, as I believe, that the Apostle teaches that Adam's transgression brought mankind under the dominion of moral evil through the laws of heredity, and that it at the same time brought our race under the dominion of a law by which sin is visited with (physical) death, the transgression of the individual securing the operation of the law in his own case. The hypothesis of a covenant, by virtue of which Adam represented the race, and that of an actual existence of every human being in Adam involving a participation in his sin, finds no support in the Apostle's language. The sin of the race is only reckoned to the individual so far as it is appropriated by his free and conscious act.

To men who have thus identified themselves with sin and are conscious of guilt, the gospel comes declaring that God will, for Christ's sake, forgive them, and thus give them that status of justification which they can never gain by any works of their own, on condition of their faith. This faith is not a work, the only one by which salvation can be obtained; rather is it "the antithesis of all human performance," a trust in the divine grace. Those who do exercise saving faith, and through it gain eternal life, are the elect, and their salvation is the realizing of God's eternal purpose with reference to them.

But this purpose was not an arbitrary one ; nor was the reason underlying it a fact outside of the person whose salvation it contemplated. On the contrary, the Apostle teaches that those who were predestinated were those who were known from eternity to be susceptible to divine grace. By this is not meant such activity on their part as would effect, much less merit, salvation, but merely such a moral condition as made a point of contact for the gracious working of the Holy Spirit.

Passing over Dr. Weiss's interpretation of the scriptural teaching concerning the new life and the sacraments and church institutions, we come to his representation of the New Testament eschatology. According to Peter, our Lord went at his death to Hades to continue there his Messianic work, which He carried on through that endowment of the Spirit which gave power to his earthly ministry. The Apostle's way of mentioning the "*descensus ad inferos*," as well-known, would indicate that it was a part of the primitive oral tradition. All attempts which have been made from Augustine to the present time to eliminate it from the Apostle's teaching, either by identifying the preaching spoken of with that done by Noah, or by denying that it was preaching, Dr. Weiss regards as illustrations of the violence which Scripture is forced to suffer at the hands of dogmatic prejudice. This triumph of prejudice over truth appears the more surprising when it is seen that the "*descensus ad inferos*" is assumed in the doctrinal teaching of the Apostle ; rejection of the gospel being spoken of as the one damning sin, and the inclusion of the dead as well as the living in the Messianic judgment being secured by the preaching to the disobedient in Hades. On the other hand, Dr. Weiss regards our Saviour as teaching in the parable of Dives and Lazarus that those who have died in hardened selfishness will not find salvation in the disembodied state. Though the judgments of that state are not definitive, yet they are, at least in this representation, a practical withdrawal of all hope, as indicating the full retribution surely to come. In no passage of Dr. Weiss's writings, so far as I know, are those two affirmations of Scripture adjusted to each other. It may be presumed that he would regard the New Testament teaching, taken as a whole, to represent the ultimate reach of the opportunity inseparably bound up with the proclamation of the gospel to be as wide as the range of divine grace expressed in the gospel, and on the other hand to declare that men may and do in this life harden their hearts into hopeless opposition to God.

The state of the blessed dead is, according to our author's in-

terpretation of Paul, a rest in the society of Christ. The hindrances to fellowship with the Redeemer which the bodily life present will be done away. The place of sojourn until the resurrection is not Hades, but beyond the third heaven, "in the special dwelling-place of God." That the Apostle's mind dwelt so little on the intermediate state is to be attributed to his eager anticipation of Christ's second coming, which, as his Epistles plainly indicate, he expected to take place within his own lifetime. Before it should come, however, he believed that the Gentile world would be substantially converted to Christianity, and that, in close connection with this consummation of his distinctive work, the Jewish nation would give over its obduracy and own Jesus as the Christ. Then would come the parousia and the resurrection of the righteous dead. Dr. Weiss finds no support in the New Testament for the belief that there will be a resurrection of the wicked. The "shadowy" disembodied state in which they are to live forever he regards as a part of their punishment. The significance of the resurrection is that it will give the soul an appropriate organ of action and expression. This will be a body composed of an "ethereal light substance like Christ's glorified body and that of the angels. Clothed in this, the redeemed will live and reign with Christ forever. The duration of the wretchedness of the wicked is also endless, the language of Scripture positively excluding belief in their ultimate annihilation.

The eschatological teaching of the Apocalypse is not in absolute accord with that of Paul. There we find predictions of a return of our Lord to the earth precedent to his final second coming. This is to bring destruction to the anti-christian powers, and to usher in a reign of Christ's faithful ones. These will consist not only of such true believers as shall be living, but likewise of those who shall have died in faith, and have been raised in a first resurrection. This reign shall endure a thousand years, and shall be accompanied by an extension of Christianity among the nations. A part of mankind will prove impenetrable to its influences, and will be seduced into open hostility to Christ by Satan, when, at the expiration of the thousand years, he shall have been unbound. They will be destroyed by the returning Christ at his final parousia, which is to usher in the universal judgment. In connection with this divergence from Paul's teaching, it should be said that, while Dr. Weiss regards the Apocalypse as probably the work of John, he assigns it to an earlier date than his Epistles and the Gospels, and regards it as a monument of the eschato-

logical views which dominated the "early apostolic Jewish Christianity."

To sum up. We find that Dr. Weiss, approaching the Bible without dogmatic trammels, and applying the highest linguistic and critical gifts to its study, finds it to be "an orthodox book." It reveals to him the universal and hopeless sinfulness of the race, salvation through faith in the atonement made by a divine Saviour, — an atonement which has an objective influence on the mind of God, — regeneration through the special influences of the Holy Spirit, future eternal glory to the righteous, and unending punishment to the finally impenitent. We find, also, in his clear and full presentation of Christ's identification with mankind, as shown both in the record of his life and the apostolic description of his person, in his enunciation of the scriptural teaching regarding the universal range of Christ's work in its atoning virtue and its offer of salvation, and his recovery of the biblical picture of creation as subordinate to Christ and God's redemptive purpose in Him, the materials of a theology whose foundation and goal and principle are the divine man, whom the Church is finding to be the Alpha and Omega of Christian truth, as it long ago found Him to be the Alpha and Omega of the Christian life.

To this necessarily meagre, but, I trust, substantially accurate, presentation of the outlines of Dr. Weiss's *Theology*, let me add a word of my own. As regards those truths which are the essential content of the New Testament, the significance belonging to our author's statement of them is simply that given by his position as a skillful exegete. But as regards that problem which lies outside of the range of New Testament teaching, and which has yet such vital relation to it, — a problem which, I need not say, is forcing itself upon the attention of the Evangelical Church of this country, — the relation of Sacred Scripture to Christianity, Dr. Weiss's work has special significance. He is, as we have said, more than an expositor of the text of Scripture; he is an expositor of the Scripture viewed in its relation to the life of the Apostolic Church. The exegetical and the critical parts of his work are inseparably united. His "*Biblical Theology*" is a setting forth of the various types of inspired teaching contained in the New Testament, in their historical relations; but the determination of those relations requires a thorough criticism of the several documents, which, in the case of the first three Gospels, involves a discrimination between different elements in their contents, and a judgment as to the relative value of these elements. And his

"Life of Christ" and his commentaries on Mark and Luke are based on the theory that such criticism of the Gospels is essential to a correct appreciation of their contents. To treat them as faultless works of God; to give up all thought of going back of them to their sources, and of examining the processes by which the narratives were shaped out of those sources; to shut the eyes to all discrepancies, this is simply to resolve not to try to understand those books. Though the resolve be made from excellent motives, those motives will not make it result in anything beyond the ignorance on which it is bent. Nor can it bear examination on ethical grounds, since it is a resolve to refuse to seek evidence which may disturb a favorite position. The consent to receive evidence would be a sanction of historical criticism.

Now this leading New Testament scholar, in treating the relation of the documents which compose the New Testament to the life of the Apostolic Church as a historical question, to be dealt with according to the methods of historical science, is setting evangelical students of Scripture an example which they cannot afford to disregard. For the question is a historical one. From what other source is an answer to be looked for than from historical inquiry? From the Scripture? Aside from the possibility of grounding a reasonable opinion as to the authorship and value of any book or collection of books upon assertions made in such book or collection, there stands the patent fact that there are no definitions in the New Testament of the New Testament. The only general assertions respecting Sacred Scripture which it contains were made of the Old Testament. How can we learn from any doctrinal affirmations of the Scriptures by whom and when the Apocalypse or the Epistle to the Hebrews was written, or how the materials used in the synoptic Gospels were preserved, or what means of information were at Luke's disposal when he wrote the Acts? And if from certain predictions of Christ we can infer the doctrinal purity of the epistles written by his apostles, we have no warrant in such predictions for predicating absolute perfection of those epistles, as distinct from their author's oral teaching, in which we find imperfection, and therefore are not justified in refusing to seek, by the use of proper inquiry, to find out what they really are, in their relation to Christ and his Church. Of course, it is assumed that this inquiry should be conducted from the Christian point of view, recognizing the supernatural in Christ and his influence, as well as the appeal which the doctrinal Scriptures make to our moral and spiritual nature, as among the facts to be taken into account.

But if the Scriptures, as historical products, must be examined historically to ascertain what they really are, we must let the historical method have its rights. We must not use it merely as a ladder by which we climb up to a convenient doctrinal position. To prove by historical criticism that Luke wrote the Acts, and then to infer that because he wrote the book it cannot contain errors, is to violate the canons of intellectual morality. Those processes which we trust while they are carrying us to the point we wish to reach, we must trust to the end. To commit ourselves to them is to burn our bridges behind us. It is so with the synoptic Gospels. If we abandon the assumption that they are miraculous products, and so above criticism, and begin to ask, in view of the facts of the case, what they really are, we must, if we would not stultify ourselves, take the answers which our inquiries yield. If they show that in some cases words of Christ have been misreported by one or the other evangelist; that facts of contemporaneous history have been unwittingly misstated; that two varying reports of the same incident in our Lord's life have been embodied in the narrative as two separate incidents, then we must not refuse to admit the proved fact to be a fact on account of its incompatibility with certain *a priori* beliefs of our own. It is not claimed that we should adopt the conclusions of any single critic, or of any number of critics, without testing them; nor is it denied that we should take into account the religious as well as the intellectual qualifications of the evangelists for their task; but it is insisted that, taking into our induction all the facts within our reach, — facts of the inner as well as of the outward life, — we should freely and fairly use historical criticism in examining Sacred Scripture.

Is such examination one of the duties of the Christian Church? Is it a profitable expenditure of time to try to find out what Sacred Scripture is? Is sacred science worth cultivating? The questions answer themselves. Do religious interests forbid the inquiry? They demand it. They demand that the claims which the ministry make for the Bible be adjusted to the facts which are in the Bible. For a minister to present a conception of Sacred Scripture which is inconsistent with the phenomena of Scripture is to injure his own power as a Christian teacher, if he believe that conception, and to undermine his influence by degrading him, if he do not believe it. For him to make a claim which is exaggerated and indiscriminating; to demand for a historical sketch like the Acts, for example, such a divine sanction as is given to a

doctrinal treatise like the Epistle to the Romans, is to hamper himself in his endeavor to show that we have inspired teaching.

And unwillingness to apply historical criticism to Scripture brings another and more serious detriment to religion. It prevents the biblical truth from being presented in its historic relations and proportion. There is only room to allude to a topic which deserves a thorough discussion. So much must be said : — the words of our Lord have especially suffered from this unwitting misrepresentation. They have been, especially in their eschatological relations, taken from their setting and treated as the final utterances of Deity instead of part of the earlier teaching of a progressive revelation. So they have been made the basis of sweeping declarations which not only lie outside of their scope, but contradict the apostolic teaching, as well as that central and deepest teaching, the Incarnation and the Atonement. Nay, the warnings which obdurate and malignant sin called from his lips have been wrested from their occasion and intent, beaten into doctrine, compared with his other utterances in a crude, quantitative calculation, and so made a rule for determining his conception of God's character and his own earthly work. And his utterances about himself and his Judæan work have been interpreted as if belonging to the revelation of his person and his relation to the race ; claims to deity have been put into them which they were never meant to bear ; artless avowals of human limitation contained in them have been quibbled away, and so the clear picture of his humanity sadly obscured. Biblical Theology will do great things for the Church if it succeeds in convincing it that the scriptural picture of Christ is to be found in the Bible which lies imbedded in history, not the Bible which men construct by grouping texts about their own set of doctrines.

Edward Y. Hincks.

THE MINISTRY OF NATURAL BEAUTY.

THE aspect of beauty which the visible creation presents to mankind belongs to it, not accidentally or superficially, but essentially and by virtue of its construction in accordance with a law of beauty. It is not, as some seem to fancy, a kind of external decoration which might possibly have been omitted, but is an absolutely indispensable element of nature. In the creative Mind which conceived the worlds, and in the creative forces that fashioned them, dwelt and wrought the very spirit of beauty. Mr. Hawthorne says of Hilda, it seemed as if she was "only visible by the sunshine of her soul!" Nature is beautiful by virtue of that inward Light

"From whose pure beams all perfect beauty springs."

It follows from this conception of nature, — a conception insisted upon by the greatest writers, from Plato to Emerson, — that natural beauty has, by divine ordination, a power of ministration for the delight and blessing of all in whom any sensibility to its influence exists. And although this sensibility is unequally distributed among men, and requires instruction and culture, none seem to be quite destitute of it, or incapable of delight and development in it.

It follows, too, that as the characters of beauty in creation are God-spelling characters, we have a sort of gospel of natural beauty, not inconsistent with other gospels, in which may be found rich revelations for human delight and culture, ranging from those which appeal to simple and unreflecting emotion to such as belong to the highest exercises of imagination, and to the clearest spiritual insight.

The ministration thereof is glorious. "Day unto day uttereth speech and night unto night showeth knowledge." Great poets, like David, Dante, and Shakespeare, are its prophets and priests. Its incense floats upward from innumerable golden censers in garden, grove, and field. Its shrines are by every wayside, its cloisters in every solitude, its altars in every forest and mountain. The hum of insects, the singing of birds, the ripple of streams, the roar of cataracts, the whispering of the tree-tops, thunders that shake the globe, and the deep diapason of the sea, are blended in its Jubilates and Magnificats. Its means of grace are in every fair form, brave color, and sweet sound in earth, sky, and sea.

Its power in human life will not cease to be felt till men can loose the bands of Orion and bind the sweet influence of the Pleiades.

Dr. Channing declared the universe to be the temple of beauty, and the enjoyments it gives to be "akin to worship" in their purity and refinement.

I. We may consider what a perpetual ministration of simple, emotional pleasure is afforded to mankind by the beautiful in nature, such as is universally felt in beholding the tints of the morning and evening skies, the rainbow, the splendor of vernal and autumnal forests, the majesty of the midnight heavens, the delicate hues of flowers. Such pleasures have blessed mankind in every age and clime. It is as if man had inherited an indestructible impression of that fair Eden in which his sinless progenitors rejoiced, which, in all his wanderings and degradations, enables him to find delight in such beauty as the world still affords, and which marks him as the child not only of a lost, but of a promised Paradise as well. And this simple delight is clearly distinct from all questions of utility. Beauty may have utility, as in the case of flowers, whose colors and perfumes attract insects by whose agency the flowers are in turn fertilized. But even in such cases utility is not the only or chief end of beauty, and gives no adequate explanation of it. Even in the attractiveness of the flowers whose conspicuous colors and sweet odors invite insects, may we not perceive, instead of a type of that vain and passionate beauty which attires and perfumes itself to lure the unwary to its selfish and seductive service, an intimation that the influence of natural beauty is wider and deeper than at first appears, and that its ministration of delight extends below mankind, condescending even to the ephemeral creatures of the air, in whom, as in every creature which God has made, some dim sense of beauty resides and stirs? "Beauty is its own excuse for being," and we claim for it a divinely ordained ministration of simple delight, apart from all considerations of utility.

Suppose an *unbeautiful* world, and man destitute of all sensibility to beauty. What better would he be than a stupid prisoner in a gloomy dungeon? The landscape would be without green or gloss; the grass would bristle like the stubble of a beard on the ugly face of the flat fields; the lichens would not gild the crags nor the heather empurple the hills; there would be no crystal snow-flakes nor diamond-drops of dew; there would be no tenderness of color on the clouds, no fretwork of the frost, no wave-motions of the sea, no violet-strewn banks, no "golden exhalations

of the dawn," no sunset splendors, no gay plumage of birds. Beneath a dreary sky the sea would be a drearier waste, and every lake a dismal scene of desolation. Light enough for the simple distinction between what is useful and dangerous would shine through some medium that should strain it of every vestige of that which makes colors perceptible. Instead of marvelous cloud-scenery, we might have a neutral mist-curtain underhanging the firmament, to hide the splendor of the heavens. The mountains would be monstrous masses from whose frowning ramparts nothing to please the wide-ranging eye could be seen. The valleys would be every way angular, and their rivers straight and dark and still. The forests could be only broad tracts of gloomy lumber, and instead of the stately pine and palm, the pyramidal fir, the sturdy oak, the bushy maple, the dainty and delicate birch, and the gothic elm, there would be so many cord-feet of sprawling timber, fit for fences or fires. Plain fruits and grains would grow in cheerless fields. How could men then ever think to lift up their eyes to the massive hills, or to a flat, staring firmament, or scan the blank horizon-walls? Unattractive nature would not be studied, and there would be neither science nor poetry. The persons, dress, and habitations of men would be destitute of charm. Home would be a lodging-place, as for savages. In hideous uniformity of white or black, the miserable multitudes of men and women, without comeliness of face or figure, would go about like mourners or ghosts,

"But, as you by their faces see,
All silent and all damned."

Or if, seeing thus how beauty belongs to the world not by way of external ornamentation, but as being an indestructible property of its forms, this effort to conceive a de-beautified world seems puerile, think of nature as retaining all its beauties of form and relation, but destitute of color only. Mr. Ruskin says, "that of all God's gifts to the sight of man, color is the holiest, most divine, the most solemn." And we can well believe this when we look at the most beautiful thing in nature, the rainbow, and reflect that it is God's own chosen symbol of his everlasting covenant of peace with mankind. Good color has this supreme virtue, that, while all cultivated minds love it, it appeals directly and effectually to the uncultivated. Conceive of the elimination of color from nature: the blue from the sky, the green from the grass, the glory from the sunlight, the hue from every flower, and in what a hideous uniformity of ugliness, instead of her beautiful

garments, would the earth be clad. But because, in order to this elimination of color, light itself must be put out, because, when God said "Let there be light," He said, in that same word, "Let there be beauty, too," therefore is the whole face of nature radiant, and her robes of gold and green and purple such as become the daughter of a king.

Such a ministry to human life has natural beauty. Its blessings abound in even heedless souls. Wordsworth calls the daisy "the unassuming commonplace of nature." It is only necessary to try and think of the world without such beautiful "commonplaces," — without the daisy, without the "daffodils that come before the swallow dares," without the "violets dim but sweeter than Juno's eyes," without the purple asters and the golden-rod that bloom along the dusty highways, without the unassuming wild-flowers that make the meadows smile, — in order to perceive how unspeakably meaner and duller it would be to every man and woman in it. Poor Peter Bell would sadly miss "the yellow primrose by the river's brim." As we live in an atmosphere and light that are essential to existence, but of which men seem heedless, so we live in an element of beauty, but for whose silent, constant ministration life would be comparatively barren and burdensome.

II. This ministry of the beautiful is also one of great intellectual quickening and culture.

Thoughtfulness accompanies the real awakening of the sense of beauty. One then experiences those "vital feelings of delight," of which Wordsworth speaks, which stimulate perception, reflection, and imagination. It is with the contemplation of beautiful things as with listening to good music. The emotions and the imagination are so intimately connected that every pure feeling of delight in the one becomes a quickening impulse in the other. I need not say how poetry finds in this sphere of the beautiful not only the materials for its work, but its inspirations also. The suggestiveness of the beautiful in nature is amazing. Thoughts for which laborious search has been vainly made in studious hours come trooping in upon the mind while one quietly contemplates some lovely aspect of the landscape, horizon, or ocean. Then one feels, —

"A sense sublime

Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is in the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man ;

A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things."

It is in such hours, when all conscious processes of thought are suspended, that the eyes of the understanding are strangely enlightened, imagination takes wing, and one has vision and gains his largest and noblest views of truth.

"The meanest flower that blows on earth could give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears."

The history of art and literature affords overwhelming proof of this power of beauty to quicken the mind to noblest activities. And this proof is so obvious that I need only allude to it. Not only are all great works of art and architecture embodiments of the spirit of beauty and monuments of its power, not only does all poetry throb and glow with its inspirations, but all living books — such as contain the springs of human thought — are the work of men who were smitten with the love of natural beauty, and whose imaginations were kindled thereby. Such books, from the dialogues of Plato to the romances of Hawthorne, are children of the sunshine and not of the cloister. Their pages smell of the fields and not of the midnight oil. Their authors ransacked the universe for images and symbols of their thought, and through all these their illuminating genius shines, as through gloriously-pictured cathedral windows the sunlight streams, making them glow and blaze with unutterable meanings and indescribable splendors.

Whatever springs of poetry lie hidden in the soul are discovered by this penetrative influence. Sometimes one seems to experience, as it were, a new intellectual birth. He becomes conscious of new aspirations and powers. Material images flock like doves to the windows of his mind only to fly forth again as the winged messengers — the carrier-doves — of his living thought. The south wind blows, and there is song and summer in the soul. So it has been historically. The great revivals of learning have been attended by wonderful efflorescences of this same spirit of beauty in art and song. The highest attainments in intellectual culture have been made by those nations which have had the keenest love of natural beauty, and in which its influence has been most powerful. One may not know how or why it is, but his whole intellectual being is invigorated and enriched in this atmosphere of natural beauty, and by this intimacy with the fair aspects of creation.

"Give me health and a day," says Emerson, "and I will make the pomp of emperors ridiculous. The dawn is my Assyria; the sunset and moonrise my Paphos and unimaginable realms of faerie; broad noon shall be my England of the senses and understanding; the night shall be my Germany of mystic philosophy and dreams."

III. The ministry of the beautiful is also one of moral and spiritual elevation.

It is not affirmed that it alone is sufficient for a complete culture. The facts of history prove the contrary. Notwithstanding the intimate relation of beauty and goodness, it is a great error to overlook their distinction.

The function of conscience is distinct from that of taste, and superior to it. There is a ministration of righteousness, apart from which the ministration of beauty is powerless against the forces of moral evil that infest human nature. Still more powerless is it, in the presence of human guilt and remorse, to effect the ends of reconciliation and peace.

I do not know where this truth is more powerfully illustrated than in the weird myth which the author of the "Marble Faun" puts into the lips of Donatello. One of Donatello's progenitors had an intimate acquaintance with a fair creature, half human and half sprite, whose life and soul were interfused with the water of a fountain. In her friendship he found delight and comfort. But one day he came and called in vain, and as he bathed his hands there was only a sound of sobbing in the stream. He had washed a blood-stain from his hand, and the delightful bond was broken. And those who recall Hawthorne's masterly delineation of Donatello's career after the dreadful deed which, in a moment of passion, he had committed, will remember how to that veriest child of nature the whole face of nature was changed. The creatures of the wood no longer came at his call. The birds no longer knew his voice. The glory of the earth had vanished. And so the legend typifies "the soothing and genial effects of habitual intercourse with nature, in all ordinary cares and griefs; while, on the other hand, her mild influences fall short in their effects upon the ruder passions, and are altogether powerless in the dread fever-fit or deadly chill of guilt."

The Greek culture was comparatively fruitless on its moral and spiritual side, because it lacked the ministration of righteousness, because it was so exclusively æsthetic and intellectual. But how far below what it actually was would have been the Greek civ-

ilization but for the culture of beauty? But for that, her literature, oratory, art, architecture, poetry, and manifold mighty power would not have been.

St. Paul, at Troas, heard a voice sounding over the sea to him from Macedonia, "Come over and help us." Help was needed. The gospel was needed in Greece. And yet, that St. Paul's ministry of the gospel might be effectual in the world, a mighty warrior had long before gone from that same Macedonia eastward, by Troas, to carry into all the world the language, the letters, and the civilization of Greece. Insufficient as it was, by itself, for the highest ends of life, the culture of the beautiful proved to be a handmaid and helper of the higher spiritual culture of the gospel. The worship of beauty is only a refined idolatry which not infrequently ends in the profanation of beauty. There are those in our age who would repeat the folly of the Crotonians who erected an altar to Phillipus "because he was beautiful." In the first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans St. Paul has vividly described the natural results of that substitution of the creature for the Creator in worship.

Let us distinguish between the true property of beauty and its profanation; between its legitimate influence and perversions thereof by the ignorant or impious. Because personal physical beauty is often associated for a while with depravity of character and abused for base purposes, shall we therefore deny its value and power as a gift of God when we behold it, where it belongs, in the Madonnas of Raphael, in the lady of Milton's "Comus," in the Hilda of Hawthorne's romance, in such historic women as Beatrice and Lady Hastings (of whom Richard Steele said, "to love her was a liberal education"), and in innumerable good women of this present time who brighten the world with their physical beauty, while they sanctify it with their spiritual loveliness? When the good and the beautiful are conjoined, then we have works and characters of eternal loveliness; then we have the perfection of virtue. Then an otherwise grim-visaged and angular righteousness lights up and rounds out in a splendor of grace. The effect is like that produced by the mellow sunlight as, of an afternoon, it softly rests, here and there, upon objects otherwise indifferent,—a bit of wood, a patch of grass, a naked rock, a fallen leaf. Their hard outlines are softened. Their coldness turns to warmth. They smile at the touch of the sunshine, and in its light become lovely. Then, too, come such hymns as Spenser sung to "Heavenly Beautie," such pictures as Fra Angelico

painted while he prayed, such scenes as Dante describes in the "Paradiso," and the whole host of spiritual forms and faces which only artistic genius, smitten with a sense of beauty, and guided by the spirit of reverence, could have produced.

And though I am not concerned here with the influence of art, yet I dare affirm that all great and enduring works of human genius have originated, not in impiety, but in holy inspirations, — either in reverent characters or in temporarily pure and exalted states of feeling, — and that the periods of debased art have been periods in which the love of nature had vanished, and the study of nature was suspended.

"Not from a vain and shallow thought
His awful Jove young Phidias wrought."

It is the property of beauty in all things and persons to awaken a pure delight, to suggest noble thoughts and ideas, and, so far as desire is awakened thereby, to hallow it. Its legitimate result is to invigorate and not enervate the heart, to suggest the higher spiritual beauty, and guide the soul thereto.

It seems to me a striking confirmation of the spiritual power of natural beauty, that the conditions of its effectual operation are precisely those required for the operation of Christian grace. Mr. Hawthorne says that the appreciation of a picture requires of the spectator "a surrender of himself in due proportion with the miracle which has been wrought." One must "look with the eye of faith or its highest excellence escapes you." Like all revelations of the better life, the adequate perception of a work of art demands a "simplicity of vision."

This "surrender of self," this "eye of faith," this "simplicity of vision" — are they not quite as requisite for the adequate perception of the highest beauty in nature? And just what is required is also wrought in all who study in such a spirit. If this seems like reasoning in a circle, it is only in such a circle as that in which the Beatitudes move, — "to him that hath shall be given."

A modern critic has said that Sir Walter Scott's delight in nature was exceptionally great because of his unselfishness and humility.

Look at the picture of Eve which Milton sketches, as she

"Rose and went forth among her fruits and flowers
To visit how they prospered, bud and bloom :
. . . They, at her coming, sprung,
And touched by her fair tendance, gladlier grew."

Do we not already know that

“Grace was in all her steps, heaven in her eye,
In every gesture dignity and love?”

The holiest and best of all the monkish multitude, St. Francis of Assisi, was most completely at home among the birds and flowers, and studied nature with utmost delight.

With equal truth and beauty, the author of the well-known “Picciola” makes a little flower that springs up and grows in the prison court-yard the means of converting the unhappy prisoner from atheism to faith. God’s truth and love were so revealed in its development and bloom, that the attentive prisoner, who had first written on the wall of his cell “There is no God,” wrote again, “perhaps,” and finally, with humbled, chastened heart, confessed in another writing his faith in God.

The simple condition of the effectual operation of this spiritual power of beauty in us is the sincere love of the beautiful. For such a spirit nature has more than delight. Beholding the beauty of the external world, it is as if one beheld “signalings from some high land of one they feel, but dimly understand.” There are suggestions of a goodness somewhere within this fair creation, — a beautiful soul of the beautiful world. What one sees that so lifts his thoughts and feelings above all physical phenomena witnesses of a higher Beauty of Holiness. And so it was said the “undevout astronomer is mad.”

Nature leads the lover of nature into her sanctuary, wherein, as in the sanctuary of God, are “strength and beauty.” She improvises for him in marvelous songs without words. She allows whatever day he pleases to devote. She constrains him to worship. Her birds sing of God’s care and provision. Her lilies tell of his glory. Once more he is taught that “man does not live by bread alone.” His envy and discontent are reprov’d. “All things are yours,” apostolic nature says. The bitter sense of hard privations gives way to a glad feeling of immeasurable possession. Out in the fields or in the woods one is so rich! Nature withholds nothing. One

“Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything.”

He is, pretty soon,

“Pious beyond the intention of his thought,
Devout above the meaning of his will.”

It is a most significant fact, that, as often as love is kindled in

any heart, the sense of beauty awakens at once, and nature begins to be illuminated. And especially is this true of the distinct love of God. One needs only read such a book as the *Confessions* of Augustine to see the truth of this statement, or even the *Life* of Jonathan Edwards. That man says in his diary, that as his sense of divine things increased, "there seemed to be a calm, sweet cast of divine glory in everything. God's excellency, his wisdom, purity, and love seemed to appear in everything: in the sun and moon and stars; in the clouds and blue sky; in the grass, flowers, and trees; in the water and all nature. I often used to sit and view the moon for continuance, and in the day spent much time in viewing the clouds and the sky, to behold the sweet glory of God in these things." Holiness seemed to him nothing "but the highest beauty and amiableness." The Christian soul appeared to him to be "like such a little white flower as we see in the spring of the year: low and humble on the ground, opening its bosom to receive the pleasant beams of the sun's glory; rejoicing in a calm rapture; diffusing around a sweet fragrance; standing peacefully and lovingly in the midst of other flowers round about; all in like manner opening their bosoms to drink in the light of the sun."

I know a child whose first impressions of beauty in the world, and whose first distinct apprehension of a good God, were received when, one day, a wise man took him gently aside to show him a sweet-pea blossom, and talked lovingly of the beauty of a Being who could make such a fair and sweet flower to grow. And considering what anxieties, cares, doubts, and fears breed and multiply in the gloom of an untrustful or sordid life, is it not well to remember by what words the Master, who loved nature so well, who sought her solitudes and mountain-tops for communion with God, and talked so much of the birds and flowers and grain and grass, reproved solicitude and distrust, saying, "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow: they toil not, neither do they spin; and yet I say unto you that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these!" The power of natural beauty to minister spiritual grace has never had and can never have more complete or eloquent vindication.

If we turn to the Hebrew Scriptures — the books of righteousness — it will appear that they abundantly recognize this same power. They bid us behold the King in his beauty. They speak of the Beauty of Holiness. "Out of Zion, the perfection of beauty, God hath shined." The prophetic soul can utter itself only in

figures and images drawn from the material world. And the Book through which the Spirit of God breathes, glows and blooms and is fragrant with the spirit of beauty, and, more fully than any other, reflects the beauty of nature.

“Out of the heart of nature rolled
The burdens of the Bible old.”

The home of innocence is a peaceful paradise. The token of God's everlasting covenant of peace is the beautiful bow in the clouds. The land of promise is surpassing fair. The institution of religion is after no Puritanic fashion, but after a divinely given pattern which appeals to the senses with beautiful vestments, picturesque tabernacle, magnificent temple, and imposing ritual. God answers Job out of a whirlwind, sublimely summoning him to review the wonders of creation in earth and sea and sky. The Psalter, that everlasting and universal liturgy, is all bright and sweet with the efflorescence of the feeling of natural beauty. Its illuminated initial letter is a tree planted by the rivers of waters, fruitful and unfading. The eighth Psalm teaches what humility and reverence a contemplation of the firmament excites. The nineteenth Psalm shows how the heavens declare the glory of God, how their music pervades the universe, how overwhelming is their grandeur, and bids us note what a tabernacle is set therein for the sun — cloud-curtained tabernacle with veil and hangings of blue and purple and scarlet and gold screening its holy of holies. The perfect Psalm figures God as a shepherd, and pictures the green pastures and still waters of his gentle providence. The floods clap their hands; the sea roars and the fullness thereof; the valleys laugh and sing; the golden harvests wave; the glad reapers that went out with tears to sow, return with songs and sheaves; the little hills rejoice on every side; the mountains shed help and bring peace; the Lord God is like the shadow of a great rock in a weary land; the grass flourishes and withers; the flowers bloom and fade; the sparrows and swallows build their nests and rear their young on God's altars; the light is God's garment; the clouds are his chariots; the winged winds and flaming lightnings are his messengers and ministers; and, to specify no further, this hymnal, so full of music and illumination, fitly closes with a summons to angels and to men; to young and old; to sun, moon, and stars; to fire, hail, snow, and wind; to forests and mountains; to beasts and birds and creeping things; yea, to all creatures and elements to praise the Lord!

Time will not permit a description of the manner in which the

prophets set forth their word in pictures drawn from scenes of nature. The beauty of Sharon, the glory of Lebanon, the grandeur and splendor of Carmel, the lily of the valleys, the vineyards of Engedi with odorous, tender grapes, the young roe upon the mountains of spices, the budding pomegranates, the fragrant mandrakes, the cottages in the vineyards, the oaks of Bashan, the ships of Tarshish, the roaring of the sea, the glittering dew on the mown grass, the broad rivers and streams, the eagles mounting on strong wings, the constellations of heaven, the doves flying as a cloud, the earth bringing forth her bud and blooming into summer, — yea, “the King’s daughter is all glorious within,” and the King’s name is Light, and his dear Son is the Dayspring from on high, the Sun of righteousness, and the goal of all his pilgrim-people is a glorious city adorned as a bride for her husband, wherein the trees of life flourish, and the fountains of life spring, — “Jerusalem the golden,” our consolation in toil, our dream in slumber, the inspiration and theme of sweetest songs, the fulfillment of still sweeter hopes, the consummation of still sweeter life.

So much of natural beauty is wrought into this Bible that its elimination would leave but a skeleton of truth.

And the meaning of all this is, that the sense of natural beauty which thrills through us all, and which the Bible recognizes and addresses, was not given for æsthetic gratification merely, but for the very highest ends of culture; that by its proper cultivation a sense of intellectual and moral beauty might be awakened in us, which sees a divine glory in the daisy and in the star, in the purity of angels and in the humblest human virtue, and, in its highest development, needs no sun or moon to shine in its kingdom, for the glory of God is the light thereof. Wherefore I consent to Mr. Ruskin’s conclusion, that “the love of nature, wherever it has existed, has been a faithful and sacred element of human feeling;” . . . and, other things being equal with respect to two individuals, “the one who loves nature most will always be found to have more faith in God than the other.” It brings with it “such a sense of the presence and power of a great Spirit as no mere reasoning can either induce or controvert;” and, rightly pursued and associated with the higher principles of religion, “becomes the channel of certain truths which by no other means can be conveyed.” I believe with Plato in the “Symposium” that he who learns “to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes towards the end, will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty.” And the true order is, “to use the beauties

of earth as steps along which he mounts upward . . . from all fair forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and knows what the essence of beauty is."

Edwin Pond Parker.

THE THEOLOGICAL TENDENCIES IN GERMANY.

NO. II.

BEFORE describing the third tendency in German theology, a scholar who ranks among the most original thinkers of the century should be mentioned. Richard Rothe, for many years professor in Heidelberg, is frequently classed with the evangelical theologians of mediation; but he had so many peculiar views that he cannot be classified with any existing party. He himself was aware of this, and said that his place was among the theosophists, somewhere near Oettinger. If we assign him a position between the evangelical and the neo-rationalistic tendencies, it is because he united with the former in defending some of the most cherished orthodox doctrines while he rejected views usually regarded as evangelical, and also took a prominent part in organizing the Association which became the embodiment of the new rationalism.

With a deep interest in practical Christianity, he nevertheless sought quiet retirement, and compared himself with a monk of the Middle Ages. Intellectually, he belonged to the speculative theologians who were trained in the Hegelian philosophy; but at the same time had learned from Schleiermacher and from Scripture the value of the emotional and moral elements in religion. His sermons revealed a devout spirit and had a strong mystical flavor. Like Beck, he regards ethics as the fundamental, as well as the highest and most important Christian science. His work on that subject, in five volumes, is one of the ablest contributions to modern theological literature.¹ It starts with the certainty of God's existence, and on this premise attempts speculatively to construct the universe. Rothe delights in abstruse and mysterious subjects,

¹ Ehrenfeuchter in his *Christenthum und moderne Weltanschauung* (1876) says: "Rothe's *Ethik* is undoubtedly the most significant production in the theological literature of our day. Since Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* no other work of equal originality and peculiarity has appeared."

such as Creation, Demonology, and Eschatology. The first edition of his "*Ethik*" was published 1845-1848; the second edition is wholly revised and greatly enlarged. The work includes much more than is usually discussed under ethics; it in fact includes nearly the whole of systematic divinity. It treats of God and man and nature, also the doctrine of the kingdom of God. This great work does not find its explanation solely in Scripture, or in a philosophical system, or in history, or in the Reformation, or in the Christian consciousness. Rothe now uses the one, then the other, then all of them, in order to construct his speculative theological system, always going his own peculiar way, regardless whether the result is orthodox or heterodox. He fully recognizes the supernatural in religion, but at the same time is free in his criticisms. Paradoxical as it may seem, the work is a union of mystical and rationalistic elements. Some of the speculations strongly suggest the Gnosticism of the second and third centuries. Instead of making the vain attempt to give even a general idea of the contents of this voluminous work, in this article, I shall give a summary of Rothe's peculiar view of inspiration. This will enable us to understand his relation to Scripture, and will also throw light on his theological position.

His doctrine of inspiration was developed in a book published in 1863, entitled "*Zur Dogmatik*." Rothe emphasized the personality of God. Instead of adopting the view so common among modern philosophers, that absoluteness and personality exclude each other, he held that the Absolute must be personal. With pantheism he also rejected deism, which exalts God beyond all mundane affairs. In "*Zur Dogmatik*," as well as in his "*Ethik*," he places the personal God in intimate relation to man, so that He communicates with him and reveals himself to him. This supernaturalism removes him far from the liberalism of the day. Real as is the divine revelation of God to man, so also are there real miracles, though the reports of them are to be accepted only after they have stood the test of thorough critical examination. Prophecy also is real. Its end is Christ, in whom the divine revelation attains perfection.

While Rothe thus removes the gulf between the supernatural and the natural, he rejects the view that inspiration is mechanical or magical; truly divine, it is nevertheless humanly conditioned. It may be regarded as the redeeming activity of God in the midst of his chosen people, by means of which the religious consciousness is purified and strengthened. Man's activity is not excluded, but

is the condition for the reception of divine inspiration. In nature and history God reveals himself in supernatural events. He also inspires men, but in different degrees. At times the divine illumination is more a feeling, at others a thought; sometimes a hope is excited, sometimes knowledge is given. God's manifestation in nature and history arouses the religious consciousness, and this state is the point to which the inspiration is attached. Generally the inspiration does not quite equal the manifestation of God, which is consequently not fully apprehended by the inspired person; but in Christ we find both the manifestation of God and the inspiration perfect.

But how is it with the Scriptures? The inspiration of holy men is purely inner and personal, directly affecting their feelings and thoughts only during the divine act. What they do afterwards may be indirectly affected by the inspiration (which is temporary not permanent), but it is not itself inspired. This applies to their writings and preaching, as well as all other acts. Hence the Scriptures, even if all their authors were inspired and aimed to give a record of the divine illumination, are not inspired. They were produced in the same way as other books, and the writers were dependent on the usual literary aids. Rothe consequently regards the Bible as purely a human production, whose writers were liable to error. Its books must therefore be used critically, just as any other volume; nevertheless its contents, and the inspiration received by its authors, give it a peculiar value; we may call it a human record of divine revelation. But what this revelation really was is not at once apparent; it can only be learned by carefully separating the truth from the error. Though Scripture is not itself a divine record, we can nevertheless obtain from it a knowledge of the inspiration which came to men of old. The Scriptures have a divine energy, namely, the power of the testimony of those whom God had inspired. Christianity does not rest on an infallible book, and faith in such infallibility does not constitute the believer, but it rests on a person: and that is genuine Christian faith which believes in the reality of a divine revelation and in the person of Jesus Christ. The authors of Scripture, prophets and apostles included, simply give their views, their impressions, and show how they were affected; and in this light their writings must be viewed. The apostles themselves could not fully appreciate the glory revealed in Christ, much less could they perfectly describe it; but by taking all the records of Him by the different writers of the New Testament we can form a correct idea of Him. By careful

study and critical investigation we may gather into a focus the numerous rays, and thus obtain a conception of the brightness which shone in Christ. Christian truth is subject to development, and Rothe thinks that we ought to understand Christ better than the apostles did. All progress should contribute to the better understanding of God and his revelation. To despair of the possibility of learning from Scripture the true character of the divine revelation, is evidence of weakness of faith. New Christian truth is still added from time to time; it must, however, be tested by the revelation of which the Scriptures give a record. This new truth is a product of the great salvation introduced by Christ.

Holding these views, Rothe was perfectly consistent when he defended the genuineness of divine revelation as strenuously as the most orthodox and yet treated the Scriptures as freely as the most critical. We now take our leave of this speculative thinker until we meet him again in the Protestant Association.

3. *The Neo-Rationalistic Tendency.*

This includes great diversity in doctrine, as well as in religious life, in some cases approaching evangelical Christianity, while in others its adherents hesitate to acknowledge a personal God and to confess faith in the immortality of the soul. It is difficult to give the theological status of this tendency, because it glories in its liberalism, its doctrinal latitudinarianism, its individualism, and its creedlessness. Indeed, doctrinally, it is a trend rather than a status; an inquiry and a seeking rather than a settled faith. Doubt is very prominent, and the tendency is much more conspicuous in its negations than in its positive declarations.

This new rationalism differs considerably from the old, which prevailed at the close of the last and the beginning of this century. The latter regarded religion as essentially dogma, and neglected the emotional element; but the new depreciates doctrine, and lays the stress on the emotions and the life. This tendency agrees in the main with Schleiermacher in placing the seat of religion in the heart, and its leaders speak of themselves as his true followers; but others regard them as constituting the left wing of his school, and the more evangelical of the mediating theologians as the right wing. Through the influence of Schleiermacher, and of the religious development of the century, it has become much more churchly than the old rationalism. It, in fact, professes to aim specially at a revival of a religious spirit and of church love among the masses. It not merely claims to be in the church, but

to be the true church. It calls itself Christian, evangelical, and Protestant, and claims to have the essence of Christianity, and to be the legitimate heir of the Reformation. But it is also the heir of Strauss and Baur, though it may not go as far in negations as they did, and it seeks to conserve what it regards as the kernel of Christianity after criticism has destroyed the shell. It is also seriously affected by the skepticism prevalent in modern culture, though it strives to defend ideal interests against materialism, and to establish religion on a psychological and historical basis, so as to be secure against the attacks of atheism.

For more than a century rationalism has been a power in Germany. Without forming a distinct ecclesiastical organization, it affected the universities, the pulpits, and the religious life of the masses. In recent times, however, the new rationalism has been embodied in a distinct and widely scattered organization. As there is no doctrinal standard to which we can appeal, we are obliged to go to the declarations of this organization and its leaders for a correct view of the tendency.

In September, 1863, a convention of theological professors, preachers, and prominent laymen met at Frankfort on the Main and formed the Protestant Association (*Protestanten Verein*). The one hundred and thirty-one persons present represented Baden, Hanover, Saxony, Thüringen, Hesse, and Nassau. Baden took the most active part in the movement, and four of the professors of its university in Heidelberg were among the leaders, namely, Rothe, Schenkel, Bluntschli, and Holtzmann; of these, Bluntschli and Schenkel were the first presidents of the Association. As the professed aim was to include all the elements of Protestantism, Professor Baumgarten, of Rostock, also appeared. He was almost the only representative of orthodoxy, and hoped here to find that freedom which was denied him at home. Professor Ewald, of Göttingen, and Dr. C. Schwarz, of Gotha, were also among the leaders.

The new Association claimed to seek the renewal of the evangelical Protestant Church in the spirit of evangelical freedom and in harmony with the entire culture of the present age. In its declaration of principles it declares that it seeks:—

“1. The development of the German Evangelical Church on the basis of the congregational principle, and to prepare the way for an organic connection of the several churches of the land on this basis.

“2. The conservation of the rights, honor, freedom, and inde-

pendence of German Protestantism, and opposition to all that is unprotestant and hierarchical within the various churches.

"3. The preservation and development of Christian toleration and respect between the different confessions and their adherents.

"4. The creation and promotion of all those Christian undertakings which are the conditions of the moral power and welfare of our people."

From this it is evident that the Association was more concerned about church polity than a doctrinal basis. Indeed, so heterogeneous were the elements, that doctrinal agreement was out of the question. Baumgarten, at this convention, and afterwards, wanted something more positive, some definite doctrinal statement; but he was informed that the Association must first agree as to negations, and that the positive elements must be expected as the result of development. Professor Baumgarten, however, discovered that he was out of place, and in a few years withdrew from the Association.

The above resolutions, together with the speeches during the convention, indicate that the stress was laid on religious freedom, on the development of the congregational element, and on the adaptation of religion to modern culture. A kind of democratic church was desired, without doctrinal restrictions, in which all who have religious needs can feel at home.

Many of Rothe's friends were greatly surprised at his interest in the new organization. However unobjectionable the principles adopted might be, the leaders were nearly all men who rejected miracles and supernatural inspiration. But Rothe was very tolerant; and he hoped from the movement a step toward the realization of a favorite idea. In 1837 he published a book on "The Beginnings and Organization of the Christian Church," in which he expressed the conviction that the church is only a temporary institution, whose place is eventually to be taken by the state. Religion and morality, he held, will completely permeate each other, and Christianity will affect and control all the interests of man, namely, art, science, literature, public life, etc.; that is, its interests will not be so limited as those of the church at present, but will include all that belongs to the state. When the leaven of the gospel has fully permeated the community and all its affairs, the church will no longer be needed, but will be absorbed by the state. This view is also found in his "Ethik;" and in the effort to establish a free, democratic church, he hoped to see an advance toward his ideal. Hence, in his address at the Convention, he

emphasized the harmony of religion and culture, and held that Christianity is to enter a new arena, namely, the "large field which modern culture tills, the entire sphere of our state, and of national life." He also said, "As far as doctrine is concerned, the church of Christ must preach to the present generation, therefore, in its own tongue, namely, by means of its own emotions, thoughts, and modes of expression; not in a dogmatic form, which belongs to a period long past, and which has now become almost wholly historic, — in a word, not in a statutory form. The real demand of the age is more concerned about the great and peculiar historic facts, through which there is a divine revelation in the world."

Rothe is dead, Baumgarten has withdrawn, and new positive men have not been drawn into the Protestant Association. It has grown in numbers, but not in doctrinal definiteness. From recent utterances of its leaders it is evident that its strength still consists largely in negations and protests. It wants to retain the church, and speaks of it as the hope of the world, but the church in its sense is ethical and religious rather than doctrinal; it wants to retain the Scripture, but with the admission of the correctness of negative criticism, and with the perfect liberty of every one to interpret it for himself as a religious book; it wants to retain Christ, but without being bound by any orthodox doctrines respecting Him. It emphasizes the formal principle of the Reformation, the freedom of each to interpret Scripture for himself; but rejects the material principle, the doctrine of justification by faith in Jesus Christ.

The principles of the Association do not exclude the orthodox; but very naturally these are not attracted by men who have no positive creed. Still there are a few members who can hardly be classed with rationalists, since they admit the resurrection of Jesus. But they are exceptions to the general rule. There are also members who seek to secure a distinct doctrinal basis, though there seems to be but little hope of success. Nor are all the rationalists in the Association. It, in fact, protests against those radicals who try to rob Christianity of all that is peculiar, who make Jesus a mere Jew, a friend of humanity, a teacher of freedom, virtue, and brotherly love, and who either rob the historic Jesus of all that is ideal, or else make Him a myth. The Association, while distinguishing between the real historic Jesus and the Christ of John and of Paul, whom it regards as an idealization, still views him as really teaching the true doctrine of God, as

leading the way to the Father, and as having introduced the most perfect religion which can be given to humanity. There is indeed no official declaration that these views are held, but they may be regarded as an average of the doctrinal position of the members, some approaching still nearer to evangelical theologians, others diverging farther to the left.

The utterances of representative men leave no doubt respecting the general character and purpose of the Association. A member recently said, "We protest against hierarchical Romanism, the mortal enemy of Protestantism; against hierarchical, and therefore unprotestant, partisanship in the midst of us; against a subjective, and therefore unevangelical, exaggeration of Protestant ecclesiastical freedom; and against godless and unideal materialism." Another leader says, "The Protestant Church, instead of being a church of theological doctrines, is rather a communion of religious life. This life can exist even with a manifold variety of theological views, just as a healing fountain can bring health to all, even if their opinions of its remedial ingredients are very different. Therefore Christ neither gave nor required the acceptance of a dogmatic system, but demanded that each one should take up his cross and follow Him. Without injury to the character and existence of our church, we can make its gates wide for all such religious views as can be harmonized with a Christian religious life." The churchly liberalism, he says, "is no theological school, no new dogma."

This negative attitude toward doctrine was illustrated by the Protestant Association of Bavaria in 1871. A catechism was adopted which ignores the doctrine of the Trinity, the divinity of Christ, natural depravity, and the atonement. The formula of baptism also omits the Apostles' Creed.

At the organization of the *Protestanten Verein*, and since then, Professor Schenkel has been one of the most influential leaders. In 1864 he published "*Das Charakterbild Jesu*," a work depending largely on the results of the criticisms of Baur and Strauss. The example of Renan inspired Schenkel to give a popular representation of Jesus. He says that he aims "to give a truly human and really historic representation of the life of Jesus." The book is founded mainly on Mark, whose Gospel he pronounces the oldest and most reliable, deserving the preference over the others because it omits "the legendary prehistoric" account of Christ's birth, and also the appearance of the risen Jesus and his ascension. He pronounces Chap. xvi, 9-20 apocryphal. He holds that the Gospel

of John dates from the year 120, and gives an idealized picture of Jesus. Matthew and Luke are but secondary authorities, and should only be used after thorough criticism. Jesus he pronounces the son of Joseph. He indeed appeared to his disciples after his crucifixion, but it was simply an inner, visionary, spiritual appearance, just as the living Christ, as the spirit of the church, lives to this day and will continue to live. In 1866 Schenkel declared that the time needs "a truly human Saviour whose characteristics are not lost in the mist clouds of supernatural phantasies, but which appear to us in fresh truthfulness, appeal to us in a human manner, and may expect general acceptance." In the same address he said: "The labors of the ablest and most earnest investigators for more than a century have proved incontrovertibly that the Biblical books, like all others, originated in a natural way; that they must be tested like all other books; and that their historic worth and their trustworthiness must be determined by the results of this test."

Among the influential writers on dogmatics is Professor Biedermann of Zürich. His "*Christliche Dogmatik*" appeared in 1869. He admits his great indebtedness to Hegel, and says of Strauss, whom he frequently quotes: "I know how much I have been indebted to Strauss from the beginning of my theological studies, and shall never be reticent in fully acknowledging this; the less shall I be silent the more others withhold this acknowledgment." But he does not want to be regarded as simply a disciple of Strauss. He defines religion as an inter-relation between God as the Infinite and man as the finite. But what is God? Biedermann declares that He is absolute, but claims that absoluteness cannot be reconciled with personality, therefore he rejects the latter. God is absolute spirit, or the spiritual principle of the universe, or *actus purus*. The pantheism is undisguised, and the immortality of the soul is resolved into an idea. It is surprising that the book bears the title: "*Christian Dogmatics*." In Switzerland his influence is probably much greater than in Germany.

Professor Lipsius, of Jena, in his "*Lehrbuch der evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik*" (1876, second edition 1879), frequently quotes Biedermann favorably, and is thoroughly rationalistic, but he is more positive than the Zürich professor, and accepts a personal God and the immortality of the soul. Christ, as held by the Church, he regards as an idealization of the historic Jesus and a transformation of an ideal into history. The union of the divine and human in Christ, he claims, is not literal, but signifies that the

man Jesus was filled with the divine Spirit. Christ is the ideal man made in the image of God. He is the Redeemer because He is the founder of a church which knows itself to be reconciled to God. This reconciliation is not accomplished through Christ's death as a sacrifice, but God reconciles man to himself in that God's eternal redemptive will is historically realized in Christ for the church. Christ's presence with believers is only the presence of his characteristics in them, such as his aim of life and his love.

The theology of the future is sketched by another leader and one of the founders of the Protestant Association. Dr. C. Schwartz, Court-preacher in Gotha, gives the hopes of his party, at the close of his "*History of the Latest Theology*" (3d edition, 1864). "The church of the present day is to be built up by means of the deepest conscience of the people, not by means of formulas of past centuries . . . And how shall the purification of our theology and church be accomplished? Above all, by means of a consistent, truly *speculative*, united, and systematic view of the universe (*Weltanschauung*); by overcoming the external supernatural form which has become foreign to our thinking; by fully and honestly rejecting the same as well as all its remnants and appendices, with the clear conviction that the substance of Christianity will lose by this rejection nothing but the form of externality and arbitrariness in the revealing activity of God. Theology will therefore be *speculative*, holding aloof from the pantheistic and atheistic aberrations of speculation, and opposing, with equal decision, all arbitrary and all miracle theology, together with their modern embellishments." This theology of the future will be critical, will treat the Bible as it does profane literature, and will reject the inspiration of the Scriptures and their authoritative character. It will, however, be religious and moral, and, according to the teaching of Schleiermacher, will see the essence of religion in the emotional nature. On this basis it will seek to reconstruct the doctrines of religion, and to harmonize Christianity and modern culture. The author admits that this is rationalism, but claims that it is much higher than the old kind. It is the rationalism of a reason given and filled by God; and this reason, taking the place of the authority of Scripture and of every other standard, is to be the final appeal.

The rationalists, as well as the evangelical theologians, aim at the reconciliation of religion and the antagonistic culture, but they seek to accomplish this in different ways. The evangelical scholars make the Biblical doctrines the starting-point. Some of them

may yield positions which are regarded as orthodox, or they may strive to give old doctrines a new form, and to establish them by means of new proofs ; but under no circumstances are they ready to give up the supernatural elements of religion, or the redemptive character of Christianity. The new rationalism, however, starts with the negative results of criticism, and then tries to save what is left of religion. Accordingly, the doctrines of Christianity are either ignored, or are so recast as to suit the culture which is to be conciliated ; but the emotional and the moral elements of religion are the more emphasized. As the Scriptural authority is weakened, more stress is laid on the psychological basis of religion in man himself. Indeed, man's needs are largely made the source and authority of religion ; and frequently expressions are used which savor of Feuerbach's view, that religion is nothing but a product of man's nature to which no objective reality corresponds. Generally, however, rationalism draws from the subjective needs the inference that the objects of religion, such as God and immortality, are real.

In a word, the evangelical theologians aim to win scholars to the gospel ; the rationalists aim to adapt Christianity to the culture of the day.

The Friends of Positive Union, as well as the confessional Lutherans, oppose the recognition of the Protestant Association as part of the state church. But the Association insists on its right to remain in that church, and one of its members gives the following reasons for the coexistence and coöperation of the orthodox and liberals in the same state church in spite of their differences. "Both regard Christianity as the most perfect religion ; as one which is recognized and proclaimed as a social and moral power whose place nothing else can take. Both hold that there is an ethical relation of the Divine Being to man. Both claim that the Christian's highest aim is, to become a son of God. Both hold that the revelation which each individual experiences in his own spirit is most fully represented historically in the person of Jesus Christ. Neither party desires to separate Christianity from the Person of its founder. Both testify with the Apostle : God was in Christ ; and his life must be made the starting-point of all religious life. To both of them Christ is not merely the religious starting-point, the founder of religion, but also the ideal to which in the various degrees of its religious life humanity looks. Both exhort to a holy Christian life by following Christ. In the department of humane effort and active love there is a field in which all

can coöperate in the spirit of peaceful rivalry. Finally, both use the same means, namely, instruction, edification, admonition, preaching, prayer, and pastoral visitation."

Besides the persons already mentioned, Professor Hase, of Jena, the well known writer on church history, and Professor O. Pfleiderer, of Berlin, author of a "*Religionsphilosophie*" and of a compend on Christian doctrine and ethics, belong to this tendency.

4. *The School of Ritschl.*

Albrecht Ritschl (born 1822) formerly belonged to the Tübingen school; but a more careful study of the history of the early church led him to abandon its position. Since 1864 he has been theological professor in Göttingen. His most elaborate work is "*The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Redemption*," in three volumes, a second edition of which has just appeared. He aims to give the Scriptural, historical, and dogmatic exposition of the doctrine. So comprehensive is the work, and so fully does it discuss related subjects, that it may be regarded as a system of Christian dogmatics from the stand-point of the author's view of justification and redemption. For the study of his theology this work is by far the most important. Valuable for the same purpose are two brochures, one entitled, "*Unterricht in der christlichen Religion*," 1875 (second edition 1881); and the other, "*Theologie und Metaphysik*," 1881. The former is intended for religious instruction in gymnasia, and gives a condensed summary of his theology.

Ritschl wants to free theology from the influence of metaphysics, and this effort is very significant in determining the character of his system. He holds that if philosophy is used for the purpose of discovering the objects of religion or their character, it impedes the progress of theology by introducing ideas, discussions, and methods, which have no religious significance, and which produce distraction without settling anything. He has no confidence in natural theology, and does not resort to it for apologetic purposes. Kant's position, that metaphysics teaches us nothing respecting God, freedom, and immortality, is also Ritschl's view. Like Kant, he also bases religion on the moral nature in man, "on the rock of duty." He holds that in man's own nature it has so firm a foundation that it requires no metaphysical proofs. Not only do man's needs, especially those of a moral, practical character, demand a God, but they are also proof of his existence. The *ought* of conscience would be absurd and inexplicable if there were

no God. This again savors strongly of Kant's effort to make the practical reason give to man that respecting which metaphysics, or the speculative reason, had failed to teach him anything.

This makes it evident why Ritschl's theology has been called "New Kantianism." Placing it on a moral foundation, he aims to make religion thoroughly practical. Instead of inquiring into the metaphysical character of the being of God, he wants simply to consider Him so far as He is related to man and has communicable attributes. Thus he holds that the doctrine of the omnipotence and omniscience of God has no significance for the explanation of nature, but only for the purpose of assuring the believer of the providential care of his heavenly Father. "Therefore the thought of the omnipotence of God is consistently perfected in that of his wisdom, omniscience, and helpfulness, in relation to the condition and needs of men." Again he says: "Love is the perfect Christian conception of God." He is a spiritual person, He is the only God, and is the Creator of the world and the Ruler of all.

Ritschl aims at nothing less than a revolution in theological thinking, at the same time seeking to promote the development of the existing religious life. Theologically, his place is between the evangelical school and the rationalists; but chronologically he comes last, his being the latest system.

He rejects the doctrine of natural depravity, and declares Augustine's view, that the original inclination to sin is propagated by generation and is viewed as personal guilt, which is punished with eternal damnation, as not confirmed by a single writer in the New Testament. Sin is not made universal by natural generation, nor by a necessity of man's nature or surroundings, though the circumstances in which he is placed allure him to sin. Ritschl says: "Sin is apparently an unavoidable product of the human will amid the given conditions of its development; nevertheless, in the consciousness of our freedom and independence, it is regarded as guilt." The fact of universal sinfulness must be admitted. Jesus was an exception, — He was sinless; but this is not to be regarded as at all in conflict with his humanity.

The calamities which come on man cannot be viewed as a divine punishment for sin. They are simply the product of nature, occasioned either by the natural course of events or resulting naturally from the sins of men. Properly speaking, the term divine punishment can be applied only to our subjective state produced by our consciousness of guilt, such as the interference with our free-

dom and a lack of confidence in God. From this subjective divine punishment we are delivered by the redemption in Christ. This redemption is the forgiveness of sin, which simply means that the separation from God, caused by guilt, is overcome. The effect of redemption is nothing but the restoration of man to communion with God, and the removal of everything from man which kept him from God.

Ritschl teaches that, as far as his nature is concerned, Christ is mere man. That which brings Him into relation with God is his faith, his purpose, and his life. We can speak of his preëxistence; but its meaning is, that it was the eternal purpose of God's love that Jesus should come into the world and gather under himself, as the Head, all the faithful. So we can speak of the continuous reign of Christ; but its sense is, that the divine will which purposes the establishment of the kingdom still continues.¹ He summarizes his doctrine respecting Christ in the following passage: "In order to get a complete conception of the significance of Jesus, we must take into account the fact that his mission, or the aim of his life, namely, the establishment of the kingdom of God, is recognized by himself as the special aim of God in the world. The unity with God, which Jesus accordingly asserts for himself, applies to the whole sphere of his activity within his calling, and therefore consists in the inter-relation existing between the love of God and the faithfulness of Jesus to his mission. Now Jesus, because He was the first to realize in his own life the purpose of the establishment of God's kingdom, is the only one of his kind; for if any one else were to accomplish the same task as perfectly as He did, he would be unlike Him in that he would be dependent on Him. Hence, as the archetype of humanity, which is to be organized into the kingdom of God, He is the original object of the divine love, so that the divine love toward the members of God's kingdom is mediated through Him. If, therefore, we estimate according to its full worth this person laboring in his peculiar calling, — a person whose constant motive is recognized as unselfish

¹ A disciple of Ritschl, Julius Thikötter, of Bremen, says: "Eine Präexistenz Christi kennt auch Ritschl, aber es ist die, welche ewig im Liebeswillen Gottes begründet ist, der vor Grundlegung der Welt beschlossen hat, dass die Gemeinde im eingebornen Sohne unter ein Haupt verfasst werde. Ein überirdisches Walten Christi nach der Auferstehung ist auch seinem Glauben gewiss; aber es ist die Fortdauer desselben Willens, der auf die Herstellung des Reiches Gottes gerichtet ist, eines Willens, dessen transcendentethätigkeit im Einzelnen wir nicht kennen." *Darstellung und Beurtheilung der Theologie Albrecht Ritschl's*, p. 32.

love to men, — we shall see in Jesus the perfect revelation of God as love, grace, and faithfulness." Ritschl means that Christ's purpose is the same as God's, and that therefore in Christ we have a revelation of the divine will.

Christ is the author of redemption. This must not, however, be taken to mean that He renders satisfaction to God for the sins of the world by means of his death. Ritschl regards that death as merely the culmination of his faithfulness to his calling. He bore the sin and punishment of no one; but so unreservedly did He devote himself to his mission, that He willingly endured the sufferings and death connected therewith, recognizing them as part of the divine purpose. This faithfulness to his calling in life and death may be viewed as a sacrifice, as a free offering of himself to God. His aim in this faithfulness was not merely personal; He wanted thereby to bring humanity into the same relation to God which He himself sustained to the Father. He accomplished all that was required to make the communion of himself and all men with God possible.

The result of Christ's faithfulness is the establishment of God's kingdom. Such prominence is given to this kingdom, that in the "Unterricht" it comes first. God aims at its establishment, and so does Christ; hence in Christ's aim we have a revelation of God. In order that this kingdom may be founded, God does not demand an atonement for sin. In the sacrifices of the Old Testament Ritschl seeks the key for the interpretation of Christ's sacrifice. His conclusion is, that in the death of Jesus there is nothing to appease God's wrath or to effect in any manner a change in the relation of God to man. He claims that God, being love, has no enmity toward man, and needs no reconciliation; but man, being at enmity with God, needs reconciliation to Him. This is brought about by Christ's faithfulness in life and death, by means of which He proved that God wants men to come to himself. Thus Christ's sacrifice, redemption, forgiveness, have significance for the sinner only; through these, without any further act or merit on his part, he is brought into communion with God. These change the sinner's attitude to God, not God's attitude toward him. The justification of the sinner means that through Christ he has obtained confidence in the love of God as a Father, and that his guilt is no obstacle in the way of communion with Him. Thus restored to God, the believer will experience all the blessings of forgiveness, and his justification becomes the source of the Christian life.

The church ascribes divinity to Christ and calls him the Son of

God. Ritschl explains it in this way. In Jesus we have the love, patience, purpose, and the victory over the world, which are also characteristic of God. Christ, therefore, in manifesting these qualities in his life and death, gave a perfect revelation of God, and for this reason divinity has been ascribed to Him. He says: "It is presupposed that the divinity of Christ is not intended to indicate an absolute distance between his person and the members of his church. Originally, that attribute was rather meant in this sense: that the divinity of Christ is a direct guaranty that the whole human nature is to be made divine." Nevertheless, Christ is peculiar, for none can share with Him the glory of founding the kingdom of God. He is also the Lord of the kingdom; and as its Founder and Lord He is an object of love.

Christ being godlike, every believer is through his example and teaching also to become godlike in heart and purpose and life. The perfect religion was given to the world by Christ, and for a knowledge of it we depend solely on the Scriptures. Being a religion which redeems man, it does not merely restore him to God in conversion, but it also keeps him from sin. It frees man from sin's dominion, makes him master of himself, raises him above the evils of this life, and gives him the victory over the world. That redemption which removes from man everything which keeps him from God, also gives him the assurance that he is justified. This assurance is attained by confidence in God and through the Christian graces, such as patience amid sufferings, and humility. He who believes in Christ's revelation of the Father as love and as ready to receive sinners cannot doubt his access to God. Thus men are saved through faith in Jesus Christ.

This theology, which aims to be wholly practical, which professes to stand solely on Scripture, which denies the divinity of Christ's nature and yet admits his sinlessness and his resurrection, and which retains the usual religious terms, but gives them a new meaning, is exciting much and violent discussion. In books, pamphlets, reviews, and religious journals, it is treated as the burning question in theological literature; and numerous pastoral conferences have passed condemnatory resolutions. A prominent orthodox minister recently said: "We have more reason to fear it than the Protestant Association." It is still in a formative state, and the school is actively engaged in developing and defending it. Already it has won able adherents, among them Professors W. Herrmann, of Marburg, Bender, of Bonn, and, in some of the main points, Kaftan of Berlin, the successor of Dorner, appointed in spite of his protest.

It is impossible to determine the strength and influence of each of the four parties described. There are in Germany seventeen Universities with Protestant theological faculties. Nominally, eleven of these belong to the United Church, namely, Berlin, Bonn, Breslau, Halle, Greifswald, Königsberg, Marburg, Giessen, Heidelberg, Jena, Strassburg; six belong to the Lutheran, namely, Erlangen, Leipsic, Rostock, Göttingen, Kiel, Tübingen. Since 1876 the number of theological students has greatly increased. In 1863 there were 2,474; in 1876, only 1,532; in 1881, as many as 2,484. In the corresponding years the United Universities had 1,482, 679, 1,300 theological students, while the Lutheran had 992, 853, 1,184. At present the number in all the Protestant Universities is probably over one thousand more than in 1881.

The above, owing to the freedom prevalent in German Universities, gives no idea of the strength of the respective tendencies. In general, it may be said that the Confessional Lutheran tendency prevails at Erlangen, Rostock, and Leipsic, though in the last the Evangelical is also well represented. The Evangelical tendency prevails at Halle, Berlin, and Tübingen, and is strongly represented in various other Universities. Heidelberg, Jena, and Strassburg are the strongholds of rationalism.¹ The theology of Ritschl predominates at Göttingen (though the faculty also has Evangelical theologians), Giessen, and Marburg. In Breslau there are Confessional, as well as Evangelical, theologians. In Bonn there are Evangelical theologians (among them Christlieb), besides representatives of rationalism and one member of Ritschl's school. In 1881 Leipsic had the largest number of theological students, 474; Halle had 321; Berlin, 284; Tübingen, 281; Heidelberg had the least. While the number studying theology is much larger now, it is not probable that the proportion has changed much.

If we look at the different countries, we may say in general that in Prussia the Evangelical party predominates, though there are districts in which Confessional Lutheranism is influential, but the Protestant Association is weak.² In Saxony Confessional Lutheranism predominates, though the Evangelical party is also strong; rationalism has few representatives. Mecklenburg and Schleswig-

¹ It is a significant fact that in 1863, the year in which the Protestant Association was formed, Heidelberg had 110 theological students; in 1876 it had 13; in 1881, 29. This winter it has 42.

² For this summary I am largely indebted to Professor Messner of the Berlin University, whose position, as editor for twenty-five years of a religious journal, has given him special facilities for learning the tendencies prevalent in various parts of Germany.

Holstein are Confessional; Bavaria and Hanover are largely so, though in both there are members of the Protestant Association, and in the latter also representatives of Ritschl's school. Württemberg is Evangelical. In Baden and Alsace and in parts of Thuringia rationalism prevails; and if we go outside of Germany, the same must be said of Holland and Switzerland.

Often the different tendencies exist side by side, and in some countries all of them are found. While their relative strength cannot be definitely determined, there is no question that the Confessional and the Evangelical parties are far more numerous and influential in the church than the other two. They also control the largest number of the theological and religious journals. At the meeting of the Protestant Association in May, 1883, it was stated regretfully that in the largest state church, namely, in Prussia, as well as in most of the other state churches of Germany, orthodoxy still reigned supreme. But while the majority of the theological professors and of the preachers are Biblical, skepticism and religious indifferentism prevail to a large extent among the masses.

J. H. W. Stuckenberg.

BERLIN, GERMANY.

EDITORIAL.

SHALL CONGRESS INVESTIGATE DIVORCE?

NEARLY a score of petitions from different parts of the country have already been sent to Washington, asking Congress to investigate the divorce laws of the several States, and to decide whether it is best to take any action securing uniformity. These petitions will soon be followed by others. Several influential congressmen favor the investigation, and it is probable that the proposal will receive early attention.

Let us understand precisely what the movement is. Congress is not asked to legislate on this subject, for it clearly has not the power, unless, in certain cases, to give effect to decisions. The States have never committed to the United States legislation and jurisdiction concerning marriage. Only by an amendment to the Constitution, agreed to by three fourths of the States, can the federal government have any authority over marriage and divorce. Congress, then, is asked to investigate the laws of the several States, and if thought best, the statistics of divorce, in order to determine whether or not a constitutional amendment securing uniformity shall be recommended to the States. Investigation with such an object is clearly within its power.

As to the importance of having uniform laws, there can be no difference of opinion. The only question now is concerning the method of procedure. The evils of divorce are generally admitted. The rapid increase of divorce is alarming. In every State where statistics have been gathered it is found that the ratio of divorces to marriages has been advancing during the last few years. The basis of comparison is relatively unimportant. Whether the ratio is found by comparing the divorces of each year with the marriages of that year, or with the entire number of married couples residing in the State, the result is the same. Divorces are more frequently sought and obtained than in former years. This increase also has accompanied the extension of causes for which divorce may legally be granted. Governor Robinson of Massachusetts, in his message to the legislature, refers to the statistics of divorce of the last twenty years, and says, "The array of facts presented is most striking. Step by step greater facility in obtaining a dissolution of the marriage bond has been secured, the causes for full divorce have been increased from two to nine, and the party against whom a divorce has been granted may now, in all cases, after two years marry again, even in the face of a record of shameless debauchery, brutality, or profligacy. Considering the ratio of divorces to marriages, or to the population of the State, the increase in the number of divorces is alarmingly excessive. The evil is so threatening, the tendencies are so dangerous, that the protest of every

thoughtful person ought to be uttered against further destruction of the safeguards of the marriage contract, or of domestic purity and integrity." Growing disregard of the sanctity of marriage is not owing to the influx of foreigners, except in a few Western cities, for the Romish Church is uncompromisingly opposed to divorce, but is found chiefly among Americans. Moreover, some of the New England States show the largest proportion of divorces to marriages.

Ignorance of these facts is disappearing. Few reforms have made so rapid progress as divorce reform. The condition of things, of which scarcely any were aware five years ago, is now recognized on all hands. The pulpit and the press discuss the subject frequently, and conventions and conferences of the great religious denominations adopt suitable resolutions. The reform has advanced to the stage when the question is asked on all sides, What shall be done about it? On the legal side, two changes are to be desired. One, the reduction of causes for which divorce may be granted; the other, uniformity of laws in all the States, in place of existing diversity. If uniformity can be secured it is believed that a reduction of causes would also be secured. Diversity of laws is a fruitful source of easy divorce and remarriage. The law of New York allows divorce for certain causes, though not allowing the divorced person in those cases to remarry. But the person divorced in New York may go over into Pennsylvania, marry again, and immediately return to New York to live. A Massachusetts man gains a residence in Rhode Island, or in some Western State, applies for a divorce, gains his case by default of the other party to appear, who knows nothing of the appeal, and marries again on the way home. Instances of this sort might be multiplied indefinitely. Since not only morals, but also tenure of property, and other legal rights, are affected by this condition of affairs, the evil is deplorable for every reason.

How shall uniformity be secured? Governor Robinson apparently favors concurrent action of the States. He says, "Uniformity in legislation in all the States is in the highest degree desirable. I submit to you to consider whether it would not be wise to inaugurate measures by conference, or otherwise, toward concurrence of action throughout the country." This may prove to be the best method. It may be found to have decided advantages. Meantime, the measure proposed in the petition to Congress has much to commend it, and does not conflict with any action which may be taken by this or that State. The petitioners do not beg that the Constitution may be amended, but that inquiries may be made, as a result of which an intelligent decision may be reached as to the best method of securing uniformity. The facts may show that there is need of an amendment, or they may show that there is no such need. If an amendment is recommended, its character could be wisely determined. If an amendment is not thought advisable, the States would have the benefit of the information gained to guide them in securing uniformity

concurrently. If it is left to the States, there would, of course, be the danger that afterwards this or that State would add to the number of causes ; but this danger might, perhaps, be guarded against. A very important suggestion is that made by Rev. Mr. Dike, the first authority on this subject in the country, and also an earnest and indefatigable defender of the sacredness of the family. He says, " If an amendment to the Constitution in the interests of uniformity were found necessary, it might, and it might not, transfer jurisdiction of divorce, or of marriage and divorce, to the federal courts. The entire effect of the amendment might be simply to prescribe a uniform basis on which marriage and divorce laws, in the several States, should be made and administered. Thus the whole matter might be left to the administrative care of the several States as completely as it now is, and with the advantage of fixed uniformity, without disturbing the relation of the States to the general government." Mr. Dike evidently does not care for definite action until a later time, when the facts are gathered. The first object of the memorial is to gain information. Its supporters are by no means committed to the method of amending the Constitution, some of them being in favor of the inter-state method of securing uniformity. What is wanted is an intelligent basis of procedure.

It is not unlikely that the legal bearings of the subject may be found to be international. Our relations with Canada in this respect, and with more distant countries, may require attention.

It may be that the agitation of the Mormon iniquity will induce Congress to make this investigation. Congressmen, who, for political reasons, are opposed to disturbing the Mormons, might remind New England Senators, when they advocate harsh measures, that the condition of things with the family is no better than it should be in their own States ; that under easy divorce the only difference between Utah and New England is, that in Utah polygamy consists in having several wives simultaneously, while in New England polygamy is consecutive. Needed legislation against Mormonism might be impeded by attaching divorce inquiry as a rider. More improbable attempts have been successful. It is important, then, that the evils growing out of conflicting laws of marriage and divorce in the States should be considered by themselves, and considered soon.

The individualism which lies at the root of easy divorce has gone too far. Unmixed selfishness chafes under the restraints of marriage, and seeks more congenial companionship. The fancied rights of the individual make him unmindful of his duties. The family must not be sacrificed to the individual. The facility with which divorce may be procured makes many marriages mere experiments. The solemn promise no longer means " till death us do part," but till one of us becomes tired of the other. There are those who do not leave out of sight the laxity of law, even at the moment of marriage. Stringent divorce laws would di-

minish the number of hasty marriages. No relation, indeed, should be more carefully dealt with than this. Bungling legislation would work untold mischief. But, on the other hand, neither should purity of morals, good order, the rights of children, and the sacredness of the family be neglected to secure individual liberty which, in this case, is too often mere license.

OPINIONS AT SECOND-HAND.

AT a recent meeting of an association of ministers, Professor Ladd's book on the Bible was the subject of discussion. Nearly all the clergymen present expressed themselves unfavorably. At length some one said he should like to know how many had read the book and were therefore capable of forming an opinion, when it appeared that not one of them had read it, and only three had even seen it. They had accepted without question the critical (or uncritical) judgment of some religious newspaper or periodical.

Unfortunately, this instance is not singular, nor is this mode of criticism limited in its application to one class of writings. Jonathan Edwards complained that his opponents, themselves clergymen, did not understand nor carefully read his published works. No assumption is safer, indeed, than that every book which departs from current views will be condemned by many who have never seen it, but who follow the opinions of others, and thus criticise at second or third hand. Dr. Bushnell had good reason to complain that his adversaries did not take pains to obtain correct knowledge of his views, but blindly followed the lead of untrustworthy critics. During earlier controversies in Connecticut the same injustice was suffered on both sides.

It is surprising that educated men, men who profess to be guides in religious thought, and from whom candor at least should be expected, will adopt at second-hand conclusions which should be accepted only after careful examination, and upon subjects which involve the most sacred interests. That should be an oracle well-nigh infallible, whose deliverances are not questioned, and which supersedes the need of forming one's own intellectual judgments. When the Pope issues an *Index Expurgatorius*, all good Roman Catholics accept it as final, but it can hardly be believed that educated ministers in New England, and at this time of day, will meekly adopt as irresponsible, and for aught they know, unintelligent opinion. It is not affirmed that every minister is bound to read every new book on Biblical criticism or theology, for life is short, the world is busy, and of making many books there is no end; but it should go without saying that no book which is the result of wide and patient research, and which is put forth with honest intentions, should be condemned by those who are ignorant of its contents, merely because a newspaper, which avows itself the organ of opposite views, sees fit to criticise it unfavorably.

Compare with this blind following of guides, who may themselves be blind, the judicial temper which refuses to form conclusions without direct knowledge. A well-known lawyer who is widely interested in theology remarked concerning a publication which was exciting much attention that it was not competent for him to express an opinion, for he had not examined the work. When speaking, however, of a pamphlet which was making some stir he pronounced emphatically concerning it, and claimed the right to do so because he had studied it with painful diligence. A professor of political economy was asked what he thought of a certain speech by a member of Congress, who was also prominent in religious and educational circles, a speech which had been praised and blamed with equal heat. The professor said, "You must excuse me from giving an opinion, for I have seen only brief reports and partisan comments in the newspapers. I hope to have the full text in a few days." The oft-repeated and urgent advice of a wise instructor to his pupils was, "Verify your references, verify your references." As far as possible have knowledge at first-hand. If at second-hand, do not take for granted the intelligence and honesty of your informant.

Let one suffer from second-hand criticism of his own views, and he will perceive the depravity of it. At a convention composed of men who are not classed as orthodox, or even progressively orthodox, a discussion was held on the rational use of the Bible. One speaker after another satirized the uses of the Bible declared to be habitual with evangelical preachers, and ridiculed their theories of inspiration. The speakers may have believed all they said, but, if so, they were grossly misinformed, and had taken exceptions as the rule. An orthodox preacher, who sat in a corner of the church, boiled with indignation as he listened to such misrepresentations, and lost his night's sleep in righteous anger. Quietness came only with the charitable reflection that he and his beloved church were the victims of second-hand criticism.

If preachers allow others to read books for them, yet talk as confidently as if they did their own reading, they also allow others to think for them, and theologize for them, and believe for them. The clerical profession is often compared unfavorably with the legal profession in this very respect, and doubtless with some justice. It is said that lawyers (and the same might be said of physicians and students of the natural sciences) are more cautious than clergymen in reaching conclusions, and especially are slower to adopt the opinions of others. The conditions under which a preacher finds himself make this one of his peculiar dangers. The lawyer knows that another lawyer sits inside the rail of the court-room, ready to scrutinize his citation and challenge his opinion, and after a few exposures of his mistakes he learns to verify his references and to have a reason for the opinion that is in him. But preachers are exempt from immediate reply to any, even the rashest statements; their assertions are never publicly, and seldom privately, challenged; and

congregations always appear to be in a docile, uncritical mood. Indeed, there are some who consider it wrong to criticise sermons, and the preacher himself occasionally rebukes those who listen in a critical spirit. It is thought a virtue to speak favorably of a sermon which is mistaken in its facts and prejudiced in its assertions. These conditions easily induce a careless habit on the part of the preacher in forming opinions on all subjects, and may encourage a foolish and fatal facility in adopting the strong assertions of others merely because they fall in with his own preconceived notions. The fact, also, that the preacher is expected to speak positively, giving forth, as the phrase goes, no uncertain sound, tends to make him dogmatic on subjects of which he may be densely ignorant, or upon which he has only borrowed opinions. Clergymen need to guard themselves against this constant and subtle temptation to inaccuracy and dogmatism. The pulpit is brought into disrepute among thinking men because the temptation is not resisted. Said a sensible man, when a minister's name was given as authority for a statement, "ministers take one-sided views." Silently, but surely, a verdict is forming against the preacher, if he is unguarded in his assertions, and thus the gospel loses some of its advantage. The Word of God may be handled deceitfully and even ignorantly. Unwittingly, because he does not verify his references, the speaker does injury to his good cause. It is still worse when he deliberately trusts to the ignorance of his audience. He lets a statement go, although he is a little doubtful of it, because he thinks no one will suspect it. The unqualified assertion that the first chapter of Genesis in all its details is in exact agreement with the latest conclusions of physical science would not be so stoutly maintained if the preacher should perceive a professional scientist in the congregation. Farmers and sailors despise a minister whose profuse illustrations exhibit his ignorance of agriculture and navigation. Even concerning subjects with which they are not familiar, plain people have a fine instinct to distinguish knowledge based on facts from assertion based on borrowed opinion. They sometimes doubt whether the eminent authorities claimed as advocates of the views which the speaker adopts are fairly dealt with. They feel that detached sentences in the writer's very language may give a wrong impression. What else does he say?

We would not bring a railing accusation against our brethren in the ministry. The judicial temper is sometimes found in the pulpit. But, for the reasons given, preachers are in danger of allowing their assertions to outrun their knowledge. If they become identified with a party in the church, they are all the more likely to pass unfavorable judgment on the books, views, and even character, of those who belong to the opposing party. The man who does his reading at second-hand will surely do his preaching at second-hand, and will show himself a partisan.

We have dwelt on the injury done by want of fairness and of personal knowledge to the preacher himself and to the gospel he stands to de-

fend,—we might have emphasized other evils. In the case of writings on religious subjects, serious injustice may be done to Christian brethren. To condemn a man unheard, to excite suspicion against a man merely because some one else sees fit to suspect him, is a wicked thing. Pretended or genuine jealousy for the truth cannot atone for unfairness. It is also probable that second-hand criticism will attribute to an author opinions he does not hold, and that strength will be wasted in misdirected opposition. Pursuit goes off on the wrong scent, and the real error is free to run where it will. If an army remains encamped before deserted fortifications, the enemy entrenching himself at another point chuckles with delight.

But, apart from all this, too much cannot be said in urging all Christian ministers to know whereof they affirm. A preacher of the gospel above all men should have the virtue of honesty. He should never deal falsely even with an enemy. It should rarely be possible for a hearer to say that in this or that particular, to his certain knowledge, there was misrepresentation. It should not be matter of surprise, as it apparently is, when it can be said of a clergyman that he is perfectly candid, and has the merit of frankness. Want of candor is always felt. “Does the preacher really mean all he says? Are these his deliberate opinions, or is he echoing the thoughts of others”? It is a bad sign when the preacher asserts in public what he qualifies or even apologizes for in conversation.

Those ministers have most influence who have most honesty. Intellectual candor, just concessions to the views of others, habitual caution in the statement of facts, give the preacher incalculable power when he does express himself with positiveness. One of the finest compliments ever paid to a Christian minister was the remark of a hearer after a sermon on an unpopular doctrine. He said: “That man would not express such views unless he had good reasons, nor unless he honestly believed them to be true.”

THE METHODS OF CHRISTIAN BENEFICENCE.

THE recent death of Mrs. Valeria G. Stone, at Malden, Mass., has called fresh attention to a notable, and in some respects, a unique instance of Christian beneficence.

At the death of her husband, a few years ago, Mrs. Stone found herself in possession of property to the amount of between two and three millions. Mr. and Mrs. Stone had lived a remarkably simple and unostentatious life. He had belonged to that class of business men who prefer safety to rapid accumulation. If not fond of brilliant financiering, he was distinguished for an instinct in discerning risk, however speciously disguised, which in some men is a genius. His growing fortune brought with it no expensive ambitions, either for himself or his wife.

When its final disposition became a pressing question, a general understanding was established between them, that, after a generous provision for relatives, the bulk of the property should be devoted to educational and charitable purposes. At his death this great charge fell into the hands of Mrs. Stone. Upon the basis of a singularly kind and sympathetic nature, a life of conscientious Christian devotedness had wrought in this admirable woman a type of benevolence, as yet seldom attained even among the disciples of Him who went about doing good. Calling to her aid a gentleman exceptionally qualified to give both information and advice, she carefully made her investments where the surest and most permanent returns could be secured. It was the transfer to the interests of Christ's spiritual kingdom of the business principles and methods which her husband had used in building up his own private fortune. Not only were unworthy objects avoided, but inferior objects also. Only the *best*, regarding the elements of large returns, of safety, and of permanence, were selected. The result promises to be, so far as human foresight can determine it, that the two million dollars she has invested will yield the largest immediate profits, chiefly in the production of cultivated and scholarly minds for Christ's service, and that this income will continue for an indefinite period, increasing rather than diminishing, — a river, like that seen by the Psalmist, "the streams whereof shall make glad the city of our God."

This principle of benevolent investment, though not peculiar to this case, has yet been so marked a feature in it, as to challenge attention. It corresponds to the principle observed in business in investing trust funds. The object is security and a permanent income; while, if the element of perpetuity can be added so that the property can be handed down unimpaired to future generations, a large sacrifice of present profit is considered justifiable. No charitable investments meet all these conditions so fully as the endowments connected with educational institutions. Experience has shown their exceptional safety and their freedom from the danger of perversion. Conscientious and enlightened men have the control of them. Watchful eyes are constantly upon them. Every personal interest connected with their administration demands their protection. Very few losses have occurred, and, in these cases, such was the void created, the loss has been speedily made up, often by the custodians themselves. Still less numerous have been the instances of mal-administration; and in these cases the evil has been uniformly due to the selection by the donors themselves of trustees, identified with local interests contiguous to, but distinct from, the institutions endowed. The peculiar economy and conscientiousness of the clergy, who are largely in the preponderance among the managers of benevolent and especially of educational funds, have contributed to this result, far more than is supposed by the general public.

Another feature of this great charity, a feature which unfortunately is

a marked peculiarity of this case, in which few others have thus far shared, is that the donor has not been merely a testator, but the almoner of her own gifts. At this point also the lessons of experience are many and decisive. The difficulties attending the execution of the will of a testator, though the utmost care and foresight are employed, have become proverbial. But these difficulties, if carefully studied, will be found to cluster chiefly about the initiation of designated enterprises. At the outset will appear the struggle of the heirs-at-law, whose hopes, for long years perhaps, have grown into such confident anticipations as to inspire the honest conviction that a fraud and a robbery have been practiced upon them, when they see their treasures flowing into the channels of benevolence. Next come the perils of administration and execution; the risks of building, costly mistakes in selecting sites, or making contracts; lack of personal and competent supervision, the wastes of inexperience, the numberless methods by which legacies can be frittered away upon ill-considered and unfruitful schemes.

Mrs. Stone ran no such risks. She was content with the income of a moderate sum for her own use. She generously provided for her husband's relatives and for her own, and put them at once, and under her own eye, into possession of the portions she had designed for them. She sent joy into many a suffering but sensitive household. She aided the aspirations of many a diligent and devoted student. Her last years were made warm and bright with the gratitude of those who received her gifts, not from her executors, but from her own personal ministry. But still more compensating were her investments of the talents committed to her, in the institutions of learning which were the chief objects of her interest. Some of these became relieved from the embarrassments of years. Some were strengthened at their weakest point. All were inspired with new courage and hope. The least of the annual dividends of usefulness coming from these great charities are those first received. As the machinery they have created becomes adjusted, and other appliances become adjusted around them, a constant increment will appear in this income of educated minds and consecrated lives.

We commend this rare example of "business shrewdness," if it be not better called *Christian wisdom*, to the thought of all whose work is assigned in the department of supplies, the commissary duty, necessary as it is honorable, in the armies of the King.

WENDELL PHILLIPS: THE MAN AND HIS MANNER.

"THE King is dead: long live the King," cried the French in the old days of Monarchy, in the same breath mourning the demise of one monarch and hailing the advent of his successor. "The King is dead," cry the American people, lamenting the death of their moral king of persuasive speech. They begin the accents of welcome, "Long live the King,"

but stop at the first syllable. Welcome is changed into inquiry, Is there any? Who is he? Some say that in the death of Phillips there is an end of American eloquence; others are discoursing upon the causes that account for the Decline and Fall of American Oratory. Our present concern is not so much with the coming ruler who shall sway our hearts with his eloquence as with the incomparable voice, now forever silent, that brought every listener under its magical dominion.

To speak of Wendell Phillips as the Orator of Popular Reform is to describe his entire career. Except the sacred temple of his hearth, he knew no other devotion than the Platform as the Tribune of the people. On the threshold of manhood he discovered that his vocation was to act upon his fellow-men by his voice alone. The Sources of Power in his Oratory were peculiarly rich and varied. "There is no true eloquence," says Emerson, "unless there is a man behind the speech." The best blood of an untitled Puritan aristocracy flowed in his veins. His gentle birth and breeding imparted to his mien and bearing the easy dignity and self-poise of a patrician. Whenever Phillips spoke his audience felt that there was not only a man behind the speech, but a gentleman — one of the brave old Sir Philip Sidney and John Hampden sort. His inherited feeling for what is morally heroic and ideal gave his oratory its captivating power of style; the force of his strenuously earnest and sincere personality gave his eloquence concentration and passion; his exquisite sensibility and fineness of nervous organization pervaded voice, figure, and action with a magnetic charm of reality and naturalness. To explain his oratory is simply to say that God organized Wendell Phillips for "the mystery of commanding" multitudes by speech as He did Jenny Lind by song. It was but *natural* that he should be elegant, noble in form and feature, endowed with genius, and excite the admiration and respect of all around him. He was not merely eloquent, he was eloquence. His daily life was identical with his rhetorical life. His oratory, in its elements, was all of a piece. Ideas, style, and delivery had, in the language of criticism, "the wholeness of good tissue." Hence, the total impression of his marvelous oratory was that of polished power, steadily moving with the unconscious grace of ease.

The historical situation of the most active part of his life furnished him with some of the grandest themes that could engage an ardent soul pervaded with a passion for justice. The air was electric with the spirit of reform. He was called to the dangerous mission of speaking to an excited populace, sometimes aroused to tumult, and he accomplished his mission with the graceful power of a gentleman and a hero. Modern history affords but one parallel, the eloquent Frenchman, Alphonse de Lamartine.

While the peculiar effect of his speaking resided in the nobleness and unity of delivery as the spontaneous expression of his chaste, elegant, and heroic nature, rather than in any one of its details, the Elements of Power

were nevertheless discoverable to critical study. Upon rising to speak, he slowly buttoned his black frock-coat, and advanced to his position upon the platform with the easy deliberation of a gentleman in his drawing-room. Unlike Webster, he never appeared in the conventional evening dress. Before he opened his lips to speak, his presence filled the eye. His attitude was a subject for the sculptor. The weight of the body was usually supported upon the left foot, with the right slightly advanced at an easy angle, his head bent slightly forward and gently inclined to one side. The attitude was the union of firmness and repose, the perfect economy of muscular effort. The auditor unconsciously felt the force of the orator's own remark, — "In a public speaker, physical advantages are half the battle."

The chief weapon of his oratory was his voice. In its natural powers it was not remarkable, either for its intensity, volume, or compass. The secret of its physical influence lay partly in its peculiar "quality," or *timbre*. The musical register was a baritone, used in the upper series of the chest notes. With its absolute purity, and its density of vibratory resonance, his voice possessed a carrying power that penetrated to every part of any large audience-room. The *character* of the voice — the man in it — had the effect of "finding" its auditor. It had an *intimate* tone, as if it were speaking to each one as an unknown friend. To our ear it was the penetrating mellowness of the flute rather than the stirring note of the bugle. Another element in its magical charm was the easy method of its production. The beauty and sweetness of the instrument was much, but it needed the skillful artist to make and control the music. The modulations were regulated by the sureness of his perfect taste. They were the flexible intonations of elevated conversation. His modulation, like his style and diction, was the perfection of talking to people. It had the indescribable grace of genuineness, and the note of distinction which marks the conversational tones of a true gentleman.

In the rate of utterance he achieved the rare excellence of speaking deliberately without seeming slow. He was thus enabled to secure audibility and distinctness by giving sufficient time, or "quantity" to the formation of the open vowels and a clear-cut stamp to the consonants. Who ever heard Wendell Phillips mar his speaking by hurry? Yet who ever heard him when he did not speak like a man *alive*? His natural sense of perfection in his art led him to conform his pronunciation to the best standards. Occasionally he would make a slip. In the same speech he would say "either" and "ither," "philosophical" and "philosophical." With an indifference to the foppery of culture, he would put to frequent use the colloquialisms, "well," "can't," "was n't," "don't," "won't," "would n't," "should n't," but from his refined lips they seemed almost to gain authority and propriety. We do not speak of them for imitation; they were simply in harmony with his general colloquial method of delivery. In the use of the intellectual and emotional

instruments of expression, — “emphasis” and “force,” “inflection” and “pitch,” “movement” and “pause,” — he had a felicity which attuned them to every shade of sentiment and meaning. He possessed the power of investing significant words and phrases with a peculiarly impressive effect. Whenever he wished the audience to weigh any important thought he had just uttered, he made a most skillful use of the emphatic pause. Sometimes the pause would be made before the word ; then the word came with the added value of an aroused curiosity. But when his voice stopped, his mind did not. The interval was always filled with some expressiveness of manner that enhanced the vividness of the thought.

The dramatic expression of emotion he almost never indulged in. There was no “start theatric” in his sincere manner. There were no tears in this beautiful voice. His was a nature full of tenderness, but not of pathos. “Why cannot I make an audience cry as you do?” he once asked Anna Dickinson. “Because, Mr. Phillips, you never cry yourself,” was the truthful reply. In his poetical quotations he usually lowered his pitch, slightly retarded his movement, softened the force, and infused the tones with his deep appreciation of the sentiment, but he attempted no more. The effect was simplicity itself, but was profoundly impressive. Who that ever heard his “O’Connell” can forget the thrilling plaintiveness of melody in which he repeated the lines, — “O Ireland ! my country, the hour of thy pride and thy splendor hath passed,” etc. ? Who could lodge a witticism or tell a story with more deftness, point, and refinement of manner ? This melodious tongue had not only the honey of the bee, it had also its sting. In his most pitiless invective — and Edmund Burke was no greater master of this terrible weapon — his eyes were half closed in withering scorn, and his voice was smooth, steady, and low.

His Action was characterized by a manly force, unstudied grace, significance, and just precision. His gesture was neither vehement nor redundant. No speaker ever better understood or more finely illustrated than he did the famous dictum concerning action, — “In the very torrent, tempest, and, as I may say, the whirlwind of passion, you must acquire and beget a *temperance* that may give it smoothness.” Nor did he enfeeble his delivery by too much action, any more than he weakened his vocal expression by over-emphasis. The effectiveness of his action resided in its significance and its comparative rarity, neither overdoing the significant nor multiplying insignificant movements. And yet, it was managed with so much ease and propriety that his auditors were deceived as to its frequency. He made many more gestures than he was supposed to have made. His colloquial method governed his action ; hence, there was great variety. He freely used the open palm, now with one hand, now with both. In the expression of ideas that were disagreeable to him he used the averted palm. In the more moderate emphasis of feeling he placed

the index finger, or the palm, or the fist of one hand on the supine palm of the other. Imagination influenced his gesture and led to the temperate use of symbolical action suggested by his language. In his references to objects and localities, real or imaginary, he frequently used an enforcing referential gesture. Contrasted ideas were almost always symbolized by some expressive antithetic gesture.

The difficult art of gracefully standing still before an audience he observed to perfection. The hands either hung quietly by the side, or were clasped behind or in front of him; a gesture made with one hand would sometimes be finished by allowing it to rest upon the body, or action with both hands would occasionally terminate with hands clasped and gently resting upon the body. He had no favorite mode of rest, but used all modes in a self-forgetful way. His changes of position were few, and in a narrow space. He never walked the platform. No man could be more perfectly at home upon the stage. All was animation, grace, energy, and self-possession. He was artistic with unpremeditated art. Every look, motion, and attitude seemed demanded by the sentiment being uttered, and was an integral element of the thought itself. He had that mastery of art by which he instinctively regulated all impulses to the law of beauty in attitude and movement.

Mr. Phillips's delivery in its general treatment, as has been suggested already, was colloquial in style and extemporaneous in method. His private conversation on earnest topics was simply ennobled, or *idealized*. His public speaking was his part of a public conversation addressed, as it were, to the farthest auditor. He instinctively modified his natural voice in pitch, force, and movement to suit the size of the audience-room and the local circumstances of delivery. The great master's colloquial simplicity and naturalness never could be successfully imitated. There were no tricks, eccentricities, or artifices for copyists to catch and appropriate. Many speakers consciously cultivate his repressed style, and fondly suppose that they are impressing people by their quiet manner. As disciples of "culture" they aim at being calm and "classical," but succeed only in realizing the description of the face of Tennyson's Maud:

"Faultily faultless, icily regular, splendidly null."

Their moderation is mediocrity, their delicacy is weakness, because they copy only the repose of his outward manner, and possess little or nothing of the white heat of his inward fire.

Here we touch upon the Moral part of his delivery. With perfect power over voice and action, his speaking, when actually confronting an audience, was entirely an affair of the soul. The character of the speaker — his sincerity, sympathy, uprightness, and intense moral earnestness — came to the front. He completely realized Cato's ideal of an orator, — "A good man who understands speaking." Mr. Phillips's audiences felt that he was not merely a man of brilliant talents, but a man of moral

power. They saw before them a good man inspired by a profound moral passion, with the power to *communicate* his inspiration. His fire kindled their fire. As Emerson finely puts it, "The essential thing in eloquence is heat, and heat comes of sincerity." But in Phillips's case it was heat held in perfect mastery. He never lost his self-possession while allowing himself to be carried away. He impressed his audience with the influence of reserved power, but he had an abundance of mental, emotional, and moral power to reserve.

The interesting question concerning his method of oratorical training and habits of preparation, it is to be hoped, will be fully answered in his authorized biography. In response to a remark complimentary to his easy power of extemporaneous address, he said that it was the result of hard work, the joint product of temperament and experience, the fruit of close self-scrutiny and study of audiences while on his feet, and *incessant practice* in public speaking. "The chief thing I aim at," he once said, "is to master the subject I wish to speak about, and then earnestly try to get the audience to think and feel as I do about it." What is this but the secret of persuasion? The school-houses and town-halls of New England were his early training-schools. He once modestly styled himself "a caucus-speaker." After his Phi Beta Kappa oration at Cambridge, a friend asked him if the address was extemporaneous. "It is already in type," he replied. "You will see it in the morning papers to-morrow." Without doubt, his power of address was the result of brooding over ideas rather than words, the general cultivation of mental powers, especially by reflecting upon the great events and characters of English and American history, and the renewal of his moral sympathies by frequent spiritual contact with the keen realities of life as he saw them in the mass of men. He doubtless knew his own points of oratorical power, and cherished a single-hearted, disinterested love and care for his precious birth-gift. He could self-forgetfully trust his native and acquired resources of language and gifts of voice and action. That he was studiously interested in Delivery is manifest in his generous criticisms of the qualities of manner in great orators whom he had heard, and in the frequent counsel he gave to young speakers to avail themselves of the best advantages for systematic rhetorical study and practice. He was often an enthusiastic observer of actual training in vocal culture and expressive delivery, and took delight in assisting his young kinsmen in preparing their tasks in declamation. "Be yourself," he said, in golden advice to Frederick Douglass in 1845, as the colored orator was starting for a speaking tour in England. "Never use a word in private you would not use in public. Be yourself, and you will succeed."

This noble, gifted, and influential man illustrated his own precept, "Be yourself," in character, as well as in manner. He was what he was by his limitations, as well as by his possessions. He had not all perfections united in him. With the courage of a proud man's humility, he neither

tried to hide his defects nor to parade them. He let men see him as he really was. His limitations were the negative side of his qualities and the exaggeration of his virtues. His passionate love of justice often betrayed him into great injustice towards those who differed from him. His clear, swift, moral insight not unfrequently ignored, with a feverish impatience, the complexity of this world's practical affairs. Was there a wrong to be righted? *Now* was the accepted time to do it; his, the only way. In reaching for the desired end, he was sometimes as reckless in the use of the means as the most accomplished Jesuit. He was reckless with facts, reckless in statements, and reckless with reputations. "I regard men," he said, "as I do carpenters' planes,—tools to carry out my plans." He well understood the criticism made upon his extravagance of speech. He regarded it of little importance. He defended himself as he defended O'Connell, when the great Irishman was charged with coarse and intemperate language: "Stupor and palsy," he said, "never understand life. White-livered indifference is always disgusted and annoyed by earnest conviction." He used to quote with approval Garrison's reply to a friend, who remonstrated with him on the heat and severity of his language: "Brother, I have need to be all on fire, for I have mountains of ice about me to melt."

There was both an oratorical and a moral purpose in this rhetoric of execration. He claimed that the speakers in the abolition movement "*needed* an attitude of independence that was almost insolent; they needed to exhaust even the Saxon vocabulary of scorn to fitly utter the righteous and haughty contempt that honest men had for men-stealers." They studied the Art of Irritation rather than the Art of Persuasion. The need of this method is cheerfully granted to men whose God-given mission was to create a national conscience "under the ribs of death;" but Phillips lies under condemnation for using the same ruthless oratorical methods against able and earnest friends of the reforms he worked for, many of them his attached personal friends, who sought the same lofty goal by a different, and, as it proved, more successful course.

In the treatment of social and political questions in later years he continued to employ the same terrific implements of speech, although the most of the reforms are vastly more complex in their nature and relations than was the simple character of the anti-slavery question; and all of them, excepting the temperance reform, lack the intensity of a great moral motive to warrant the display of so much energy in the eloquence of vituperation. His impatience and want of scrupulousness may yet point a moral in the exposition of the Christian Ethics of controversy.

Great questions for public discussion will arise in the future as they have arisen in the past. The great ideas and the great occasions will demand and will find voices adequate for their utterance. There may be occasional temporary obscuration of brilliant oratorical lights, but there can be no obliteration. The speaking function is a perennial one. Truth

will ever come to men in a living voice and as a living, practical example. He who is the Truth announced himself as the Word. His religion is a religion of thought, and the need of it is imperishable. But that thought was divinely ordained to move men, not through the word written, but the word *spoken*. Its eloquence is a popular eloquence, for it is first and foremost the word spoken for the saving health of the People.

Great men will be continually passing from scenes of their earthly action, and men will be sought to embalm their virtues in eloquent speech. Boston has honored herself in inviting to the tender office of eulogy for him who was so recently her First Citizen the man who, above all others, is most in sympathy with the controlling moral ideas of the dead orator, — himself a masterly orator of Popular Reform, a Puritan in conscience, a Greek in grace, endowed with the selectest gifts of public address, and whose art, embellished with the choicest literary culture, has given him Everett's place as the elegant and scholarly orator of great occasions. American oratory will suffer neither eclipse nor decadence so long as it can command the moral force, ability, experience, wisdom, and the fervid yet judicious eloquence of George William Curtis.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

THREE NOTEWORTHY ARTICLES.

THE discussion concerning Probation has recently elicited three articles which deserve special notice. Two of them are important contributions to the subject, the other is valuable as a testimony and for its frankness. The first appeared in "The Presbyterian Review" for July, 1883, from the pen of Professor George L. Prentiss, D. D., of the Union Theological Seminary, New York. The second is published in "The Reformed Quarterly," January, 1884, and is contributed by Rev. E. V. Gerhart, D. D., Professor of Systematic Theology in the Theological Seminary, Lancaster, Pa. The third is to be found in "The British and Foreign Evangelical Review," January, 1884, an article on "The New Theology," by the Rev. R. M'Chéyne Edgar, M. A.

Dr. Prentiss maintains that for centuries until very recent times the dogma that all unbaptized children, dying in infancy, are lost has been held as a part of Orthodoxy, and that the modern belief that all infants will be saved is a theological "revolution," whose consequences the Church has not begun fairly to appreciate. Assuming that this tenet of universal infant salvation is now a part of Protestant Orthodoxy, he proceeds to point out its legitimate influence upon other dogmas. It does not disturb the commonly accepted views respecting original sin, for it emphasizes the conception of salvation, and thus implies that there is something to be saved from. It does, however, affect our conception of the necessary conditions of salvation. In the case of infants, we cannot

reasonably suppose any exercise of repentance, faith, or obedience. They are saved, Dr. Prentiss thinks, without any subjective conditions. The result is purely and absolutely a work of objective grace. Such a salvation is a striking testimony, the only satisfying testimony, to the fact of infant personality. It has a bearing, also, upon the traditional doctrine of the means of grace. A large portion of the race are saved without these means, without the church, without sacraments, without the written or preached word; "without any outward means whatever, except simply their birth and death in a redeemed world." The fact proves also the powerful working of divine grace outside of the pale of the Christian Church, throughout heathendom, wherever infants and young children die. It has an important bearing "upon the conception of this life as a probation." Dr. Prentiss here introduces an exceedingly interesting and valuable account of the rise of the doctrine of probation, tracing the term in its present theological use to the discussions rife in the latter part of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries, and particularly to the Deistic and Arminian controversies, and to Bishop Butler. The tenet that this life is a moral probation with reference to the future, he maintains, is a doctrine of natural theology, has only a subordinate position and meaning in Christian theology and church standards, and is wholly inapplicable to an immense minority of the human race. The ruling idea of Calvinism is not Probation, but "God's free, sovereign, electing grace in Christ." "In this whole sphere of Christian thought we find ourselves in contact primarily with the spiritual and personal, rather than the ethical. The aboriginal and last ground of any man's salvation, according to the Scriptures, is not that he has been under moral government and has proved faithful to its requirements, but that the Father Almighty, out of his infinite love and compassion, chose, called, and redeemed him." Dr. Prentiss thus not only denies the applicability of the term probation to infants, but also to all the saved, though in their case it may be used in a subordinate sense, namely, that they are subjected to a discipline by which they are trained, and more rapidly trained, for the heavenly service. Nor does the word, strictly taken, suit any better the remaining class, namely, "those who are at once responsible, and out of Christ." Such persons have the offer of the gospel, and opportunity to accept it; "we may, indeed, call this opportunity a probation, but does it not lack some of the vital elements of a real, complete probation? *That* would seem to involve a certain freedom, an autonomy of will, scarcely consistent with the spiritual bondage and alienation from God, which is a distinctive mark of our natural state. . . . Now just here, as it seems to me, is the knot to be untied. Some endeavor to untie it by ascribing to the natural man such freedom of will and power of attaining to true virtue, as may enable him of himself to secure the rewards of eternity. The evangelical view maintains that the natural man, while endowed with reason and conscience, and strictly responsible for his own character, is yet utterly unable of himself to secure eternal life; that he needs, therefore, first of all, to be saved, not proved; and that he can be saved only by God's free grace in Christ." "In answer then to the question, 'Is this life a probation?' I reply both yes and no. Yes; probation enters into it, on its ethical side, as a subordinate element; there is in this life more or less of moral trial. No; probation is not its most essential, universal character, and fails utterly to meet some of the principal facts in the

case. Redemption, not probation ; no mere ethical system nor any doctrine of natural religion, but Jesus Christ, the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, is the real key both to the meaning and the perplexing mysteries of this life."

The next topic considered by Dr. Prentiss as affected by this new and revolutionary belief in the universal salvation of infants is the salvability of the heathen. He denies that we can hold that all heathen infants are saved, and logically stop there. "Universal infant salvation . . . does not and cannot stand alone ; it has a most important bearing upon the whole soteriological doctrine. It shows how inconceivably wide and deep is God's mercy in Jesus Christ. It shows that, speaking after the manner of men, He is doing all He can do for the actual redemption of the world ; nothing keeps any soul from the gracious operation of his infinite love and pity but its own willful choice of evil and refusal of the good."

We have not space to follow Dr. Prentiss further in his article. It is one of the most suggestive, candid, comprehensive essays in the literature of this subject.

Mr. Edgar's article need detain us but for a single quotation. Dr. Prentiss subordinates the notion of Probation ; Mr. Edgar rejects it *in toto*. He says : "Our 'New Theologians' have no proper conception of human *probation*. They insist on probation, not only in the present life, but even after death. But we are not in a state of probation. We are either in a state of condemnation, or in a state of salvation by a Redeemer. It is a deception of souls to tell them otherwise. . . . Human probation ended in Eden. Men have since been either under condemnation, or they have escaped condemnation through believing. It is only loose thinking which represents things otherwise." This is at least unambiguous. The probation of all of us was long ago passed in Adam. No human being has any other, here or hereafter.

We pass to Dr. Gerhart's article. Dr. Prentiss assumed, as a theological axiom, the universal salvation of infants. Dr. Gerhart concedes that we may entertain the hope of such an issue, but denies that it can be accepted as a truth so assured and incontrovertible that other doctrines, seemingly well established, must necessarily give way before it. Dr. Prentiss's method is still further embarrassed by the apparent assumption that death is universally decisive as to future destiny. This leads him into representations of infant salvation which it is impossible to relieve of a magical character. Dr. Gerhart's strongest and most successful criticisms are directed to this point. "If grace," he remarks, "may work its saving effects in the subjects of salvation 'without condition,' that is, if God may deliver moral agents from the perverting forces, not to say condemnation, of moral evil, whether the subjects by their own active response appropriate the redemptive virtue of the Mediator or do not appropriate his mediatorship, then 'renewing grace' becomes divine magic ; and a magical salvation, instead of annulling the perverting forces of moral evil, is itself an abnormal and alien force ; for it deals with a moral agent, not according to the autonomy of his ethical life, but as if he were a passive subject possessing only an unethical nature. . . . The sentiment that a person may be redeemed who does not believe in the only redemption, . . . is, it seems to me, plainly a contradiction in terms." Dr. Gerhart meets the difficulties in which Dr. Prentiss becomes involved by adducing certain "general Christian principles

which are definitely taught by the Word of God." The most important of these principles are, the second coming of Christ; the union of two factors in the New Testament idea of salvation, namely, divine grace and faith, or redemption and its personal appropriation; and the universal manifestation of Christ. Dr. Gerhart justly emphasizes the biblical method of turning men's thoughts to the final Advent, and calls attention to the fact that "Theology and the pulpit have in our times allowed the reality and momentous significance of the parousia to recede in great measure from the Christian consciousness of the Church, and as an unavoidable consequence have raised the crisis of natural death to a position of prominence which it does not hold in the teaching of the New Testament or the economy of redemption." "Infants dying in infancy," he maintains, "do not continue to be unconscious infants in the transearthly period of human existence. Such a notion has possession of the minds of many Christian parents. Bereft of a sweet, innocent babe, they are inclined to remember it as a babe, and from year to year imagine it to be an unconscious child in the invisible world. But there is no warrant for such a notion either in Scripture or in anthropology. . . . Infants dying in infancy develop into self-consciousness and freedom, and thus become moral agents. Moral agency conditions their character in relation to God no less after than before death." "The necessity of saving faith is an universal necessity. Objectively, Christ is the central fact of human redemption. Subjectively, faith is the pivot on which the Scriptural doctrine of personal salvation turns." Dr. Gerhart rejects every magical conception of baptism. He thinks that its blessings follow infants, who die, into the transearthly period, as though they had continued to live in this world. The universal manifestation of Christ he argues from (1.) the clear teaching of the New Testament that Christ went among the dead to preach the gospel; (2.) that He is Head over "all things," sustaining a universal relation to mankind; (3.) the absence from the New Testament of any passage "which limits the proclamation of the gospel exclusively to men living in the earthly period of their history;" (4.) the revealed fact that "Jesus the Son of Man, the only Mediator, will be the judge of all men;" (5.) the command to proclaim the gospel to all men, together with the assurance of a final manifestation. On the supposition that there will be no revelation during the intermediate ages, they would not be in accord with the method thus disclosed.

Dr. Gerhart, with Dr. Prentiss and Mr. Edgar, rejects the conception that this life is properly described as a probation. This concurrence of opinion is noticeable. What in this country and England for many years has been assumed as beyond dispute, is now not only questioned, but rejected by some of our most eminent and orthodox divines. To a certain extent their opposition is rather to the word probation than to the thing. But so far as it is a mere entail from deism, and a deistic natural theology, Dr. Gerhart discards it even more decisively than Professor Prentiss. "Scripturally speaking," he remarks, "sinful men are not on trial here, nor will they be hereafter. . . . It is an unsolved problem in the case of every man, when Christ challenges his confidence and love, whether he will yield a positive response to the challenge. But this problem does not involve probation in the sense of Bishop Butler, nor in the sense in which the term is commonly used. . . . There is, then, no

probation, here nor hereafter, either for infants or adults. All unregenerate men die under the abnormal action of sin; and all need the saving virtue of Christ's redemption. Without it they are hopeless. But through the preaching of the gospel there will be a manifestation of the Mediator to all, both to infants dying in infancy and to the heathen. This manifestation of the Mediator is real and mighty here; it will also be real and mighty hereafter. So far forth there is hope for all who have not, by the renunciation of the supreme good, made final and irreversible choice of moral evil."

This rapid analysis does but scant justice to a masterly paper. It is not a mere criticism of Dr. Prentiss's essay, but a positive and scientific development of important principles.

We venture to offer a few additional comments upon this discussion.

1. Dr. Prentiss shows conclusively that there has been a great change in Protestant belief, particularly in the Reformed or Calvinistic churches, respecting the salvation of infants. Only ignorance, or something much less excusable, will question this historical fact.¹

¹ This change of belief is not generally understood. Even so well informed a theologian as the late Dr. Hodge does not seem to have been aware of it until Dr. Krauth published his essay on "Infant Baptism and Infant Salvation in the Calvinistic System." Dr. Prentiss points out that the tenet that unbaptized infants are lost is recognized in the Augsburg Confession, the first Protestant Symbol, and still a standard of the Lutheran Church. The Westminster Confession affirms the salvation of "elect infants." "If . . . a single one of the Westminster divines believed that all who die in infancy are elect, and consequently saved, he never, so far as is known, avowed such belief." It seems to be supposed, however, that it is a calumny to affirm that there was any prevalent belief among Calvinists in the actual condemnation of any infants. The direct implications or assertions of such belief on the part of eminent theologians are passed by in silence. It cannot, at any rate, it is supposed, have been a part of current theology and popular Orthodoxy. How far this is from being correct may be made clear by an extract from what was once a widely circulated treatise of practical piety in this country and in England. The author is Rev. Michael Wigglesworth, A. M., "Teacher of the Church at Malden, in New England." He died in the seventy-fourth year of his age, had been a Fellow and Tutor in Harvard College, and was called from Cambridge to Malden, where, as Cotton Mather says, he "was their faithful pastor for about a jubilee of years together." His *Day of Doom*, from which we quote, "has been often reprinted," says Mather, "in both Englands, and may, perhaps, find our children till the *Day* itself arrive." The copy before us is marked "The Sixth Edition, enlarged, with Scripture and Marginal Notes." Boston: 1715.

"Then to the Bar, all they drew near
who dy'd in infancy,
And never had or good or bad
effected pers'nally,
But from the womb unto the tomb
were straightway carried,
(Or at the last e're they transgress)
who thus began to plead:

"If for our own transgression,
or disobedience,
We here did stand at thy left hand,
just were the Recompense:
But *Adam's* guilt our souls hath spilt,
his fault is charged on us;
And that alone hath overthrown,
and utterly undone us.

"Not we, but he ate of the Tree,
whose fruit was interdicted:
Yet on us all of his sad Fall,
the punishment's inflicted.
How could we sin that had not been
or how is his sin our
Without consent, which to prevent,
we never had a pow'r?

"O great Creator, why was our Nature
depraved and forlorn?
Why so defil'd, and made so yild
whilst we were yet unborn?
If it be just, and needs we must
transgressors reck'ned be,
Thy Mercy, Lord, to us afford,
which sinners hath set free.

2. Neither the traditional nor current beliefs of a particular branch of the Christian Church can claim, unsupported, to represent the faith of

"Behold we see *Adam* set free,
and sav'd from his trespass,
Whose sinful Fall hath split us all,
And brought us to this pass.
Canst thou deny us once to try,
or Grace to us to tender,
When he finds grace before thy face,
that was the chief offender?"

"Then answered the judge most dread,
God doth such doom forbid,
That men should dye eternally
for what they never did.
But what you call old *Adam's* Fall,
and only his Trespass,
You call amiss to call it his,
both his and yours it was.

"He was designed of all Mankind
to be a publick Head,
A common Root, whence all should shoot,
and stood in all their stead.
He stood and fell, did ill or well,
not for himself alone,
But for you all, who now his Fall,
and trespass would disown.

"If he had stood, then all his brood
had been established
In God's true love never to move,
nor once awry to tread:
Then all his race, my Father's Grace,
should have enjoy'd for ever,
And wicked Sprights by subtle sleights
could them have harmed never.

"Would you have griev'd to have receiv'd
through *Adam* so much good,
As had been your for evermore
if he at first had stood?
Would you have said, we n'er obey'd,
nor did thy Laws regard;
It ill befits with benefits,
us, Lord, so to reward.

"Since then to share in his welfare
you could have been content,
You may with reason share in his treason
and in the punishment.
Hence you were born in state forlorn,
with Natures so depraved;
Death was your due, because that you
had so your selves behaved.

"You think if we had been as he
whom God did so betrust,
We to our cost would ne're have lost
all for a paltry Lust.
Had you been made in *Adam's* stead
you would like things have wrought,
And so into the self same wo,
your selves and yours have brought.

"Am I alone of what's my own
no master or no Lord?
O if I am, how can you claim
what I to some afford?
Will you demand Grace at my hand,
and challenge what is mine?
Will you teach me whom to set free,
and thus my Grace confine?"

You sinners are, and such a share
as sinners may expect,
Such you shall have; for I do save
none but my own Elect.
Yet to compare your sin with their
who liv'd a longer time
I do confess yours is much less,
though every sin's a crime.

"A Crime it is, therefore in bliss
you may not hope to dwell;
But unto you I shall allow
the easiest room in Hell.
The glorious King thus answering
they cease and plead no longer:
Their Consciences must needs confess
his Reasons are the stronger."

The poet then proceeds to describe, in language we will not transfer, the pronouncing of sentence by the Judge, and its fearful execution upon "great and small," — a sentence whose "lightest pain" is "more than intolerable," and least infliction sufficient to consume the soul, "if God did not prevent." "In contemporaneous renown," says Professor Tyler (*History of Amer. Lit.* ii. 23), far above all other verse-writers of the colonial time, was Michael Wigglesworth, . . . a poet who so perfectly uttered in verse the religious faith and emotion of Puritan New England, that, for more than a hundred years, his writings had universal diffusion there, and a popular influence only inferior to that of the Bible and the Shorter Catechism." Of *The Day of Doom* Professor Tyler remarks: "This great poem . . . had for a hundred years a popularity far exceeding that of any other work, in prose or verse, produced in America before the Revolution. The eighteen hundred copies of the first edition were sold within a single year, which implies the purchase of a copy of *The Day of Doom* by at least every thirty-fifth person then in New England, — an example of the commercial success of a book never afterwards equaled in this country. Since that time the book has been repeatedly published; at least once in England and at least eight times in America, the last time being in 1867" (ib. p. 34). Allibone refers to two editions in England, — one published in London, the other at Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

the Christian Church, or Orthodoxy. The dogma of infant damnation is no part of catholic Christianity, or the historic faith of the Church. Irenæus, who represents beyond any other man the beliefs of the Church in the century following the Apostolic Age, affirms the salvation of infants as though it were undisputed. Even when the prevalent belief was darkest, there were many who took a more Christian view.

3. The prominence given by Drs. Prentiss and Gerhart to the question about infants is justified by history, as well as by the direct reasons they advance. It is convenient for men, whose easy-going and superficial opinions are disturbed, to resort to agnosticism, or the cry of "speculation" or *cui bono?* but there never has been a period of progress in anthropology or soteriology, when the bearing of positions taken upon infants and young children did not have to be considered. Children exist, and have their divine rights and compassions, and something is known about them and their relation to Adam and to Christ.

4. We agree fully with Dr. Gerhart in his view of the importance of recovering to preaching and theology the biblical doctrines of the second coming of Christ and of his universal manifestation.

5. We are unable to agree with these honored brethren and eminent Christian teachers in their rejection or disparagement of the doctrine of Probation.

It is not surprising that the very word probation now finds disfavor with intelligent and devout students of the Scriptures. Like the phrase "moral government," it has been used to designate a relation of the soul to God so one-sidedly apprehended, so forced out of its true connections, so over-wrought and strained, as to become unreal and practically false. Theology has been verily guilty in this matter, and needs to humble itself and bring forth fruits meet for repentance. Dr. Gerhart's and Dr. Prentiss's articles supplement each other and administer a timely rebuke to the self-sufficiency and provincialism and ignorance of much current theology.

But it does not follow, because an idea has been taken up in a pagan or Pelagian form, that it has no truth in it. We concede that the ordinary conception of probation has been derived from natural theology; that it came in with an Arminianism which was not evangelical and with the apologetics of Bishop Butler, that it has been made to do too much work, that it has been twisted out of its place in biblical and evangelical dogmatics. But it does not follow that it is to be discarded or minimized. It may need simply to be stated in terms of the gospel, — to be Christianized. It is not wise, in our humble judgment, for Christian theology to turn its back on Bishop Butler. It is not necessary to repudiate a doctrine which has given seriousness to preaching and life, which has its roots in the moral order of the universe as we come in present contact with it, and which has a just and salutary power over the human reason and conscience.

Dr. Prentiss traces the conception to the discussions of the age of Deism. It is much older in Christian theology. Irenæus, or his Latin translator, uses the very word, and in a blind and groping way feels after the very thing, a probation on gospel and not merely legal, or even parasitical terms. And the deistic, unchurchly, and unevangelical thought of the eighteenth century embodied a truth which, in our opinion, it has been the merit of the New England theology to conserve, how-

ever ill adjusted it has remained, namely, that of free personality. Dr. Prentiss, in his disparagement of probation, will find himself logically driven back to the old Calvinism of the Presbyterian standards, and of the Rev. Mr. Edgar, from which our Edwardean and New School fathers revolted.

Dr. Gerhart claims that "moral probation implies that the subject is constitutionally in a normal state and ethically good, possessing adequate ability to sustain a right relationship to God in the face of all solicitations to the contrary." We do not question that the New School theology, in its use of the term, has sometimes given occasion for the belief that it so conceives of probation. But neither unimpaired power nor uncertainty of issue is necessarily involved in probation. We have before us, as we write, a copy of an unpublished manuscript of the elder Edwards, in which he discusses this question: "Since Christ has been in a state of probation, and has passed through a time of trial in behalf of the elect, why is it requisite that they should be in a state of probation after Him?" And again he writes of "the offer of a Saviour *or a probation*," making the two phrases equivalent. Jonathan Edwards was not lax in his views of original sin or man's need of divine grace, nor wavering in his doctrine of certainty. The word probation may be abused, but we are not satisfied to substitute for it the word opportunity. There is something more in the manner in which the gospel meets men than mere opportunity. They are dealt with as free, responsible, accountable agents, and they will be judged at the last day, not simply for having violated the moral law, but for having rejected the Redeemer. The word probation suggests, also, more plainly than does the proposed substitute, that opportunities may cease. In the constructive work now needed in eschatology we believe that the conception of probation will continue to fill an important and prominent place. Only it will be Christianized, its conditions being determined and the sphere of its operation widened in accordance with the greatness of Christ's atoning and redemptive work, and the revealed doctrine of his final coming to judge all men.

Egbert C. Smyth.

M. PRESSENSÉ ON THE ECCLESIASTICAL POLICY OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.

What are we to think of the attitude of the present Republican government of France towards the Roman Catholic Church, and does it signify opposition to intolerance and superstition, or intolerant opposition to religion? In the January number of the "*Revue Chrétienne*," that stanch republican and eminent Protestant, Edmond de Pressensé, has given his opinion most distinctly and energetically.

"The manner in which this great reform" — the separation of church and state — "is approached is such that it is not possible for the most pronounced partisans of separation to applaud it. In fact, it is not the spirit of liberty and justice which presides over it, but the spirit of passion, and, above all, the outspoken hatred of all religion. Moreover, the method chosen to realize it is deplorable in every point of view. . . .

"We affirm . . . that the separation of church and state is not aimed at by the majority of the Chamber as a grand liberal reform, intended to

insure peace in the country, and better to guarantee the rights of conscience. . . . If we take note of the considerations advanced at the tribune in favor of the diminution of the budget of Worship, — something always presented as the preface to its suppression, — we observe that, in lieu of being derived from those principles of political justice which ought alone to inspire the opinions of the representatives of the nation, they have had no other inspiration than antipathy to religion. And take good note that the discussion did not turn solely upon the Catholic Church, with her principles of intolerance and her long history of opposition to the liberties of the country. Even that would be going too far, for it is not the business of a parliament to take action of a doctrinal tendency. It ought to suppress abuses and strike at culpable or unconstitutional acts, but it exceeds its authority, when, because it detests the principles of a church, it attacks the church as such. But the Chamber of Deputies has gone much farther; it is religion in itself which its principal orators have had in view. In effect, what has been their chief argument against the budget of Worship? It is that all that was granted it was retrenched from the ministry of Public Instruction; that to favor worship was to favor superstition to the detriment of free science represented by the Department of Public Instruction. Let this be judged of by the following fragment of the discourse of M. Jules Roche, who, with harsh and biting talent, has played the principal part in this discussion: —

“‘There is,’ says the orator, ‘a budget which is intimately allied with the budget of Worship; it is the budget of Public Instruction, and it is not without profound philosophical reasons, belonging to the very nature of things, that the budget of Public Instruction has been so long associated and originally subordinated to the ministry of Worship.’

“‘These two budgets, in fact, according to the conception which one forms to himself of the laws which preside over the moral and intellectual development of communities, have one and the same end. The expenses for religion and the expenses for science, these are, speaking precisely, according to the two opposing systems, expenses which have for their object the moral and intellectual culture of the nation. During long ages, it was, in fact, of the various religions that humanity demanded its education and the laws of its morality; but the modern world reposes upon a different philosophical conception; the French Revolution has created a new right — the right of man, . . . it has proclaimed the independence of conscience, the sovereignty of reason enlightened by science, and all the progress made in this country during the past eighty years . . . is due to science. You see, then, plainly, that the two budgets, the two departments of the public service, cannot exist. The one is bound to decrease in proportion as the other increases, since everything which science gains she conquers from the supernatural. Whenever you wish to facilitate the progress of public instruction and of science, you ought, then, to demand the necessary means for this of the budget destined to the institution essentially hostile to this progress of science.’

“‘An interruption from one of the most distinguished members of the Assembly, M. Paul Bert, formerly Minister of Public Instruction and of Worship under Gambetta, and now leader of the most influential section of the Chamber, one of the speakers most listened to, has struck the keynote of this discourse: ‘The two budgets of Public Instruction and Worship,’ said he ironically, ‘may coexist, like the light and the shade.’

It has, then, been well understood that the reductions made in the budget of Worship were so many victories over the spirit of darkness and of obscurantism personified by religion !

"It is not possible to inaugurate more distinctly what is called in Germany the *Kulturkampf*, the combat of *intellectual culture* with the power of ignorance and of enslavement, which is unhesitatingly identified with religion itself. A strange way, forsooth, of bringing about the separation of church and state. We have always hitherto supposed that what constituted the grandeur of this reform was the establishment of a definitive separation between the domain of conscience, of faith, of philosophical or religious thought, and that of the civil power, in order that the latter might no longer be anything more than the representative of general law, of justice in its widest sense.

"The separation of church and state is, in our view, as well as in that of all real liberals, the enfranchisement of the church, and, simultaneously with it, the secularization of the state, the proclamation of its doctrinal neutrality. This is the most elevated aspect, — what Lamartine used to call the consummation of the French Revolution. And here we have public men who give themselves out as the true heirs of this revolution while denying its fundamental principle, and essaying to turn against religion the resources and the authority of the state in the name of a philosophical doctrine which they would establish as paramount. They thus deprive it of its neutrality, they belie its laic character, of which they make so much in their speeches, and do not perceive that they are reverting to the most distressing errors of the past. This is done, say they, to humble clericalism, ultramontanism. But it so happens that they carefully save out the most characteristic principle of this, which is, imposing on the state the defense of a doctrine. It matters little that this doctrine is what they call Free Thought. This does not make it less a doctrine of state. A curious sort of free thought, which would suppress the liberty of every one who does not accept it. Our Free Thinkers of the Chamber of Deputies thus render themselves the plagiarists of a past which they detest, but which they rehabilitate while detesting it. Here is a monstrous inconsistency, against which we cannot protest too intensely. . . .

"At the very moment when the budget of Worship was discussed in the spirit which I have just characterized, a bill was introduced by the government, which recognizes the rights of all associations except religious ones. These are, in reality, outlawed. This intention of impoverishing and enslaving the church before abandoning her to herself has been avowed from the tribune and in the press in the frankest, we might say in the most impudent, manner. . . . The plan of the intended campaign against the various forms of worship has been distinctly revealed. We hold it detestable ; all the friends of liberty, though they stood in the front rank of advocates of the separation of church and state, ought to combat it with all their energy.

"It is evident that for us the Republic is at this moment passing through a very serious, if not formidable, phase of development. The strife is becoming more and more strenuous between the liberal republicans and the arbitrary republicans, imbued with the Jacobin spirit. On the issue of this strife depends its destiny. It is a combat which ought to be manfully maintained, and, in order to guide it to a good issue,

we ought to keep solely in view the essential question while frankly accepting the only form of government compatible with our democracy. Everything surrendered to monarchical prepossessions is a waste of force."

C. C. Starbuck.

ARCHÆOLOGICAL NOTES.

ASSYRIOLOGY: A NEW QUARTERLY.

THE young science of Assyriology has made a step in advance in the establishment of a journal, called "*Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung und verwandte Gebiete*," under the editorial control of Dr. Carl Bezold and Dr. Fritz Hommel, *privatdozenten* in the University of Munich. The journal is to appear quarterly, from the publishing house of Otto Schulze, in Leipzig. The first number, eighty-eight pages, makes a good impression, both in appearance and in the quality of its articles. Professor Schrader, of Berlin, contributes a discussion in German on the pronunciation of the sibilants in Assyrian, and Professor Guyard, of Paris, has a French article on the same subject. Both articles are called forth by a paper published by Dr. Haupt in April last, and are polemics against some new views presented in this paper as to the pronunciation of the signs containing the sounds *s* and *sh* in Assyrian. Haupt had proposed to read *s* where most Assyrian scholars read *sh*, and vice versa.

Professor Sayce, of Oxford, contributes an excellent article in English on the origin of the Persian cuneiform alphabet. After showing that the signs representing vowels in Persian are Babylonian characters slightly modified, he goes through the list of consonants, tracing these, also, in twenty-five cases to Babylonian originals. Thus, the Babylonian sign *gu* gives the Persian letter *g*, *pu* gives *p*, *ba* gives *b*, *na* gives *n*, *ma* gives *m*, etc. Seven characters of the Persian alphabet Sayce cannot explain, and four others he considers doubtful. Even some of his identifications may be wrong, but the method seems very probably right. Dr. Oppert, of Paris, had already derived the Persian cuneiform alphabet from the Babylonian ideographic characters, but in a less direct and plausible way than Professor Sayce has done. The time of the invention of the Persian letters Sayce places between 518 and 513 B. c.

Dr. Hommel writes on early Babylonian chronology. The recent discovery by Mr. Pinches, of the British Museum, of the date 3750 B. c. as the date of king *Naram-sin* makes very probable a Semitic supremacy in the Tigris-Euphrates valley more than a thousand years older than we were warranted in supposing before this fortunate discovery. But preceding the Semitic there seems to have been a great non-Semitic civilization, which Hommel assigns to a date at least as old as the close of the fifth millenium B. c., a civilization whose wonderful pantheon was adopted by the Semites, and many of whose remarkable psalms and hymns have been preserved with parallel or interlinear Assyrian translations.

Dr. Oppert presents a paper on a contract tablet, recording a sale of land made in the fourth year of Nabonidus, the last of the Babylonian kings. Of this interesting document there are two copies, one at London and one at Paris. It is very greatly to be desired that such articles

should give not only the transliterated text, but also the original. At the close Oppert reasserts the correctness of his view as to the method by which the Persian cuneiform alphabet was derived from the Babylonian cuneiform characters. This method was as follows: Certain ideograms, together with their signification, were adopted by the Persians, the Persian *name* for the object represented by the sign being, however, retained. These signs were then simplified and used as syllables, each sign having as syllabic value the first syllable of the Persian word which it represented. Thus the Babylonian sign for house was adopted, and as the Persian word for house is *tacara*, this sign received as a syllable the value *ta*. This opinion of Oppert, certainly very ingenious, and finding support in the similarity of the signs in Babylonian and Persian, is declared by Sayce to be too ingenious, who proposes, as we have already seen, to derive the Persian characters directly from the syllabic Babylonian characters.

J. Halévy, of Paris, has two short notes on Assyrian lexicography. The first and most interesting concerns the translation of some lines in the cuneiform narrative of the Deluge. The connection is the passage immediately before the account of the beginning of the storm. The Sun-god, *Samas*, sends forth a decree ordering Hasis-adra (Noah) to enter the ship, and when Hasis-adra hesitates to obey, the command is repeated with more power than before. Then follow two lines which have been understood by nearly all Assyrian scholars as saying that Hasis-adra awaited with suspense the coming evening and feared to embark. Halévy, however, translates:—

During four days I beheld his face (*i. e.* I entreated the Sun-god);
The day (following) I was afraid to look (to him) (*i. e.* to pray any longer)
I entered the ship and closed the door.

This is the best translation yet offered of this difficult passage. Whether the sign which Halévy reads “four,” consisting of four perpendicular wedges, is really the numeral IV., or, as has generally been supposed, the genitive sign *sha*, cannot be certainly decided. If a parallel text should be found, presenting in the place of the sign in question the other sign, *sha*, which is never used as a numeral, this would be fatal to Halévy’s reading. Supposing his rendering correct, we have, as he shows, a new point of comparison between the cuneiform and the biblical accounts of the Deluge. Genesis (vii. 4, 10) allows seven days between the time of the command to enter the ark and the beginning of the Deluge. If we suppose that the two commands of the Sun-god in the Assyrian version were made on successive days, that the four days of intercession followed, and that on the next day Hasis-adra entered the ship, we shall have, as in the biblical narrative, an interval of seven days between the first command and the entrance. That Halévy has here made a real discovery is very probable. As in the Jehovistic biblical account so in the cuneiform version, seven is the favorite number. The rain continues seven days, the ship rests on the mountain seven days, and after the Deluge Hasis-adra arranges seven and seven vessels of sacrifice. It is, therefore, in itself very probable that seven days should intervene between the command to enter the ship and the beginning of the Deluge.

Another interesting point, which seems to have escaped notice, occurs in connection with this expression “seven and seven” vessels of sacrifice. This is on all sides supposed to mean “by sevens.” It seems, however,

more probable that the writer means fourteen vessels. Then why did he not adopt the usual way of writing this number by using the signs for ten and four? Because by the arrangement of the vessels in two groups of seven he symbolized the two periods of seven days each during which the waters were rising and falling. In addition to this, each vessel represented, of course, one of the fourteen days of the Deluge.

In the "Sprechsaal" Dr. Hommel explains the object of the journal, and indicates some of the subjects which will be discussed in the near future. He specifies the questions as to the pronunciation of the sibilants, and as to a distinction between *i* and *e* in Assyrian. This will specially interest students of language. A larger number will be interested in the problem whether Sumer-Akkadian was a language, or, as Halévy and Guyard maintain, only a hieratic method of writing Assyrian. The discussions of grammar and lexicography will appeal to all Semitic students, and the journal hopes, also, by discussions of the great mass of historical and religious material, to win friends among all students of religion and of archæology.

Two or three other short articles, book notices, and bibliography are added. At the close is a leaf in mourning, in memory of François Lenormant, who died December 9, 1883, nearly forty-seven years of age. In the death of M. Lenormant the science of Assyriology has sustained its greatest loss since that sad day in August, 1876, when, at Aleppo, the young and brilliant George Smith died, a victim to his enthusiasm.

D. G. Lyon.

RECENT EXCAVATIONS IN ROME: THE ATRIUM OF VESTA.

The accounts of recent excavations and archæological discoveries at Tivoli, Antemnæ, Roma Vecchia, and even those at Rome, incident as they are for the most part to opening new streets or building new structures, are very numerous and somewhat dreary, except to the archæologist, with their repeated pavements, brickwork, broken *amphoræ*, fragments of marble, and illegible or inconsequential inscriptions. The discoveries in November last, and subsequently down to the latest date from Rome, conducted under the direction of Signor Baccelli, the Minister of Public Instruction, with a strictly scientific purpose and in pursuance of the large plans which have been so systematically and vigorously carried out by the Roman government for several years past, are of a kind to interest all students of history and art, and even the wider public.

In the spring of 1883 the work in the forum proper was completed by removing the high causeway passing in front of the Arch of Septimius Severus, and building an inconspicuous thoroughfare on a low level between the arch and the temple of Concord. The road embankment across the forum, at the temple of Castor and Pollux, which had been left during the excavations on either side of it, had been replaced by a bridge in 1882, and thus, at last, an unobstructed view of the forum in its whole length and at the ancient level had been opened from the Capitol to the Arch of Titus. Further explorations to the north and east were planned, but they were blocked by the rights, and in some cases by the avarice, of private owners and ecclesiastical corporations, who hold above some of the most interesting sites of ancient Rome. Time and liberal appropriations will remove these obstacles.

Careful excavations by Signor Rosa in all the accessible grounds of the Palatine Hill, beginning in 1861, had made the public familiar with the wonderful ruins of the palaces of Imperial Rome which he uncovered there. Between these two areas of excavation lay vast accumulations, in some cases 80 feet deep, heaped up against the slopes of the northern angle of the Palatine, from the church of S. Maria Liberatrice to the Arch of Titus, bounded on the northeast by the raised road, not then removed, leading to the arch. This quadrilateral, roughly 700 feet by 150, has been the theatre of the recent researches. Private letters, as well as the public telegrams and communications, attest the enthusiasm with which the new discoveries have been received.

The excavations began near the church of Santa Maria, and moved southward. Presently a street was discovered about midway between and parallel to the *Clivus Victorie* (Rosa) and the *Sacra Via*. This was recognized as the *Nova Via*, the identification being confirmed by the fragment of the marble map of Rome which was found near the temple of Vesta in 1882. November 5, 1883, the workmen found three marble pedestals, bearing inscriptions in honor of the Vestal Virgins, and the discovery of the *Atrium Vestæ* was announced. The three inscriptions, forty lines in all, were in honor of three Vestals, each the head of the college: the first being inscribed by the Pontiffs, the second by a devoted client, the third by a dutiful niece and grand-nephew. Two are dated, and a date is easily supplied for the third by another published inscription (Orell. 2234). The dates are, respectively, 254 A. D., 286, and 364. The inscriptions, interesting in themselves, had some intentional erasures and other noteworthy peculiarities. This discovery stimulated further efforts, and in the two months following 36,000 cubic metres of débris were removed, 13 marble pedestals were discovered, in all 25 inscriptions, 102 brick stamps, 15 busts and heads, 11 statues and seven important parts of statues, 835 coins (mediæval), one gold coin (Byzantine), with precious marbles and two pieces of jewelry. The topographical interest centres in the disclosure of a marvelous *atrium*, some 250 feet long and 75 feet wide, a paved court surrounded by a marble portico, adorned with statues and votive tablets, so like a modern cloister as to lead easily to the belief, supported by many other independent and conclusive proofs, that this was the court of the official residence of that most ancient, wealthy, and honored sisterhood, whose influence was so great from the time of its institution by Numa down to the establishment of Christianity, and which served as the model of the sacred sisterhoods of the Christian church. About the *Atrium* is a series of many small but elegant apartments, some still retaining the decorations and fixtures which show the uses for which they were intended. Bath-rooms in the second story, lined with marble, and supplied with pipes for heating purposes, arched ceilings, wall-paintings, and rich mosaic floors, are evidences of the elegance of this spacious home of the small but wealthy order. It seems to have been connected at one corner with the temple of Vesta, and near by was the *Regia*, the house of the Pontifex Maximus. The date of the structure is subsequent to the great fire in the reign of Commodus, in 191 A. D. It is surprising that so much remains after seventeen centuries of neglect and decay, — after ignorance, avarice, and malice have had their full opportunity to plunder and destroy. Beneath the black marble *tesserae* of the pavement now exposed

is to be seen the unbroken mosaic of an earlier structure, perhaps that of the era of the republic.

The excavations as they go on will doubtless add much to our maps of ancient Rome. They bid fair to settle the questions, so far as they are still unsettled, of the *Sacra Via*, the rotunda of Romulus, and the outline of the Palatine. The richness of present discoveries heightens expectation.

C. F. P. Bancroft.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE EXPANSION OF ENGLAND. Two Courses of Lectures. By J. R. SEELEY, M. A. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1883.

The relative proportions in area, population, and other particulars, which the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland bears to the British Empire, as a whole, will appear from the following figures for the year 1881, the last census year: Area in square miles, the United Kingdom, 120,892; the British Empire (including the United Kingdom), 8,025,007. Population, the United Kingdom, 34,929,679; the British Empire, 252,558,375. Revenues, the United Kingdom, £84,041,288; the British Empire, £193,972,085. Expenditures, the United Kingdom, £83,107,924; the British Empire, £197,105,424. Total imports and exports, the United Kingdom, £694,105,264; the British Empire, £1,094,423,613.

It is of the British Empire regarded as a whole — of Greater Britain — that Professor Seeley treats in two courses of lectures delivered at the University of Cambridge, now published under the title of “The Expansion of England.” He does not attempt to trace the history of kings or parliaments, nor does he discourse upon any progress of the race peculiar to England. By England he means the state or political community which has its seat in England, and the most important development of the English state, in his view, has been and is the extension of the English name into other countries of the globe, — the foundation of the Greater Britain. The internal union of the three kingdoms was brought to completion substantially under Queen Anne; “the creation of a still larger Britain, comprehending vast possessions beyond the sea,” began with the first charter granted to Virginia in 1606, but did not stand out in distinct prominence before the world, “in its gigantic dimensions and with its vast politics,” until the eighteenth century. The history of England in the eighteenth century, says the author, was not in England, but in America and Asia; and the succession of wars between England and France, which, with intervals of peace or of nominal peace, were waged from 1688 to 1815, were, in fact, one long duel for the possession of North America and for the sovereignty of India.

“There was once a Greater Spain, a Greater Portugal, a Greater France, and a Greater Holland, as well as a Greater Britain, but from various causes those four empires have either perished or have become insignificant. . . . Greater Britain itself, after suffering one severe shock, has survived to the present day.” What is to be the future of

this Greater Britain? Will it fall to pieces, as the other empires referred to have done? Will its colonies demand and obtain, each in turn, national independence for themselves, as did the American colonies in the eighteenth century? These are the questions the vast importance of which Professor Seeley urges upon the consideration of the young men of Cambridge, — the future public and professional men of England, — and which he endeavors to answer.

In relation to the Indian Empire, Professor Seeley admits that it is precarious and artificial, and that it greatly increases British dangers and responsibilities, while it is a question whether it does or can increase British power or security. He urges, however, that, in view of the commercial interests involved, so far as England is concerned, and still more for the sake of India itself, the empire should not be abandoned. "To withdraw our government from a country which is dependent on it, and which we have made incapable of depending upon anything else, would be the most inexcusable of all conceivable crimes, and might possibly cause the most stupendous of all conceivable calamities."

But what is to be the destiny of the Dominion of Canada, of the West India possessions, of the group of colonies in South Africa, and of Australia? Turgot said, a quarter of a century before the Declaration of Independence, that colonies were like fruits, which cling to the tree only till they ripen; and he added that when America could take care of herself she would do what Carthage had done. "What wonder that when this prediction was so signally fulfilled the proposition from which it had been deduced rose, especially in the minds of the English, to the rank of a demonstrated principle? This, no doubt, is the reason why we have regarded the growth of a second empire with very little interest or satisfaction." But why were the American colonies lost to England in the last century? Professor Seeley lays the blame, and justly, upon the colonial system, so called, which, in a word, was based on the idea that colonies exist mainly for the use and benefit of the mother country. Bacon, in his essay on Plantations, had taken a more enlightened view; but the statesmen and merchants who came after him believed, as one of the latter, Sir Josiah Child, expressed it in 1669, that "colonies and foreign plantations do but endamage their mother kingdoms, when the trades of such plantations are not confined to their said mother kingdoms by good laws and the severe execution of those laws." The American Revolution has been truly described as a liberation from commercial rather than political thralldom; but the British colonies to-day chafe under neither political nor commercial thralldom. They may and do enact tariff laws which operate against the mother kingdom precisely as though she were a foreign country; and under what is known as responsible government they enjoy a degree of political freedom just short of absolute independence. And yet, the colonists are not entirely satisfied. The relation which they sustain to the empire, politically, is not that to which they can look forward as a permanency with complacency. They do not stand in London as they wish to stand, and they do not receive there the recognition in all respects to which they think they are entitled. The tone of the English press toward them is apt to be unappreciative, patronizing, irritating, almost insolent. We have heard some of them speak of themselves as "the pariahs of the empire." What is the remedy for this state of things? How may the loyalty of these men to the Crown be perpetu-

ated? Professor Seeley says: "We must cease to think that the history of England is the history of the Parliament that sits at Westminster, and that affairs which are not discussed there cannot belong to English history. When we have accustomed ourselves to contemplate the whole empire together, and call it all England, we shall see that here, too, is a United States. Here, too, is a great homogeneous people, one in blood, language, religion, and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space." The author does not touch upon the question of local government, although, of course, it is in his mind, nor does he attempt to show how the affairs of the empire should be administered in the future. Many think that a legislative body should sit in London for the transaction of imperial business, in which every part of the empire should be represented.

These lectures are admirable in thought and expression, avoiding equally, to quote their own language, the bombastic and the pessimistic. They do not contain the faintest hint of jingoism, but they are conceived in a large and liberal spirit. Novalis said, Every Englishman is an island: certainly the views which Professor Seeley here urges upon our attention are not insular; on the contrary, they may be said to be as comprehensive as the globe.

Hamilton A. Hill.

A ROUNDABOUT JOURNEY. By CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER. Pp. 360. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Company. 1884.

SEVEN SPANISH CITIES AND THE WAY TO THEM. By EDWARD E. HALE. Pp. 324. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1883.

IN THE SHADOW OF THE PYRENEES, FROM BASQUE-LAND TO CARCASSONNE. By MARTIN R. VINCENT, D. D. With Etchings and Maps. Pp. 276. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

Spain, once in arts and arms the foremost nation in Europe, is now the most backward. This fact is both the delight and the distress of those who visit her. The fragments of her splendid past are her chief attraction, and if she had only taken better care of these we could easily forgive her neglect of modern improvements. The Spaniards claim to be in the very front rank of civilization. There is a semblance of this in the large cities. We naturally expect Spain to be civilized, but, in point of fact, one finds out that she is oriental, and even partially barbarous. There is a proportionate disappointment and irritation. The Spanish character does not readily lend itself to instruction from outsiders. But there is gain. Within a few years a crowd of charming writers have been acting the double part of ushers and admirers to Spain. Meantime, railroads, telegraphs, barely decent hotels, and all the vastly convenient but rather unheroic and vulgarizing instrumentalities of modern times have given access to almost all the corners and treasures of her decayed mediævalism.

Only six of the twenty-two chapters of Mr. Warner's "Roundabout Journey" are devoted to Spain, but these six are so good that one wishes there were more. His book, a bundle of papers originally published in various periodicals, begins at Paris, and carries the reader along a route of quaint description and witty observation to Avignon, Nîmes, Montpellier, and the adjacent coast of France; then skips over to Italy by

way of Munich and Innsbruck; gives us a glimpse of Orvieto and its cathedral; crosses to Sicily; rummages through the doleful gallery of the dead at Palermo, and among the classic remains of Taormina and Syracuse; lands at Malta to tell us how the women coquet with the *faldetta*; sails to Gibraltar, thence by the most wretched short sea passage in the world to Tangier, and so to Spain at Cadiz.

There the author meets the usual exasperating difficulties with which the Spanish officials make miserable the life of the traveler, especially at a seaport, and which are obviously almost too much for even Mr. Warner's good humor. Chapters on the Alhambra, the Bull-Fight, Monserrat, and "Random Notes," follow, and the book ends with a description of Wagner's "Parsifal" at Baireuth. No one who has read Mr. Warner's other sketches need be told with what finish, keenness of insight into men and things, droll conceits, and delicious surprises of fun this attractive bill is filled up. He is at his best in picturing what makes up so much of a tourist's life, — the accommodations and *dis-accommodations* of hotel, railway, and diligence, and all the endless by-play of the journey. His perfectly original humor, his cool, shrewd, Yankee way of looking at things, never fails him. He speaks of *table d'hôte* as "that great European ritual," of "the sustenance contained in the garlic-laden air of the interior" of a diligence; notes the similarity between the growth of the cactus and the German language; and in passing a prison observes that "we do not select our people for the jails with much discrimination." We wish he had not thought it necessary, in order to discharge a "traveler's duty," to exert his best powers in spreading before us all the dreary and disgusting details of the bull-fight, till he was "glad to escape from the demoniac performance" and seek "refuge in an old church near by, to bathe his tired eyes and bruised nerves in its coolness and serenity."

On the whole, Mr. Warner gives a fair judgment respecting the advantages and disadvantages of Spanish travel. We cannot fully agree with him when he says that "the real Spain is the least attractive country in Europe to the tourist. The traveler goes there to see certain unique objects. He sees them, enjoys them, is entranced by them, leaves them with regret and a tender memory, and is glad to get out of Spain. There are six things to see: the Alhambra [better say Granada], the Seville Cathedral and Alcazar, the Mosque of Cordova, Toledo and its cathedral, the Gallery at Madrid, and Monserrat. The rest is mainly monotony and weariness." Has not Mr. Warner forgotten the old port and cathedral of Barcelona, one of the finest in Europe; the charm of Tarragona and Poblet; the costumes and fruit market of Valencia? Of course the others are the plums of the pudding. The great trouble with Spain, from the standpoint of the traveler, is not the lack of objects of interest, but that it is inhospitable. There are few cushions, and little that is gracious and homelike. Needless annoyances abound. In the presence of the great sights which have been mentioned, one can put up with these; but they put a heavy discount on the average attractions, which otherwise would fascinate. In general, our author is right when he says, "In Spain the traveler is pretty certain to be rubbed the wrong way, most of the time. He is conscious of an atmosphere of suspicion, of distrust, of contempt, often," and always, we might add, even at his dinner, of bad tobacco.

Mr. Hale's "Seven Spanish Cities" is a random, racy, and a trifle romancing little book, packed full of rather rose-colored information and jolly good-nature. He is clearly in love with Spain. He is never rubbed the wrong way while there; indeed, one is very sure that it would be an extremely difficult matter ever to rub Mr. Hale the wrong way; he has so many ways and is so captivatingly good-natured in them all. His persistent optimism, however, becomes a trifle wearisome, and soon raises the suspicion, especially in the mind of one who has experienced some of the indifferent delights upon which he dilates, that Mr. Hale's Spain is the product of Mr. Hale's exuberant disposition to make everything Spanish the best. He has been a week in Spain, and has "yet to see the first flea," and this in summer! One envies Mr. Hale many things, but not the least among these is his cuticle. He found no liars, but a "very civil, friendly, self-respecting, and thoughtful people, ready to oblige, and not seeking the usual European pence or shilling." Did Mr. Hale escape counterfeit money and the supercilious contempt of Spanish bankers and officials? But Mr. Hale is in holiday mood: "the restorations of the Alhambra are so perfect that they need a trained eye to tell where they begin;" the rust on the pavement is "the blood-stain where the thirty-six Abencerrages chiefs were killed;" the almost hideous elaboration and deformity of richness in the Cartuja at Granada strike him as making the vestry "perhaps the finest room in Europe;" the king is a "young man admirably fitted for his delicate position,—one of the most interesting and remarkable men in Europe." Mr. Hale jocosely remarks that he had no opportunity of talking politics with the king, as the king did not send for him. It was a great pity, for in view of the recent conduct of this interesting but very weak and pleasure-loving young man it would have been of the greatest value if he could have heard and followed the sound advice which Mr. Hale would certainly have given him. But with this general discount, that it is far too rose-colored, Mr. Hale's book is direct, bright, and thoroughly readable. No one must take it as gospel, unless he is very sure he has Mr. Hale's traveling temperament. He must not expect to find in Seville a hotel equal to the best to be seen in Europe for two dollars a day for everything. He must not expect to find an interpreter at the railway stations. He must expect that in general Spain and the Spaniards will treat him as though he had no business there, and that they will not put themselves out for him a hair's breadth. A good average for the ordinary traveler about to visit Spain would be struck by taking three parts of Mr. Warner's book and one part of Mr. Hale's, and simmering them together over a slow fire of small expectations. We are glad Mr. Hale did not go to the bull-fight, but that he did go to church; that he investigated worship, politics, and education, and gives some good statistics upon them; that he went to Palos, or rather La Rapida, and tells us about Columbus; and finally, that he took the diligence route north, over the Pyrenees, which is sure some day to be vastly popular, and which he describes with inimitable charm.

This brings us to Dr. Vincent's little book, with its three or four maps and as many etchings, which is not so much about Spain proper as about the Basque-Land. It is carefully written, and is full of easy description of Bayonne, Biarritz, San Sebastian, the Pyrenees, miracle-working Lourdes, and ancient Carcassonne. We are given delightful glimpses

into the history, language, literature, and customs of the Basques, — the broken survivors of nobody knows how many centuries of conquest, the aboriginal freemen, and, ethnologically, the most interesting people of Europe. We have graphic and none too witching description of beautiful San Sebastian, the great watering-place of fashionable Madrid, with its fascination of sea and sky and sunshine. We are taken far up among the mountains, to the birthplace and monastery of Loyola, and are impressed with the deathlike horror of Jesuitism. A glimpse of Pau is given us, and Lourdes, with its hundreds of thousands of modern pilgrims coming on *trains de piété* and its stacks of crutches and votive offerings, is vividly set forth. Dr. Vincent is the only author we have seen who has done even tolerable justice to the merits of the Spanish flea, — especially the flea of Basque-Land. He remarks that this flea “partakes of the hardy, enterprising, indomitable character of the Cantabrian. Like the Basque mountaineer, the Basque flea has successfully resisted the enervating influences of modern civilization. He is the one drawback to the pleasure of a summer on the Cantabrian coast, except to those happily constituted insensate cuticles on which the poison produces no effect.” Has Dr. Vincent fortunate Mr. Hale in mind?

The Pyrenees offer a capital field for a cheap and fresh summer excursion. Let a student or overworked business man who wants the adventure and invigoration of a mountain tramp brush up his French, take one of the Bordeaux line of steamers from New York, — excellent Clyde-built ships, — and in twelve days at most he can be in the heart of the Pyrenees, at Eaux Bonnes or Luz, with small expense, in the midst of scenery rivaling that of Switzerland, with bracing air, comfortable inns, and unhackneyed people and customs.

Daniel Merriman.

THE WORKS OF ORVILLE DEWEY, D. D. With a Biographical Sketch. New and Complete Edition. Boston: American Unitarian Association. 1883.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND LETTERS OF ORVILLE DEWEY, D. D. Edited by his daughter, MARY E. DEWEY. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1884.

We join together in this notice two works, independent of each other, and yet closely related. The first is a selection from the writings of Dr. Orville Dewey, making a volume of more than eight hundred pages. The other is a smaller volume, containing an Autobiography, covering, in a rapid way, nearly the whole of Dr. Dewey's long life, which is still more fully illustrated by his letters, and by notes and connecting passages from the pen of his daughter, Miss Mary E. Dewey.

Dr. Dewey was born in a farm-house in the pleasant town of Sheffield, among the Berkshire Hills, March 28, 1794, and died in the same town, March 21, 1882. Seven days more would have brought him to his eighty-eighth birthday. He serves thus as a fresh illustration of the fact that a half-way invalidism through a large part of one's years is not at all inconsistent with a very long life. In the early part of his Autobiography he gives facts and incidents showing a coarser and rougher style of life and manners, during his boyhood, in the country towns of New England, than now prevails. There are many men yet living who will confirm the truth of his statements on this point.

The childhood and youth of Dr. Dewey were passed under the minis-

try of Dr. Ephraim Judson, who went from Taunton to Sheffield in 1789, and continued there in the ministry until his death, in 1813, at the age of seventy-six. Dr. Judson was a prominent man in the Congregational ministry, and a part of his business was to take theological students into his family and instruct them in divinity. Dr. Dewey's recollections of him as the minister of his childhood and youth were not pleasant, though he gives him credit for a kindly heart under a rough exterior.

His daughter, in her brief introduction to the Autobiography, says that her father was "heavily handicapped in his earlier running by both poverty and Calvinism." We venture, however, to think that "poverty," such as he had, which was not severe, and "Calvinism," were both ministers of strength to him rather than of weakness. The Unitarian divines of the early part of the present century, such as Dr. William E. Channing, Dr. Joseph S. Buckminster, Dr. John T. Kirkland, Dr. Nathaniel L. Frothingham, Dr. Joseph Tuckerman, Dr. James Walker, Dr. John G. Palfrey, Dr. Francis W. P. Greenwood, Jared Sparks, LL. D., the subject of this present sketch, and others, passed their days of childhood and youth during the old New England *régime*. They grew up under the Congregational ministry of the former days, and the Calvinistic elements operating about them were doubtless of varying degrees of intensity. But we have never discovered that the men so reared, for intellectual strength, for scholarly habits, and for sweetness of disposition, were not fully equal to those who were started on their way since the sun of religious liberty is supposed to have risen. Whatever the defects of Calvinism may be, or may have been, it cannot be charged that it has not, on both continents, from generation to generation, reared men, in large numbers, of great compass and strength.

The following is a brief outline of Dr. Dewey's life. After his education in the district schools of Sheffield, his labor on the farm, and his preparation for college, he entered Williams College, Sophomore class, in 1811, and was graduated in 1814. He was the first scholar in his class, notwithstanding a trouble in his eyes, for a long period of his course, made him dependent on the eyes of some one else. In Williams College he was converted in the thorough old-fashioned way. He entered heartily into the religious life of the college, and gave up his idea of the profession of law for that of the ministry. After a year in teaching and a year in business in New York, in 1816 he entered Andover Theological Seminary, and was graduated in 1819. Then, for a few months, he was employed as an agent of the American Education Society. In 1820 he preached without settlement for a year in the old Congregational church in Gloucester. Then for two years he became the assistant of Dr. Channing, in Boston. In December, 1823, he was ordained, and set over the Unitarian church of New Bedford, Dr. Joseph Tuckerman preaching the ordination sermon. Here he continued, with some interruptions from ill-health and foreign travel, till 1834, when he retired to his native Sheffield for rest and recuperation. In 1835 he was settled over the Second Congregational Church in New York, now known as the Church of the Messiah, Dr. James Walker preaching the installation sermon. In New York he had among his parishioners Peter Cooper and William Cullen Bryant. He remained here until 1849, when he retired again to his old home in Sheffield, broken in health and seeking rest.

In this retirement, he was invited by Mr. John A. Lowell to prepare a course of lectures to be given before the Lowell Institute, which he did.

They bore the general title of "Lectures on the Problem of Human Destiny." These lectures were afterwards delivered in many of our large cities, and were repeated, by request of Mr. Lowell, before the Institute. He also prepared another course for the Institute under the title "Education of the Human Race." These were also given in other places. From this time on to the close of his life his home was mainly at Sheffield, though he lived for short periods at Washington, D. C., where the office of Chaplain in the Navy was given him, at Charleston, S. C., and at Boston. In the latter place he filled, for a time, the pulpit of the South Green Church, — Dr. Young's. He gave his dwelling at Sheffield the name of St. David's, in token of his Welsh ancestry and in honor of the patron saint of Wales. In his Autobiography, he tells of a discovery he made while traveling in Wales: "I found that our name had an origin of unsuspected dignity, not to say sanctity, being no other than that of Saint David, the patron saint of Wales, which is shortened and changed in the speech of the common people into Dewi."

The volume of Dr. Dewey's works, published last year by the American Unitarian Association, to which reference has been made, is a gathering together in one of volumes before published under the personal supervision of the author. The first publication was in 1846, the second in 1864, and the last in 1876. The history of the present volume is briefly stated in the preface, as follows: "Very early after the death of Dr. Dewey many requests came, both from this country and from England, that the American Unitarian Association should publish a dollar edition of his works, uniform with a like edition of Dr. Channing's works. We ought especially to mention an official letter received from the British and Foreign Unitarian Association. It seemed desirable, both on account of the great and permanent value and interest of the works themselves, and also from the position and influence which Dr. Dewey had acquired and maintained in our body during a long and useful life, that these requests should be complied with."

The reader, opening this volume, and taking the most cursory glance at its contents, would be apt to conclude that its author was, by nature and habit, a thinker. The slightest survey of the topics treated would suggest that no other than a man of a thoughtful and philosophical turn of mind would be the author of such a book. And if, on closer examination, the reader should find himself not always agreeing with the writer, it would not change his conviction that he was holding converse with a man of right earnest and solid thought.

The estimate put upon his writings by his Unitarian brethren may be gathered from one or two sentences in the preface: "With the possible exception of Dr. Channing, no person occupied a more prominent position in the early annals of American Unitarianism than Dr. Dewey. As a preacher of practical truth to tried and tempted men and women, he had an almost unique power."

As a Unitarian thinker and preacher, Dr. Dewey kept himself far nearer to the old body of New England faith and doctrine than have many of his brethren of the later years. In his "Discourses upon Questions in Controversial Theology and Practical Religion," he defines the Unitarian belief thus:—

I. "We say, in the first place, that we believe 'in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost,' claiming, at the same time, that this does not mean or imply the doctrine of the Trinity.

II. "We believe in the atonement. That is to say, we believe in what that word and similar words mean in the New Testament. . . . We believe that Jesus Christ 'died for our sins,' that he 'died the just for the unjust,' that 'he gave his life a ransom for many,' that 'he is the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world,' that 'we have redemption through his blood.'

III. "In the third place, then, we say that we believe in human depravity; and a very serious and saddening belief it is, too, that we hold on this point. We believe in the very great depravity of mankind, in the exceeding depravation of human nature.

IV. "From this depraved condition, we believe, in the fourth place, that men are to be recovered by a process which is termed in the Scriptures regeneration. We believe in 'regeneration, or the new birth.'

V. "We believe, too, in the fifth place, in the doctrine of election. That is to say, again, we believe in what the Scriptures, as we understand them, mean by that word.

VI. "In the sixth place, we believe in a future state of rewards and punishments. We believe that sin must ever produce misery, and holiness must ever produce happiness.

VII. "Once more, and finally, we believe in the supreme and all-absorbing importance of religion."

These heads of discourse are carefully guarded, but, after all the qualifications are annexed, they show an order and style of doctrinal thought not common, we think, in the Unitarian pulpits of the present day. He was naturally conservative. His daughter says of him, "His clinging to the miraculous element in the life of Jesus, while refusing to base any positive authority upon it, is equally characteristic of him, arising from the caution, at once reverent and intellectual, which made him extremely slow to remove any belief, consecrated by time and affection, till it was proved false and dangerous."

Dr. Dewey's "Autobiography and Letters" reveal wit, playfulness, good humor, love of anecdote, merriment even, to a degree hardly to be expected from the grave and serious character of his ordinary writings. This habit of mind he might very naturally have copied from those supposed gloomy divines of the earlier New England generations. In his Autobiography he relates a story touching Dr. Joseph Bellamy, of Bethlehem, Conn., which we do not remember to have before seen, and with this we will close this notice. Dr. Dewey was apologizing for an uncle of his, who used to say rough things *of* and *to* ministers, but who was, nevertheless, a tender husband and father. "It reminds me," said Dr. Dewey, "of an anecdote related of old Dr. Bellamy, of Connecticut, the celebrated Hopkinsian divine, who was called into court to testify concerning one of his parishioners, against whom it was sought to be proved that he was a very irascible, violent, and profane man; and as this man was, in regard to religion, what was called in those days 'a great opposer,' it was expected that the doctor's testimony would be very convincing and overwhelming. 'Well,' said Bellamy, 'Mr. — is a rough, passionate, swearing man, — I am sorry to say it; but I do believe,' he said, hardly repressing the tears that started, 'that there is more of the milk of human kindness in his heart than in all my parish put together.'"

This anecdote may serve a double purpose: that of showing the kindly and generous impulses of Dr. Bellamy, and at the same time showing Dr. Dewey's readiness to report favorably of one of those old Calvinistic divines with whom he had parted company.

Increase N. Tarbox.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNKNOWABLE, as expounded by HERBERT SPENCER. By WILLIAM M. LACY. Philadelphia: Benjamin F. Lacy, 121 South Seventh Street. 8vo, pp. 235. 1883.

Mr. Lacy states the doctrine of "the Unknowable" to be that "all without the sphere of consciousness is, in respect of its nature, — that is, the sum of its attributes minus its existence, — absolutely unknowable." He first proceeds to test the possibility of establishing unknowableness as such; from this point of departure to examine the inductive argument as applied to the explanation of the origin of the universe and of causation; also (as applied) to our ideas of space, time, matter, motion, and force. Following the critique in regard to these, he raises the question as to the validity of self-knowledge, and the nature of consciousness and of mental substance, and the competency of a merely "transfigured realism" as confronted by the problems of realism. These inductive investigations are supplemented by deductive inquiry into the capacity of the mental process of comprehension to reach the real as well as the phenomenal; whether the unconditioned is strictly unthinkable, and what the nature of "unknowable" existence; what the true idea of "life," and whether thought actually transcends consciousness. These discussions, inductive and deductive, are succeeded by a chapter on the reconciliation of science and religion, which completes the work.

As to Mr. Spencer's claim that "the Unknowable" has "existence," but is unconditioned, it is argued in reply that knowledge is involved in the assertion of existence in distinction from non-existence; and that to declare "the Unknowable" unconditioned involves in regard to it even a higher degree of intelligence. To the farther claims that this "Unknowable" is absolute, first cause, infinite, actual, and real, as distinguished from the relative, the finite, the apparent, and phenomenal, Mr. Lacy insists that "this is an amount of information we do not possess concerning many things that are called knowable." Similar implications of knowledge he exposes in Mr. Spencer's definition of "life" and in his declaration that every phenomenon is manifestation of some power incomprehensible, — such manifestation involving a recognized capacity, and, as well, an actual causing; indeed, to no part of what is unknown can we bring proof that it will never be known.

The assertion that we can have no knowledge of time as a reality, for the reason that infinite time is absolutely incomprehensible, is met thus: "The infinity of time is not conceived, as it is not discovered, by traversing time exhaustively. By conception of the *nature*, not the *quantity*, of time is its infinity discovered and represented." To similar objection that the "first cause" is "illusive" recurs answer that it were better to call it the Eternal Cause; for eternity, not beginning, is its distinguishing attribute. If causation pure and simple is unthinkable, causation by the "Unknowable" must be preëminently so. Of like tenor is his rejoinder to the claim that matter, by reason of the enigma of indivisibility, is rendered inconceivable. It is this: "To conceive the infinite divisibility of matter is but to realize that matter and indivisibility cannot exist together as substance and attribute." The argument against the recognition of motion (which reminds irresistibly of the puzzle of Zeno of Elea) is met by indicating the illicit logic of rejecting motion "because nothing *fixed* can be pointed out."

In reference to the assumptions that, while we do not know the reality, we can and do know the appearance, the author now proceeds to argue from Mr. Spencer's own admissions the inconceivableness of mere phenomenon as such. "The basis of science," says Mr. Spencer, "is the persistence of force;" and yet this acknowledges persistence of a cause which transcends our conception. Furthermore, he (Mr. Spencer) maintains that "the noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis of the phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought as an actuality;" "appearance without reality is unthinkable;" "an ever present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence;" "the momentum of our thought carries us beyond conditioned existence to unconditioned existence;" "the very demonstration that a *definite* consciousness of the absolute is impossible to us unavoidably presupposes an *indefinite* consciousness;" "there is some ontological *nexus* whence arises the phenomenal relation we call difference." The author examines these admissions, pointing out the implications, and concludes that from the knowledge his opponent admits may be obtained the knowledge he denies, which is substantially what Mr. Lacy propounded in setting out, namely, "It is impossible to construct an argument (that the real is unknowable) which shall, without disabling itself, lead to the required conclusion."

The final chapter, in which the reconciliation of science and religion is considered, is in some respects weaker than what goes before. Comparison of subjects which are really disparate is not necessarily to be charged to Mr. Lacy. His task is to refute his opponent on his opponent's grounds. Had he passed on to consider the theory of morals and the symmetrical adjustment of such truths as Mr. Spencer assumes as axiomatic, no doubt he could have shown incoherencies equally numerous.

The author's argument is throughout courteous, lucid, and fair, and at times vigorous. We think that it will commend itself to most minds as decidedly successful.

It is easy to overestimate the amount of argumentation required for rebuttal of Mr. Spencer's agnosticism. To a great number of thinkers it is sufficient refutation to exhibit his results summarily. For not only does he deny validity of our knowledge of a Divine Being, but equally that of matter, space, time, mind; conditioned objects, as well as unconditioned, cannot be apprehended as real; things are appearances; only the outside of the cup is reached; the idea of the race, wise and unwise, being of an opposite character, is to be set aside; our intelligence of God and of everything else, as realities, vanishes as a vapor.

Xenophanes, like Mr. Spencer, claimed only to know existence. But this $\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{o}\nu$ was to his thought a veritable divine presence. Hegel considered the notion of *Existenz* a composite, and subjected it to searching analysis; and nature, as unfolded therefrom, became to his mind the veritable revealing of God. But even Mr. Spencer recognizes a universe evidently "everywhere alive;" every point pulsating with an infinity of vibrations; our mental substance identical with this eternal energy, from which all things proceed, — mentality, beauty, righteousness, vision, hearing, linguistic ability, personality (and he says the absolute may reasonably be interpreted as spiritualistic); this existent Reality worthy of reverence, affording, as acknowledged, a rational basis for the religions of the world.

Why, in presence of all these confessed verities, he should incline to ignore a Divine Being seems mysterious, exceptional, and is, perhaps, explicable in his own words: "I distinctly trace to my father an ingrained tendency to inquire for causes of the physical class." Mayhap, there might be added also, "and a bitter prejudice against evangelical religion." "Ingrained" is suggestive. Perhaps the extent to which Mr. Spencer is victim of his environment is by himself unknowable.

God cannot be reached by merely physical inquiries. "The god of this world" tends to crowd out the vision of the Spirit Supreme. Is there not a moral insight, a spiritual discerning, which Mr. Spencer has overlooked? His error is psychological. His agnosticism is founded on a two-fold assumption of absolute knowledge: (1) that the capacity of the mind to know is by him (absolutely) known, and (2) that, with equally (absolute) completeness, he cognizes the apprehensibility of the external world.

G. Campbell.

BEYOND THE GATES. By ELIZABETH STUART PHELPS. 16mo, pp. 196. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1884.

The charm so many found in "The Gates Ajar" is present in this book. Few will begin it without reading to the end, and the most hurried will scarcely skip a line.

At the crisis of a dangerous illness "Mary" falls asleep, "with nothing in the range of her eyes but" pictures of "the cross, the Christ, and her father." In the dream that follows and constitutes the book these three are blended in a single theme, which is expanded into an elaborate symphony. The Christ revealed through suffering and through human affections is the substance of the vision. There is an abundance of subtle speculations and glowing fancies. But even the most startling of them is plainly the outgrowth of some genuine heart-hunger which we all have felt.

Those who take up the book "to learn how the heavens go" will not easily lay it down without clearer views of "how to go to heaven." For in this dream of the Father's house many essential gospel truths are expressed with a charm that wins attention and a vigor that compels assent. The author does not prove that there is a heaven, but she assumes that there is with a fervor of conviction which, by its contagion, is more helpful than argument in resisting what is called, with rare felicity of phrase, "the pressure of fashionable reluctance to believe." She does not tell us that we cannot go to heaven until we are converted. But she makes us feel that fact as we look at Mrs. Mercy and Marie Sauvé.

The dreamer feels sure she is in heaven, not because she sees the splendors that surround her, but because she prefers the Lord's will to her own. She is among people who always think first of what the Lord gives rather than of what he denies; who never make excuses for themselves; who pray because it is natural to pray, feel a sense of perfect safety because of the Lord's nearness, and love God with all their hearts and their neighbors as themselves.

If we were like this, we know we should find heaven here; and until we become like this, Miss Phelps tells us with indubitable emphasis, we cannot find heaven there.

It is not said directly that we can hope for heaven only because Christ died for us. But Christ's self-sacrificing love is faithfully and persuasively shown to be the source of every influence by which men are brought to heaven and kept there.

On these three foundations, the reality of heaven, our need of dispositions changed into the Saviour's likeness, Jesus Christ the way, the truth, and the life, Miss Phelps has built. The superstructure, if sometimes fanciful, is always alluring, and the reader who shall be won by its beauty to step within its walls will find his feet upon the rock.

William Burnet Wright.

THE CHURCH-BOOK. Hymns and Tunes for the Uses of Christian Worship. Prepared by LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON. Pp. 437. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1883.

SONGS OF PRAISE AND PRAYER. For the Sunday-School and Social Meeting. Compiled and edited by CHARLES H. RICHARDS, D. D. Pp. 222. New York: Taintor Brothers, Merrill & Co. 1883.

Hymn-books are following one another in quick succession, and in some respects with steady improvement. The hymns are devotional and of a high order of poetic merit, and the music is inexpressibly finer than the mechanical tunes of the old collections.

Very few *good old* tunes can be selected from the books in use in America till twenty years ago, while the number of good new tunes, whether restored from lost treasures or freshly composed, is continually increasing.

But the devotional education of our churches has only begun, and the book has not yet appeared which is to remain. Dr. Bacon's book has decided merits. It is printed in an attractive form; every hymn has its tune to itself; many choice tunes have been restored, of which the German "Nun danket alle Gott" is a striking example. Some noble hymns are here which are not found in any other book. A large number of tunes by Dykes, Barnby, Monk, Redhead, and Sullivan are brought into use. All this is good, and the book will promote dignity of worship where it is used. With the single exception of "Nothing but Leaves," the compiler has had the moral courage to exclude sentimental hymns.

The conspicuous faults of the book are omissions and wrong adaptations. Some of the omissions are surprising: such as, "Hark, hark, my soul, angelic songs are swelling;" "Calm on the listening ear of night;" "The head that once was crowned with thorns;" "All praise to Thee, my God, this night;" "There is a green hill far away;" "Lord of every land and nation;" "Onward, Christian soldiers;" "Christian, dost thou see them?" "O Jesus, thou art standing;" "O very God of very God and very light of light;" "I lay my sins on Jesus." It makes one homesick to miss these familiar hymns. Certain hymns are wedded to certain tunes, but Dr. Bacon, the sworn enemy of divorce, and especially when without cause, has in more than one case put them asunder. He has taken away from "Sun of my soul, thou Saviour dear," its well-known "Hursley," by Monk, and has put in its place a stranger, which is indeed by Dykes, but is not one of his best. "The Son of God goes forth to war" has been cruelly torn away from its inspiring tune. "Far from my heavenly home," which is perfectly suited to the minor tune to

which it is usually sung, is set to a tune without character, and is placed among the versified psalms, where it is likely to be overlooked. "Awake, my soul, and with the sun" is set to the ponderous music of the Missionary Hymn in place of the bright, firm movement of the Morning Hymn. As a second tune is given for "All hail the power of Jesus' name," why could we not have had "Miles' Lane," which is one of the grandest congregational harmonies ever heard?

While the excellences of the book are marked, so that it ranks among the very best, these omissions and maladaptations are serious faults. It is of the right sort, but has left undone some things which it ought to have done.

Dr. Richards' little book is partly a selection from his larger manual and partly the addition of popular tunes, the object evidently being to satisfy various tastes. Much of the music cannot be too highly praised. The impetus given twenty years ago by Monk's "Hymns Ancient and Modern" has reached even the Sunday-school and prayer-meeting, for which this manual is prepared. But it is difficult to understand how a compiler who loves the best music could have made room for some of the undignified tunes which are found here. Several tunes have no character whatever, others trip along without a thought of reverence, and still others are merely jolly refrains. A popular air from Verdi's "Traviata" caracoles and capers even under the restraint of religious words. The "Marseillaise Hymn" is absurd doing duty to some verses on temperance.

The worst of it is that the stately and tender harmonies are sure to be neglected for the ditties and easy choruses. The book, as it stands, is a compromise. If a quarter of its pages could be cut out, the remainder would admirably promote education in chaste and beautiful worship.

George Harris.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

FROM D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK.

Early Christian Literature Primers. Edited by Professor George P. Fisher, D. D.

I. The Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists of the Second Century. By Rev. George A. Jackson. 18mo, pp. 203. 1884. 60 cents.

II. The Fathers of the Third Century. By Rev. George A. Jackson. 18mo, pp. 211. 1881. 60 cents.

III. The Post-Nicene Greek Fathers. By Rev. George A. Jackson. 18mo, pp. 224. 1883. 60 cents.

FROM CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

History of the Christian Church. By Philip Schaff. A new edition, revised and enlarged. Vol. III. Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity, from Constantine the Great to Gregory the Great, A. D. 311-600. 8vo, pp. xv., 1049. 1884. \$4.00.

The International Revision Commentary on the New Testament. Edited by Philip Schaff, D. D., LL. D. Vol. VI. The Epistle to the Romans. By Professor M. B. Riddle. 12mo, pp. xxxiii., 256. 1884. \$1.00.

Luther. A Short Biography. By James Anthony Froude, M. A., Honorary Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. Reprinted from the Contemporary Review. 12mo, pp. vii., 90. 1884. 30 cents

Quotations in the New Testament. By Crawford Howell Toy, Professor in Harvard University. 8vo, pp. xliii., 321. 1884. \$3.50.

Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church. With an Introduction on the Study of Ecclesiastical History. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D. D., Dean of Westminster. New edition. With plans. 12mo, pp. 79, 422. 1884. \$2.00.

FROM BENJAMIN F. LACY, PHILADELPHIA.

An Examination of the Philosophy of the Unknowable as expounded by Herbert Spencer. By William M. Lacy. Pp. iv., 235. 1883.

FROM GEORGE H. ELLIS, BOSTON.

Martin Luther. A Study of Reformation. By Edwin D. Mead. Pp. 194. 1884. \$1.25.

FROM CUPPLES, UPHAM AND COMPANY, BOSTON.

A Memorial of John Farmer. By John Le Bosque. Pp. iv., 138. 1884. \$1.00.

FROM LEE AND SHEPARD, BOSTON.

Twelve Months in an English Prison. By Susan Willis Fletcher. 12mo, pp. ix., 478. 1884. \$1.50.

FROM TAINTOR BROTHERS, MERRILL AND COMPANY, NEW YORK.

Songs of Praise and Prayer. For the Sunday-School and Social Meeting. Compiled and edited by Charles H. Richards, D. D. Pp. iv., 332. 1883.

FROM METHODIST BOOK CONCERN, PHILLIPS AND HUNT, AGENTS,
NEW YORK.

Library of Biblical and Theological Literature. Edited by George R. Crooks, D. D., and John F. Hurst, D. D. Vol. II. Biblical Hermeneutics. 8vo, pp. iv., 781. 1883.

FROM THE AUTHOR, COHOES, NEW YORK.

The Outlines of the Mental Plan, and the Preparation therein for the Precepts and Doctrines of Christ. By L. W. Mansfield, author of "Up-Country Letters," "The Morning Watch," etc. Pp. xxiv., 187. 1883.

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THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY AS A PROFESSION AND
A SACRED CALLING.

A FEW THOUGHTS FOR STUDENTS IN OUR COLLEGES, AND
THEIR FRIENDS.

I AM assured that at the present time there are special and urgent reasons for considering the claims of the clerical profession upon the students and recent graduates of our colleges, and also upon their friends. I address my argument to both with equal directness, forasmuch as the opinions and wishes of relatives and other friends have very much to do with the determination of their profession with the majority of young men.

I write for those who believe in the supernatural origin and authority of Christianity, in the permanence of the Christian Church, in the certain growth and final triumph of the kingdom of God, and in the existence of the ministry as an essential condition to the rapid progress and ultimate triumph of this kingdom. While I would give prominence to the ministry as a sacred calling, with its special responsibilities and its spiritual attractions, I shall also treat of it as a profession which, notwithstanding its sacred character, is beset by many human conditions, and involves the possibility of failure or success. Much has been lost, in the view of the writer, in looking at this profession exclusively upon its spiritual side. It certainly has an earthly side which is sometimes painfully conspicuous, and it is not wise to leave this out of view, or to thrust it into the background, by giving almost exclusive prominence to its higher relations, or investing its sober prose with the glamour of exaggerated representations.

Some fifty years ago and more, earnest and special efforts were made to increase the number of students for the ministry. In

view of the then newly awakened spirit of religious enterprise, as manifested in missionary movements in foreign countries and at home, the opinion prevailed that every college student who had publicly taken Christian vows was seriously bound to consider the question whether these vows did not bind him to select the ministry as his life-work. It was almost unanimously taught that every such person was bound to furnish some decisive reason why he should be exempted from responding to the universal summons. In the generations previous, the consciousness of a divine call in some form of impulsive feeling or constraining obligation or spiritual communication had been held by many to be an essential prerequisite for the office. But with the enlarged views of men in respect to the multiplied and expanded spheres of Christian activity, and their more enlightened interpretations of the voice of God's providence, it was urged by very many that the call of God to the ministry, and even to the missionary field, was sounded in the ear of every college student; or at least that he was bound to show some good reason why it was not addressed to himself before he could be justified in declining the sacred office.

It was also fervently believed by very many leaders in the Church that there were special reasons for believing that the kingdom of God was at hand. A great variety of new religious instrumentalities had been put into operation. Sunday-schools were instituted, and other elaborate arrangements for the instruction of the young, which it was hoped would bring many very early into the Church. Special movements were set on foot for the reformation and recovery of the vicious and neglected classes. Revivals of religion, with their concentrated glow and social excitements, were accepted as likely to be the normal and oft-repeated experiences of the Christian Church. In the prospect of the anticipated enlargement and the speedy triumphs of the kingdom of God, it seemed not only clear that every educated man ought to give the best of reasons why he should not listen to and obey the call to the ministry which was in all probability addressed to himself, but that special provision should be made for selecting young men for a course of special education and assisting them with special pecuniary aid. Education societies and beneficiary foundations were provided, and every pastor and zealous layman deemed it his constant duty to seek out gifted young men and induce them to enter upon academic studies with a special reference to the ministry as their future profession. Instead of the old-fashioned doctrine that a special divine call must be waited for as a still small

voice within the recesses of each individual soul, it was practically held that the call could be heard as the sound of a trumpet proclaiming from every hill-top to every Christian youth, "Whom shall we send and who will go for us."

As the result of these strong convictions and these ardent feelings, the number of students for the ministry was suddenly increased. Some observers and critics would say that there was an over supply. This could hardly be asserted, in view of two things, — the great increase of the demand by reason of the sudden and widespread increase of population who rushed into our vacant territory from the older States and foreign countries, and the rapid growth of the country in wealth. It would be no more than candid, however, to say that under the pressure described, not a few persons were urged into the clerical ranks who had no special adaptation to its special duties, and who would have rendered a more useful service to the kingdom of God had they never aspired to teach from the pulpit.

The fact cannot be overlooked nor denied, that at the present time, there are very many young men who are solidly and ardently Christian who shrink from the Christian ministry, if indeed they are not positively averse to it, and their distaste or aversion is accepted by themselves and their friends as a decisive reason why they should not enter the ministry. The opinion also prevails, more or less extensively, that, as between the two, the active Christian layman is more likely to be the happier and the more useful, other things being equal, than the equally zealous clergyman, and that spiritually considered a conscientious layman is more free from the constraint and criticism of his fellow-men in respect to his opinions and character, while, in respect to his private affairs, he is immeasurably more free from that intermeddling which every man resents as officious and unwelcome. A clergyman, it is also reasoned, has a very slender chance of acquiring wealth, and a tolerably certain chance of being poor, or, at least, of being shut up to a frugal life. The obligation of getting on in the world, in the attractive form of acquiring a comfortable independence, is more distinctly recognized as a duty than in other times, while the dazzling possibility of being rich presents irresistible attractions to many sanguine saints who would fondly make "the best of both worlds" by being rich in this world's goods and also rich in faith. The special duty of abandoning the prospect of a competence or a fortune, for Christ's sake, is not accepted as one of those prizes of the Christian life which are so clearly commanded by a divine

call, especially when it is urged by those who do not accept it for themselves or for their children. "The shady side" of the pastor's life is minutely portrayed and painfully emphasized, even by the sons and daughters of clergymen, in their conversations, if not in tales which are expressly written to enforce the humiliations and hardships of a clergyman's life. The bondage of the pulpit to the pews is not infrequently set forth in eloquent satire. The ingratitude and parsimony of here and there a parish to a pastor, who had served it for more than a generation, is accepted as the rule rather than the exception. Last, but not least of all, the limitations to freedom of thought, the bondage to creeds, the weakening of faith in an articulated and abstract theology, the tyranny and capriciousness of ecclesiastical courts, the narrowness of church feeling and opinion, are matters of free disquisition in many circles, and felt to be, if not spoken of, decisive reasons why a young man of an inquiring yet conscientious spirit and honest mind should hesitate to embark in a profession the entrance to which may possibly be made very narrow by the scruples of bigoted deacons, elders, clergymen, bishops, committees, councils, and synods. These difficulties often seem most formidable to some of those who seem most likely to attain the highest usefulness and eminence in the clerical profession, and to bring to it the most ardent devotion and self-denying activity. The evil of the case is aggravated by the circumstance that of late the opportunities for distinguished activity and eminent usefulness on the part of laymen have seemed especially abundant and promising. It would seem to be the deliberate opinion of not a few, that a layman with practical good sense and evangelistic zeal, especially if he comes into the field with the prestige of wealth and social position, or the reputation of high professional or business ability, can be more useful than if he were a clergyman. Hence it is concluded, by parents and sons, that it is on the whole wiser and safer that the son should avoid the manifold chances and perils of clerical life, and seek to carry the consecrated spirit into the manifold public activities for which the layman, without question, has always a divine call and inviting opportunities.

The number of students with religious purposes, in the mean time, is rather increased than diminished. Their assent to the obligations of personal religious activity and supreme consecration is possibly more universal and hearty than ever before. The duty of active Christian work on the part of every educated man is fervently assented to. And yet it is observed that the number of

those who propose to enter the Christian ministry has steadily fallen off within the last twenty-five years. At this moment there may be a slight reaction, but it is most manifest that the whole subject needs to be reconsidered in the light of the present times, and the obligations and privileges of the Christian ministry need to be represented to students and their friends from new points of view. To do this is the object of the following essay, in which the writer proposes to consider the Christian ministry as a secular profession and a sacred calling or special form of Christian service. He designs to bring into view its human and divine sides, and the attractions and repulsions which pertain to each.

The first point to which he would direct especial attention is that the ministry *is* a profession requiring special tastes and capacities, a peculiar training of learning and discipline. To furnish this training special schools are useful, if indeed in the present state of civilization they are not absolutely necessary, with special courses of study involving the mastery of a considerable variety of subjects, as, the critical knowledge of the Hebrew and Greek languages, a study of the art of interpretation, the history of the Hebrew people and the Christian Church, with its creeds and institutions and its inner and outer life, the study of philosophical and biblical theology, and the scientific and metaphysical relations which these several studies involve. To this should be added as indispensable to practical success, the mastery of the power to use written and spoken discourse, of skill in pastoral care and the practical ministrations which are required in the beginning and progress of the Christian life.

The studies involved in this training, when it is prosecuted with any considerable thoroughness, are largely *philosophical*, and if *philosophical* they are logical and psychological. The so-called argument for the Being and Moral Government of God implies profound reflection upon the profoundest and most subtle of all themes. Here is room and demand for the most refined distinctions and the most vigorous logic. The themes themselves have fascinated thoughtful men in all ages. The interest in them is in our days by no means limited to clergymen or Christian believers. The scientific world has taken them up into its discussions and has popularized them in our most evanescent literature. The Physicist, the Evolutionist, and the Agnostic of the present day are all Theologians, speculating, affirming, and denying concerning matter and mind, duty and sin, the mystery of the universe, its origin, its end, and its signification. Is there anything beyond the

present, and if so, what is it? Is there any life besides the life in the body, and if there is, what is its nature, its evidence, and the conditions of living it well? The studies to which these themes invite and inspire must require a severe intellectual discipline, and constitute a career of the most inspiring intellectual activity and enterprise.

The clergyman is also an *interpreter*. His weekly, and often his daily occupations compel him to search for the import of the Scriptures, under all the lights and with all the aids of learned criticism. The Scriptures themselves embody a great variety of human compositions, each of which must be studied by its own light, and may be made to contribute to the total of religious knowledge. The preacher prosecutes these researches not merely nor chiefly to gratify his personal curiosity or to add to the accumulations of exegetical research, but that he may use the results for the guidance and help and uplifting of his fellow-men. No man will question that the studies which occupy the clergyman, from the beginning of his training to the end of his active life, are employed upon the most elevating, the most stimulating, and the most rewarding of all conceivable themes. The fact that their results are practically applied to the most important uses of character, of conduct, and of destiny surely does not detract from their interest or lower their dignity. Rather, the circumstance that these results must be constantly brought home to the minds and hearts of men in the forms of reasoning and persuasion opens still more varied opportunities for invention and literary skill. The themes themselves are fraught with eloquence. They are also capable of eloquent enforcement by any one who is alive to their practical significance and their emotional power. At present we have to do with them as elevating and ennobling studies; and we assert that, if one's profession or occupation in life is to be valued at all for the problems with which it occupies his thoughts and the questions which it proposes for his solution and the truths with which it stirs his intellect, the clerical profession is foremost for the legitimate influence which it exerts upon a noble and honest mind.

The clergyman, as we have said, is more than a philosopher. He is also a *critic* and an *interpreter* of books written long ago in languages that are difficult and dead, the import of which can be fully discovered only by the laborious and faithful use of all the resources of modern criticism. Criticism involves *history*, and *history* requires the historic imagination, as also a nice power of discrimination, such as at once stimulates and rewards the intelligent

student, who is excited and awed by the faith that the personages and events with which he has to do spake the truth of God as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, and wrought wonders in his name as aided by supernatural power. To make this living and credible truth to his own mind, surrounded by its appropriate setting, and glowing with the power of speaking and acting readily, is an occupation which at once stimulates and rewards the noblest minds.

The story is well accredited of Daniel Webster, that on some occasion, when he was at his ease among his friends, the question was started, What is the most interesting theme which can occupy the mind of man? When it came to him, he replied with his ponderous and more than usually pathetic impressiveness, "Gentlemen, the most exalted theme which can occupy the mind of man is man's relations to his Creator." Whatever may be true of the effect upon the clerical profession, it certainly has this advantage above every other, that it confronts and stimulates the mind with this most exalted of themes, as suggested by the revelations of nature, as enforced by the facts and revelations of history, and as recorded and vivified in the most interesting forms of human literature.

The fact that the clergyman does not prosecute his studies primarily for either a philosophical or critical, but for a practical use, by no means lowers the dignity or attractiveness of his profession. He is not a merely dry metaphysician, acute but abstract perhaps, nor is he a learned critic alone, but he must bring the results of his thinking and reading into such forms as will interest and affect his fellow-men. In order that he may do this, he must use all the resources of popular reasoning and fervid eloquence; in other words, he must be trained to the noble offices of genuine literary power. This necessity forces him in some sense to become a student of literature and to aspire to the invention and skill of the practiced writer and the genuine orator.

This necessity of the clerical profession explains why a taste for and a familiarity with *literature* are so commonly looked for and generally found in the well-trained clergyman. It certainly shows that the profession itself is friendly to literary tastes. It explains why the clergyman, other things being equal, is expected to be conversant with the best literature, and to occupy himself with the best essays, the best reviews, and why the best writers of essays and reviews are more frequently clergymen than the representatives of any other profession.

I know that it will be urged by some and is thought by more, that the philosophy of the clergyman is narrow and antiquated unless it is atheistic or agnostic; that he stands in perilous need of a scientific training, in order that he may learn what scientific evidence is; that he is fond of talking about materialism and evolutionism without being aware that every student of nature has ceased to be frightened by these once odious terms. Not a few will think, if they do not say, that his literature is sentimental and forced. There are not a few, however, who were never so clear and confident as at the present time, that the Theistic and spiritual theory of the universe was never more rationally believed and ably defended than it is at the present moment, and never required more discriminating and learned expounders; that materialistic science has uttered the last and best word which science can make plausible; that literature was never so ready to be inspired by faith or to incarnate the spirit of worship; and that, for all these reasons, the studies of the expounder and defender of the faith were never so rewarding as at the present moment.

Possibly the question might be asked, whether the clergymen, as a class, seem to be elevated and inspired by their professional studies as they ought to be, or whether they are not generally content with a low and tame level of attainment in thought and exposition. I reply, that depends on the zeal with which they prosecute these studies and the earnestness and fervor of their practical faith in their work. I may add, that however narrow may be the range of their culture and limited the appliances of many for study and depressing their earthly and sordid cares, they find "an exceeding great reward" in the intellectual excitement and elevation to which their profession exalts them. Among the thousands of preachers of the gospel at this moment in our land, there are hundreds — and more — who are no mean philosophers; who are able critics, eloquent orators, and among them is here and there a gifted poet, even though the dwelling and church of many are humble cabins, and their living is as plain as their thinking is high. What many call their narrowness of vision and the positiveness of their convictions comes from the assurance that they have to do with the truth of the living God, which abideth forever in its facts and its principles, even though criticism casts new light on the records of our faith, and modern thought demands changes in the phraseology of our creeds. If I am asked whether this or that clergyman is inspired by his work, or whether he has not become tame and stiff and dull, I have a right to learn whether he is earnest in his faith,

fervent in his spirit, faithful in his studies, and devoted to his people. Of all such it is safe to say, that, according to their capacities and their opportunities, they never fail to be satisfied with the intellectual attractions of their profession, but find it, to the end of life, full of kindling inspiration.

The *practical* side of the clerical profession is also invested with peculiar attractions to any right-minded man. The life of the Christian minister is formally consecrated to the well-being of his fellow-men, conspicuously in the highest and most enduring of relations. He is a messenger to all men of God's redeeming and forgiving grace. He claims in a special sense to be commissioned by the incarnate Christ; to speak in his name, and to be moved by his sympathy. His business is eminently to save men from their sins, from the degradation and power of sin in the present life, and from its consequences in the life which is to be. His occupation and message are not limited to spiritual functions or to official proclamations. Were this the case, he would be in danger of asserting an offensive prerogative, or assuming sanctimonious and priestly airs. To guard him against these unmanly degradations, his mission is to care for all that promotes human well-being, whether it be man's bodily comfort, his intellectual culture, the gratification of his taste, or the advancement of his civilization. He is set apart by his office as a recognized friend of human kind in every possible method of private and public activity.

In very many, not to say in most communities, this secures to him an assured and desirable *social position*. If he is not always admitted to the highest places in society, he is usually treated with marked respect. It is rare that he is left to urge any claims to recognition which a man who respects himself would care to enforce. He usually has a vantage ground of introduction to the courtesy and confidence of his fellow-men which exempts him from the rough and rude encounters which befall most others. It is true that now and then he encounters personal prejudices and violent hostilities without fault of his own, but in general he is exempt from offensive experiences of this sort. His family take a desirable social position without being obliged to wait or to scramble for it, and in this position their personal courtesies and claims are estimated at their fullest value. He finds friends when he needs friends, if he deserves to have friends, and more readily than most men, and all that he is and all that he does is under circumstances which tend to assure him a high and a warm place in the esteem and confidence of the community and generation which he serves.

The clergyman ordinarily does not need to serve a *long apprenticeship* at the beginning of his professional career. The young clergyman usually sets off with all his sails filled by a favoring breeze; indeed, this breeze sometimes blows more freshly than he can steadily manage. The failures and troubles incident to his inexperience are usually regarded with partial forbearance by reason of the attractions of his youth. His permanent success, indeed, must depend, as it ought, upon his industry, his fidelity, his sagacious tact, and his Christian spirit; but success in every profession is determined by capacity and character. But with reasonable fitness for success, and the determined, not to say the Christian, purpose to succeed by legitimate methods, success is certain. Not infrequently a flow of popularity suddenly meets a young minister which is dangerous to his modesty and self-poise, which turns his head with extravagant ideas of his relative importance, and leads him to assume attitudes which are very disagreeable to the rest of mankind. But let the reverse be true, let him struggle hard at the beginning with adverse circumstances, he will find more or less sympathy from many Christian people simply from their regard for the office which he represents.

It is favorable to the clerical profession that the public sentiment in most Protestant countries is becoming more and more united and strong that the moral progress of the community is essential to its highest well-being. In consequence, it accords its respect to all those professions which are devoted to this progress. The most negative and irreligious of philosophers, the most frivolous and the most earnest of critics, are now unanimous in their assent to the axiom that "conduct and character" are the supreme ends for man's life and institutions. The various theories of political and social science are all urged on the ground of their alleged fitness to advance human well-being. Sociologists, political economists, and educators of every description, all proclaim a gospel of human welfare and human salvation, and they all find listeners and believers. Their message to man is the same, "Peace on earth and good will to men," whether or not they utter it as a voice spoken from heaven, or do or do not add "Glory to God in the highest." The company of preachers is enormous; so great as in some sense to bring preaching into disrespect, and yet to root more and more deeply in the public mind the conviction that man does not live by bread alone. Man is always striving after some good which is higher and better than sense or culture can give. Not a few malcontents and croakers find in this fermentation some dis-

advantage to the clerical profession. They overlook the one advantage, that men recognize the aims of the teacher and reformer to be of supreme importance. So long as the cry continues to be so earnest, "Who will show us any good?" so long will those who profess to answer this question by earnest convictions expressed in fervent speech be treated with respect.

These convictions and desires for moral and social betterment enlarge immensely the sphere and opportunities of the clergyman's activity. He is expected to take a prominent part in all these movements for individual and social welfare, and to show his fellow-men his invention, his enterprise, and his practical wisdom. Not a few educated young men are now moved by a laudable ambition to engage in political life with the hope of reforming its principles and methods. The young clergyman can do more than any other young man to influence his generation even in this direction and without dishonoring his Christian calling or being polluted by the soil of "practical politics." This much certainly cannot be disputed, that the Christian pastor who gives his attention to the moralities of public affairs, if he stands on the high ground of spiritual convictions and treats human society with its relations and duties as controlled by the laws which regulate the kingdom of God, cannot fail to elevate those conceptions of his hearers which respect their life on the earth. Such a pastor may, in these days, exert an enormous influence in purifying every family and sweetening every social circle. He may dignify the aims and occupations of the daily life, he may lift trade to a higher plane, he may spiritualize and refine art and culture and amusements by the breath of the living God.

We contend that in all these directions there is opening a wide and inviting field for every clergyman who can discern the needs and calls of his time and the opportunities of his profession in respect to Christian ethics and Christian social life. We certainly do not contend for the feeble or the less frequent recognition of Christian truth or enforcement of Christian motives. The broader is the sphere of Christian duty, the higher the ideal of the Christian temper; the more complicated the machinery for Christian activity, the more imperative will be the need for the driving force which Christ and a living faith in his person alone can furnish. Activities in a secular direction need not secularize the mind of the clergyman, nor belittle his habits to small gossip or petty intermeddling, while yet they may tend to make him more completely a man among his fellow-men. Such habits will rather enlarge the

sphere of his thinking, and elevate and vary the tone of his pulpit addresses, and bring down the generalities of the Christian rule of life to a more definite and varied application to the daily conduct, and in so doing impart elasticity and freshness to every variety of public teaching. To realize such an ideal of the preacher's and pastor's life is the commanding duty of every Christian minister at the present day. The opportunity to do this gives to the clerical profession one of its chief attractions. To effect the personal and social improvement of any community, by the force of Christian teaching and Christian persuasion in the light of modern thought and modern experience, is an ideal aim which cannot but dignify the clerical profession in the eyes of all right-minded young men. The remark of Richard Cecil is true in more senses than one, that "a country minister fighting the devil in a country parish has higher ideas than Julius Cæsar or Napoleon ever dreamed of." It holds good not only of the ideas of the spiritual life but of that earthly human life which spiritual truth is fitted to inspire and direct.

The *pecuniary promise* of the ministry, it must be confessed, is not so attractive as are its intellectual and its social rewards. Very few clergymen become rich in their profession, certainly not by means of it, and this only. A few indeed receive large incomes, perhaps disproportionately large for their own welfare or that of their congregations, or for the well-being of the kingdom of God, but the number is relatively small. A great number have moderate incomes from which they save less, perhaps, than they should under the suggestions of wise prudence and manly self-respect. Very many struggle all their lives with a scanty income, which often depresses their spirits and occupies their intellect with cares more or less sordid, except so far as their Christian faith and love and hope can lift them to higher moods. That their attention is often distracted and their usefulness limited by these trials cannot be questioned. Much is made of these inconveniences by clergymen and their friends in the way of appeals to arouse the churches to greater liberality for the support of the ministry. The churches generally are sometimes charged, in a wholesale and indiscriminate fashion, with criminal indifference to this evil. Sometimes they are threatened with a temporary loss of the ministry, unless they rouse themselves to greater liberality, very ridiculously as it seems to us, inasmuch as should the ministry undertake to starve the churches in spiritual blessings, because the churches had starved the ministry in earthly aliment, there would

survive neither churches nor ministers to starve or be starved. But with this aspect of the subject we have little to do. To the student the question comes home in a practical form and upon its human and mundane side, What kind of a living will the ministry yield me if I enter upon it? To this question, it is safe to reply, "It will not yield you a fortune; of this you may be assured." It is not certain, however, that you will acquire a fortune by any other occupation. The number of those who become rich in any calling or profession is comparatively small. The number of those who remain very rich after becoming so is smaller. The number of those whose descendants retain the wealth which their fathers had acquired is still smaller. The number of those who acquire wealth by professional life is smaller still. A few members of the medical and legal professions become very wealthy; but the majority of either reach only a moderate competence and very many die with scarce any accumulation. It is true that now and then a man of acknowledged ability and industry enters the clerical profession and fails of success, and suffers in his feelings and his purse. He is bitterly disappointed and so are his friends. We are not disposed to deny that the clerical profession requires certain conditions for eminent success and popularity, and even for moderate usefulness, which a few men otherwise able and eminent fail to fulfill. It is no dishonor to such a man to leave the profession in which he cannot be happy or useful. It is no dishonor to the profession that he can leave it with better prospects of success in another than he can leave the profession of medicine or the law. There are failures of success in every calling owing to some want of adaptation for its special requirements. There are failures also from indolence or passion or some other unconquerable habit of temper or of mind. These we are not required to estimate in our personal decisions, least of all in our selection of a profession in which we may have reason to suppose that we have a fair prospect of success.

But we have not yet finished the pecuniary promise of the ministry. We have already asked and answered the question whether there is certainty of acquiring wealth in any calling in life? especially for such as have no passion for business and no special thrift in saving? This prepares us for another, namely, whether it is imprudent or unwise to reject a profession which is otherwise full of promise and satisfaction, because it gives no promise of wealth, although it may afford a competence. Are there not some advantages which more than outweigh the possibility of a for-

tune? Ought not a rational man to estimate very highly the occupation of his time with elevated and perhaps favorite studies, the constant calls to beneficial activities, with the enjoyment of the confidence and esteem of his fellow-men, and a more than usual exemption from the manifold vexations which distract and oppress the lives of most men? Those who are most intimately conversant with the personal history of clergymen and their families will testify most confidently that they have been singularly peaceful and happy; that, though frugal and sometimes straitened, they have been contented and cheerful; that they have been generally exempt from poverty and dishonor, and have in a remarkable degree enjoyed the confidence and respect of their fellow-men, and have left behind them memories that have usually been honored. Intelligence, humanity, public spirit, thrift, and self-respect have been their distinguishing characteristics. In the families of clergymen have been trained a very large number of men and women who have adorned the highest positions in the community. The prospect and promise of a life so fortunate as this are not without their attractions.

It should not be overlooked in this connection that there are other professions, in which the promise of wealth is not a chief nor certain attraction, which are yet sought for and occupied with eager aspiration and devoted enthusiasm. Science, art, letters, and instruction, all inspire and reward their many devotees, to whom fame and influence and personal enjoyment are ample and satisfying rewards, and who never think of money except as a secondary attraction, necessary to be considered indeed, but by no means supreme or decisive. If parents and children would suffer their estimates of life to be less frequently controlled, and, so to speak, penetrated by mammon worship, life in its hopes and its realizations for their children would be immeasurably more dignified, contented, and Christian. The so-called poverty of "poor ministers" would be less frequently a theme for condescending commiseration and contemptuous sympathy, and the aspirations of Christian parents for their children being more reasonable would be more successful than they often are. The fearful fluctuations in modern commercial life, the sudden and frightful reverses that overtake the rich, even those of the household of faith, ought, it would seem, to teach lessons of common sense, to say nothing of Christian wisdom, to those parents who anxiously plan for the future of their children, and so summarily decide not to expose them to the straitened conditions of the ministry.

An objection of a more serious character presents itself which cannot so easily be set aside. Eminent success or popularity in the ministry, it is urged, is often owing to factitious and even unworthy conditions, and for this reason the profession is not attractive, and sometimes becomes repulsive, to men of honest and sensitive self-respect. Some go so far as to contend that it has always been so, and that the popular preacher has always been something of a demagogue or a charlatan. The public, whom it is his business to address and influence, is rarely capable of any special discrimination, and is often carried away by inferior qualities. The sensational preacher, in one sense or other, must carry the day with the crowd whether the crowd is religious or profane. The eminently popular preacher must in some sense be superficial and declamatory. He must flatter, or amuse, or bewilder, or mislead. He must declaim or denounce. He must descend to depths which the self-respecting must despise, or soar to heights to which good taste would never aspire. The profession, it is urged, which not only tolerates such quackery, but in some sense fosters and rewards it, cannot be attractive to a young man whose taste is elevated or whose intellectual conscience is sensitive. We do not deny that at first thought there is some force in these objections. They take a graver form when it is urged that the preacher to the populace must of necessity be in some sense a demagogue, and be compelled to employ some of the arts of the leader of a mob, whether the mob be vulgar or calls itself refined.

To a certain class of young men these considerations come with no inconsiderable force, and not without reason, when they hear or read the marvelous productions which draw gaping crowds, and pass current as flights of pulpit oratory. To all such objections it is enough that we reply by such questions as these: Are there no demagogues, or sensationalists, or quacks in the other professions? Do they never try the patience and insult the understanding of judges, or pull the wool over the eyes of jurors? Do they never figure in the sick-room, or play fantastic tricks in the chamber of the dying? Do they never play the demagogue in the caucus or the party convention, or inspire a fallacious leader in the newspaper, or indite a juggling party manifesto? Do they never write misleading money articles, or make up a railway report that is as false as it is plausible? Or, again, is it true that in the other professions men are esteemed in exact proportion to their solid worth, or that factitious attractions are never prized beyond their solid and reasonable claims? It is true that in the clerical profession

quackery and sensationalism are reasonably deemed more offensive than in any other. We deny, however, that either quackery or sensationalism is essential to the best success and the most desirable reputation in the clerical profession, and this is proved by the high position which is accorded to very many preachers of the manliest spirit and the severest taste. Some of the best examples of power in the pulpit in our own day have been furnished by men of massive intellect, and fervid imaginations and varied culture. The fact should, however, never be overlooked that the profession is in its very nature a profession for the people, and that success in it is lawfully measured by popular adaptation. The clergyman is not a professor who meets select classes, to instruct them in scholastic learning or profound philosophy. He is not an inspirer of culture who finds in his devotees tastes already refined and matured, but he is a teacher to plain men of practical principles and inspiring historical facts, both which he is bound to apply to their characters and lives. His learning, his philosophy, his culture, his eloquence, and his manhood are all to be so moulded and refined and rewrought as to be serviceable to this, the end and passion of his life. Whatever may be his learning, his philosophy, his taste or his philanthropy, if they be not fused by this fervent desire and then recast in the moulds of popular thinking and popular feeling, he fails either rightly to conceive, or successfully to realize, the commanding end of his profession. Whether he fails by misconceiving its aims, or by not fulfilling these aims, he cannot excuse or explain his failure by the charge that the profession itself is necessarily sensational or demagogical. We may readily concede that preaching in general is too scholastic and stiff in its form, too remote and abstract in its treatment, and too bookish in its illustrations. The very circumstance that these facts are true, shows by the possible and sometimes actual contrast that the resources of the profession are not exhausted, and its attractions as a possible field for eminent success with superior minds have been as yet by no means realized. If the pulpit has been degraded by men of demagogical tastes and temper, let it be elevated above the contamination of quackish buffoonery by men of masculine eloquence and apostolic fervor, moved by the controlling purpose to make the gospel effective with the present generation. To do something in these directions may reasonably be the noble ambition of any aspiring youth who is conscious of intellectual power.

Thus far I have limited myself to the ministry as a profession, implying rather than enforcing its higher aspects and relations. I

could not omit these altogether, inasmuch as they incidentally and indirectly give character and elevation to its human and earthly relations. But it is these *spiritual relations*, I need not say, which give to the ministry its supreme attractiveness and enforce its highest claims. Viewed in this aspect, the Christian ministry requires, in an eminent sense of the word, faith in Christ and his kingdom and the spirit of self-sacrifice for the welfare of others, and the maintenance of those habits of thought and feeling which alone can give interest and effect to the varied duties of pastoral and pulpit service. While in one sense it is true that the claims of Christian duty are no more pressing upon the clergyman than upon any other man, in another sense it is true that he is reminded of these claims more constantly by the very nature of his occupations. His studies, his reading, his writing, his conversations with his fellow-men, their greetings by the way, his welcomes to their homes, his special recognition by the public, — all remind him that he is devoted to special duties, to which he must be constantly alive, and that consequently he must live in a spiritual atmosphere, must control his temper and bridle his tongue, not merely as he would give account to God at the last, but as he must in a sense give account to his fellow-men day by day. It is not only the duty of the clergyman, as it is the duty of every other Christian believer, to seek first the kingdom of God for himself, but in some active and special sense to seek it for others. To maintain such a purpose tense and active, and at the same time to be true to one's self so as to fall into no sanctimonious and unnatural ways of conduct or temper or speech, involves a trial to one's temper and one's life.

There are not a few young men who esteem the ministry as the most elevated and desirable of all the callings of life, but who honestly distrust their own capacity to assume with comfort and confidence the office of a spiritual teacher and guide with all their responsibilities. Such persons would do well to remember that a training for this profession may and probably will present the profession itself in more attractive lights. They cannot, from the nature of the case, predict what their studies and experience will do for their tastes, their self-confidence, and their conscious pleasure and power. They may very properly be reminded that self-distrust and modesty at the outset of any profession are the preconditions of that docility and patience which are the secrets of power over one's self and power over others. Many of the most distinguished and useful clergymen have reached their first decision and prose-

cuted their early studies with the same misgivings by which they are oppressed. To decide against any profession for reasons of modesty and self-distrust or from a morbid dread of unfitness is to decide prematurely and perhaps unwisely. In many cases it would preclude the possibility of deciding at all.

It may not be ill-timed to suggest that all the indications of these times point to some sudden development in the kingdom of God, in Christian and pagan lands, during the present generation. It is altogether probable, on the one hand, that unbelief will be more daring and confident, and perhaps more specious and plausible, than in other times. Science, philosophy, and literature may be invoked to do their utmost on the side of unbelief, and faith, in consequence, may be required to do its utmost to strengthen its lines of defense, and perhaps to alter some of the old lines and to abandon some of its old positions for those which shall be shown to be better and stronger. The dicta of theology and the interpretations of criticism may be modified more or less in this as they have been in other generations with advantage to the cause of truth, while yet the same Christian faith shall remain in its essential features. The application of Christian truth to private and social ethics is not only likely but it is certain to awaken general interest, to lead men to more enlightened views of duty, as well as to call for more abundant and marked self-sacrifices. A bolder and more specious atheism will necessarily evoke a more positive and fervent theism, both theoretical and practical. The sad and reluctant, the brutal and scornful, rejection of the supernatural Christ by considerable numbers will by reaction evoke a more positive, enlightened, and affectionate faith in his person and his kingdom. As a consequence, the services and sacrifices of the Christian Church, its intelligence, and its zeal, are certain to be increased in manifold forms and to an intensity unknown before. The miserable quarrels of narrow theologians and the selfish strife of divisive sects will be shamed and hushed in the stress and urgency of the conflicts about the grander issues. The sweet charities of the Christian temper, the munificent gifts of Christian liberality, and the patient endurance of Christian suffering, will give their testimony that Christ is still present in his laboring and suffering Church. The awakening of the hosts of the Lord by the trumpet-call of present duty, and their patient continuance in all the self-denying occupations to which they shall be summoned, will give a new interest and enthusiasm to the life of the Christian Church.

If times like these are at hand, then the profession of the Christian ministry cannot but be attractive to the most gifted and aspiring youth of the present generation. It is a position which calls for animation and effort and hope. The profession must be broadened and elevated and inspired by the influences which penetrate and surround it. Whatever of learning, of thought, of literary power, or personal force, can be embarked in the service of the kingdom of God, cannot fail to yield abundant fruits of blessing to the coming generation and the most satisfying inspiration to those who give themselves to this high service; and not only to themselves, but to the friends and relatives who encourage them in their purposes and hopes.

The decision of a young man in respect to his profession, I need not say, is one of the most serious and important which he is called to make. If there is ever an occasion for confidence in the operation of permanent principles as the conditions of success, and for hope in the guidance of the Father of Spirits by any young man who is willing to follow this guidance, this is such an occasion. With the earnest desire and heartfelt prayer that the foregoing considerations may lead those who read them to decide wisely for themselves and their friends and their generation, they are commended to their candid attention.

Noah Porter.

THEISTIC EVOLUTION.

At the beginning of an essay on "Darwinism and Morals" Frances Power Cobbe observes, "It is a singular fact that, whenever we find out *how* anything is done, our first conclusion seems to be that God did not do it." That this is a true statement as regards a numerous and highly-educated "we" can hardly be questioned. And more singular than the existence of such an association of ideas is the tenacity with which it retains its hold upon minds that have already recognized its falseness.

That such a conception should exist and grow in the thoughts of men who are so absorbed in pursuing the means of knowledge that the recognition of the great end of knowledge has become difficult is not surprising; for in other branches of human endeavor we have become familiar with that operation of mind to which we give the name monomania. By dwelling upon one idea, which is the object of pursuit, the mind gradually changes its re-

lation to all other objects of thought, to such an extent that the very end which was its original stimulus to action is not only lost sight of, but becomes of all thoughts the most unwelcome. Thus a man absorbed in the accumulation of money may transfer all his affection and care to that which, in the case of a normal mind, presents itself only as the means to an end. And as such a man cannot bear the thought of going beyond the idea of accumulation to contemplate the many uses to which his money may be put, so the materialistic or agnostic evolutionist, dazed with his success in tracing the processes by which nature works, cannot patiently entertain the thought of anything more important lying behind these. The magnitude of the discoveries made seems to him overlooked so long as they are held to have effected no revolution in the fundamental conceptions of the world.

But in the case of those who recognize, and love to recognize, God as the Creator of the universe, it does seem not a little singular and most unfortunate, that the false notion above stated should be so persistent. It cannot indeed be regarded as an isolated phenomenon; for when have men been able to distinguish easily between the essential and the non-essential elements of their beliefs? It is difficult, even at the undoubted call of reason, to separate at once and forever a simple idea from the complex form in which we have held it. The old form retires for the moment, but it has made a place in our consciousness which exactly fits it. So while we are attending to other things it resumes the position from which it has been expelled and continues to affect our conclusions. But is such a fault in our mental processes any the less to be deplored because it is natural? On the contrary it ought to be the more resolutely contended against in these days when we are called upon to accommodate ourselves to so many new ideas and to modify so many old ones. It is not a question of accepting new views at sight. We are not called upon to be dogmatic champions of evolution any more than to be dogmatic deniers of it. But it is of the utmost importance that we should understand its bearings upon the persistence of faith in the unseen, and inure our minds to live in the new element, for which we feel the instinctive dread of the unaccustomed, but to which we may be obliged to commit ourselves with all our precious freight of hopes and convictions.

It is certain that the impression of the destructive nature of this new element to religion will, if it continues, be to many the cause of the very disaster which is foreboded. Every additional

wave of evidence in favor of evolution will wash away something from the faith which pins itself to the immovable anchorage of the forms of ideas. If the forms are destined to be submerged, then those ideas which cannot be separated from them must sooner or later be submerged also. Let us suppose that the dream now entertained by many living chemists should suddenly become an incontestible reality ; and that it should be proved beyond a doubt that living things had been and could be at will created in the crucible from unorganized matter. Would there not be a shout of triumph from many on the ground that the idea of an intelligent first cause had been finally banished from the world ? And would there not, on the other hand, be a profound disturbance in the minds of multitudes of believers ? There would probably be those who for a long time would consider it impious to accept the fact on the testimony of the united scientific world. And yet this discovery would have disclosed only a little more of the process ; and its bearing on the theory of an intelligent cause would be simply to afford a fresh illustration of it. The argument from the mind of man to the mind of God would have a new and most convincing support. A succeeding generation would wonder that this discovery could ever have been viewed in any other light ; and yet while pitying their ancestors, this same wiser generation would perhaps be almost as easily upset by further discovery.

The positive statement of the truth, which should be our protection against such false inferences and panics, may be something like this : *the agency of God in creation can never be negatived or obscured, but only more clearly revealed, by the unveiling of the processes by which He works.* If we could hold this truth without flinching in the face of all the new facts which confront us in science, it would do much to steady our minds and commend our faith to others. The most radical revolution in our notion of methods could not disturb our fundamental beliefs. As that intrepid explorer, Sir Humphry Gilbert, when threatened with destruction by a terrific storm, tried to rally the courage of his companions by exclaiming, "We are as near to Heaven by sea as by land ;" so may we stay our tremors by the reflection that we are just as near God by evolution as by special creation.

It may seem to some reader that I am making too much of an exceedingly simple truth which every intelligent person is sufficiently well aware of. But I am not. It may indeed be taken for granted that every one will assent to it. But, for all that, there are comparatively few who have the strength to trust in it

when they find themselves in unaccustomed places. There are many who start bravely, with the light of this truth in their hands, to explore the doctrine of evolution in its many departments. It guides them safely through the great entrance hall. They find no occasion for stumbling in the application of evolution to many of the processes of nature. There is no objection to believing that, with the exception of man, all species of animate things have been derived by descent, with modification, from one or a few original germs. They may even be able to see their way to admitting that the derivation of man from the lower animals may not be hopelessly irreconcilable with Christian beliefs. But when they open the door to the realm of evolutionary morals their light goes out altogether. They stumble and grope, and in their distress declare the application of the principle to morals impossible; or seek to fly the idea of evolution altogether by calling to mind the missing links.

The writer of the sentence which I have quoted at the beginning of this article affords a striking illustration of just such an experience. In the very same essay which is prefaced with the words, "It is a singular fact that, whenever we find out how anything is done, our first conclusion seems to be that God did not do it," and again, in one full of true thought and religious earnestness, published twelve years later,¹ Miss Cobbe deplores the introduction of Darwinism into the region of morals, on the ground that if conscience can be shown to have been evolved like our other faculties or instincts the foundation of theism and all morality will be swept away.

Is, then, the finding out of how God does things so much more dangerous in the sphere of morals than in the sphere which lies outside morals? Must we abstain from applying the principles of evolution here because certain philosophers have made applications of it which seem to us faulty? I will not deny that the problem is far more complicated when the will of man becomes a factor in it, and that it is easy to make false steps, not only because of this complication, but also because of the difficulty of determining beyond dispute the facts of human consciousness. But this does not justify us in taking the stand that evolution, which appeals to us as a universal law, must be excluded from the realm of morals. The proof, if proof can be found, that the complex conscience of Christian civilization has been created by a gradual process no more discredits the divine authorship and au-

¹ *Contemporary Review*, June, 1883.

thority of it, than the proof that an oak has grown from an acorn, or a man from a minute jelly-like cell, shows that no mysterious and intelligent creative power was the cause of the growth.

Now, I do not, be it clearly understood, find fault with Miss Cobbe for objecting to some of Mr. Darwin's conclusions, or for dissenting from inferences which she conceives to be bound up with them. What I do find fault with is this, the failure to distinguish between the scientific theory of evolution and the special application of it which she conceives Mr. Darwin to have made. If Mr. Darwin has given an account of the genesis of our moral convictions which invalidates their authority, it does not follow that evolution has nothing to teach us about morals, but that no one man is great in all departments. It may be true, as has been said, that evolution is "the good genius of philosophy," nay, it may yet appear that it is the good genius of religion; but it does not follow that Mr. Darwin is, in all respects, the good genius of evolution. When Mr. Herbert Spencer tells us that the "Data of Ethics" is a rationalized version of the principles of Christianity¹ we do not, if we differ from his theory of ethics, at once conceive a prejudice against Christianity; but believe rather that Mr. Spencer, with all his breadth of knowledge, has failed to apprehend its essential spirit.

If evolution is a scientific fact, if without question it is the law of growth in the individual, if when we pass from the individual to the universe the application of the same law finds a striking and constantly increasing array of facts to support it, then it is a doctrine which is entitled to our respect. If it is a law, it is a law of God, not of the scientific explorers who have unveiled it for us. And if of God, it is a revelation which cannot fail to have important bearings on belief, and which may throw much needed light on some of the problems which vex us. When, therefore, conclusions are arrived at by its expounders which seem to contradict our fundamental beliefs, it is futile to jump to the inference that evolution is at fault, or that it can have no application to the subject in hand. A sober analysis of those applications of this theory which have troubled the religious world the most will show that it has been the philosophy attached to it, and not the principle itself, which has been at fault.

Already phases of evolutionary philosophy which have held so conspicuous a place in current thought as to be identified in the consciousness of many with the scientific theory itself have passed,

¹ *Data of Ethics*, p. 257.

or are rapidly passing, away. We have heard a great deal about *materialistic evolution*. But now the leading non-Christian evolutionists in this country and in England repudiate the name, if they do not altogether repudiate the essence of the combination which that name represents. Thus Mr. Spencer expressly denies that his philosophy involves materialism, and intimates that the school to which he belongs looks with contempt upon that of Büchner.¹ And Mr. John Fiske tells us that materialism is hopelessly behind the age; and that the course of modern philosophy is distinctly in the opposite direction.² One form then that has troubled theologians has retired from the scene. What appeared in the guise of a centaur-like monster, threatening great damage to the faith, has been resolved into its elements. On the one hand, a young and vigorous steed of great promise, and on the other, an impossible rider that has already lost his seat.

But if materialism has failed to prove its right to sit in the saddle of evolution will agnosticism, so close of kin, fare better? At all events, after the experience of the first rider the world may await the result with a good degree of philosophic composure. And, in the mean time, it is our duty to watch against the tendency to be prejudiced against the steed because of the defects of the shadowy thing that has for the moment mounted him. Agnosticism was not born of evolution, it was not suggested by it, it has no affinity for it. It has had a well-known history as a hanger-on at all philosophic courts, ready to serve the turn of any adventurer who found himself without an answer. The very form of the agnostic philosophy made use of by Mr. Spencer is borrowed from a distinguished theologian who was so short-sighted as to believe that he could make it serviceable in the defense of Christianity.

Now, let us ask why it is that the scientific doctrine of evolution should be so repeatedly and conspicuously associated with philosophies which are antagonistic to Christianity? Is it the fault of evolution? Or is it the fault of Christianity? Shall we conclude that the new-comer has disclosed a fatal affinity for atheistic society, and must therefore be avoided? Or shall we, on the other hand, be forced to acknowledge that Christianity has repulsed evolution, often ridiculed it from its pulpits, often condemned it without a hearing, and thus surrendered the revelation which it contains to be construed atheistically? Brave attempts have been made by Christian scientists to rescue its truths, and to induce theologians to give them an unbiased hearing. Such men

¹ *Essays*, vol. iii. 249.

² *Excursions of an Evolutionist*, p. 277.

as Dr. Asa Gray and Dr. Joseph Le Conte have, on the part of science, clearly shown the way. But the policy of Theology, with some notable exceptions, has been that of a masterly inactivity. It has been slow to accept the situation which it is called upon to take as a leader of evolutionary thought. Preserving its traditional attitude toward scientific discovery, it has devoted the main force of its energy, so far as evolution is concerned, to the setting forth of its weak points, as if the weakness of evolution were the strength of Christianity.

It has been often said by representatives of Christian thought that evolution is as yet only an hypothesis, and that it will be time enough for theology to adjust itself to it when it has been proved. But this is certainly a short-sighted view. Evolution may not be proved in this generation or the next. But if the current of the next quarter of a century is like the last, it will be continually adding to the volume of evidence by which it now commends itself, and will more and more draw the thinking world after it. Men believe in hypotheses long before they are proved; and the analogies which support evolution are of a singularly convincing character. The growth of thought ever is, and must be, toward the discovery of unity in the scheme of the universe. Theists, of all others, ought to anticipate the discovery of order and solidarity where there has seemed to be separateness and confusion. If therefore the course of discovery and the tendency of true progress is in this direction, it is of the utmost importance that theology should not leave the world to believe that its current is in an opposite one.

As to the use of hypothesis, Dr. Gray has very truly observed, "It is the precursor of every fruitful investigation in physical nature. You can seldom sound with the plummet while standing on the shore. To do this to any purpose you must launch out to sea and brave some risks."

Is it not equally true that hypothesis is the proper instrument for dealing with questions which relate to the adjustments of theology and science? If theology has anything to learn from the growth of knowledge it must form its hypotheses, and advance with even step and firm front. This is not to say that theology must take notice of every scientific guess that is set afloat; but that it should be slow to condemn in advance, slow to accept the position of an opponent, and ready, when probability sets in, to hypothetically entertain the assumed facts, and frame its own tentative explanation of them. Only by preserving such an attitude

can theology free itself from the air of timidity and half-hearted confidence in its own foundations which so often seems to characterize it. "In proportion as faith is sincere," it has been said, "philosophy will be fearless." It is not assumed that a perfect hypothesis of theistic or Christian evolution can be formulated at once. Any such scheme will be full of imperfections. The doctrine of evolution itself is, in the view of some of its most distinguished advocates, only outlined as yet. "I am quite sure," says Professor Le Conte, "that the most fundamental factors (of evolution) are still unknown; that there are more and yet greater factors than are yet dreamed of in our philosophy. But evolution of some kind and according to some law which we yet imperfectly understand, evolution affecting alike every realm of nature, a universal law of evolution, is, I believe, a fact which is rapidly approaching recognition."

Theology has often been mistaken in the past. It can better afford to be mistaken in the future than, through fear of making mistakes, to remain inactive. God has not given us the knowledge of himself in its completeness, any more than He has given us complete knowledge in any other department. It is our duty to follow on wherever He leads the way, less afraid of stumbling than of holding back when He beckons us forward. It is in this spirit that I will venture to call attention to some aspects of evolution as related to theology, hoping thereby to aid in clearing the way for the formation of a Christian theory of evolution.

I must at this point assume the position that evolution has done no more toward explaining the mysterious power that underlies nature than the Copernican theory of astronomy has done. The one, as the other, leaves the question of efficient cause just where it found it. The scientific theory of evolution does not claim to disclose the origin of life. Darwinism does not claim this. Nor does it claim that natural selection is ever the originating cause of variation. That a contrary impression has been produced is not to be wondered at. For while Mr. Darwin admits the existence of a causative power lying behind phenomena, to which the initial impulse must be attributed, he gives no prominence to this power. The preoccupation of his mind with the explainable part permits him to no more than glance at the unexplained. In the former he is interested, in the latter he is not. Evolution, therefore, presents itself in the works of Mr. Darwin in an utterly one-sided aspect. The explained and the explainable seem to occupy almost the whole field; and though, in a

general way, any amount of mystery is granted, the impression is made at every step that far more is accounted for than has been, or ever can be, accounted for by physical science.

But to the Christian philosopher, that part of evolution which ever eludes the investigation of the naturalist is by far the most important, as well as the most interesting; for from this direction flows the creative power. This unexplained part is, in fact, the positive part of evolution. "To speak technically," says Mr. J. J. Murphy, "evolution is differentiation."¹ So, also, Mr. Huxley, "If I affirm that species have been evolved by variation, including under this head hereditary transmission (a natural process, the laws of which are for the most part unknown), aided by the subordinate action of natural selection, it seems to me that I enunciate a proposition which constitutes the very pith and marrow of the first edition of the origin of species."² Now, differentiation, or variation, is just that part of evolution which, while it proceeds from a power of which natural science gives no account, at the same time originates everything. "In each variation," says Dr. Gray, "lies hidden the mystery of a beginning." Natural selection, on the contrary, originates nothing. It is a destructive, not a creative, principle. If we must idealize it as a positive force, we must think of it not as the preserver of the fittest, but as the destroyer that follows ever in the wake of creation and devours the failures, — the scavenger of creation, that takes out of the way forms which are not fit to live and reproduce themselves.

It is possible, nay, we may say it is probable, that some part of the process by which variation is produced will be explained to us. In the words of the last mentioned writer, "We are not to suppose that natural agencies cease just where we fail to make them out." "When we find out something, — as we may hope to do, — we only resolve a before unexplained phenomenon into two factors, one of them a now ascertained natural process, the other a something which still eludes our search."³ It is this "something which still eludes our search" that is always the representative of the efficient power, — not the efficient power itself, but the expression of it to our minds, till science advances to some new form of the unknown lying farther back. With this understanding of evolution, therefore, as simply the unveiling of a part of the process by which the positive and creative principle of variation attains

¹ *Habit and Intelligence*, p. 47.

² *Critiques and Addresses*, pp. 298, 299.

³ *Natural Science and Religion*, p. 75.

its ends, and with the thought continually in mind that the discovery of *how* phenomena come to pass, affords no presumption whatever against the belief that God is the efficient cause and constant mover of all things, I will venture to call attention to some of those points at which theology has, without reason, been assumed to have a controversy with evolution.

First, then, theology has no controversy with evolution because of the hypothesis that man has descended from the lower animals. The grounds of hostility to this idea on the part of theistic writers may be ranged under two heads. First, that to trace man to such an origin lowers him in the scale of being; and second, that it conflicts with the scriptural account of his creation. The first objection derives its force almost wholly from the one-sided view of evolution to which I have already adverted. The imagination, while dwelling on the unwelcome thought of consanguinity, is so preoccupied as almost to leave out of its conception the important element of differentiation. If man is descended from a creature of a lower order, it somehow seems equivalent to saying that he is himself of a far lower order than he had supposed. If, to state the popular conception of man's lineage, he is descended from an ape, it follows that he is still only a modified and highly developed ape. Even Professor St. George Mivart allows himself to speak of "Darwin's hypothesis of man's essential bestiality." But if the attention can be turned away from the idea of heredity, as known to us in ordinary descent from human ancestors, and concentrated upon the idea of variation as a condition of the descent of one species from another, the prejudice may be dispelled. As I have already observed, the tendency of Darwinism has been to obscure the importance of the creative factor in evolution. It is for theology to rectify this distortion, and represent evolution in its true light as an hypothesis which, while it makes the whole world akin, does not in any way diminish the differences which exist between the various orders of created things. I do not mean to say that theology has any new ground to break in this direction, or that a particular emphasis should be given to one aspect of evolution purely in the interests of religion. This emphasis is required no less by science than by theology; and to secure it we have only to bring to the front the later and clearer statements of evolution made by leaders of scientific thought, who, at the same time, labor under no suspicion of a theological bias.

The fact that the word evolution does not describe the modern doctrine, but one historically opposed to it, should be more widely

known. The popular conception of the matter is nearly identical with the abandoned theory which contemplated simply a process of enlarging and unfolding, the expansion of that which was invisible into visibility. The theory of Darwin and other modern evolutionists, on the contrary, is more properly called *epigenesis*; a word which signifies that the process through which all changes take place in nature is one of addition and assimilation. Not-living matter is metamorphosed and converted into living matter of a specific type.¹ The following is from Dr. Maudsley: "Continuity of nature certainly, but as certainly not of kind in nature; for the continuity is of different kinds, therefore in some sort a discontinuity, — a new kind springing from the basis of the old kind; not continuity by homogeneous but by heterogeneous generation. A new chemical compound, with new properties, was a new thing when it appeared first. Though it presupposed the elements which united to form it, and therefore had a continuity of being with them, its new function was not the sum or mechanical effect of the coöperation of their properties; it was quite a special power, that might properly be said to have its *autonomy*, or, so to speak, its *spontaneity*."²

Again, it must be recognized that the question of the *rate* of variation has no real bearing on the character of the result. If, as Mr. Darwin believes, all changes have originated in slight variations, the sum of these variations is just as important as if they had been massed into one, though the effect upon our imaginations may be very different. But if we can only bear in mind the fact that after every variation the thing acted upon has ceased to be what it was, and has in some respect become a new creature, we may, even without supposing any long step, adjust our imaginations to this theory of the descent of man. I have purposely stated the case in its most extreme form, — a form which we are not at present obliged to accept. There is no proof whatever that all changes have taken place by means of slight variations. *Natura non facit saltum* is a pure assumption. Even Mr. Darwin allows that this "canon in natural history" has been somewhat exaggerated; while Professor Huxley believes that "nature does make jumps now and then, and that a recognition of the fact is of no small importance in disposing of many minor objections to the doctrine of transmutation."³ But were we to accept the principle

¹ See Professor Huxley's article, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th edition; published also in *Science and Culture*.

² *Body and Will*, p. 132.

³ Quoted in *Studies in Science and Religion*, by G. F. Wright, p. 139.

that nature makes no leaps, how should we ever determine what constitutes a leap? In the evolution which takes place beneath our observation, we are confronted with a rapidity of differentiation which would be a continual marvel in our eyes were it not for our familiarity with it. The blossom that suddenly bursts out on the tree after decades of growth is a development that is very like a leap. The egg that in three weeks is differentiated into a chicken, with its complex organization and intelligent vitality, reveals a power that can work with great rapidity, even when measured by our standard.

There is nothing to prove that such rapid differentiation may not at times characterize the development of species. There are many facts in nature which seem to compel such an hypothesis. The breaks in the geological record, the abruptness with which new species appear, the seemingly impossible length of time required for the production of existing results by slight variations, and in the evolution of organs, the necessity for the comparatively sudden appearance of marked variations to save them from the obliterating power of natural selection,—all these considerations point with cumulative force to the theory of occasionally rapid or paroxysmal evolution. Such a theory, as I have said, is not a necessity to a theistic scheme. But it renders any such scheme more easily conceivable, and until the burden of evidence is against it we may assume it to be true, and use it as a working hypothesis.

Professor Mivart has been an able supporter of this view, and in other directions has made valuable contributions toward a theistic construction of evolution. But on this very account, when he comes to the question of the descent of man, he seems to me the most conspicuous illustration of an unwise defender of it. In the "Genesis of Species" he squarely states two views of the origin of man, both of which he acknowledges are compatible with theistic belief. One of these is also compatible with evolution. But he deliberately chooses that one which necessitates a break with evolution, and takes the position that the spiritual soul of man must have had a different source from the animal body which it informs.¹ In a succeeding volume² he endeavors to prove this position by considerations derived from the differences which distinguish man from the highest of the lower animals. Man, he argues, is possessed of an intelligent will, of the power to distinguish between right and wrong, of the ability to express his

¹ *The Genesis of Species*, p. 300.

² *Lessons from Nature*.

thoughts in rational language, of self-consciousness and of other powers and characteristics which prove him to belong to a separate and higher order of creation. Now all these facts, which Professor Mivart urges with great force, have a very important bearing upon the discussion of the question as to what man *is*; but on the question *how did he come to be what he is?* they have no bearing whatever.

But this is not the worst of it. When used for such a purpose, these arguments are damaging to the cause which they assume to support. The whole discussion produces the impression that the vital interests of theism are bound up with the doctrine that the soul of man has had an exceptional origin, — that it is a thing outside nature. Nothing can be demonstrated by emphasizing the differences which distinguish man from the animals beyond this, that it is impossible to conceive of any process by which such differences could have been bridged over in the course of nature. But the evolution of every individual soul from its first faint dawning presents all the mystery and contradiction of our notions of the possible that are encountered in the larger problem. An excellent statement of this argument is made by Canon Driver. After speaking of the impossibility of conceiving how the immaterial soul is united with a material organism in the individual, he says, “What if, with the race then, as with the individual now, Almighty God ordained the completion of the bodily structure by the same laws which he has imposed upon all organic nature, until the unknown conditions were satisfied, in virtue of which the dawning intelligence was manifested in it? In this case what science postulates is granted.”¹

But do not the intellectual faculties of man differ not only in *degree* but also in *kind* from those of the brute? That depends upon the meaning which we attach to the words. The distinction between differing in degree and differing in kind is vague to the last degree. It is one of those equivocal distinctions that produce assertion and denial without end, but which cannot really be reasoned about because no exact meaning can ever be attached to the terms. The controversy as to what constitutes a species and a variety is a form of the same question, the unsatisfactory result of which is notorious. Probably, in most cases, one who studies the manifestations of mind in the brute creation with the expectation of finding there the rudiments or homologues of all human faculties will satisfy himself that they do exist; while one

¹ *Oxford and Cambridge Undergraduates' Journal*, October 25, 1883.

who concentrates attention upon the highest faculties of man, and contrasts these with his general notion of the brute creation, will arrive at an opposite result. But in either case there is no quarrel with evolution; for differentiation is equal to the production of differences in kind as well as differences in degree. The lowest forms of the animal and vegetable kingdoms shade into each other by such delicate gradations that it is in some cases impossible to say to which of these certain organizations belong. Yet between animal and vegetable, intelligent and non-intelligent life, there is surely a difference of kind. So between a mind that has the power of reflective, abstract thought and one that has not this power, we may say there is a difference of kind. But such an admission constitutes no obstacle to the belief that the one may have proceeded from the other by differentiation.

But another difficulty has to be considered. Is not the idea of the descent of man from the lower animals at variance with the teaching of Scripture? As to the attitude of the Bible toward science it is necessary that theology should have some well-defined theory and on all occasions adhere to it. If in relation to one class of phenomena we take the ground that the Bible was never intended to instruct us in science, and that we are therefore not to regard its account of natural phenomena as a statement of scientific facts, we must not straightway forget this principle when we have to deal with another class of phenomena. Professor Mivart's first argument in support of his theory of the separate origin of the soul of man, in a sense averse to evolution, is an appeal to Scripture. "God made man from the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life." "This," he says, "is a plain and direct statement that man's *body* was *not* created in the primary and absolute sense of the word, but was evolved from preëxisting material (symbolized by the term 'dust of the earth'), and was therefore only derivatively created, that is, by the operation of secondary laws. His soul, on the other hand, was created in quite a different way, not by any preëxisting means external to God Himself, but by the direct action of the Almighty symbolized by the word breathing."¹ So also Dr. Hopkins says "to a certain extent the language and statements of the Bible favor the doctrine of evolution as now stated. It is the *earth* that brings forth grass and herb and fruit tree; the *waters* that bring forth the moving creature that hath life, and the fowl that fly above the earth; and the earth again that brings forth cattle

¹ *Genesis of Species*, p. 300.

and creeping things. This is the language of evolution. . . . But in the Bible account of *his* (man's) creation there is nothing that indicates any affinity with evolution. Then God did not call upon the earth or the waters, but simply said 'Let us make man.'"¹

Is not this going to the Bible for scientific statements? And is it not because of this very thing that the history of theology in its relation to science has, during the last three hundred and fifty years, been the record of an uninterrupted succession of humiliating defeats and surrenders? It is interesting to note the remarkable correspondences between the Mosaic outline account of creation and modern theories; and elaborations of such observed correspondences have their useful place in Biblical literature. But we must never forget that science has always been our guide and teacher here. Considered as theology and poetry, the Mosaic account of creation is full of inspiring power, a power that is felt by the unlearned. It is a setting forth of the most sublime truths in elevated yet simple language. But regarded as science, it must, at best, be said to be science written in cipher, for the interpretation of which we are dependent upon the laboriously acquired discoveries of scientific men. To reverse the process, in opposition to science, has been and probably always will be disastrous to theology.

There is an inherent improbability in Professor Mivart's theory that the body of man came into the world mediately by descent from the animals, and that his soul was added thereto from a different source. Are we asked to conceive that when the body of the anthropoid animal had reached a given stage, his intellectual part, with all its inherited faculties and experiences, was blotted out, leaving an organism without a soul, into which a soul, formed out of connection with any body, was introduced? If there were any sufficient reason for such an hypothesis, mere inconceivability ought not to stand in the way of our receiving it. But there is no hitherto discovered law which compels us to adopt this violent explanation. On the contrary, the whole order of the universe, so far as we know it, and the analogy of creation contradict it. There is, as Professor Mivart himself has shown, another hypothesis which is at the same time in harmony with evolution and theism; and we may add with Scripture also, for in the 104th Psalm the Almighty is represented as creating animals by the sending forth of his breath, and in the 33d as having made all the host of the heavens in the same manner.

¹ *Scriptural Idea of Man*, p. 7.

A further, and, as it seems to many, an insuperable objection against evolution, is presented by its absolute contradiction of the fundamental doctrine of the fall of man. Dr. James Martineau declares that evolution holds up to orthodox theology an inverting mirror. It tells us, he says, that "man, instead of falling from a higher state, has risen from a lower, and inherits, instead of a uniform corruption, a law of perpetual improvement."¹ If in a general way we allow this statement of the traditional doctrine of the fall, yet, on the side of evolution, the definition is far from accurate. That this is the popular conception of it may be granted; but evolution is not responsible for the popular conception, on the one hand, nor are the Scriptures responsible for traditional theology on the other. If we go back to the Biblical account of the fall of man and compare this with scientific evolution, the apparent contradiction will vanish. Milton's dream of the first man will, indeed, lose its colors. We shall no longer be able to hold, with Dr. South, that man "came into the world a philosopher;" that "an Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam;" that we may admire the human intellect now "only as antiquaries do a piece of old coin, for the stamp it once bore."² All this is extra Biblical, the outcome of a fervid imagination. The Scriptures tell us nothing about the intellectual superiority of the first man. "So God created man in his own image" is not the same as saying He created him in all respects fully developed.

So far, indeed, as the highest part of man is concerned, the Scriptural account may be claimed as an explicit declaration of evolution. While yet in the unfallen state, man is said to be in the image of God; but in that state he had no knowledge of good and evil. If he can in any sense be said to have been a moral being at that time, the grounds for such a description of him must rest mainly upon the possession of potentialities, not upon the existence as yet of a developed moral character. We must, indeed, believe that, having advanced to the condition of man by the addition of self-consciousness, he at the same time had developed within him a dim recognition of right, associated with certain actions which he had previously performed because impelled thereto by natural instinct. These actions in themselves good involved no moral quality until by the recognition of their goodness there emerged an indistinct feeling of ought in connection with them. Then truly the moral sense had begun to germinate. But it was

¹ *Materialism, Theology, and Religion*, p. 22.

² *South's Sermons*, vol. i. pp. 24, 25.

not till this feeling of ought had been overruled by the will that man became a developed moral being, with an understanding of himself as such. It was after the fall that "The Lord God said, 'Behold the man is *become* as one of us, to know good and evil.'"

Was, then, the fall of man a step upward? If we follow the Scriptural account, we must certainly say that it was. It was a step upward in the scale of being. Man from that moment was a creature possessed of infinitely higher possibilities, and at the same time, of possibilities infinitely lower. Was it, then, not a fall? It surely was. For the lower possibilities were far easier to realize than the higher, and the bitter experience of these came first. From the time man became a moral being he was launched upon a sea of conflict. The higher realms of his new nature were not to be entered upon at once. He might not eat of the "tree of life," and come as by a leap to the goal. The way to it is the way of warfare. Henceforth the law of his being is not simply a becoming, it is an overcoming. He shall be purified and re-created, but it is by passing through a Medea's caldron. The second creation is a long way off; but when it is reached, he will have become a new creature, — man, perhaps, still, and yet more than man. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that we shall be like Him," in a sense far higher than the first man was like Him. But does evolution, it will be asked, present us with any such picture as this in the upward movement of other things? Do we find degeneration as an accompaniment of improvement? Such, certainly, is the fact, not only occasionally, but, we might almost say, invariably. Evolution is not properly defined as a law of "perpetual improvement." It is at the same time a law of perpetual deterioration and extinction. Wherever there is marked development in one direction we must look for loss in some other.

Without any special revelation on this subject, simply reasoning from man as we know him to the anthropoid animal as we must conceive of him, we are inevitably led to the belief that the addition of reflective reason to a creature of highly developed instincts could not have been an unmitigated blessing. Widening the field of intelligence would bring many thoughts tending to disturb the life that had hitherto moved in the grooves of unreasoning natural impulses. To question instincts would be the natural outcome of self-consciousness, and to try the experiment of transgressing them would as naturally follow. The desire for novel sensations would increase as the possibility of experiencing

them was recognized; and the pleasure of waywardness would lead farther and yet farther away from the beaten track of instinct. The power of self-reflection, moreover, involves to some extent the power of imagination, the most prolific source of ill-regulated and unnatural action. Fear is the parent of a countless brood of evils and immoralities; and the fear of both seen and unseen agencies would be extended and intensified by the slowly developing reason. If, as we should naturally believe, the condition of life regulated by instinct receded gradually before the life of dawning reason, it would almost necessarily follow that, *in many respects*, the course of human life would for a time have been a continuous retrogression.

Why, then, it may be asked, was not the race exterminated by other creatures of unimpaired instincts? The answer must be the same as that already given. There was a fall, but at the same time there was a rise. Reason grew while instinct waned; and in the battle for existence reason would make ill-regulated and immoral man more than a match for unreasoning, though better regulated and not immoral brutes. History affords abundant analogies for the illustration of this idea of the fall. The age in which we are living, with its flood of new light and its enormous additions to the means of better conduct, illustrates it. In some directions the result is deterioration, physical, mental, and moral. But, so long as we keep our faith in God, we can believe and think we see that all this new thought and new life, and all this destruction of old things, marks the opening of a higher and nobler career for man. Man with instinct as yet unimpaired was man under a paternal despotism. Without thought and without reason he went as he was moved to go. When the "age of reason" came, he went according to his own sweet, wayward will, and only slowly and painfully could he rise to the higher ground and become a law unto himself. All along the way of his upward march, from the dawn of civilization to the present time, man has suffered losses as well as made great gains.

The question as to what *are* the points at issue between a theistic and a non-theistic evolution remains untouched. All I have tried to do is to point out that there is no conflict between evolution and theism up to the time when man emerges upon the world as man. But at this point the conflict begins; a conflict not with the scientific theory of evolution, but a conflict with certain systems of philosophy, many-decked and imposing, that fly the evolutionary flag and hail us in its name. To carry a theory that has

been formulated in connection with one class of phenomena into a sphere where the phenomena are of a radically different nature, and apply it correctly, is a matter of no little difficulty. There is a strong temptation to crowd the new facts into that special shape which the old facts have caused the theory to assume, instead of patiently enlarging and reshaping the theory to fit the new facts. A system formed in this way may be attractive from its apparent unity and completeness, but it is neither science nor philosophy.

F. H. Johnson.

A BIBLE STUDY: JESUS AT THE WELL OF SYCHAR.

THE Gospel of John may be called the Gospel of the Conversations, for, more than any other, it reports particular interviews of our Lord with individuals. In the first chapter we have the conversation with Nathanael; in the second, with the mother of Jesus; in the third, with Nicodemus; in the fourth, with the woman of Samaria; and passing by others less striking, we have the interviews with Mary and Martha, and the words spoken at the Supper; until after the Resurrection, the history closes with question and answer, as they passed between our Lord and Mary Magdalene, and Thomas, and finally with Peter and John.

These conversations, too, are real conversations, for Jesus was not like some famous men, who discourse in monologue. Even his addresses to the multitude were often interrupted by the inquiries or remarks of others, and, in smaller companies, He guided the conversation, while apparently taking the lesser part. The "golden silences" of Jesus are very marked, and George Borrow, in that fascinating book, "*The Bible in Spain*," relates that the taciturn people of the little Republic of Andorra noticed these silences, and said of them, "Jesus played the Andorran." While He spoke with authority, yet He dispelled all feeling of restraint, and even seemed to awaken in others unwonted freedom. Not unfrequently He gave the thought, and let them do the talking. He had the rare quality of a good listener, and He heard with such deep penetration that his answers, as is sometimes plainly stated, were directed to the thoughts of men rather than to their words.

It is often said that Jesus was the greatest of preachers, but not so often that He preferred to converse. Then indeed He appears to have been most truly himself, when, in direct appeal to some

individual heart, or in the effort to comfort or instruct a few, He utters those great sayings which shine like the fixed stars in the firmament. He never appears to have saved anything for a large audience, nor feared that any utterance of truth, breathed into the receptive heart of however humble a hearer, could fail of its effect. Thus, if you would seek for the doctrines of Jesus, the great and distinctive revelations which mark his career on earth, you will find them in his private interviews with Nicodemus, and the sisters of Bethany, and the woman of Samaria.

And these conversations all have a personal turn. They attach great principles to common life, and they lead people through their own needs to the grandest spiritual truths. Jesus evidently has confidence in the living power of truth, and therefore does not press it, but leaves his hearers to follow out the idea and make the application for themselves. We are surprised at the large space in the dialogue which is taken up with the sayings of others, until we learn the germinant power of Jesus' words, and see them, as it were, growing before our eyes in other minds.

With the woman of Samaria, Jesus opens the conversation with a simple request. He asks a favor, almost the only one that is recorded of his asking, and the smallest that could be asked. Thus throwing himself on her sympathy, and willing to be dependent on her for the relief of his manifest weariness, He opens the way for interchange of thought. But the prejudice that is strong in her people cannot be repressed, and she utters it not scornfully, but with a feeling of surprise. Indifferent to this narrow prejudice, and seeing that the time is not yet come to overthrow it, our Lord passes into what we may call the beautiful parable of "The Water of Life," which the woman, taking half literally, and in deep amazement at the power of his speech, answers with a counter petition, that He would give her this water, "that I thirst not, neither come all the way hither to draw." The favor that Jesus asked is forgotten. The relation is changed, or rather, each has shown a willingness to trust the other, which is the closest bond of sympathy. But Jesus, perceiving that He has made no definite impression upon her, save that of friendliness and curious interest, turns suddenly to the woman with the personal command, "Go, call thy husband, and come hither;" and when she denies the existence of such a relationship, He turns the leaves of her past history with an unsparing hand. To all this she humbly rejoins, as being no longer able to evade the truth, "Sir, I perceive that thou art a prophet;" and then, as if still wishing to turn the conversa-

tion, she hastens to recall the distinction between her own people and the Jews. We can almost see her confusion, which she attempts to hide in this manner. Coleridge somewhere says that "Multitudes never blush," and that it is safer to appeal to the honor and conscience of an individual than to a crowd. At any rate, she drops the subject, but the thought still lingers in her mind. The personal matter is the central point of the conversation, as we shall afterwards more clearly see; and yet she prepares for herself a further humiliation by bringing up the great subject of dispute between the Jews and the Samaritans.

And now our Lord, referring no more to the personal charge which He has brought home to her conscience, addresses her with a sublimity rising to the height of his grandest utterances, describing the nature of worship, and the approach to the Father that is open to every longing heart in all the world. But in the midst of it He meets and overthrows the prejudice which she first introduced, and sweeps it out of the way with a lofty and decisive sentence that leaves no room for answer: "Ye worship ye know not what. We know what we worship, for salvation is of the Jews." Why does she not resent this humbling sentence? Why does not her Samaritan hatred rise in defiance, as it would have done, one must think, had Jesus thus addressed her at the first? Ah! it is because of that stroke with which He had smitten her conscience when He laid bare the deformity of her past life. She has no heart to contend against this. Her quick intuition brings up the thought of the promised Messiah, and the revelation of herself that He has made compels her to answer with docility, "When He is come, He will tell us all things." What things does she refer to? What is in her mind as she gives this answer, half musingly? The great and spiritual truths of which Jesus has spoken? Yes! but much more the revelation of her own heart and life. She may seek to change the subject; our Lord may forbear, as He did, to press it any further, but the arrow has hit the mark and clings to the wound. The revelation of the Christ to her, as to every one, is in what He has told her of herself. This is what Paul means by "being apprehended" of the Christ. And that we have in this the true impression that was made on her mind appears from her own description of the interview: "Come, see a man which told me all things that ever I did. Can this be the Christ?"

Here is the triumph of the conversation, that she has been made to see herself, and acknowledge the heart-searching power

of the Redeemer. Says Thomas à Kempis, "It asketh great skill to know how to hold converse with Jesus;" but he adds, "Be thou humble and peaceable, and Jesus will be with thee." In accepting his searching rebuke, she has discovered the glory of his character and mission.

If, then, we would understand the effect of our Lord's conversation with the woman of Samaria, we must read it in the message she bore to her people: "*Come, see a man which told me all things that ever I did. Can this be the Christ?*" She says nothing of his promise of never-failing water, nor of his grand sentences about worship, still less of his being a Jew and proclaiming their superiority. The one thought which fills her mind, and gives a glow and a fascination to her report that cannot be resisted, is what He has told her of herself. This is her message, her watchword, so to speak, that passed from lip to lip as she hurried on among her townsfolk, so that we read: "Many of the Samaritans of that city believed on Him for the saying of the woman, 'He told me all that ever I did.'"

It were hardly needful to bring into clearer light those principles of human nature which are here involved. We need a friend who knows us altogether, and to whom we can be perfectly joined. Such sympathy and thorough comprehension are vainly sought in mere human relations. As says the author of the "Christian Year," —

"Not even the tenderest heart, and next our own,
Knows half the reasons why we smile and sigh."

This thorough comprehension our Lord Jesus only can supply. He knows every thought and feeling, He holds the threads of our past life, seeing every error, every crime. And He is ready to interweave his own love and knowledge, upon which we may rest. He interprets with personal love and power the language of the writer of the 139th Psalm: "O Lord, thou hast searched me and known me. . . . Thou understandest my thought afar off. . . . Thou art acquainted with all my ways."

It seems at first a startling hyperbole, that the woman should have gone through the town saying to every one, "He told me all that ever I did." Why, it was but a single sentence in which He had spoken of her personal relations. But there was no other way to describe the truth. How tame, and false even, had she said, "He knows some things about me," or, "He knows the chief things;" for his knowledge covers all and admits no less a compass than this, — "He told me all that ever I did."

The truth which is here made known to us and answers to every Christian experience is, that Jesus reveals to us the hidden life. He enters our consciousness, and becomes another self within us. A little child, tired of play, sits down by his mother, and she tells him something that happened years ago; stories of his infant days, and of his little brothers and sisters, and of the household pets. He is amazed that she can tell so much of all that has gone on about him; that she knows more of him than even he does himself. From other lips he would scarcely believe it true; but he listens, with rapt amazement, to some story of the earliest opening of his mind, and when it ceases, he cries out, "Tell that again." This is the nearness of a mother's love. It is a consciousness that enwraps our own; a memory that encloses ours, and holds it in custody. What we were from the first, and what were the earliest movements of thought and feeling, — these are in her keeping more than in our own. But there is a higher than human consciousness that enwraps ours. There is a deeper love, as there is a more far-reaching knowledge. It is Jesus who comes and sits by us, as He sat on the well of Sychar; and into our listening ears He pours the story of our life, — the wasted hours, the false and selfish passions, the unthinking chase after worthless toys. To us, also, He will reveal all things. Rightly listening, we shall say, with humble yet with glad surprise, "He told me all that ever I did."

Thus Jesus becomes another self within us. There is that familiarity of intercourse which constitutes the highest delight of the soul. And he does not hesitate to use figures regarding it which present the simplest picture of intimate acquaintance with us. "Behold I stand at the door and knock; if any man hear my voice and open the door, I will come in to him, and sup with him, and he with me." It is no class of men, no favored few, to whom He offers his inmost heart; but to each, in just the present state of character and knowledge, with the faults of to-day still cleaving, with the crimes and follies of the past still in memory. Nor can He ever afterward reject us because of past shame; for the first thing He does is to tell us all that we ever did. Other friends might grow cold when they came to know our history; our past associations and misdeeds might alienate them or breed disgust; but it is not so with Jesus. He knows us altogether, and, accepting Him, we enter into full fellowship with a forgiving and faithful Lord.

This perfect knowledge of the Christ is our greatest safeguard.

It is needful, to defend us from plunging farther into sin, that we have the confidence of a loving Saviour. When we are on the verge of temptation, the thought that He knows and grieves over our past sins may win us back. When ready to despair of his favor, or to think it impossible that such as we should be accepted or enabled to do anything for his honor, we may remind ourselves that, when He gave us the invitation to repent, He weighed the full burden of our transgressions. He did not undertake a work of which He knew not the magnitude. With joy we may press close to our hearts the saying of the woman, "He told me all that ever I did."

The conversation of Jesus with the woman at the well throws light on the subject of confession. That the practice of auricular confession, which prevailed in the Mediæval Church, had a basis in the sincere longing of the penitent, there is no doubt. Indeed, confession was regarded as a part of repentance, or at least the outward manifestation of it. The danger arose from magnifying the outward, until it absorbed and drew away the life of the inward. This could hardly be otherwise, since human confessors are too prone to claim authority, and the idea of having fulfilled a painful task makes men imagine that their guilt is relieved. But when the confessional is abolished, there remains often a slavish view of repentance, which takes away its true blessedness. Some are troubled because they know not how long they ought to repent. Ought they to mention in words every sin they have ever committed? If they forget or omit any, will God pardon? If they do not rightly estimate the guilt of all, and consider some their chief sins which are not so, will God have patience with their mistakes?

How happily is all this relieved when we learn the noon-day lesson taught at the well of Sychar, that it is the Christ who reveals us to ourselves! It is not for you to find out your sin, but for Him to reveal it to you. With the Psalmist, you ask God to search you, "that you may be led in the way everlasting." You are to become acquainted with your own heart by having Him read it to you; and all you can tell Him will be of that which He has told you before. Repentance now loses its bitterness, because it is the revelation of the Christ. "Once," says Luther, "I thought no word so bitter as repentance; now there is none more sweet, and those passages in the Bible that used to terrify me now smile and sport about me." In the same spirit, Augustine says, in his "Confessions," "I will now call to mind my past foulness

and the carnal corruptions of my soul ; not because I love them, but that I may love Thee, O my God. For love of thy love I do it ; reviewing my most wicked ways in the very bitterness of my remembrance, that Thou mayst grow sweet unto me."

The power of such a revelation of the Christ is manifest in the fact, that the largest harvest of souls our Lord ever gathered while on earth was reaped in the two days He spent at Sychar. A soul brought face to face with Him, beholding his glory by being self-revealed, is a fit instrument to convey to others the advent of the Christ. Here is the song of Bethlehem, "Peace and good will." The woman waits not for a full rehearsal of all the windings of her guilt, for He has known and felt it all.

For us there is the same freedom of approach. Listening to Him, you, also, shall learn to confess. Receiving into your heart his love and sympathy, your lips shall be opened to tell Him every want and grief, and prayer shall be only the communion of kindred minds. The saying of the woman shall become your saying, "He told me all that ever I did."

James G. Vose.

PROTESTANT MISSIONS IN EAST AFRICA.

THE first Christian missions in East Africa followed the Portuguese discoveries and settlements in the beginning of the sixteenth century. A chain of stations stretched along the coast from Delagoa Bay to Mombasa and beyond, and followed up the valley of the Zambesi, nearly five hundred miles, to Zumbo. The missionaries were Dominicans and Jesuits, many of them brave and devoted men. The results of these missions were neither very great nor very permanent. The labors of the missionaries were hindered, and the fruits destroyed, by the perpetual hostilities between the Portuguese and the blacks, — hostilities due, in part, to the commercial and religious jealousy of the Arabs, but chiefly to the conscienceless policy of the colonial government toward the natives. Missions and the slave-trade could not both flourish in the hands of the same people. Not even the prejudice against Christianity which this fatal alliance begot survives in East Africa.

It was not till almost the middle of this century that East Africa again became a mission field, and it is hardly more than

ten years since Christian Europe and America began to realize how wide was the door which God had here opened to the church. The missionary advance, from all sides, upon the citadel of darkness is one of the most interesting chapters in modern church history. It is the purpose of this article to give an account of those operations which have the east coast for their base.

The first mission established on the coast was the result of the closing of Abyssinia against the missions of the Church Missionary Society in the year 1843. One of the missionaries thus shut out, J. L. Krapf,¹ after an unsuccessful attempt to make his way from the north into the country of the Gallas, sailed along the coast as far as Zanzibar, hoping to find some way to reach them from the east. In this, also, he was disappointed; but among the Wanika, on the coast north of Zanzibar, he found a present opportunity and a good starting-point for that advance into the interior which he had at heart. Accordingly he removed to Mombasa² in May, 1844, and in July he buried, on the mainland opposite, his wife and her infant child. In reporting her death to the society in London, Krapf, who had himself been very ill, wrote: "Tell our friends that there is, on the East African coast, a lonely grave of a member of the missionary cause connected with your society. This is a sign that you have commenced the struggle with this part of the world; and as the victories of the church are stepping over the graves and death of many of her members, you may be the more convinced that the hour is at hand when you are summoned to the conversion of Africa from its eastern shore."

In those days the solitary missionary conceived the project of a chain of mission stations across the continent connecting Mombasa with the American mission on the Gaboon. He thought much, too, of the establishment, on the east coast, of a colony for liberated slaves, like Sierra Leone on the west, from which native

¹ Johannes Ludwig Krapf, born near Tübingen, January 11, 1810; died at Kornthal, near Stuttgart, November 26, 1881. See *Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labors*, etc., by the Rev. Dr. J. Lewis Krapf. London: Trübner & Co., 1860. Reissue, 1867. Also, two articles in the *Church Missionary Intelligencer*, February and March, 1882.

² Mombasa, or Mombas, is on an island three miles long by two and a half wide. The estuary in which it lies forms the best harbor on the Zanzibar main-land. The Portuguese put a fort there in 1594; the present citadel was built in 1635. The Portuguese were finally expelled in 1698. Sayyid Said, of Zanzibar, made himself master of it in 1834, dispossessing the line of Arab princes who had ruled it since the early part of the eighteenth century.

evangelists might go back to their tribes in the interior. Unlikely enough it was at that time that these castles in the air would ever be materialized, yet Krapf lived to see, within 200 or 300 yards of his wife's lonely grave, the busy mission settlement of Freretown; and to see his line of stations pushed into the interior from the east and the west, before long to meet in the heart of the continent. In June, 1846, he was joined by Johannes Rebmann, like himself a Würtemberger, trained in Basel.¹ Toward the end of August they removed to Rabbai Mpia, on high ground, twelve or fifteen miles from Mombasa, that they might live among the Wanika. They did not, however, deem it their whole duty to preach the gospel to the Wanika or the Suaheli. From all inner Africa they heard a cry, "Come over and help us." Feeling, as Krapf wrote in his journal, in 1849, "that the missionaries in Rabbai must be the pioneers for East Africa," they undertook those missionary reconnoissances with which the exploration of that part of the continent began. In 1848 Rebmann explored the Jagga country, and on May 11th saw, in the distance, the snow-covered summit of Kilima Njaro. In April following he boldly set out on a journey to Uniamesi, to the great lake, "and thence to the western coast of Africa." He got no farther than Jagga, however, and returned in June, after many hardships and dangers. Krapf, in 1848, visited Usambara, where he was well received by King Kmeri. The next year he planned a journey to Nyassa, which an unusually wet season compelled him to give up. Later in the year he explored Ukambani, in the direction of Mount Kenia. In February and March, 1850, with Erhardt, he followed the coast south from Zanzibar to the Portuguese possessions at Cape Delgado. On this journey they met natives of the inland tribes bordering on Lake Uniamesi, and heard from them, among other things, that the lake rises and falls: "A remark," Krapf writes, "which struck me, as it must others, as important."² Here, also, they learned something of the appalling proportions of the slave-trade on this coast. In 1850 Krapf was in London, urging upon the committee of his society his scheme of a trans-continental chain of stations, and making

¹ J. Rebmann, born at Gerlingen, in Würtemberg, labored in East Africa for almost thirty years. He died at Kornthal, October 4, 1876. See *Church Missionary Intelligencer*, 1876, p. 697 ff.

² The changes in the level of the Tanganyika since it has been visited by Europeans are striking. They have been lately discussed before the Royal Geographical Society by Captain Hore, of the London Mission.

arrangements for the printing of his "Suaheli Grammar," and a "Comparative Vocabulary of Six East African Languages," the first fruits of his linguistic labors.

The committee entered into his plan so far as to send out two new missionaries, Pfefferle and Diehlmann, and three lay brothers, — a carpenter, a farmer, and a smith, — all Germans, and recommended the establishment of a station in Usambara, and one in Ukambani or Jagga. Krapf returned in April, 1851, with fresh strength and courage, and in high hopes; but these were doomed to speedy disappointment. Diehlmann turned back from Aden; Pfefferle died in a few weeks after reaching his post; two of the artisans escaped the same fate only by immediate return to Europe. Meanwhile Rebmann and Erhardt had bought ground and built a new house in Kisiludini, about two miles from Rabbai Mpia, to which, shortly, Rebmann brought his wife. Notwithstanding the failure of the attempt to reinforce the mission, Krapf set out in July, 1851, to establish a mission at Yata, on the borders of Ukambani.

The journey ended disastrously, and Krapf, after incredible hardships, having wandered alone for days in the trackless forests, made his way back to Rabbai. Early in 1852 he paid another visit to King Kmeri of Usambara, at his capital, Fuga, hoping to find an opening for a mission in his domain. The king's consent was obtained, and in 1853 Erhardt went thither to settle, but after a few months was driven away by political disturbances. Krapf returned to Europe in the fall of 1853, and was never able to serve again in the field.

With this ended, for the time, all efforts to expand the sphere of operations. Erhardt had to leave the mission in broken health in 1855, and Deimler, his successor, after two years' service, in 1857. Both the latter afterwards did good work in India, — Deimler, especially, by his labors among the liberated African slaves who were landed by British cruisers at Bombay. Rebmann alone stood heroically at his solitary post. In 1857 a raid of the wild Masai destroyed the station and scattered the Wanika, and compelled Rebmann to abandon the main-land for more than two years.

What were the results of this faithful toil and sacrifice? Measured in conversions to Christianity among the Wanika, almost nothing. Yet it would be an error to infer that it was a mere waste of life and labor. To say nothing of the influence of a Christian example upon the manners and morals of the

people, the contributions of the missionaries to African geography, ethnology, and linguistics were of the first importance, not only to science, but to missions. From Krapf and Rebmann, and, later, from Livingstone, the Christian world learned what Africa is, and what it asks of Europe; and so, by labors seemingly fruitless, the way was prepared in Europe for that sudden and great expansion of the work which we have witnessed in the last few years. The future must have seemed very dark, when, in 1859, Rebmann returned to Kisiludini; but he would not give up. From that time till 1873 he labored on alone, doubly alone after the death of his wife, in 1866. His only help was from a native catechist, trained in the school at Sharanpur, near Nasik.¹ In 1873 there were but eight converts at Kisiludini, and five of these belonged to two families who had been sent from the Orphanage at Nasik. Here Sir Bartle Frere found Rebmann, an old man, broken in health and threatened with blindness, jealously guarding his precious manuscripts, which included, beside various translations, three complete dictionaries of the Suaheli, Nika, and Nyassa languages.²

In 1861 The United Methodist Free Church undertook a mission in East Africa, and sent out two English missionaries and two lay brothers from St. Crischona.³ Dr. Krapf accompanied them to give advice and aid in planting the mission. The first plan was to establish a station among the coast tribes north of Mombasa (the Kauma),⁴ and in time to push inland to the Galas. This proved impracticable, and the expedition ended in the occupation of Ribé among the Wanika, eight or ten miles northeast of Kisiludini. Here Wakefield,⁵ the only one of the original company who held out to the end, was soon joined by New.⁶ Their work among the Wanika does not seem to have been much more successful than that of their neighbors at Kisiludini. Repeated attempts between 1862 and 1878 to work their way northward

¹ Nasik is the centre of the Ahmednagar mission of the C. M. S. It is northeast of Bombay, distant, perhaps, a hundred miles.

² *Eastern Africa, as a Field for Missionary Labor.* London, 1874.

³ The institution of the "Pilgermission," near Basel; founded by Spittler.

⁴ About half way between Malindi and Mombasa.

⁵ See Thomas Wakefield, *Footprints in East Africa*, London, 1866.

⁶ Charles New, *Life and Wanderings in East Africa*, London, 1876. New went out to East Africa in 1862. He accompanied the Livingstone search expedition of 1872 as interpreter. Returning to Africa from England in 1874, he engaged again in pioneer service. His last journey was to Jagga. He died on his way back, at Lubueni, near Duruma, February 16, 1875.

to the Gallas failed. A war between the Somalis and the southern Gallas in 1870, however, drove many of the latter from their homes to the coast, and some of them took refuge at Ribé. The missionaries have labored to raise up from among them some who may become evangelists to their own people. Both Wakefield and New made important contributions to the geography of the region north and west of them. New was the first European to make the ascent of Kilima Njaro.

In 1883 the mission was gravely threatened by a raid of the Wakwafi; neighboring villages of the Wanika were burnt and twenty or thirty men killed; but the Christian settlement suffered no harm. Later in the year one of the missionaries accompanied by two native preachers made a new effort to get a foothold in the Galla country, of the success of which I have not yet learned.¹

In their journeys back from the coast the early missionaries at Rabbai and Kisiludini heard much of the great lake in the interior. Krapf, as he skirted the coast on his way from Aden to Zanzibar in December, 1843, heard at Takaungu of "the inner African tribes of Uniamesi, in whose territory there is a great lake." Putting together the information they had gathered from native sources Erhardt and Rebmann drew a map, on which the lake appeared a veritable African Mediterranean, winding in a singular shape through twelve degrees of latitude. Their map was first published in the proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society in 1856, and at once excited the greatest interest among the geographers.² The Geographical Society, aided by the government, the next year sent out Burton and Speke, who discovered Lake Tanganyika (Unyamwesi) in 1858, accomplishing thus what Rebmann had attempted in 1849. In rapid succession followed that brilliant series of discoveries which have transformed all our notions of the lake region of Central Africa.

But long before this a missionary of the London Missionary Society had begun from the south the journeys which made his the greatest name among the explorers of the continent, — shall we not say among the benefactors of Africa? In 1849 (August 1), Livingstone discovered Lake Ngami; in June, 1851, he first saw

¹ The publications of this church have unfortunately not been accessible to me so that the sketch of this mission is necessarily meagre.

² See Petermann's *Mittheilungen*, 1856, where the map is reproduced, together with an interesting geographical commentary. The communications of Erhardt and Rebmann were not the first report European geographers had of the existence of a great lake or lakes in the interior of Africa. See Petermann, *l. c.*, and *Edinburgh Review*, 1835, p. 347 ff.

the Zambesi at Shesheke; from November, 1853, to September, 1855, was spent in the journey from Linyanti to Loanda on the west coast and back. Leaving Linyanti again in November and descending the Zambesi, he reached Quilimane May 20, 1856, having crossed the continent from sea to sea since September 20, 1854.

Leaving the service of the Missionary Society to devote himself wholly to the work of exploration, in 1859, at the head of the Zambesi expedition, he explored the Shiré (January), discovered the Lake Shirwa April 18th, and the Nyassa September 16th.

The impulse of these discoveries was felt by missions as well as by science. In 1859 a Society for Central African Missions was formed in the four Universities, Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, and Durham. The neighborhood of the Nyassa was chosen as their field. The first company consisted of C. F. Mackenzie, earlier of Natal, who had been consecrated Missionary Bishop of Central Africa, three clergymen, a carpenter, an agriculturist, and a lay superintendent. At the mouth of the Zambesi they met Livingstone whose counsel and help had been promised in the beginnings. Following the Shiré up to Chibisa's town they proceeded by land to the neighborhood of Lake Shirwa, where they decided to establish their first station, called, from a river near by, Magomero. Livingstone left them here to continue his exploration of the Nyassa. Very soon the missionaries allowed themselves to be entangled in the hostilities of two native tribes, and on August 18th, they engaged in a pitched battle, in which English firearms decided the day. The consequence of this military success was a large increase in the population of Magomero, — the neighboring Manganja being prompt to put themselves under the protection of such powerful allies. With greater numbers came scarcity and epidemic disease. The mission, which in November had been strengthened by three new men, suffered greatly. Early in January Mackenzie and Burrup set out for Chibisa's, and thence down the Shiré, expecting to meet Miss Mackenzie, the bishop's sister, and Mrs. Burrup who had come out with Mrs. Livingstone. They had not reached the Zambesi when in consequence of exposure Mackenzie fell ill, and died January 31st, on a little island in the mouth of the Ruu. Burrup, after burying his leader on the mainland near by, returned to Magomero, where he also, in a few weeks, died. In March, after a very difficult journey, the two ladies reached Chibisa's, to learn that those whom they sought were both dead, and stricken with fever they hastened back to the coast.

At Magomero there was great distress. Broken down by fever, in want of everything, threatened on all hands by their old enemies the Ajawa, whose turn had come now, it was very plain that they must abandon the place. They therefore fell back to Chibisa's, but even here the famine which resulted from the unusual drouth of 1862 pursued them. Several members of the mission died of privation and fever. In May, 1863, Bishop Tozer with Dr. Steere and two other missionaries arrived, but after an unsuccessful attempt to found a new station in the Morumbala Mountains on the lower Shiré, they were compelled to withdraw from the field.

The enterprise was not, however, wholly abandoned. In 1864 Bishop Tozer established the Universities' mission on the island of Zanzibar. Here he built up a flourishing school, from which he hoped to send out catechists and evangelists to labor on the mainland. These expectations were only in part realized. The pupils in the schools were chiefly children rescued from the slave dhows; few or none of them from tribes within reach of the mission. On the island of Zanzibar the mission, beside its great stone church, on the site of the old slave-market, and its school-buildings in the city, has outposts at Kingani and at Mbweni, respectively two and five miles distant. The first station on the mainland was in Usambara. The bishop wished to occupy the capital, Fuga, but was prevented by the unsettled state of the country consequent upon a war of succession, and the missionary, Mr. Allington, established himself at Magila, a long day's journey inland from the mouth of the Pangani River. Bishop Tozer was succeeded in 1874 by Dr. Steere, under whose wise and vigorous leadership the mission made very great progress. The Usambara, or as the missionaries of this society write it, Shambala, mission, which up to 1873 had been for some time occupied only by a native catechist, was strengthened; an out-station established at Umba, at which in 1882 there was a school with 150 pupils. In 1882 a very remarkable movement took place among the Moslems in Mbwego near Magila. The heads of the community of their own accord announced to Mr. Farler that they had closed their mosque and dismissed their school teacher, and that they desired to connect themselves with the Christian community, and send their children to the mission school. From native villages all around came requests for schools and teachers. The mission seems to have entered upon the period of positive results.

In 1876 Bishop Steere planted a colony of freed slaves from Zanzibar at Masasi on the Makonde plateau north of the Rovuma

River, about 430 miles from Zanzibar and 130 inland from Lindi, where a station is established as the base for the advance inland. Fifty-six freed slaves in charge of two missionaries were first sent up; later arrivals increased their numbers to 160. Subsequently fifty freedmen were sent from Zanzibar as the nucleus of a mission colony at Newala, nearer the Rovuma, and about sixty miles from Masasi. An out-station was also established at Mkwera twelve or fifteen miles north of Masasi.

A sad calamity befell the settlement at Masasi in September, 1882, when it was attacked by a marauding party of Wagwangwara from the northeastern corner of the lake. Seven of the people were killed and forty more carried off as slaves. The missionaries subsequently redeemed them, as far as possible. The exposed position of Masasi, and the threat of future raids by the Wagwangwara, determined the mission to abandon the place, falling back first on Newala, and ultimately to Numange's, a still safer place on the Makonde plateau.

As early as 1875 the mission, which had never ceased to regard the Nyassa as its proper field, proposed the establishment of a station at Mataka's town, the largest in that region. In the following year explorations were made toward the northeastern corner of the lake.

In 1881 Mr. Johnson, from Masasi, following the Lujende, arrived at Mwembe, Mataka's town, where he was well received by the young king. Points were named for two intermediate links in the chain of stations which was to reach from Lindi by Masasi to the lake. Very shortly, however (August, 1881), Mr. Johnson was driven away by the hostile feeling aroused by Captain Foot's capture of a slave caravan on its way to the coast. The missionary was accused of giving the information which led to the seizure.

In December, 1881, and the beginning of 1882, Johnson and Janson traversed the whole plateau from Masasi west to the middle of the lake at Ngoi, from which centre they proposed to preach the gospel through the regions around as far as Mataka's. Janson died before reaching the lake. Mr. Johnson established himself at Chitesi's, almost directly across the lake from the Scotch mission at Bandawe. An effort was making in England, in the last months of last year, to furnish a steamer for the missionary service of this society upon the lake.

Not only the Universities' mission, but the cause of Christianity and civilization in East Africa, suffered an irreparable loss in the death of Bishop Steere, at Zanzibar, August 28, 1882. His

successor, the Rev. Charles A. Smythies, sailed from England January 16, 1884.

We must now take up again the history of the mission at Mombasa, where Krapf's early project of a mission settlement of liberated slaves was being carried out. The active measures taken by the British government to stop the export of slaves from East Africa, especially under the treaty to that effect, which was signed by the Sultan of Zanzibar, in June, 1873, made it a question of considerable importance what should be done with the slaves taken by the British cruisers. To return them to their homes was out of the question; to turn them loose on the African coast was to give them the alternative, — starvation or slavery. Various temporary expedients were employed. Some came under the care of the Universities' mission in Zanzibar, or the Roman Catholics at Bagamoyo; many were landed in Mauritius, or on the Seychelles; a number were carried to Bombay. A school and orphanage for African children was established as early as 1860, at Sharanpur, near Nasik. It will be remembered that Livingstone's faithful companions on his last journey were boys from this school. There were serious objections to carrying the slaves taken by the cruisers to such remote points. The island climates were said to be too severe; the change in the way of life was too abrupt; and from the missionary point of view, the hope that from the converted exiles streams of Christian influence might flow back into the heart of Africa was cut off. The first thought was of a colony like Sierra Leone, but to that the government would not hear. The missions were left to solve the problem unaided. After conference with Sir Bartle Frere the neighborhood of Mombasa was chosen as the best place for a settlement of freedmen, and the mission there was at once strengthened for this purpose. The first company left England in July, 1873, and the next year (October, 1874) was followed by a still larger force. At the head of the undertaking was the Rev. W. S. Price, who had served twenty-five years in India, and had been connected with the African school at Sharanpur. Their instructions covered three points: namely, the settlement for recaptured slaves; the expansion of the work among the Wanika at Kisiludini; and "the establishment of a strong station with a view to a chain of stations toward the interior." A tract of land, containing about two hundred and twenty acres, was bought on the high ground opposite Mombasa, one mile distant, and a village laid out, to which the name Freretown was given, in honor of Sir Bartle Frere. As the nucleus of the settlement,

about a hundred Africans, who had had some experience of Christianity and civilization, were sent back from Bombay. The clearing, road-making, and building, necessary to prepare the asylum for the reception of the recaptured slaves, required many hands, and the founders rightly judged that the example of industry set by men of their own race, as well as their better dress and house-keeping, would be more potent with men fresh from the slave-gang than many sermons. The work was pushed forward rapidly. In September, 1875, the first cargo of slaves—two hundred and seventy-one in number—was received, and a little later twenty-five more were sent. Forty more men were brought from India, many of them skilled cultivators from the government farms near Bombay. The English missionaries suffered severely from fevers, and it was only by continual reinforcements that the station was held. The average term of active service during the first seven or eight years was about two years. The report of the society for 1880 says, that “the East African mission seems now to have passed into the condition of steady progress.”

In 1881 the mission was seriously threatened in consequence of complications which arose about fugitive slaves. In a country where slavery is lawful and religious the neighborhood of such an asylum could hardly be regarded as a blessing. It was a constant temptation to the slaves to run away, and the missionaries, or the lay superintendent, put various hindrances in the way of their masters’ reclaiming them. The Arabs of Mombasa accordingly resolved to break up and burn the settlements. In this purpose they were thwarted by the timely appearance of a war ship in the harbor, and through the intervention of Dr. Kirk, British consul at Zanzibar, and of Mr. Price, who visited the mission as special commissioner on the part of the society, the causes of grievance were removed and peace restored. In 1882 a raid of the dreaded Mbaruk, at the head of his Masai, created great alarm, but he did the mission no harm. The statistics of the mission to May, 1883, were as follows: European missionaries, seven, occupying four stations; native teachers, 19; native adherents, 858, of whom more than half are baptized; communicants, 91; schools, three; scholars, 203. In September, 1883, Bishop Royston, of Mauritius, was able to confirm at Rabbai 71 men and 74 women. The stations are Mombasa, Freretown, Kisiludini, which has now become much the larger of the two; Kamlikeni, among the Giriama, forty miles north of Freretown, in charge of a native catechist, and a new station in the Teita hills, occupied (January,

1883) by Mr. Wray. The work among the Giriama has a peculiarly interesting history. It was from the beginning a native movement, and it seems to have received little direct help from the missionaries. It now counts thirty-six adherents. Beside this, mention should be made of a Giriama Christian settlement, quite independent of the mission, at Fulladoyo, fifty miles inland in the heart of the forest.

The pressing need which led to the establishment of the Freretown colony proved to be only temporary. Since 1876 the number of slaves recaptured by the cruisers has been very small. The dealers in human merchandise finding the sea too dangerous abandoned it for the longer but safer land routes. The future work of the Mombasa mission must be among the native tribes settled on the coast, toward the north and inland. The sending of Mr. Wray to Teita is a move in this direction. Among the Wanika too, around Kisiludini, there seems to be an increased interest in the gospel.

We have seen that from the beginning in 1844 the idea of a chain of stations at supporting distance, reaching into the interior, had always been in the thought of the leaders of this mission. In 1851 it was strengthened for this purpose, but the attempt failed. The discoveries of Burton and Speke, and of Speke and Grant, revived the scheme. Soon after the return of the latter party, in 1863, the Church Missionary Society began to consider the advisability of a forward movement from Mombasa.¹ Speke himself seems to have proposed the organization of a new society to establish a mission in Karagwe, on the west side of Victoria Nyanza, with King Rumanika. The plan of Knight, Secretary C. M. S., was for a series of stations on the shortest line from Mombasa to the northern end of the lake. This would require, he thought, six stations, occupied by two or three men each. Nothing more came of this than the instruction to the party sent out in 1874 and 1875 to locate one inland station as a base for a further advance when the way should open.

Before this could be accomplished, however, the society was led to form other plans for a Central African mission. On the 15th of November, 1875, a letter appeared in the London "Daily Telegraph" from the American explorer, Stanley, giving to the Christian Church in England an urgent invitation, in the name of King Mtesa, to establish a mission in his kingdom of Uganda on the northern side of the Victoria Lake, and putting the duty of doing

¹ *Church Missionary Intelligencer*, 1864, p. 116.

so in the strongest way. Three days later, one who subscribed himself an unprofitable servant offered the Church Missionary Society £5,000, as the beginning of a mission fund for this purpose. On the 23d of November, the committee resolved unanimously to undertake the work. As soon as this was known they received in the same anonymous way £3,000, which was afterwards increased to £5,000. Within a month £2,000 more came in in smaller sums. The question now was by what route the missionaries should try to reach the lake. Dr. Krapf urged his own plan of 1850 and Knight's of 1864 of an advance directly northwest from Mombasa. This line is much shorter than the common road from Bagamoyo through Unyanyembe to Kagei, but it leads through the territory of wild tribes, a region almost wholly unexplored.¹ The society, warned by experience, wisely declined to use up its resources and perhaps indefinitely to postpone the accomplishment of its object by undertaking to break a new road through an unknown country, and preferred to follow the beaten track. The men chosen for this advance were Lieutenant G. Shergold Smith, R. N. ; Mr. A. M. Mackay and Mr. G. J. Clarke, engineers ; the Reverend C. F. Wilson ; Mr. John Smith, physician ; W. Robertson, J. Robertson, and T. O'Neill. Lieutenant Smith, who had seen some African service in the Ashantee war, was at the head of the expedition, which was assembled at Zanzibar by the 1st of July, 1876. A preliminary exploration by Lieutenant Smith in the steam yacht *Highland Lassie*, which had been sent out for the use of the East African mission, proved that the Wami, which Stanley had recommended as a missionary road to the Usagara country, is not navigable. So there was nothing to be done but to follow in the footsteps of other travelers with great caravans of native porters. They left the coast in four divisions at different times between July 14th and September 14th. The first stage of the journey ends at Mpwapwa in Ugogo. Here Clarke and Hartnoll, a sailor who had volunteered to take the place made vacant by the death, at Zanzibar, of J. Robertson, were left to establish a station. W. Robertson had to be sent down to the coast, sick ; and a little farther on Mackay also was compelled to turn back. The rest went on in two companies, the first of which, Wilson and O'Neill, reached Kagei at the southern end of the lake, January 29, 1877. Not long after Lieutenant Smith and Dr. Smith came up, but the latter reached the lake only to die. On June 30, 1877, Lieutenant

¹ An expedition of the Royal Geographical Society under Mr. J. Thompson is now engaged in the exploration.

Smith and Mr. Wilson reached Mtesa's capital, Rubaga, where they were cordially received. Leaving Mr. Wilson there, Lieutenant Smith returned to the southern end of the lake, Ukerewe, to see to the transportation of the stores. Here he and his companion, O'Neill, were killed December 13, 1877, in the attempt to protect an Arab trader who had taken refuge with them from the wrath of the king. Clarke and Hartnoll were soon forced by ill health to leave Mpwapwa, so that of the eight men sent out only Wilson, at Rubaga, and Mackay, who after his recovery had been busy in the most necessary work of making a passable road from the coast at Saadani to Mpwapwa, were left. But in a few months a large reinforcement was on the way. Six men were sent by Zanzibar, and four by the Nile. Mackay hurried forward and joined Wilson in Uganda in the fall of 1878. Their relations with the king were friendly and encouraging. He seemed ready to do almost anything they asked. One day the report came that at Mackay's suggestion Mtesa has published an edict forbidding the selling of slaves on pain of death! It is needless to say that it was never enforced.

On February 14, 1879, the Nile party, consisting of Litchfield, Felkin, and Pearson, reached the capital. Ten days later two French Jesuit priests, the advance guard of a considerable missionary expedition, arrived from the south, and on April 9th two more of the English party came up by the same route. For a moment the mission had the full strength originally intended, seven men. But before the arrival of the last party, Messrs. Stokes and Copplestone, the affairs of the mission had taken a most unfavorable turn. The Arab merchants, exasperated by the opposition of the Englishmen to the slave-trade, and anxious to regain the influence over Mtesa by which in former times they had profited, so misconstrued or mistranslated a letter from Dr. Kirk, British consul at Zanzibar, to Mtesa, as to make the missionaries appear a pack of impostors and liars. The king became angry and hostile. Sweeping prohibitions were laid on the work of the mission, and things came to a stand-still. After some consideration it was decided to say to the king that as the promises with which he had invited the establishment of a mission in his kingdom were thus broken, they would withdraw and seek a field elsewhere. This did not suit Mtesa, who found the white men useful and hoped to make them more so. Various difficulties were put in the way of their departure. In June, 1879, however, Felkin and Wilson, with three chiefs of the Waganda, as envoys

to England, set out by the northern route for Egypt, and Stokes and Copplestone left by the lake for the south, leaving Litchfield, Mackay, and Pearson in Uganda. The next reports from them were more encouraging, so far as there is any encouragement in the fickleness of a black tyrant. Mtesa had ordered all his chiefs, soldiers, and pages to learn the alphabet, and this unexpected and somewhat premature compulsory education act made much business for the missionaries. He promised to build a church and a school; in September he wanted to be baptized, and to have Mackay write to Queen Victoria to send him out an English princess for his wife.

Stokes and Copplestone having crossed the lake established themselves at Uyui, a collection of villages twenty miles northeast of the principal Arab town of Unyanyembe, Tabora or Kaseh. The station at Mpwapwa, which had been established in 1876, and then for a time vacated, was reoccupied by a part of the company sent out in the fall of 1877, Dr. J. E. Baxter and Mr. J. T. Last. Forty or fifty freed slaves from Mombasa and from Bishop Steere's schools in Zanzibar were brought up as the nucleus of a settlement. The Rev. J. C. Price and Mr. H. Cole joined this mission in October, 1879, and an out-station was planted in the Nguru country at Mamboia, three or four days nearer the coast than Mpwapwa, and on the road to it. This was occupied by Mr. Last, who in January, 1880, brought his wife thither, — the first woman in the Central African mission.

In January, 1880, the mission in Uganda witnessed a great pagan reaction. An old woman, in whom Mukasa, the *lubare* or demon of the lake, is supposed to reside, made her appearance at the king's town. The powers of heathen darkness aroused themselves to make war on the light. The chiefs were loud for the old ways. Mtesa declared his policy: "The Arabs can have their religion and you yours, but we will have the religion of our fathers." In accordance with this he strictly prohibited all teaching and preaching. The excitement lasted only a few weeks, the *lubare* returned to her place, and the world went on as before. Referring to this outbreak Mr. Litchfield wrote, "There were always the elements of an explosion at hand in Mtesa's court, which the stirring of a child's finger may bring together, — Arab, savage, Roman Catholic, and Protestant; politics, religion, envy of the native chiefs, hatred of the Arabs, underhand machinations of Romanists, and other sulphurous materials." The next religious revolution was in July of the same year, when Mtesa declared himself a Moham-

medan in consequence of a dream. His Mohammedanism was not more serious than his Christianity. He never would submit to circumcision, and within a week after his new conversion solemnly decided, in full council, not to keep Ramadan! The substance of it was a parrot-jabbering *allah akbar!* the burning of some gunpowder, and flying a flag on Friday. In March, 1881, Mr. Stokes and the Rev. P. O'Flaherty, accompanied by the Waganda envoys, returning from England by way of Zanzibar, arrived at the king's town. The reports the chiefs gave of what they had seen in England seem to have increased Mtesa's respect for the English, and no further serious obstacles were put in the way of the missionaries. Mr. O'Flaherty fortunately had a knowledge of the Koran, with which he confounded the amateur missionaries among the Arab traders, much to Mtesa's delight, who has a barbarian's delight in a controversy, deepened by total indifference to the result. In these encounters with the Arabs M. Lourdel, of the French mission, also took an active part. The relations between the English and French missionaries at the beginning were not very friendly, but in time a *modus vivendi* was established in the presence of the common foe. The year 1881 was one of material progress. A house more permanent and comfortable than the grass huts of the natives was building, a well sunk and a pump mounted to the amazement of all who saw it. A cart had been built and a yoke of oxen broken to draw it, a new wonder. The road from the mission station to the town was made passable for wheels. Mr. O'Flaherty had been employed in teaching, translating, printing, etc. The first spiritual fruit of the mission was gathered in March, 1881, when five young men were baptized; fifty more had been taught to read, and not a few were thought to show signs of having received the truth into their hearts. The Gospel of St. Matthew, Bishop Steere's "Scripture History," a large part of the Old Testament lessons, the order for morning and evening prayer and for the baptism of adults, had been translated. The mission grounds had been enlarged and fenced; several thousand plantain-trees set out; good crops of maize, millet, beans, peas, tomatoes, and sweet potatoes, were raised. Not the least of the results of these improvements is that the natives are learning to work for hire. The regeneration of labor is the first step in the conversion and civilization of Africa.¹ At Mpwapwa and Mam-

¹ See the weighty words of Père Horner, Sir Bartle Frere's *East Africa as a Field for Missionary Labor*, p. 52. "Nobody can ignore the fact that the natural apathy and indolence peculiar to the negro character form the greatest ob-

boia also 1882 was a year of progress. The mission at the former station occupied a point called Kisokwe, in a fertile district six miles from Mpwapwa, where they raise their crops of grain and vegetables. The experiment of ostrich farming is being tried at Mpwapwa, where the conditions are unfavorable to agriculture. Mr. Last at Mamboia reports an open door in Usagara. Some notion of the Babel that reigns in this country may be got from the fact that Mr. Last finds seven dialects, belonging to at least two separate families, necessary to the prosecution of his work. The mission suffered during the year by the death of Mrs. Last and Mrs. Cole, the pioneers of woman's work in Central Africa. In 1883 the society sent forward a large reinforcement, five clergymen and one layman, with the Rev. J. Hannington at their head. Two of them were designated for Uyui, where they relieved Mr. Copplestone; the rest took a new road to the Nyanza through Mirambo's country, reaching it at Msalala, west of Kagei. Delays occurred in getting transport across the lake, and all suffered severely from fever. Mr. Hannington was compelled to return, and with him one of the men from Uyui. One of the party reached Mtesa's May 2, 1883, and at the last reports Mackay with the other two were near Kagei, putting together the boat which had been brought out in sections.¹ In the meanwhile the French missionaries had abandoned Uganda, intending to found two new stations southeast of the lake at a place whose name they give as *Boukoubi*.

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stacles to his 'moralization;' and it is only by degrees that we can conquer their vices, by inspiring them with a regard and love of work according to the principles of Christianity."

¹ The statistical summary at the latest date is as follows: Number of stations four (Uganda, Uyui, Mpwapwa, Mamboia); English missionaries, 14 (of whom in the field, nine, in England five); native Christians, seven; scholars, 81. The distribution of the force in the field: *Victoria Nyanza*, Rev. Messrs. O'Flaherty, Ashe, and Gordon; Messrs. Mackay and Wise; *Uyui*, Rev. Jos. Blackburn; *Mpwapwa*, Rev. J. C. Price, Mr. Cole; *Mamboia*, Mr. Last.

Conclusion in the next Number.

BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

I.

THE BOOKS OF CHRONICLES, WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO
THE BOOKS OF SAMUEL.

THE critical study of the Old Testament, in which American scholars have been engaged during recent years, has not as yet brought much into public notice the structure and the peculiar contents of the Books of Chronicles. The more radical class of views in regard to them, no doubt, exists among us, but it has not made itself very prominent, and has engaged in no persistent attempt to secure the public ear. It has been, of course, widely known among reading men, that, in Germany and Holland, and, to some degree, in England and Scotland, there is a respectable body of opinion, according to which these books, from their late date, the peculiar circumstances of their time, and the limitations, both literary and religious, of their author, have little or no value as documentary evidence for the history of the times they profess to describe. Kuenen has been translated, Wellhausen has been read in the original, or his views transmitted through various channels; Samuel Davidson and Colenso and Robertson Smith have had their say. But the opinion about the Chronicles has been here regarded as incidental to a certain view about the Pentateuch, and interest for the latter has diverted attention from the former.¹ The extreme conservatives have been anxious to repel the movements of Pentateuchal criticism, and have either allowed, for argument's sake, the exclusion of Chronicles from the discussion, in order to meet their opponents on common ground, or have simply denied, with little discussion, the allegations of those opponents with reference to these late historical books, and have treated them as sources of history of equal weight and authority with the Books of Samuel and Books of Kings.²

¹ Professor C. H. Toy, D. D., has expressed, in compact form, the opinion of Chronicles held by him, in common with most of the scholars above named, in his *History of the Religion of Israel*, Boston, 1883, p. 94.

² E. g., Professor W. H. Green, D. D., *Moses and The Prophets*, New York, 1883; see, especially, pp. 86, 87. Rev. Rufus P. Stebbins, D. D., *A Study of the Pentateuch for Popular Reading*, Boston, 1881; see, especially, pp. 38-42, 100-104. Somewhat fuller are the remarks of Professor S. I. Curtiss, D. D., *The Levitical Priests*, Edinburgh, 1877, ch. vii., pp. 100-120. Cf. also Professor E. C. Bissell, D. D., in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, for October, 1883.

In like manner those Old Testament scholars among us who can hardly be included in either of these categories have been, for the most part, absorbed in the more central and vital Pentateuchal problems, and have allowed the questions connected with Chronicles to wait.

The present paper lays no claim to an exhaustive treatment of a subject which involves the consideration of numberless details. It proposes, first, to offer some general reflections suggested by discussions over the book, and then to pass cursorily over a few of its chapters, for the purpose of illustrating its actual character. To give a definite limit to the examination, it will not be carried beyond those chapters which correspond more or less fully with chapters in the Books of Samuel.

It is useful to consider this work from several points of view. Those who minimize its value as a source of information concerning the times of which it professes to treat allow to it a certain importance for the history of belief and custom in the time at which it was composed. Now this aspect of it is not without its claims to our consideration. And it is entirely conceivable that the purpose of the divine Spirit in causing the book to be written might have been wholly or mainly this, — to give us an illustration of the stage in the process of moral and spiritual education reached by the chosen people in the fourth century B. C., in the form of a work which should interpret the previous history according to the convictions of the present. It might not seem to us a very probable form for the clothing of this lesson, but we should hardly be justified in asserting its impossibility. At all events, we ought to insist with considerable energy upon the great value of possessing such a witness to the religious condition of the Jews in the time of the last Persian kings, or of the Macedonian rule.¹ It is no small matter to be assured that the

¹ It is not necessary, for our present purpose, to determine the precise date when this comprehensive work, including Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah, was composed. The limits of variation exhibited by the opinions of the most competent scholars of the present day have been indicated. A date as early as the generation of Ezra, or that of his immediate successors, would make no essential difference to the positions here taken. It would give a slightly greater intrinsic probability to the claim of Chronicles to historical accuracy, and it would, on the other hand, diminish the interest attaching to them as documentary evidence for the history of their own time. It is worth more to us to know what were the habits of religious thought among the Jews of the fourth century than to receive additional evidence as to what they were among the Jews of the fifth. But, obviously, the question of date cannot be determined by such reflections as these.

conceptions about Jahve, and the relation of his people to Him, and the sacredness of his worship, were really matters of common belief, when the Chronicler lived, or even to have a fresh ground of probability offered us that this was the case. It is of much consequence to have a witness to the fact that the great reform and restoration in which Ezra was the chief figure had proved effective and permanent up to the end of the fourth century, and to have some light thrown on its practical workings. For it ought not for a moment to be left out of sight that the religious attitude of the people of Israel after the exile was a real and great advance upon anything which had characterized them before. Pictures may be drawn to set forth in idyllic beauty the untrammelled life of the people known to the earlier historical books. It is quite possible so to represent their religion that it shall appear to have been in the time of Samuel and David, and the succeeding kings, patriarchal not only in its simplicity, but also in its direct contact with God. But such a picture is glaringly false to the facts. We need not postulate the existence of the full Levitical ritual in those times to conclude that they were times of constant and prevalent disloyalty to God, when low conceptions of Him were either openly avowed or secretly cherished, and immoralities, of which we cannot now talk to each other, were ever and anon made a part of religious service. The condition of things which resulted from Ezra's reformation was so far in advance of this that it is hard to measure the advance. No doubt the exclusiveness, the burdensome attention to details, the orders and minute arrangements for public ceremony and private life, did not constitute an ideal form of religion. No doubt, if the individual Israelites had been able to rise to those lofty spiritual conceptions with which the prophetic writings have made us familiar, they would have needed less ceremonial, and their religious development would have been divested of many unlovely elements which showed themselves more and more as time went on. But they were not able to do so. The Levitical law furnished, it is true, many external props, but these props were greatly needed. Whenever it was promulgated, it certainly had not been fully observed previous to the exile, and Ezra's enforcement of it was something new, and a prodigious step forward. We do not let our thoughts dwell exclusively upon the sternness and hardness of the Puritans, but reverence them for their living protest against loose living and thinking. So it is the sterling value of Ezra's reform, and the real worth of its results, in the higher moral and

spiritual tone of the people at large, which ought to fill our view, more than the dangers to which it was exposed, or the abuses which marked its development here and there. Even if, then, we have in the Books of Chronicles evidence as to the state of things in this period only, these books are invaluable to us, because this period was indispensable in the religious history of the nation from which the Christ was to come. The religious arrangements of the post-exilic temple were not a finality, but they formed a step of the ladder, — a link in the chain.

These considerations would be weighty, even if the value of Chronicles to us lay wholly in the information it gives of the period when it was composed. But they have an important bearing on the relation of the book to the previous times also. We ought not merely to admit, but emphatically to assert, that what the Chronicler gives us is, at all events, not colorless history. If it be history, it is history from a sharply defined stand-point. The events are not looked upon from this side and that, with a careful balancing of merits and defects, of self-devotion and selfishness, of heart worship over against idolatrous leanings. One strong light falls upon them all and casts deep shadows. Character is not philosophically analyzed, it is categorically judged. What we are accustomed to call impartial history does not occur in the Old Testament at all. Certain aspects of each life and each event are so preëminently important that the attention is fixed on these to the exclusion of all others. The Bible histories penetrate to the heart of things, and array men and acts according to their inmost, essential relation to eternal principles. With this truth clearly in mind, we shall not find it an *à priori* ground for discrediting the Chronicler that he had and held his own definite stand-point. And in view of what we have observed concerning the organization of God's visible kingdom, in his time, — with the conviction that that organization was no mere human contrivance, but was brought about under the direction of Jahve, and through men who were in sympathy with Him, — we shall see that it does not necessarily depreciate the Chronicler's work to say that it is written from the stand-point of the Levitical law. As long as the statement remains in this general form, it can call forth only the remark that it is reasonable and right that it should be written from that stand-point.

Nor can it be a just cause of complaint against the Chronicler that he leaves the northern kingdom almost wholly out of account in writing his narrative. It is not only to be admitted, but to be

emphasized, that he finds himself more in sympathy with Judah than with Israel. This is no evidence of a blind partiality. It results necessarily from his devotion to Jahve and Jahve-worship. For the indications go to show that Judah was really on a higher moral and spiritual plane than Israel. The difference has no doubt been often exaggerated, but that does not warrant our denying it altogether. In spite of the fact that you can match nearly every overt act of sin and shame in the northern kingdom with a similar instance in the southern, notwithstanding the denunciations of the prophets of Judah, — as unsparing as those of the prophets of Israel, — it is still true, if we can place any reliance at all upon the most accredited documents of the Old Testament, that there was a rottenness in the foundations of the one kingdom, by which the other was less thoroughly affected. We need not embarrass our discussion by attempting to answer in a few words the questions how far the secession of the ten tribes was justifiable, and how far superior to the religion of Israel the religion of Judah was, when Rehoboam was king in Jerusalem. But the golden calves at Dan and Bethel were a prop to the northern monarchy, and, according to the mildest possible judgment, the presence of those calves was a standing temptation to idolatry, — all the more so, indeed, the less firmly established the supremacy and unique character of Jahve was in the minds of the people. With this starting-point, it is quite explicable that, from the frequent and violent change of dynasty; from the repeated, and, for considerable periods, uninterrupted exposure of Israel to the inroads of foreign habits and a foreign *cultus*; from the absorbing and centralizing influence of a great military establishment, rendered necessary to some degree by the position and alliances of an important state, but bringing its own multiform temptations, — it is quite explicable and natural that degeneration should have been more rapid and more radical in the northern kingdom, so that, while punishment came to them both, the punishment of the northern kingdom should have been the swifter and the more irrevocable. No king arose in Samaria to do what Hezekiah and Josiah did in Jerusalem and Judah. That they could do it proves the support of a considerable body of their subjects. That the crafty appeals of the Rabshak (2 Kings xviii. 22) had so little effect on the inhabitants of Jerusalem proves a certain degree of moral stamina in them; so one might enumerate tokens of a better condition among the people of the southern kingdom. And the event proves it. It was from the captivity of Judah that the exiles

returned and rebuilt Jerusalem and the temple, and lived their strict life in accordance with the divine commands. We should have good reason to doubt the moral and spiritual qualifications of the Chronicler for his task, if he did not show greater sympathy with Judah than with Israel. But it should be noticed that there is no gloating over the sins and the sufferings of the northern people. It is not the Chronicler who devotes half a chapter to a recital of their wrong-doings, in order to draw the lesson taught by their downfall. It is the author of 2 Kings xvii. And how easy it might be, by unguarded statements about the prejudice of the Chronicler against Israel, to give a very false notion of the case, appears still further from a passage like 2 Chr. xxviii. 1-8; this shows that the author was not so blinded by partisanship as, on the one hand, not to see the evil doings of the nation to which he belonged, and, on the other, not to acknowledge that the northern kingdom was used by God to chastise the southern. We are not now considering the question of absolute accuracy, and may, therefore, grant, if any one chooses, that this statement of the Chronicler is at variance with that of 2 Kings xvi. 5; a variation of such a sort certainly does not prove that the Chronicler is perverting history in the interests of Judah. The account in Kings is, on the face of it, more favorable to Judah than that in Chronicles is. The former does not name Ahaz' sin as the cause of the expedition made by Pekah (and Rezin) against Jerusalem, and does say, distinctly, that they could not overcome Ahaz. Chronicles affirms, specifically, that Ahaz was delivered into the hand of the king of Syria and the king of Israel; that there was great slaughter and a great multitude carried captive. This modification of the statement of Kings might, conceivably, be incorrect, but assuredly could not spring from a desire to glorify Judah at the expense of Israel.

A similar line of remark is in place when we are brought face to face with the fact that the Chronicler presents to us what is, undoubtedly, in its general impression, a different and more favorable picture of David than is furnished by the Books of Samuel and Kings. Impartial, analytic biography is not within the Chronicler's scope. But there are times and purposes for which such biography is not suited. With all David's faults and sins, there was a healthful spirituality within him which enabled him to repent, and was the subjective basis of a genuine communion with God. The earlier books of history show this. It is not in Chronicles, but in 1 Sam. xiii. 14, that David is called "a man after

God's own heart." 1 Chr. xvii. contains the glowing prophecy of Nathan, but it was already recorded in 2 Sam. vii. To lay stress on God's favor to David, and on the kingly qualities of the founder of the dynasty which was unbroken for more than four hundred years, is not necessarily to falsify history. Not only this, in the deepest sense it was true, according to the style of the Chronicler's thought, — representing everything in broad strokes, — to portray David in the essential lines of his character and life, rather than to qualify and offset the real current of his being by dwelling upon sins which were bitterly repented of and were forgiven.¹

It would be an interesting study in the history of the higher criticism to trace the phases of opinion in regard to the Chronicles, since Eichhorn² developed his elaborate theory of the documents used by the Chronicler, and especially since De Wette³ assailed so sharply both the Chronicler and Eichhorn, down to Wellhausen, De Wette's latest follower.⁴ But this is not possible within the present limits. The general conception of the Books of Chronicles underlying this article is as follows: That these books aim to give a history of the kingdom of Israel from the establishment of Jerusalem as its capital, and of the southern kingdom, after the division, with especial reference to the power of its religion, and to the men who were chiefly instrumental in promoting that religion; and, further, that the result is a work against whose value as documentary evidence of the events it relates, no sufficient grounds have been adduced.⁵ It is to this latter proposition that the following pages are devoted.

We must, however, make a careful distinction between the defense of the Chronicler as to these general features of his work, and a vindication of him in all the details of his narration. A book might be entirely right in its point of view, in its prepossessions and principles, and yet be defective or faulty in the descriptions and representations of separate facts. And the question in the present case is not simply whether there are or are not defects

¹ E. Böhl, *Zum Gesetz u. zum Zeugniß*, Vienna, 1883, brings forward, briefly, some of the considerations thus far adduced. This is one merit in a book characterized by very grave defects of argument and of temper.

² J. G. Eichhorn, *Einleitung in d. A. T.*, Leipz., 1780–83, 3^{te} Aufl. 1803; 4^{te} Aufl. 1824.

³ W. M. L. De Wette, *Beiträge zur Einleitung in d. A. T.*, Erstes Bändchen, *Kritischer Versuch über die Glaubwürdigkeit der Bücher der Chronik*, Halle, 1806.

⁴ J. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israel's*, Berlin, 1883.

⁵ E. Bertheau, *Die Bücher der Chronik*, 2^{te} Aufl. Leipzig, 1873, *Einleitung*.

and errors in the work, without regard to the occasion of them. The attitude of criticism toward it makes a double inquiry needful. (1.) Are there defects or errors proceeding from ignorance, inadvertence, or misunderstanding? (2.) Are there defects or errors proceeding from a modification of the facts, in the interest of certain prepossessions? It is the second question which is now to concern us. To combine the two is to involve one's self in needless embarrassments, and it is not necessary to admit the possibility of the state of things contemplated by the first question, in order to understand what is meant by this statement. De Wette acted shrewdly, and so does Wellhausen, in combining "lack of precision," "carelessness," etc., together with the charge of modifying facts, to suit the author's prepossessions, into one indictment. They have a great advantage when they can succeed in forcing their critics to accept this presentation of the case, as if both counts were of like importance. They are not so, from the point of view of historical criticism. A document may contain some erroneous statements, and yet, because written in good faith, and on the basis of valuable materials, be indispensable to the historian. It is very different with a document entirely composed under the warping influence of a theory. In regard to (1), it will be sufficient for our purpose to illustrate the difficulty of proving that there is perfect harmony between all the statements made in Chronicles and corresponding statements made in Samuel and Kings. Take, for example, the account of the collections for temple-repairs, in the time of Jehoash, 2 Chr. xxiv. 4-14, compared with the account of the same collection, 2 Kings xii. 4-15. It is instructive to look at these accounts side by side:—

2 Kings xii. 4 (*Heb.*, 5). And Jehoash said unto the priests, All the consecrated money which is brought into Jahve's house, current money, life-money of each man's rating, all money which it enters a man's heart to bring to Jahve's house, (*5. Heb.*, 6) let the priests take it to them, each from his acquaintance, and they, let them repair the decay of the house, according to all decay which shall be found there. (*6. Heb.*, 7.) And it came to pass, in the twenty-third year of king Jehoash the priests had not repaired

2 Chr. xxiv. 4. And it came to pass, after this, that Joash had it in mind to renew Jahve's house. (*5.*) And he assembled the priests and the Levites and said to them, Go out to the cities of Judah and collect of all Israel money to repair the house of your God every year, and ye, hasten ye the matter. But the Levites did not hasten (it). (*6.*) And the king called Jehoiada the chief, and said to him, Why hast thou not required of the Levites to bring out of Judah and out of Jerusalem the payment of Moses, Jah-

the decay of the house. (7. *Heb.*, 8.) And king Jehoiash called Jehoiada the priest, and the priests, and said unto them, Why do ye not repair the decay of the house? And now, do not receive money from your acquaintances, but for the decay of the house ye shall give it. (8. *Heb.*, 9.) And the priests agreed not to receive money from the people, and not to repair the decay of the house. (9. *Heb.*, 10.) And Jehoiada the priest took a chest and bored a hole in its lid, and set it beside the altar at the right as one goes into Jahve's house, and the priests, watchers of the threshold, put there all the money that was brought to Jahve's house. (10. *Heb.*, 11.) And it came to pass, when they saw that the money in the chest was much, that the king's secretary and the high priest went up and bound and counted the money which was found in Jahve's house. (11. *Heb.*, 12.) And they gave the money which was told, into the hand of the doers of the work, those overseeing Jahve's house, and they gave it out to the workers in wood and the builders, who were working on Jahve's house, (12. *Heb.*, 13.) and to the masons and the stone-cutters, and to buy wood and cut stone to repair the decay of Jahve's house, and for all which is spent upon the house for repair. (13. *Heb.*, 14.) Only there were not made for Jahve's house bowls of silver, snuffers, basins, trumpets, any vessel of gold and vessel of silver, out of the money which was brought to Jahve's house. (14. *Heb.*, 15.) But to the doers of the work they gave it, and repaired with it Jahve's house.

ve's servant, and of the assembly of Israel, for the tent of the law? (7.) For Athaliah the wicked, her sons, they had violated God's house, and also all the sacred things of Jahve's house they used for the Baalim. (8.) And the king ordered, and they made a chest and set it at the gate of Jahve's house outside. (9.) And they made a proclamation in Judah and in Jerusalem to bring to Jahve the payment of Moses, God's servant, (laid) upon Israel in the desert. (10.) And all the princes and all the people rejoiced, and brought, and cast into the chest until it was full. (11.) And it came to pass when they brought the chest to the overseer of the king, by the hand of the Levites, and when they saw that the money was much, that the king's secretary and the high priest's overseer came and emptied the chest, and lifted it and returned it to its place; so did they day by day, and they collected money in abundance. (12.) And the king and Jehoiada gave it to those doing the work of the service of Jahve's house, and they kept hiring masons and artisans to renew Jahve's house, and also for workers in iron and brass to repair Jahve's house. (13.) And the doers of the work wrought, and the restoration of the work went on in their hand, and they set God's house according to its measure, and strengthened it. (14.) And when they finished, they brought before the king and Jehoiada the rest of the money, and he had made of it vessels for Jahve's house, vessels for service and for offerings, and basins, and vessels of gold and of silver. And they kept offering

(15. *Heb.*, 16.) And they did not burnt-offerings in Jahve's house reckon with the men into whose continually, all the days of Jehoiada hand they gave the money to give to the doers of the work, for in faithfulness they did (it).

Besides unimportant variations in detail, there are considerable disagreements. Such a disagreement need not, indeed, be found in the fact that, according to Chronicles, there was a chest set "without, at the gate of the house of the Lord," while the account in Kings represents the chest as set "beside the altar on the right side as one cometh into the house of the Lord;" nor in the addition by the Chronicler of v. 7. But in v. 6 the Chronicler represents the king as astonished that the collection, particularly designated as that appointed by Moses (see Ex. xxx. 12 ff.), has not been made, v. 9 relates the proclamation summoning the people to come to Jerusalem to make this offering, and v. 10 their compliance. According to Kings, however, there was no such special collection, but a careful securing of the continual and occasional offerings made in the ordinary course of the community's life. More particularly still: 2 Chr. xxiv. 14 relates that the money that was left over was used in making vessels and utensils for the house of Jahve, while 2 Kings xii. 13 says, distinctly, "Howbeit, there were not made for the house of the Lord bowls of silver . . . any vessels of gold, or vessels of silver, of the money brought into the house of the Lord." What is now affirmed is not that these statements cannot in some way be reconciled, but that they are very difficult of reconciliation.

One more illustration will suffice. We find in Kings and Chronicles different accounts of the relations of Jehoshaphat with Ahaziah in maritime affairs:—

1 *Kings* xxii. 48 (*Heb.*, 49). Jehoshaphat made ships of Tarshish to go to Ophir for gold, but he did not go, for the ships were wrecked at Ezion Geber. (v. 49, *Heb.*, 50.) Then said Ahaziah son of Ahab to Jehoshaphat, let my servants go with thy servants in the ships, and Jehoshaphat did not consent.

2 *Chr.* xx. 35. And after this Jehoshaphat king of Judah joined himself with Ahaziah king of Israel; he did wickedly; (v. 36) and he joined himself with him to make ships to go to Tarshish, and they made ships at Ezion Geber. (v. 37.) And Eliezer son of Dodavahu of Maresha prophesied against Jehoshaphat, saying, For thy joining thyself with Ahaziah, Jahve hath broken thy work; and the ships were wrecked, and had not power to go to Tarshish.

The most obvious discrepancy is the statement of Chronicles that Jehoshaphat made an agreement with Ahaziah, over against the statement of Kings that he did not. Text corruption in Kings may perhaps explain this. But equally noteworthy, though intrinsically unimportant, is the statement of Chronicles that the ships were to go to Tarshish (*i. e.* Tartessus, in Spain) over against the statement of Kings that they were to go to Ophir, and in view of the agreement of the two as to Ezion Geber, on the Ælanitic Gulf, the eastern branch of the Red Sea. What are we to say when the criticism is made that ships going to Ophir would not pass near Tarshish, and *vice versa*, and that to sail from Ezion Geber to Tarshish would involve either a transport of the vessels across the Isthmus of Suez, or a voyage around the Cape of Good Hope; and that the Chronicler has mistaken "Ships of Tarshish," — *i. e.* Tarshish-ships, — vessels of a particular build, — for ships whose destination was Tarshish? Necho of Egypt was not yet alive, had not yet formed his plan of reopening the ancient "Suez" Canal, and the voyage round Africa which Egyptians and Greeks accomplished in his time (c. 600 B. C.) can hardly be postulated for the ninth century. We are not now concerned, let it be said again, to deny that there may be some reconciliation between these two accounts, but it is certainly difficult to establish their exact harmony. There is thus reason for preferring, in view of the more vital question before us, to waive for the present the matter of defects or errors resulting from ignorance or inadvertence.

In passing to this more vital question, it is necessary to touch, for a moment, upon the much discussed problem of the documentary sources from which the Chronicler drew. De Wette and Wellhausen agree, again, in undervaluing this question, and, indeed, if the Chronicler's documents, outside of the Books of Samuel and Kings, were all compiled under the same influences as those in the midst of which he himself lived, there is reason in their low estimate of its importance, when once the position is taken, that the Books of Samuel and Kings were his chief source of information.¹ But this position cannot be regarded as impregnable, and the assertion that any other sources he may have had were long subsequent to these books is incapable of proof.² Accordingly, while any detailed examination of this topic is beyond

¹ See especially Graf, *Die Geschichtlichen Bücher des Alten Testaments*, Leipzig, 1866.

² See Bertheau, *Die Bücher der Chronik*, Einleitung.

the scope of the present article, the entire possibility of sources of information as old as those of the Books of Samuel and Kings, and of large independence of these canonical books on the part of Chronicles, may be considered a postulate of the discussion. That these books, also, were known and used by him, is entirely likely.

What remains of the task proposed is to institute a comparison between the parallelisms of Chronicles and the Books of Samuel, with a view to determining the amount and kind of evidence thus attainable in regard to the degree to which the Chronicler seems to have been influenced by his prepossessions. Do these appear to warp his view of facts so as to make his writing worthless as a record of previous events?

The narrative of the Chronicler begins with 1 Chr. x., a parallel of 1 Sam. xxxi. The differences are nearly all verbal. Graf holds them to be unimportant, and Wellhausen passes them by altogether. There are, however, one or two details which are worth observing. Occurrences of a better text in Chronicles may indeed be disregarded, since no one of these bears on the main question. Non-essential for our purpose are such variations also, as "in the valley" for "on the side of the valley," etc. (v. 7), "gods" for "Ashtaroth" (v. 10), "Dagon" for "Beth-Shan" (v. 10), and the omission by Chronicles of "all night" (1 Sam. xxxi. 12). Nor can there be any significance in the omission by Chronicles of the words, "and they fastened his body to the wall of Beth-Shan" (1 Sam. xxxi. 10), since 1 Chr. x. 10 says they "fastened his head in the temple of Dagon." The Chronicler says, however (v. 6), that *all* Saul's house died, (כל-ביתו), while the corresponding verse in Samuel says "his armour-bearer and all his men" (נשא כליו וגם כל אנשיו). Neither statement is literally true, or consistent with other statements of the book in which it occurs. 1 Sam. xxviii. 4 tells us that "Saul gathered all Israel together in Gilboa. If, then, ch. xxxi. 1, 6, were to be taken literally, there would have been no soldiers left, which is contradicted by vv. 7, 11, 12, 2 Sam. ii. 8, 17, 25, etc. On the other hand, if 1 Chr. x. 6 is taken literally it contradicts ch. ix. 39, which names a fourth son of Saul. Neither statement, therefore, can be pressed. And that Chronicles dwells on the loss of the royal family rather than on the loss of the army is indeed according to the purpose of the book, but from that stand-point is entirely justifiable. It was more important to him. His phrase calls attention to the fact that obstacles to David's succession were removed, and it thus shows a desire to make a cer-

tain class of occurrences prominent. This, however, does not show either a desire or willingness to pervert facts. — It cannot be affirmed that the omission by Chronicles of the burning of the bodies of Saul and his sons was due to an aversion to the act on the part of the writer. There is, indeed, no evidence that the Hebrews had the habit of burning the dead, except what may be gathered from this verse of Samuel and from Amos vi. 10. Their prevailing custom was, it is true, to bury, and the later Rabbinical teaching was to the effect that it was idolatrous to burn the dead.¹

We do not know enough, however, about the view of the Chronicler's time to say that this was his conviction. What became of the bodies was of no consequence to him. The burning may well have been omitted as a non-essential detail.

But the verses which the Chronicler adds are the most important as bearing on our question (1 Chr. x. 13, 14): "So Saul died for his transgression which he committed against Jahve, because of the word of Jahve which he did not keep, and also for asking of a necromancer to inquire (of the dead). Yea, he did not inquire of Jahve, and so he slew him and turned over the kingdom to David, son of Jesse."

The apparent discrepancy between the words "he did not inquire of Jahve," and 1 Sam. xxviii. 6, "And when Saul inquired of the Lord, the Lord answered him not," we may mention in passing. It is of more consequence to inquire what is meant by "his transgression" (מַעַלָּוָת), in v. 13. By far the most likely reference is to Saul's disobedience in sparing the king of Amalek and the best of his flocks and herds (1 Sam. xv. cf. xxviii. 8), since the condemnation of him by Samuel is in that connection far more emphatic than elsewhere, and the chapter concludes with the words, "And Jahve repented that he had made Saul king-over Israel." Bertheau, however, thinks it possible to refer to 1 Sam. xiii. 9, 13, x. 8, which represent Saul as offering, instead of Samuel, and Samuel as condemning him for it in the name of the Lord. A reference to this occurrence is less likely, for the reason stated. If there is no such reference, then we have the Chronicler giving, apparently as the expression of his own judgment, the reasons for Saul's ruin, and omitting altogether the one offense which would appeal to his Levitical mind. If, however, there is here a reference to 1 Sam. xiii., then we have the hardly less noteworthy

¹ Mishna, Tract *'Abodah Zarah* (De Cultu Peregrino) Surenhusius, iv. p. 364: "Sed sapientes dicunt omnem pompam funebrem, cui adjungitur combustio sive consecratio, eam involvere cultum idololatricum."

fact that the Chronicler takes no pains whatever to call special attention to this disobedient sacrilege, but is much more explicit in regard to the consulting of the dead. There is certainly no indication here of a desire to magnify the Levitical law, or even the Deuteronomic law. If the Chronicler were perverting history in the interest of a theory, it is difficult to see why he should omit one of the most convincing evidences of his theory.

2 Sam. i.-iv., the chapters immediately following the account of Saul's death, have no parallel in Chronicles. The inquiry is a fair one, whether this is probably owing to a wish on the part of the Chronicler to glorify David. This can hardly be claimed in regard to the narrative of 2 Sam. i., which displays David's piety and magnanimity, and includes the lament over Saul and Jonathan; this would naturally be of interest to the Chronicler by reason of his zeal for music, and his conception of David as the royal singer. (See *e. g.* 1 Chr. xvi.) To suppose that the Chronicler refuses to represent David as lamenting over the death of those whom God had judged, is to attribute a vindictiveness to him which nothing in his book justifies. But any explanation of the absence in Chronicles of 2 Sam. ii.-iv. which does not explain the absence of chapter i. is inadequate, and any explanation of the former which would naturally conflict with the latter is to be rejected. Chapter ii. contains the account of the anointing of David as king over the house of Judah, and the rival kingship of Ishbosheth, under Abner's leadership, in Ephraim and Benjamin. Chapter iii., after summarily stating the relations between these two powers, gives a list of six sons of David, born to him in Hebron, and then describes the defection of Abner from Ishbosheth and the murder of him by Joab. Chapter iv. relates the final dissolution of Ishbosheth's power, his assassination, and David's punishment of his murderers. If we had simply the omission of these three chapters to explain, it might be possible to say that there was a disposition on the Chronicler's part to suppress such facts as could cast a shadow of doubt over David's natural, lawful succession, though even then, in view of the previously expressed will of Jahve, which the Chronicler is entirely aware of (1 Chr. x. 14; xi. 2, 3), it is difficult to see how the overcoming of a rival claimant could present itself in any other light than as a magnifying of Jahve's power and David's prestige. But even if this be left out of sight, there would be still no explanation of the omission of the facts of 2 Sam. i. It is, therefore, more probable that the whole section is left out by the Chronicler because his ob-

ject is to present the history under its religious and ecclesiastical aspects, and these are not defined in the section omitted. This object, however, is entirely legitimate. It should be observed that the Chronicler by no means ignores the fact that David was king before he was anointed king over all Israel (1 Chr. xi. 3). The title applied to him, "the king," in this very verse, before the anointing is mentioned, points to a previous right to the appellation; ch. xxix. 27 expressly speaks of his seven years' reign in Hebron. Incidents are related in ch. xii., too (which has no parallel in Samuel), referring quite plainly to the period of uncertainty as to his position.

1 Chr. xi. 1-3 is quite parallel with 2 Sam. v. 1-3. They describe the establishment of David as king over the entire nation. It is curious to observe, although, of course, no great stress should be laid upon it, that, while the charge has been made against the Chronicler of emphasizing the tribal divisions of Israel beyond the historical reality, it is not Chronicles, but Samuel, that here uses the word שָׁמַיִם. The Chronicler adds to v. 4 the clause, "According to the word of the Lord by Samuel," plainly showing for himself and presupposing for his readers an acquaintance with the canonical book containing that word (1 Sam. xiii. 14; xv. 28; xvi. 1, 13), or some other good documentary source. The verses which follow in Samuel do not appear here in Chronicles, but, as already remarked, in 1 Chr. xxix. 27, where there is a slight, non-essential modification. 1 Chr. xi. 4-9 agrees in the main with 2 Sam. v. 6-10 in giving the account of David's occupation of Jerusalem, which the Chronicler calls Jebus (cf. Jud. xix. 10, 11); v. 4, which contains this name, and is, therefore, more precise, probably shows a better text than the corresponding clauses of Samuel; v. 5 omits the latter half of 2 Sam. v. 6, a difficult passage, but with no conceivable bearing on the Chronicler's purpose; v. 6 gives Joab a prominence which he has not in the other account, and omits (like v. 5) the allusion to "the lame and the blind"; v. 8 adds the mention of Joab's repairs to "the rest of the city," which, whatever it refers to, can have no connection with any dogmatic theory. Neither David nor the Levitical *cultus* is glorified by the prominence here assigned to Joab.

1 Chr. xi. 10-47 repeats, with many variations of detail, what was published earlier in 2 Sam. xxiii. 8-39. None of these variations point to a warping of facts in behalf of a theory. No sober critic can suppose that the addition of fifteen or sixteen names to the list of David's mighty men, nor the variations in the

other names, is for undue glorification of David, and it is well to observe that amid the prevalence of large numbers in Chr., v. 11 of this chapter contains "three hundred," over against the "eight hundred" of 2 Sam. xxiii. 8.

It has been already noticed that ch. xii. has no parallel in Samuel. There are distinct evidences of genuine history in it, such as the meeting between David and the children of Judah and Benjamin; the words of David; the words of Amasai, in response; the mention of the men of Manasseh as having joined David before, at the time referred to in 1 Sam. xxix. It is not necessary to our purpose to stop to show that the numbers given are not exaggerated, or that the difficulties which lay in David's path are not overlooked. There is nothing to indicate that the author is not making an honest use of such facts as are suited to his plan.

2 Sam. vi. describes the removal of the ark from Kirjath Jearim to the house of Obed Edom, and thence, after three months, to Jerusalem. The same events are described in 1 Chr. xiii. and xv. The interruption of the narrative by the insertion of ch. xiv. may be properly considered by itself. The first stage of the ceremony, the removal from Kirjath Jearim to the house of Obed Edom, is related in the two accounts with comparatively little variation. Verses 1-4 of Chr. give more details, and mention particularly "priests and Levites," of whom we hear nothing in Samuel. Both accounts, however, show us that the procession was one in which the entire people took part. (Chronicles is more explicit, but see, also, 2 Sam. vi. 1, 2, 5, cf. 15, 19.) It would be a remarkable thing if Levites had not been there, and especially remarkable if, at a religious celebration such as this, there had been no priests. Whether the distinction was then sharply drawn between priest and Levite is another matter, nor, in spite of what critics may say, can this be regarded as the essential matter.¹ Neither can any principle of historical criticism lead us to question the documentary worth of the Chronicles, because its narrative contains such an addition as v. 3, pointing to a late period for its issue, or because of the added v. 4, or because of the verbal differences and amplifications which appear in vv. 5, 6, or because the names of the musical instruments

¹ It may be well to insist here on the wide and deep distinction between the non-observance of a law and its non-existence. If there is good evidence that the priests were not distinguished from the other Levites in *practice* in the pre-exilic period, we may accept it without impairing the force of the other evidence in favor of the existence of the Levitical law (not fully observed) in the same period.

(v. 8) do not exactly coincide with those of Samuel, or because the name "Chidon" appears for that of "Nachon" (v. 9), or because Uzza (v. 9) is not said to touch the ark, or even because of the probable translation of v. 14: "And the ark of God remained by the house of Obed Edom in its house," over against 2 Sam. vi. 11: "And the ark of Jahve remained in the house of Obed Edom." Some of these details may indicate the post-exilic stand-point, but they do not therefore vitiate the historical statements of the book as a whole.

There is more difficulty when we come to ch. xv. That the natural connection is broken by the insertion of ch. xiv. is a minor point, and so is the omission of David's relief at learning how Obed Edom's house was blessed by the presence of the ark; that David prepared in Jerusalem a tent for its reception (v. 1) we know also from 2 Sam. vi. 17. But it occasions surprise to find that David now, for the first time, awakes to the propriety of the Levites' carrying the ark, and that he attributes the death of Uzza to the neglect of this requirement (vv. 2, 12, 13). Before we conclude, however, that this account is wholly untrustworthy, let us observe that 2 Sam. vi. 13 also speaks of the ark's being carried by men, though it gives no explanation. Now it is easy to say that this casual statement lies at the bottom of the Chronicler's account, and that he is merely interpreting it according to his ideas of what must have been; but even supposing, for the moment, that he has given too formal and precisely regulated a character to the ceremony, is there anything more likely than that Levites should have been selected to carry this most sacred of objects? And is not the *à priori* likelihood of this choice of bearers tenfold increased by the fact that the touch of a common man had resulted in his death? If we add to these intrinsic probabilities the elaborateness with which the Chronicler recounts the names of the Levites, priests, and singers, and the extreme difficulty of imagining that such lists are pure matters of invention, it is most natural to suppose that even if in some details he has given touches of his own, the main facts depend upon some credible authority. The statements about the sacrifices (v. 26, cf. 2 Sam. vi. 13; 1 Chr. xvi. 1, cf. 2 Sam. vi. 18) do not quite agree in form. In Samuel the verbs are singular, and David is the subject; in Chronicles they are plural, and the subject is indefinite. It is possible to say that the Chronicler has changed the statement because it was contrary to the Levitical law for David to offer, but quite as possible that the earlier narrative meant only

that David had sacrifices offered, and that the Chronicler changes the definite singular to the indefinite plural simply to make it evident that it was not done by David in his own person. At all events, it is difficult to see how the Chronicler can be supposed to be falsifying in the interests of his theory of the priesthood, when he (v. 27.) without hesitation employs a statement precisely similar to that of 2 Sam. vi. 14, in regard to David's dress: "And upon David was an ephod of linen,"¹ for this was a priestly garment (1 Sam. xxii. 18). It has been supposed that the omission of Michal's words to David grew out of the Chronicler's exaggerated respect for the king. In fact, however, if his object was to glorify David at the expense of the truth, he has thrown away a fine opportunity. The object would be far better attained by giving 2 Sam. vi. 20^b-23 entire, and thus showing the harmful consequences, to the woman herself, of her mockery. The omission of this may conceivably destroy the point of the incident, but that is quite different from warping history with a purpose.

A word now in regard to ch. xiv. (= 2 Sam. v. 11-25) and its position in the book. We may readily admit that the events here described cannot well have taken place in the three months that seem to be allotted to them. But we need not condemn the book on this account. That some part of them occurred in this period can hardly be disproved. But even if this is not likely, there is no impeachment of the historical worth of a writing because in it a natural pause in the narrative is employed, either to anticipate what actually occurred later, or to introduce previous events which were omitted in their chronological order.² It is this latter case that we apparently have before us. And if it be said, Yes, but the motive of omitting this account before was to make the affair with Hiram and the conflict with the Philistines of secondary consequence!—the reply is, that if this be so, it only puts things into their right relations with one another. The bringing of the ark to Jerusalem, with all that this involved for the religious life and the permanent advantage of the people, was of far greater consequence than the erection of a palace for David, or even than victory over the Philistines at this particular time. The author shows here, on this supposition, not untrustworthiness, but true insight.

¹ If the present text of 1 Chr. xv. 27^a is correct, we should have a further fact of note in the express agreement of David's attire with that of the Levites in the procession. But the correctness of the text is open to grave doubt.

² The structure of the gospels ought to save us from finding any difficulty here.

There are some not uninteresting details in this chapter, but we may now pass them by, to gain time for matters of more consequence. 1 Chr. xvi. 4-42 has no parallel in Samuel. Verse 4 tells us that David appointed some of the Levites to minister before the ark, etc., which has great intrinsic probability. The greater part of the chapter is occupied with the text of David's song of thanksgiving. There is every reason to suppose that such an outburst would follow upon the final establishment of the ark of God within the walls of the city which it rendered sacred, although it appears that the song here given is compiled from several psalms found in our Psalter; *i. e.* vv. 8-22 = Ps. cv. 1-15; vv. 23-33 = Ps. xcvi; v. 34 = Ps. cvi. 1, etc.; vv. 35, 36 = Ps. cvi. 47, 48. There are many verbal modifications, but none upon which we need dwell.

Perhaps no statement in the book is more difficult to understand than that of xvi. 39 — "the tabernacle of Jahve upon the bamah which was in Gibeon," in immediate connection with which we have the mention of the "altar of the burnt-offering," and of an observance of Jahve's law by offering upon it morning and evening (v. 40). If the tabernacle was still in existence, why had not the ark been kept in it? Why was it placed in Gibeon without the ark? What was there to make it holy, if it was empty of the most sacred object it had ever contained? Why was it not brought to Jerusalem to be the house for the ark there? It is not possible to give certain answers to all these questions. But when it is said that the Chronicler has invented this, or followed an invented story, to account for the fact that Solomon offered sacrifice there (1 Kings iii. 4, cf. 2 Chr. i. 2-6), the proof is not so easy. The whole question cannot be discussed without examining the passages which have to do with Solomon, and this our present limits do not allow; some considerations bearing on the problem will be offered in connection with 1 Chr. xxi. (See below.)

1 Chr. xvii.-xix. are parallel with 2 Sam. vii.-x. except that 2 Sam. ix. is omitted. This would have been a fresh evidence for the Chronicler of David's magnanimity, but is probably left out as not pertinent to the main topic. In ch. xvii. there is agreement with 2 Sam. vii. except in the omission of the possible unworthiness of David's seed and the discipline which would follow. That this should be an omission for the sake of a theory seems not easy to suppose, in view of the subsequent history of Judah. The variations between chs. xviii. and xix. and the corresponding ones

of Samuel, while they affect a good many details, do not bear upon our immediate purpose.

1 Chr. xx. 1-3 correspond to 2 Sam. xi. 1; xii. 29-31; but the long intervening account does not appear. It is the painful story of Uriah and Bathsheba. That the connection of incidents is obscured by this omission is evident. That a special motive led to the omission is probable. But that this motive was one to induce the author to invent narratives of unreal events does not follow. Nor, however much such an omission may conflict with our conception of a historian's task, have we any right, in view of the considerations offered on an earlier page, to blame the Chronicler for omitting reference to a terrible, but a forgiven, sin. Variations in the details of the events common to both narrators need not here detain us.

That 2 Sam. xiv.-xxi. 17 have no place in Chronicles is sufficiently accounted for by the author's general scheme.

1 Chr. xx. 4-8 corresponds to 2 Sam. xxi. 18-22. That v. 5 speaks of Lachmi, brother of Goliath, while v. 19 of Samuel speaks of Goliath himself is unimportant. There is dispute in regard to the text, but the matter, however decided, has no bearing on our present line of inquiry.

2 Sam. xxii.-xxiii. 7 have no parallel in Chronicles. The verses contain two songs of David, which can hardly have been omitted for any dogmatic reason, and we need not inquire further.

1 Chr. xxi. 1-27 is a parallel of 2 Sam. xxiv., and relates the numbering of Israel, the resulting punishment, and the sacrifice on Araunah's (Ornan's) threshing-floor. Here, as before, we can dwell only on the chief points. The mention of Satan instead of Jahve, v. 1, shows only that the doctrine of the Jews in regard to this personality was developed to the extent of making Satan an arch-tempter. This brings the doctrine nearer to that of the New Testament than any other statement of the Old.¹ Verse 4 summarizes vv. 5-8 of Samuel. The numbers of v. 5 (1,100,000 Israelites and 470,000 of Judah) do not differ in such a way from those of Samuel (800,000 and 500,000) as to indicate that they are less trustworthy. Verse 6 says that Levi and Benjamin were not included in the numbering, and it is wholly arbitrary to suppose that this was not true. The latter clause of v. 6 is difficult, if translated according to the A. V.,—though even then it cannot be a perversion of facts to honor David, or for any other intelli-

¹ It has been remarked by others that the absence of the article with שטן, in this passage marks the advance from the השטן of Job and Zachariah.

gible theory, — but Bertheau's translation (*Chronik*) is preferable: "For an abomination became the word of David with Joab" (*i. e.* David's command to Joab already brought signs of God's displeasure. Hence the numbering was not completed). The description of the destroying angel's work differs in some particulars from that of Samuel, but the details are not irreconcilable, and are at most indicative only of a more developed angelology. The descent of fire from heaven "upon the altar of burnt-offering" (v. 26 of 2 Sam. xxiv. 25) may, for our present inquiry, be either true or not true. It cannot be seriously thought to indicate a special fondness for miracle on the Chronicler's part, in view of the occurrence of similar statements in the older histories.

Verses 28–30 do not appear in Samuel, and, taken together with 1 Chr. xxii. 1 ff. point to a connection between this sacrifice and the location of the temple which is significant, and explains to us the reason for the details of the purchase of the threshing-floor and the emphasis upon the sacrifice itself. Verses 29, 30, however, make a further reference to the tabernacle at Gibeon. We are not in a position to deny the correctness of the statement that it was there. The statement does not contradict 1 Kings iii. 4. And it is not easy to see how any writer under the influence of the Levitical law and not true to his sources of information should have been contented to represent the ark as thus separated from the tabernacle, and the regular sacrifices as all offered where the ark was not. As already remarked, however, to discuss this matter fully, would take us into the Book of Kings, which we cannot now enter upon.¹

Our hurried survey is now at an end. It is not supposed that students of the Bible will rest contented with so brief and so incomplete a sketch. The object will have been fully attained if the items now to be recapitulated have been fairly made out:—

1. That the Chronicler should have his particular stand-point is not to his discredit.
2. The point, or points, of view which he is actually thought to have had are natural and justifiable.
3. The question whether he has warped facts to favor his theory should be distinguished from the question whether he has made any mistakes.

4. As far as appears from a comparison of those parts of the Books of Chronicles and Samuel which run parallel to each other,

¹ The same remark applies to a consideration of 1 Chr. xxii. 8, compared with xvii. 4 ff., 2 Sam. vii. 5 ff., on the one hand, and on the other with 1 Kings v. 3.

there is no sufficient ground to charge the Chronicler with such warping of facts.

Hence it is entirely wrong to deny to the books of Chronicles a genuine and great value for the history of the times of which they treat.

Francis Brown.

II.

BISHOP BRYENNIOΣ' "TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES."¹

THROUGH the kindness of Professor J. H. Thayer, D. D., in apprising us of the arrival in this country of an advance copy of Bishop Bryennios' new volume, and by the favor of Dr. Ezra Abbot of Cambridge, who has placed this copy at our service, we are able to give our readers an early account of it, accompanied by a translation of the exceedingly interesting and important document to which it is mainly devoted. For this translation we are indebted to Rev. C. C. Starbuck.

The editor of the work before us is a very accomplished scholar. In earlier years he acquired the English language, and was also a student in one or more of the German universities. He was present in at least one of the Bonn Conferences of Old Catholics, and in various ways has maintained connection with western men and western thought. In 1875 he published a volume which contained a brief account of a manuscript discovered by him in the Library of the Most Holy Sepulchre in Phanar, that is, the Greek quarter of Constantinople, and a new and complete text, derived from this codex, of the First and Second Epistles of Clement to the Corinthians, with elaborate prolegomena and notes. The discovery was greeted with great enthusiasm on account of its intrinsic importance, its indication of a revival of scholarship in the Greek

¹ ΔΙΔΑΧΗ ΤΩΝ ΔΩΔΕΚΑ ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΩΝ ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροσολυμιτικοῦ χειρογράφου νῦν πρῶτον ἐκδιδόμενη μετὰ προλεγομένων καὶ σημειώσεων, ἐν οἷς καὶ τῆς Συνόψεως τῆς Π. Δ., τῆς ὑπὸ Ἰωάνν. τοῦ Χρυσοστόμου, σύγκρισις καὶ μέρος ἀνέκδοτον ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειρογράφου, ὑπὸ ΦΙΛΟΘΕΟΥ ΒΡΥΕΝΝΙΟΥ, μητροπολίτου Νικομηδείας.

"Οὐδὲ μὴν διὰ τὸν λέγοντα προκαταγνωστέον ἀμαθῶς καὶ τῶν λεγομένων, . . . ἀλλὰ τὰ λεγόμενα σκοπητέον, εἰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἔχεται." (ΚΑΗΜ. ΑΛΕΞ. Στρώμ. λόγ. 5', σελ. 647.)

Ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει, 1883, τύποις Σ. Τ. Βούτουρα. [Σελ. 8, ρμθ', 75. Τιμᾶται φράγκων 5.]

[TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES, from the Jerusalem manuscript, now published for the first time, with prolegomena and notes, together with a collation and unpublished part of the Synopsis of the O. T. by John Chrysostom, from the same manuscript, by PHILOTHEOS BRYENNIOΣ, Metropolitan of Nicomedia.

"What is said must not be decided against ignorantly on account of him who says it, . . . but it must be looked at to see if it keep by the truth." (Clem. Alex., Strom., lib. vi, p. 647.)

Constantinople, S. T. Boutoura, 1883. [Pp. 8, 149, 75. 5 francs.]

Church, and as an omen of possibly even better things to come. The Library where the treasure was found is in a monastery belonging to the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. It has not been closed to scholars in search of manuscripts. That in a place thus frequented a codex of such importance should be so lately discovered excited at once, to use the language of Bishop Lightfoot, "a hope of future discoveries in the domain of early Christian literature . . . in which the most sanguine would not have ventured to indulge before." Scholars noticed with pleasure also Bryennios' announcement of a purpose speedily to publish from the same manuscript a new text of the Epistle of Barnabas, and of the longer recension of the Ignatian Epistles, and some may have wondered what might possibly be hidden under the words "Διδαχὴν τῶν δώδεκα Ἀποστόλων, φύλλ. 76 α μέσον—80," which the discoverer printed in a table of contents of the codex. But fewer still, if any, have anticipated the result which is now assured. The learned editor, we trust, will still be able to fulfill his purpose respecting the Epistles of Barnabas and Ignatius, but no one will regret that he has turned aside from this work and devoted seven or eight years to the task of reproducing with worthy erudition what proves to be a document of unique and superior value for the history of the Church in a period at once the most obscure and the most eagerly scanned of any in its history since the first creative age.¹

The codex in which the "Teaching" stands is described by Bryennios in his edition of Clement. It is a parchment folio, containing 120 leaves of small octavo size (19 centim. in length, 15 in breadth). The writer signs himself "Leon, notary and sinner," and states that he completed his work in the month of June, 6564, — that is, A. D. 1056. The "Teaching" follows Second Clement, and precedes the Epistle of Mary of Cassobelæ and twelve letters of Ignatius.

In the Introduction to the volume before us the editor discusses the general significance of the "Teaching;" its author; for whom it was written; against whom, and when; its identity with the "Teaching" referred to by the early ecclesiastical writers; the many sagacious auguries of modern criticism; the relation of the "Teaching" to the "Apostolic Constitutions" and to the "Epitome of the Canons of the Holy Apostles;" its authority and sources.

¹ Bishop Bryennios has generously furnished the various readings of MS. C to Bishop Lightfoot for his promised edition of Ignatius, to Professor Funk for his edition of the same (*Op. PP. Ap.* II., 1881), and to Hilgenfeld for his second edition of Barnabas (1877). Besides the matter specified on the title-page the volume before us contains a noteworthy list, from the MS., of O. T. Scriptures, and fifteen pages upon the Epp. of Clement and the Ep. of Barnabas.

It is impossible within the space and time at our command to follow our erudite guide into the details of this discussion, but we will endeavor to indicate its method and more important conclusions, and to offer a few suggestions which may be of service to those of our readers who are not familiar with the ground it covers.

The work bears two titles. The first appears to be an abridgment of the second and from another hand. Even the second refers not to the whole book, but to the first six chapters. The writer does not intend to represent the Lord as teaching directly, for He is repeatedly spoken of in the third person. Nor the Apostles. For it is one and the same person throughout who speaks, as is indicated by the oft-recurring phrase, "my child." Nor is there any claim or hint that the writer is himself one of the Apostles. No name of real or reputed author is given. The "Teaching" stands in this respect in marked contrast with the "Epitome" and the "Constitutions," which love to parade the Apostles as speaking in person. It refers its injunctions to the Lord and his Apostles, but with a beautiful simplicity foreign to other works of its class. There are not a few indications that the author was a Jewish convert, but however this may be he is evidently a Christian in piety and citizenship, simple and unlearned, knowing nothing beyond the Scriptures and the sacred tradition of the Apostles, from which he prepared this book that the simple might be apprised of the true Apostolic teaching and flee from those who would lead them astray.

The "Teaching" is written for catechumens, — principally Jewish converts, — who were to be taught and learn the first six chapters before baptism that they might know to what life they were called, and how they should live in the world as disciples of Christ. It is specially noteworthy that the "Teaching" does not address itself directly to persons exercising liturgical and didactic functions, but only obliquely and without any appearance of instructing them.

Against what errors and deceivers is the "Teaching" directed, and when was it written? It is not to be supposed that it has no reference to its own time. In answering this question Bryennios quotes at length from the account given by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. iii. 4) of certain early Antinomians, also from utterances of writers of the second century against the Montanists; but finally concludes that the allusions in the "Teaching" to false prophets, and other errorists are too indeterminate to require any more developed tendencies than meet us prior to the outbreak of Montanism.

Unlike those who combated the Antitactæ and the Montanists, the author of the "Teaching" mentions no names of any he may be opposing, and enters into no controversy with them, but is satisfied with setting forth with great simplicity the teaching and tradition of the Lord and his Apostles. From these indications Bryennios infers that the "Teaching" was composed between A. D. 120 and 160. "Moreover," he adds, "in diction and style and cast of thought the "Teaching" seems rather to be like the simplicity of the Apostolic Fathers, and nothing occurs in it suggestive of a later date."

Evidence is next adduced to show that the newly discovered "Teaching" is the work mentioned by ancient ecclesiastical writers. Eusebius mentions, with the Epistle of Barnabas, a book called the "Teachings of the Apostles." Athanasius enumerates among works "not included in the Canon but appointed by the Fathers to be read by those who are now coming and wish to be instructed (*κατηχεῖσθαι*) in the doctrine of piety" a work "called 'Teaching of the Apostles.'" Nicephorus of Constantinople not only gives the same title, but mentions 200 as the number of lines in the manuscript. The work in hand contains 203. Thus in title, purpose, and size it corresponds to these ancient testimonies.

Eusebius, in putting it among the *νόθα*, or spurious books, implies that it had been regarded by some as genuine and inspired, and it evidently was so esteemed by the learned and laborious Clement of Alexandria, who quotes from it as Scripture.¹

Eusebius says "Teachings," and Athanasius "Teaching." But this variation is unimportant. Epiphanius uses indifferently the singular or plural form in speaking of the "Constitutions." Bryennios thinks that Rufinus also refers to the "Teaching" in an allusion which has lately been supposed to refer to the "Epitome."

In passing to the relations of the newly discovered work to the "Apostolic Constitutions," Bryennios pays a deserved tribute to modern criticism. It has divined many things now assured by his discovery. Particularly it has discerned that the seventh book was a distinct work before it was combined with the rest, and Bickell conjectured that its compiler and the author of the "Duæ Viæ," or "Epitome" (discovered in modern times, and much resembling the seventh book of the Constitutions), both had before

¹ Strom. I. 24 : "οὗτος . . . κλέπτης ὑπὸ τῆς Γραφῆς εἶρηται. φησὶ γοῦν· 'Υιέ, μὴ γίνου ψεύστης· ὁδηγεῖ γὰρ τὸ ψεῦσμα πρὸς τὴν κλοπὴν.'" ("Such an one is called a thief by Scripture. It says, therefore, 'Son be not found a liar, for the lie shows the way to the theft.'") Cf. the "Teaching," ch. iv.

them a third document which they used as a source. This supposition is now verified.

We have not space, nor is it necessary, to follow our author into his comparison of the "Teaching" with the seventh book of the "Constitutions." The case is perfectly plain. It is easy to see at a glance just how the fabricator went to work.

From this point Bryennios advances to a conclusion which reverses the generally accepted theory of the relation of the seventh book to the preceding six. It has been supposed that the former is of later date than the latter, and is an abridgment of them. Bryennios argues, on the basis of a careful comparison of the two parts, that the reverse is true in both particulars. The redactor first wrote the seventh book on the basis of the "Teaching," and then composed, by expansion, the preceding six, and finally added the eighth. The whole proceeds from the "Teaching," which is followed closely in many passages, and is the "type and example and prototype, so to say, of the 'Constitutions.'" The work is done smoothly and fluently, but with superfluous and annoying repetitions, of which the compiler shows himself to be conscious, alleging that reiterated admonition may lead some for shame to give heed. The materials for enlargement are derived from the Scriptures, the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, and, as Drey thinks, from an ancient liturgical book from some part of the East. In point of antiquity the seventh and the eighth books appear to excel, so that we might be tempted to say there were three authors. In reality, however, the whole has been brought into its present shape by one writer. This author Bryennios regards as from the East, a contemporary of the Arian heresy, between which and the orthodox he shows a disposition to mediate by using everywhere the theology of the older writers respecting the Son. For this reason the decision of the Trullan or sixth Ecumenical Council, rejecting the "Constitutions," appears the more just, and it is confirmed by the judgment of the patriarch Photius.

Bryennios thinks that his theory will find universal acceptance. It is certainly a brilliant and masterly generalization, and will command at once the attention of scholars. Difficulties suggest themselves which, so far as we have observed, he does not notice. But whether they are insuperable or not can only be determined by an examination not possible in the brief time in which the "Teaching" has been in our hands.

After considering the relation of the "Teaching" to the "Epitome,"—which he thinks was composed by way of amusement sub-

sequently to the "Constitutions," — and the authority given to it by various early ecclesiastical writers, the editor notices quite too cursorily its sources, particularly the "Epistle of Barnabas," and the "Shepherd," and concludes with a synopsis of its contents. We may be permitted here not only to congratulate him upon his happy discovery, but to thank him for the labor he has expended in making it available to others. He has edited it with an accuracy, thoroughness, and clearness which will command the highest respect. His subject is a difficult one, but he has mastered it.

"Cui lecta potenter erit res,
Nec facundia deseret hunc, nec lucidus ordo."

It remains for us within the space available and under the limitations of a too brief opportunity of examining so weighty a document, to answer as we may some of the more important questions it suggests, and to point out in certain relations the special value of its testimony.

1. When was the "Teaching" written? We see no reason for questioning the date assigned by Bryennios. All the evidence, and it is not slight, points unmistakably to a time anterior to the outbreak of Montanism and the appearance of the great leaders of Gnosticism. The document belongs to the literature of the Sub-Apostolic Church, and may have been written in either of the first decades of the second century.¹

¹ The relation of the "Teaching" to the "Shepherd" of Hermas and the "Epistle of Barnabas" deserves a more careful investigation than it receives in the volume we have been reviewing. If, as seems probable, it shows a use of the "Shepherd" this will do much to strengthen the position of Zahn, Schaff, and others who assign to this work a date within the Apostolic age. The use of materials which appear in Barnabas is undeniable. But it is chiefly confined to chapters which are not given in the old Latin version, and which are seriously disputed as interpolated, though the later criticism has offered a tolerably successful vindication of their genuineness. The coincidence between this part of the "Epistle" and the "Teaching" is very extensive, including not only many words and phrases but successions of sentences. The arrangement, however, of precepts and prohibitions is for the most part very dissimilar, especially in the account of the "way of life." This will be readily seen by the following table, which gives the order of thirty-nine parallelisms from "the way of life" as set forth in the two works: —

T.	B.	T.	B.	T.	B.	T.	B.	T.	B.	T.	B.
1	1	8	20	15	5	22	37	29	33	36	4
2	16	9	14	16	7	23	35	30	26	37	34
3	32	10	23	17	21	24	11	31	19	38	38
4	9	11	6	18	22	25	15	32	25	39	39
5	8	12	17	19	28	26	27	33	24		
6	10	13	12	20	29	27	30	34	3		
7	18	14	13	21	36	28	31	35	2		

2. The early date of this document imparts special value to its use of Scripture. This is in perfect accord with that familiar to students of the Apostolic Fathers. The gospel is referred to in the singular number, and is invested with divine authority. Two of our Gospels, Matthew and Luke, are freely used. Chapter iv. shows a reminiscence of Acts iv. 32, and the Eucharistic prayer, in its appropriation of the word *πάις* (servant), as applied to David and Jesus, reminds us of a similar use in the prayer recorded in Acts iv. 22-30, as well as in the prophecy of Zacharias. There is an interesting coincidence with 1 Thess. v. 22, in the opening of chapter iii.: "Flee from every evil thing, and from everything the like thereof," and a specially important one with Ephes. vi. 5, 9, in ch. iv. 1 Pet. ii. 11, and Tit. ii. 12, may possibly be combined in the precept, "Abstain from fleshly and worldly lusts."

The order in Barnabas is very obscure and confused; in the "Teaching" it is natural, logical, easily intelligible. It is not supposable that even an unskillful writer would throw the beautiful arrangement in the "Teaching" into such hopeless anarchy if he had it before him while composing. It is supposable that an author guided by a definite, didactic purpose and of clear head might rearrange the materials given confusedly in Barnabas. And yet when we attempt to realize this process, and think of the author of the "Teaching" as employing it, we are in difficulty. The method seems too mechanical to comport with the freshness, spontaneousness, movement, and ease apparent in the result. Criticism, moreover, has been embarrassed in maintaining the integrity of Barnabas by the peculiarities of diction and style in the chapters whose contents correspond with portions of the "Teaching," and has found support in the use of a chapter not thus corresponding but which is closely connected. All the phenomena are accounted for by supposing that both writers wrote near each other and used common materials, which were taking shape in the rapidly developing catechetical and missionary work of the Church, each arranging and expanding them according to his purpose and ability. The scheme of "the two ways" is not original to either. We are reminded of the classic story of Prodicus in the "Memorabilia," and still more of familiar passages in the law and the prophets, and in the Gospel of Matthew. (Jer. xxi. 8; Deut. xxx. 15-19; Ps. i. 6; Matt. vii. 13, 14; 2 Pet. ii. 15.) Bryennios refers also to similar representations in "Baruch," the "Shepherd," the "Clementines," and the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs." It looks as though a conception so readily adapted to didactic purposes early gathered about it appropriate materials, which were worked up on the basis of the Decalogue, and, where the Christian spirit prevailed, by a free use of the Sermon on the Mount and other preceptive instruction both oral and written. The number of coincidences between "Barnabas" and the "Teaching" is very great, and the latter seems to have used the former. But we doubt whether the dependence is so pure and simple as might at first sight be thought. In any event the "Teaching" may have been written soon after the Epistle. If this was written, as seems probable, before the close of the first century, the "Teaching" need not be regarded as later than the opening decades of the second. Matthew's Gospel is cited in Barnabas.

At the same time there is the same amount of variation in the use of Scripture, with consequent uncertainty as to the exact source, which stamps the literature of the early period in which we believe that the "Teaching" was composed. The use of the Old Testament and its Apocrypha we have not room to notice. One passage is cited, apparently with the respect due to a writing deemed authoritative, which cannot be traced to any Scripture or other known work. Here, too, we are reminded of the early Christian authors.

3. General authority and value of the "Teaching." It has no religious authority in the strict sense of the word. Clement refers to it as "Scripture," but this cannot be pressed even as respects his own opinion. Athanasius clearly distinguishes it from canonical books, and there is no evidence that it was ever regarded by any church, or in any locality, as of direct Apostolic origin. Its authority for us is simply that of a witness. It has in this regard an inestimable value. But a just appreciation of its worth requires that its testimony be carefully weighed. We may not accept a local usage, however early, as of necessity an Apostolic tradition, nor a particular stage of knowledge as a complete representation of church doctrine, nor a single document, however highly esteemed, as a sufficient exponent of the universal faith. Invaluable in certain directions, the "Teaching" is historically unimportant in others. Particular discrimination and intelligence are required in arguing from its silences.

4. Doctrinally, the position of the "Teaching" is not Ebionitic. Yet its Christology is comparatively undeveloped. Written as a practical rule for catechumens, we should not expect anything like an exposition of the Christian faith. Due account must be taken of the fact that it refers explicitly to religious instruction outside of its own limit, and has much to say of prophets and teachers. It is rich in its statement of the Christian law of life, recognizes the essential Christian revelation of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and, in one passage, seems to point to the atonement of Christ, and yet, as compared with the Epistles of Polycarp, Ignatius, Clement, or even Barnabas, it has surprisingly little of distinctive Christian doctrine. These writers were not penning treatises on any article of faith; they were dealing with questions of church administration and polity; still the evangelical spirit finds frequent utterance. The "Teaching" is pitched on a lower key. It seems to connect directly with the first stage of Christian belief as it took form in the Jewish Church. Many indications point

to Egypt as the place of its origin. The Christianity of that region, there is reason to suppose, did not originate from the Pauline mission. It may have felt but slowly, especially away from Alexandria, the influence of the Apostle John. The church at large soon learned to connect its Apostles' Creed with the rite of baptism, and though in the formation of the old Catholic Church something was lost from Paulinism, much was also gained over Jewish Christianity. It is not enough to teach even catechumens what they shall do; it is at least equally important to point out the sources of spiritual strength. The type of Christianity reflected in the "Teaching" might easily develop into more or less Jewish and legal methods in ritual, polity, and doctrine. It was beginning apparently, when this work was written, to be conscious that its prophets needed looking after.

5. Baptism. Pedobaptists have made great use of the Jewish feeling about children as inheritors of covenant blessings. Here is a manual for Christians largely won, it would seem, from Judaism, and there is no allusion to Infant Baptism! It cannot be said that this is what might be expected in a work prepared for catechumens, for such a limit is exceeded in other particulars. The "Apostolic Constitutions" say, "baptize your infants." Nothing of this appears in the "Teaching," though it is much more likely that some of those early Egyptian (?) catechumens were parents than that there were children in Lydia's household. This may be taken as at least one indication of the early date of the document. The natural explanation of its silence on this subject is, that infant baptism was not a part of the primitive Apostolic tradition as these Christians had received it. This does not exclude the validity of Neander's position that infant baptism is a legitimate outgrowth of Apostolic teaching, and from the heart of Christianity; nor even the supposition that a rite which Irenæus and Origen accept, indirectly or avowedly, as Apostolic, may have arisen in connection with the mission of Paul and the long residence at Ephesus of the Apostle John.

As to the mode of baptism, the "Teaching" gives documentary proof of what is clearly attested by Christian art. The evidence for affusion from the Catacombs goes definitely back into the time of Irenæus, in the fresco in St. Lucina. It is wholly in the line of such representations that affusion should appear, in a document claiming to represent Apostolic teaching, as a legitimate alternative to immersion. It would be indeed a discovery for which the church might be specially grateful, if this testimony should lead

our Baptist brethren to relax, in view of it, their doctrine of the necessity of one mode.

6. There seems to be no other possible explanation of the use of the word *ἐπίσκοποι* (bishops) but the one taught by New Testament usage and that of the Epistle of Clement, namely, the identity of bishops and presbyters. And this in the first Church Manual ever written, so far as we know, and one claiming to be Apostolic! At the same time it must not be overlooked that elsewhere, and perhaps even earlier than its date, bishops were beginning to be discriminated from presbyters, even though their order was not yet diverse.

7. As we have here a specimen of the primitive church manuals, so of the first church catechisms. We say "a specimen" designedly, for there may have been in other regions other "Teachings." But doubtless this is of the most primitive sort. And a wonderful and most instructive prototype it is. The old idea of Polity (*πολιτεία*), says Von Drey, comprehended the duties and mode of life of the citizen. This first Church Manual, or book of Polity, is also a catechism, and embraces the duties and way of living in the world of a citizen of the Christian commonwealth. How directly Christianity aimed at conduct! How supreme its law of righteousness, and pure its standard of morals! Like all sound catechisms, this one goes back to the Decalogue. It takes the form of precept and injunction. It prohibits absolutely. There can be no evangelical training of the young with the law omitted. But the Sermon on the Mount and the two commandments on which hang the law and the prophets are put first.¹ Add to this the Apostles' Creed, as Luther did, giving the sources of Christian motive and power, and we have all the materials of a perfect catechism for the young.

8. The discovery of this document shows the trustworthiness of the "higher criticism," so long as it uses the instruments and methods of scientific historical investigation. It was considered a wonderful achievement of Astronomy, and a verification of its most "speculative" mathematical instruments, when a planet appeared where theoretic science showed that one was needed. The higher historical criticism has the same vindication in Bryennios' discovery of the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles."

Egbert C. Smyth.

¹ The arrangement of the "Teaching" is worthy of note. 1. The law of love and its exemplification in precepts of the Gospel (ch. i.). 2. Commandments from the second table (ch. ii.). 3. Particular evil tempers and passions which lead to transgression of these commandments (ch. iii.).

III.

TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES.

TEACHING OF THE LORD THROUGH THE TWELVE APOSTLES
TO THE GENTILES.

CHAP. I. There are two ways, one of life and one of death, and a wide difference between the two ways. The way of life, then, is this: first, thou shalt love God that hath made thee; secondly, thy neighbor as thyself; and all things whatsoever thou wouldest should not be brought upon thee, thou also do not to another. And of these words the teaching is this: Bless those that curse you and pray for your enemies, and fast in behalf of those that persecute you: for what thank if ye love them that love you? do not even the Gentiles the same? but love them that hate you and ye shall not have an enemy. Abstain from fleshly¹ and worldly desires. If any one shall give thee a blow on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also, and thou shalt be perfect: if any one compel thee to go one mile, go with him twain; if any one shall take away thy cloak, give to him also thy coat; if any one shall take from thee thine own, ask it not back; for neither art thou able.² To every one that asketh thee give and ask it not again; for on all is the Father willing to bestow of his own benefactions. Blessed is he that giveth according to the commandment; for he is guiltless: woe to him that receiveth; for if any one receiveth, having need, he is guiltless; but he that hath not need shall give account, wherefore he received and for what, and coming into close restraint he shall be strictly examined concerning what things he hath practiced, and shall not come out from thence until he have paid the last farthing. But, take note, even concerning this hath it been said: Let thine alms sweat in thy hands, until thou shalt have come to know to whom thou shouldst give.

CHAP. II. And a second commandment of the Teaching: Thou shalt do no murder; thou shalt not commit adultery; thou shalt not corrupt boys; thou shalt not commit whoredom; thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not use magic; thou shalt not practice sorcery;³ thou shalt not murder a child by abortion nor when born shalt thou put it to death. Thou shalt not desire the goods of thy neighbor; thou shalt not forswear thyself; thou shalt not bear false witness; thou shalt not speak slanderously; thou shalt not bear a grudge. Thou shalt not be double-minded nor double-tongued; for a snare of death is the double tongue. Thy

¹ σαρκικῶν. Bryennios says, "The manuscript has σωματικῶν."

² Justice could not be expected from the "unrighteous."—Cf. Matt. v. 40; 1 Cor. vi. 1.

³ οὐ μαγεύσεις, οὐ φαρμακεύσεις. The latter, perhaps, including the arts of secret poisoning, supposed to be a great part of African witchcraft.

word shall not be false, not empty, but filled full with deed. Thou shalt not be covetous nor rapacious nor a hypocrite nor malicious nor haughty. Thou shalt not take evil counsel against thy neighbor. Thou shalt not hate any man, but some shalt thou rebuke,¹ and for some shalt thou pray, and some shalt thou love above thine own soul.

CHAP. III. My child, flee from every evil thing and from everything the like thereof. Be not found ² prone to anger; for anger showeth the way to murder; nor jealous nor contentious nor resentful; for of all these things are murders engendered. My child, be not found a luster; for lust showeth the way to harlotry; nor a filthy talker, nor a greedy gazer;³ for of all these things are adulteries engendered. My child, be not found a drawer of auguries; since it showeth the way into idolatry; nor a user of incantations nor a caster of horoscopes nor one who sacrificeth against misfortune, nor be willing to behold these things; for of all of these things is idolatry engendered. My child, be not found a liar; since the lie shows the way into the theft; nor a lover of money nor a vain-glorious man; for of all these things are thefts engendered. My child, be not found a murmurer; since it shows the way into blasphemy;⁴ nor arrogant nor evil minded; for of all these things are blasphemies engendered. But be meek, since the meek shall inherit the earth. Be found forbearing and compassionate and void of malice and gentle and good and evermore in awe of the words which thou hast heard. Thou shalt not exalt thyself, nor shalt thou allow over-boldness to thy soul. Thy soul shall not be joined with lofty ones, but with righteous and humble ones shalt thou be conversant. The works that are wrought towards thee shalt thou receive as good, knowing that apart from God nothing comes to pass.

CHAP. IV. My child, of him that speaketh to thee the word of God shalt thou be mindful night and day, and thou shalt honor him as the Lord; for whence lordship is spoken of, there is the Lord.⁵ And thou shalt diligently seek the countenances of the saints, that thou mayest rest upon ⁶ their words. Thou shalt not be fond of division, and thou shalt set contenders at peace; thou shalt judge righteously, thou shalt have no respect of persons in rebuking for faults. Thou shalt not waver in soul whether it shall be or no.⁷ Be not found extending thy hands to receive,

¹ Cf. Lev. xix. 17.

² μὴ γίνου.

³ ὑψηλόφθαλμος.

⁴ It is hard to say whether or not βλασφημία here includes both God and man, but it probably does. I have translated *ex majori parte*.

⁵ ὁθεν γὰρ ἡ κυριότης λαλεῖται, ἐκεῖ Κύριός ἐστιν. The parallel passage from the *Ap. Const.* is ὅπου γὰρ ἡ περὶ θεοῦ διδασκαλία, ἐκεῖ ὁ θεὸς πᾶρεστιν.

⁶ ἐπαναπαύη. Rom. ii. 17.

⁷ "If thou doubttest in thy heart thou wilt receive none of thy requests."—*Shepherd*, Com. ix. The allusion in the "Teaching" seems to be to wavering in prayer.

and contracting them to give; if thou have,¹ through thy hands shalt thou give redemption of thy sins.² Thou shalt not delay to give, nor giving shalt thou murmur; for thou shalt know who is the munificent³ recompenser of the reward. Thou shalt not turn away from him that needeth, but shalt communicate all things to thy brother, and shalt not say that they are thine own; for if ye are joint participants in the immortal thing, how much more in mortal things. Thou shalt not withdraw thy hand from thy son or from thy daughter, but from youth up shalt thou teach the fear of God. Thou shalt not enjoin aught upon thy bondman or maidservant, who hope in the same God, in thy bitter mood, lest they should not fear the God who is over both; for He doth not come to call with respect of persons, but to those whom the Spirit hath prepared.⁴ And ye the bondmen be subject to your lords as to a type of God in modesty and reverence. Thou shalt hate all hypocrisy, and everything which is not pleasing to the Lord. Do not in any wise forsake commandments of the Lord, but thou shalt observe what things thou hast received, neither adding to them nor taking from them. In the church⁵ shalt thou openly acknowledge thy sins, and thou shalt not approach to thy prayer in an evil conscience. This is the way of life.

CHAP. V. And the way of death is this: first of all it is evil and full of malediction; murders, adulteries, lustings, whoredoms, thefts, idolatries, magic arts, sorceries,⁶ rapines, false witnessings, hypocrisies, double-heartedness, deceit, haughtiness, malice, insolence, covetousness, foul talk, emulation, headiness, arrogance, boastfulness: persecutors of good men, hating truth, loving falsehood, not knowing a reward of righteousness, not cleaving to good nor to righteous judgment, watching not unto good, but unto evil; from whom far are meekness and patience, loving vain things, pursuing reward, not pitying a poor man, not toiling for him that is bowed down with toil,⁷ not acknowledging Him that hath made them, murderers of children, destroyers of the image of God, turning away from him that is in need, oppressing the afflicted, advocates⁸ of rich men, lawless judges of poor men, complete in sin: be ye delivered, children, from all these.

CHAP. VI. See that no one lead thee astray from this way of the Teaching, since aside from God doth he teach thee. For if indeed thou art able to bear the whole yoke of the Lord, thou shalt be perfect: but if thou art not able, what thou canst this do. And concerning food, what

¹ ἐὰν ἔχῃς, i. e., if thou hast wherewith to give.

² This thought comes through the Septuagint version of Daniel iv. 27 (24), "redeem thy sins by almsgiving and thine iniquities by compassions to the poor."

³ καλός.

⁴ οὐ γὰρ ἔρχεται κατὰ πρόσωπον καλέσαι, ἀλλ' ἐφ' οὗς τὸ πνεῦμα ἡτοίμασεν.

⁵ Ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ.

⁶ μυγείαι, φαρμακείαι.

⁷ οὐ ποιοῦντες ἐπὶ καταπονουμένῳ.

⁸ παράκλητοι.

thou art able bear ; but from that which is sacrificed to idols utterly abstain : for it is a worship of dead gods.

CHAP. VII. And concerning baptism, thus baptize ye : having said all these things beforehand, baptize ye into the name of the Father and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit in living water.¹ But if thou have not living water, baptize into other water ; and if thou canst not in cold, in warm. And if thou have neither, pour out water thrice upon the head into the name of Father and Son and Holy Spirit.² And before the baptism let the baptizer fast and the baptized, and whatever others can : and thou shalt enjoin on the baptized to fast for one or two days beforehand.

CHAP. VIII. And let not your fastings be with the hypocrites : for they fast upon the second of the week and the fifth ; but do ye fast on the fourth, and on the Preparation.³ Neither pray ye as the hypocrites, but as the Lord hath enjoined in his gospel, so pray ye : Our Father which art in heaven,⁴ hallowed be thy name, thy kingdom come,⁵ thy will be done as in heaven so on earth : give us this day our daily bread, and forgive us our debt⁶ as we also forgive⁷ our debtors, and bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil :⁸ for thine is the power and the glory forever. Thrice in the day so pray ye.

CHAP. IX. And concerning the Eucharist,⁹ thus give ye thanks : first concerning the cup : We give thanks to Thee, our Father, for the holy vine of David thy servant, which thou hast made known to us through Jesus thy Servant ;¹⁰ to Thee be glory forever. And concerning the broken bread :¹¹ We give thanks to Thee, our Father, for the life and knowledge, which thou hast made known to us through Jesus thy Servant : to thee be the glory forever. As this broken bread¹² had been strewn abroad upon the mountains, and being gathered together became one, so let thy church be gathered together from the ends of the earth into thy kingdom : for thine is the glory and the power through Jesus Christ forever. And let no one eat nor drink of your Eucharist, but those who have been baptized into the name of the Lord : for indeed¹³

¹ According to Bryennios, ὕδωρ ζῶν is not exclusively flowing water, but fresh, just brought. His first note is, “Ὑδωρ δὲ ζῶν λέγει τὸ ἄρτι ἀπὸ τοῦ φρέατος ἠντλημένον, τὸ ὑπόγυον, τὸ πρόσφατον καὶ νέαρον. Cf. John iv. 10, 11 ; vii. 38.” In the appendix he adds : “Such especially was the water of rivers and springs, where in the earliest times the Christians were wont to baptize.”

² Ἐκχεον εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν τρις ὕδωρ εἰς ὄνομα Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος.

³ That is, Preparation of the Sabbath, Friday, as being the day of the Saviour's Passion.

⁴ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ.

⁵ ἐλθέτω.

⁶ τὴν ὀφειλὴν ἡμῶν.

⁷ ἀφίεμεν.

⁸ Or “the evil one.”

⁹ Περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐχαριστίας, οὕτως εὐχαριστήσατε.

¹¹ τοῦ κλάσματος.

¹⁰ Cf. Acts iv. 25, 27, 30.

¹³ καὶ γάρ.

¹² κλάσμα.

concerning this thing hath the Lord said: Give not that which is holy to the dogs.

CHAP. X. And after being satiated, thus give ye thanks: We give thanks to Thee, Holy Father, for thy holy name, which Thou hast caused to tabernacle in our hearts, and for the knowledge and faith and immortality, which Thou hast made known to us through Jesus, thy Servant: to Thee be the glory forever. Thou, Sovereign Almighty, hast created all things for the sake of thy name, both food and drink hast Thou given to men for enjoyment that they may give thanks to Thee, and on us hast Thou in grace bestowed spiritual food and drink and life eternal through thy Servant.¹ Above all we give thanks to Thee that Thou art mighty: to Thee be the glory forever. Remember, Lord, thy church to deliver her from all evil, and to perfect her in thy love, and gather her together from the four winds, her that hath been hallowed for thy kingdom, which Thou didst prepare for her: for thine is the power and the glory forever. Let grace come, and let this world pass away. Hosanna to the Son of David. If any one is holy, let him come: if any one is not, let him repent: Maranatha. Amen. But to the prophets permit to give thanks as much as they will.

CHAP. XI. Whoever therefore shall come and teach all these things, the aforesaid, receive him: and if the teacher himself shall turn and teach another doctrine unto your overthrow, do not hear him: but if unto the adding to you of righteousness and knowledge of the Lord, receive him as the Lord. And concerning the Apostles and Prophets according to the precept of the gospel,² so do. And let every apostle coming unto you be received as the Lord: but he shall not remain one day:³ but if there be need, the second also: but if he remain three days, he is a false prophet. And let the apostle when going forth take nothing except bread to suffice until he shall have found a lodging;⁴ but if he ask money, he is a false prophet. And every prophet speaking in the Spirit⁵ ye shall not try nor judge,⁶ for every sin shall be forgiven, but this sin shall not be forgiven. And not every one speaking in the Spirit is a prophet, but if he have the behavior of the Lord. By his behavior therefore shall the false prophet be known and the prophet. And no prophet appointing a feast in the Spirit eateth thereof, but if otherwise, he is a false prophet: and every prophet teaching the truth, if what things he teacheth he doeth not, is a false prophet. And every prophet proven, true,⁷ dealing in reference to the mystery of the Church here below,⁸ but not teach-

¹ παιδός σου.

² τὸ δόγμα τοῦ εὐαγγελίου.

³ So the manuscript. Harnack says: "This is intolerable. I have, following the parallel passage in Chap. 12, inserted *εἰ μὴ* before *ἡμέραν*."

⁴ ἄρτον ἕως αὐλισθῆ.

⁵ ἐν πνεύματι.

⁶ διακρινεῖτε.

⁷ ἀληθινός, genuine.

⁸ So Harnack translates, *der da handelt in Hinsicht des Geheimnisses der Kirche hienieden*, adding: "This obscure passage reads as follows: *ποιῶν εἰς μυστήριον κοσμικὸν ἐκκλησίας, μὴ διδάσκων δὲ ποιεῖν ὅσα αὐτοῖς ποιεῖ*. The author appears

ing to do what things he himself doeth, shall not be judged in your presence : for with God hath he his judgment : for so did also the prophets of old. But whosoever shall say : Give me money or aught else, ye shall not hearken to him ; but if he shall speak concerning others that are in want, that ye give, let no one judge him.

CHAP. XII. And let every one that cometh in the name of the Lord be received, and then having proved him ye shall know (for ye shall have understanding) both right and left.¹ And if he that cometh is a wayfaring man, assist him as much as ye are able ; but he shall remain with you only two or three days, if there be necessity. And if he is minded to abide among you, being a craftsman, let him work and eat : but if he have not a craft, according to your discretion provide, that no idle Christian shall live among you. And if he will not do so, he is one that makes merchandise of Christ : beware of such.

CHAP. XIII. And every true² prophet, being minded to abide among you, is worthy of his food. Likewise a true teacher is worthy also himself, even as the workman, of his food. All the first fruits, therefore, of wine-press and threshing-floor, of both oxen and sheep, shalt thou take and give to the prophets ; for it is they that are your high-priests. And if ye have not a prophet, give to the poor. And if thou makest a batch of dough, take and give the first fruits according to the commandment. Likewise on opening a jar of wine or oil, take the first fruits and give to the prophets : and of money and raiment and every possession take the first fruits, as it may seem good to thee, and give according to the commandment.

CHAP. XIV. And on the Lord's Day³ being gathered together break bread and give thanks, having also confessed your sins, that your sacrifice may be pure. And let no one that hath a controversy with his friend come together with you, until they be reconciled, that your sacrifice be not profaned : for this is that spoken by the Lord : In every place and time offer to me a pure offering : for I am a great King, saith the Lord, and my name is marvelous among the Gentiles.

CHAP. XV. Appoint⁴ therefore unto yourselves bishops and deacons worthy of the Lord, men meek and free from the love of money and true⁵ and proven : for to you do they also render the service of prophets and of teachers. Do not therefore condemn them ; for it is they who are the honored among you, with the prophets and teachers.

And rebuke one another not in wrath but in peace, as ye have it in to refer to continence in sexual relations. See Ignat. *ad Polyc.* 5. Tertull. *de monog.* 11.

¹ We have here followed Bryennios. Harnack removes the parenthesis, and translates : "dann aber sollt ihr ihn prüfen und erkennen was an ihm ist ; denn ihr sollt Unterscheidungsgehab haben für das Gute und Böse."

² ἀληθινός.

³ Pleonastically Κατὰ δὲ κυριακὴν Κυρίου.

⁴ χειροτονήσατε.

⁵ ἀληθεῖς.

the gospel, and to every one that behaveth amiss against another let no one speak, nor let him hear aught from you until he repent. And your prayers and your alms and all your deeds so do as ye have it in the gospel of our Lord.

CHAP. XVI. Watch for your life: let not your lamps be quenched, and let not your loins be loosed, but be found ready: for ye know not the hour, in which our Lord cometh. And often shall ye gather yourselves together seeking the things which are profitable to your souls: for the whole time of your faith shall not profit you if ye be not found perfect in the last time. For in the last days shall the false prophets and the corrupters be multiplied and the sheep shall be turned into wolves and love shall be turned into hatred: for by reason of the increase of iniquity, shall they hate one another and persecute and betray, and then shall appear the world-deceiver¹ as Son of God and shall do signs and wonders, and the world shall be betrayed into his hands and he shall do abominable things, which never have come to pass from the beginning of the world. Then shall the creation of men² come into the fire of searching trial and many shall stumble and perish, but they that endure in their faith shall be saved by Him, the Curse.³ And then shall appear the signs of the truth: ⁴ first, the sign of an opening in heaven, then the sign of the voice of the trumpet and the third the resurrection of the dead: yet not of all, but as hath been said: The Lord shall come and all the saints with Him. Then shall the world see the Lord coming upon the clouds of heaven.

¹ ὁ κοσμοπλάνος.

² *I. e.* all men. — *Harnack*.

³ *Harnack* says: "The manuscript has it σωθήσονται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ καταθέματος. I leave the last words untranslated, because I do not yet understand them."

⁴ σημεῖα τῆς ἀληθείας: that is, I suppose, the true signs.

EDITORIAL.

THE NEW CREED OFFERED TO CONGREGATIONALISTS.

THE National Council of 1880 took steps for the appointment of a commission of twenty-five men to prepare a creed for the use of the churches. They were instructed to report the result of their labors, not to the council, "but to the churches and to the world through the public press, to carry such weight of authority as the character of the commission and the intrinsic merit of their exposition of truth may command." The report has recently been issued in a creed of twelve articles, and also a form for the admission of members to the churches, which is brief and cordial, and which also includes the Apostles' Creed, to be repeated by the church with the new members.

The report is favorably received. The religious newspapers commend it as catholic, evangelical, intelligible, and sufficiently specific. This is doubtless the opinion of nearly all candid readers.

It is signed by all but three members of the commission: Rev. Dr. Goodwin, of Chicago, — who was unable to attend its meetings, — Rev. Dr. Alden, of the American Board, and Rev. Dr. Karr, of Hartford Theological Seminary. These two gentlemen, it is understood, thought that more explicit statements should have been made on certain doctrines. It is believed, also, that the creed, as far as it goes, is satisfactory to all the signers. It is not unlikely, however, that Rev. Drs. Dexter, Walker, Taylor, Goodell, and some others, while they had no hesitation in subscribing to the creed as it stands, would have preferred more definite expressions at several points. Probably no member of the commission is perfectly satisfied with the method of arrangement and the rhetorical form. When twenty-four men undertake such a task, they expect to yield personal preferences in many subordinate particulars, and to agree at last on a result which will bear the evident marks of compromise.

Dismissing all minor criticisms, we find that interest centres in two questions: Are those ends secured for which the creed was to be framed? and What will be its practical uses for the denomination? To learn the intended objects we go back to the paper of the late Professor Hiram Mead, on which the action of the council of 1880 was based. One reason for desiring a new statement was that the denomination might no longer seem to be yielding assent, directly or indirectly, to the confessions of the Puritan period. The Burial Hill declaration made at Plymouth in 1865, since which time none has appeared, affirms adherence to the confessions and platforms of 1648 and 1680, namely, the Cambridge platform and the Savoy confession. Professor Mead argued forcibly

that such assent should not be expected, if for no other reason, because few Christians have any knowledge of those statements. The new creed, then, has no allusion to former confessions, and thus one of the intended objects is secured. It begins, indeed, with extracts from the Nicene Creed, and ends with an expression from the Burial Hill declaration, but assents only to that which it actually incorporates.

Another object was, in the language of the instructions, "to offer to our churches something which may be worthy of their adoption, and which may come to stand by a general and common consensus as the exponent of our doctrines, the symbol of our faith." Whether it will gain the general consensus remains to be seen; but it certainly is worthy of adoption. It is an exponent of doctrine which in its comprehensiveness omits nothing essential, in its clearness leaves no room for mistake, while in its catholicity it ignores non-essentials. Any one who objects to these statements can hardly be considered evangelical. Any one who insists upon more must be considered ultra-conservative, and could not reasonably expect his views to be adopted by a general and common consensus of the churches. The great body of evangelical believers stop about where this creed stops.

Still another object, as defined by Professor Mead, though not mentioned in the final action of the council, was to obtain more precise statements of certain doctrines. He said, "The preparation of a new symbol is needed to secure the thorough reinvestigation of the biblical foundation of certain doctrines, which, as hitherto held, are now boldly questioned." Among them he mentions the doctrine of inspiration, of the Atonement, and of endless punishment. "It is *not* a matter of indifference whether they are answered this way or that. The chief motive power of the gospel depends upon the right view of them." Emphatically, this object has not been secured. The article on the Bible carefully abstains from formulating a theory of inspiration. It only states the fact that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the record of God's revelation of Himself in the work of redemption; that they were written by men under the special guidance of the Holy Spirit; that they are able to make wise unto salvation; and that they constitute the authoritative standard by which religious teaching and human conduct are to be regulated and judged. Professor Ladd finds no difficulty in accepting this statement. It perfectly agrees with the theories of his recent books. And Dr. Dexter, who repudiates Dr. Ladd's theory, assents to this article with the utmost facility. There is no philosophy of the Atonement, but only the facts and the results. Even Dr. Bushnell would have subscribed to the statement that Christ's sacrifice of Himself for the sins of the world declares the righteousness of God, and is the sole and sufficient ground of forgiveness and reconciliation with Him. The commission would not go so far as to use the word vicarious, or even atonement, and probably because those terms

have come to stand for certain theories, rather than because any of the signers really reject the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice. The article on the awards of the future declares that these are determined at the final judgment, and that the issues of the final judgment are everlasting punishment and everlasting life. It is neither said that probation ends with life, nor that it continues in any case beyond life. The "Independent," apparently with knowledge, says that one of Dr. Alden's reasons for not signing was that the creed fails to state that the awards of the judgment are conditioned in all cases by the deeds done in the body. We may suppose, then, that the omission is intentional. So far as this creed pronounces, the question is left open. The tenet of universal salvation is clearly excluded, but, according to this test, one may be evangelical who believes that those who have no knowledge of Christ before death may have it after death and before the final judgment. Undoubtedly the several members of the commission have decided opinions on that point, yet by refusing to qualify the general statement they unmistakably concede liberty of opinion within the limits of that statement. Such liberty is all that is claimed by the most positive believers in the possibility of probation, for certain classes of persons, after death.

The other question is, What will be the practical uses of the creed? The immediate use will be to allay solicitude. The signing of such a creed by so many influential men, and "representing different shades of thought," shows that there is, after all, substantial agreement on the great essentials of the Christian religion. The right wing and the left wing of the denomination cannot be far apart, if both stand within these lines. Agreements far outweigh differences. All are agreed as to the Divinity of Christ, the universal sinfulness of man, redemption only through the sacrifice of Christ, regeneration through the Spirit, the eternal glory of the redeemed, the everlasting punishment of the finally impenitent. It is sometimes said that the so-called New Theology begins as the Unitarian defection began early in this century. But those who are pointed to as exponents of the new thought cordially assent to this creed, which no Unitarian could subscribe to, and which the original leaders of that defection could not have subscribed to. This creed, with its signatures, must then have a reassuring effect concerning the practical unity of the denomination to which it is offered.

It will be of service to councils in the settlement of ministers. When there seems to be vagueness or peculiarity of opinion, hearty assent to this creed will be considered sufficient.

When new churches are formed, or better statements are desired for existing churches, this creed will be found "worthy of adoption." Twenty years from now its use may have become quite general.

It will also have the effect of strengthening belief in the fundamentals of evangelical doctrine which are so positively stated.

The form for admission of members should not pass without notice.

It is very suitable for the purpose, and is made impressive, as it could not otherwise be made, by the use of the Apostles' Creed. Its significance is that as a confession of faith it is distinguished from a statement of doctrine. The latter is not to be read at the time of receiving members. They are required to assent to the creed only according to the measure of their understanding of it. This is practically a return to the custom of the early New England churches, and is for every reason to be commended.

On the whole, the commission is to be congratulated on having reached with substantial unanimity so satisfactory a result, and the churches have reason for gratitude that these men of "piety and ability" have so faithfully performed the duty assigned them, and have made available a "simple, clear, and comprehensive exposition of the truths of the glorious gospel of the blessed God, for the instruction and edification of the churches."

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LENT.

THE observance of Lent is a reminder to the non-liturgical churches of the decline among them of the purely devotional and disciplinary element in the religious life. The Fast once held a well-defined place in the New England churches of the Puritan order. The public day of fasting and prayer, "honored" not "in the breach, but in the observance," was the sign of a pervasive religious habit. The churches set apart their own days, at times with great frequency. The more solemn religious duties were introduced with fasting and prayer. President Edwards, in his diary, gives the following circumstances attending the subscription to the famous covenant of 1742, at Northampton: "In the month of March I led the people into a solemn public renewal of their covenant with God. To that end, having made a draft of a covenant, I first proposed it to some of the principal men of the church, then to the people in their several religious associations in various parts of the town, then to the whole congregation in public. Then the people in general, that were above fourteen years of age, first subscribed the covenant with their hands, and then, on a *day of fasting and prayer*, all together presented themselves before the Lord, in his house, and stood up and solemnly manifested their consent to it, as their vow to God." The diaries and memoirs of the more devout Christians of that time abundantly confirm and illustrate the type of religious devotion set forth in this extract.

But under the incoming of the greater enterprises of the church, and its missionary activities, religious devotion has gone over into consecration to outward duties. The present concern of the church is for the conversion of the world. Whatever "times and seasons" are set apart and observed by the non-liturgical churches are for this specific object. With the possible exception of the Methodist church, no uniform and well-ordered endeavor is made by them to promote personal habits of spiritual

devotion on the part of their membership. Nothing, that is, is continuous and impressive in its effect. The individual Christian is attentively and persistently "developed" on the side of his activities and benevolences, and, in some cases, of his beliefs, but he has few reminders of his duty to himself and few incentives toward a closer communion with God. Beyond doubt, the present type of religious life is providential. This is a missionary age, and demands consecration to outward ends and enthusiasm for tangible results. But the earlier and now neglected characteristic of the Christian experience has a permanent place in the Christian life for which there can be found no full equivalent. The health of the soul requires denials as well as activities. There is a disciplinary process which is quite as necessary to its growths and to its largest uses as any exercise of itself in charity.

The chief suggestion of the Lenten season, to those who do not keep it, is to be found in the prominence which it gives to this disciplinary element in the religious life. This is its idea. It stands for repression and self-denial. We are, of course, aware of the evasions and misuse of the season. Lent is an institution of society, as well as of the church. And society uses it for its own purposes, specially as the time in which it may recover its tired and worn devotees. Very well. We are not now concerned with the misappropriation of the idea nor with the misuse of the time. The idea itself remains, and is worthy of consideration by those who rely for their spiritual development upon another training and culture. For it is not possible for the church to overcome the world simply through its activity and benevolence. Luxury will gain upon charity. The sphere of self-indulgence will widen even beyond that of service. The Christian who does not at times turn himself about and inquire carefully into his personal and social habits will find that they are tending to neutralize his active Christian influence. Some "self-denying ordinance" is necessary to the individual Christian and to the church to maintain an aggressive attitude or an aggressive spirit. Lent itself, as a mere season of time, a forty days' break in the flow of pleasure and worldliness, signifies nothing. But the idea of Lent, that we must discipline ourselves in denials if we are to repress luxury, and not rely simply upon our benevolence to reduce by a little its volume, — this deserves careful study and exemplification by the modern church in all its branches.

Lent has also a suggestion for the Christian believer who has been trained to faith in the doctrine of Christ without a corresponding fellowship with Him in person. To such a mind the Cross of Christ is hardly more than a figure, of which the reality is to be found in the doctrine of the Atonement. The Passion of the Redeemer is lost sight of in the endeavor to measure the uses of his sufferings and death, their relation to God, their effect upon man. A more sympathetic consideration of the personal element in the sufferings of our Lord, the meditation upon the sorrows of the Messiah, would prove a source of spiritual quickening,

not only to those who are accustomed to live in the region of philosophic thought, but also to those who are in the midst of evangelistic work. The following of Christ down into the valley of humiliation and death, the study, day by day, of the last days of his earthly life, the reverent watch by the Cross, the waiting for the Resurrection, — these are spiritual exercises which cannot fail to give warmth and reality to the Christian faith. The majority of Christian believers, without reference to sect, now observe Easter. By the “logic of events,” no less than by spiritual sympathy, Passion week deserves its place in the calendar of the private Christian; and the more remote the thoughts which it suggests may be to his ordinary religious thinking, the more helpful they may be to the spirit of devotion.

The proposition is made from time to time that the annual Fast, by order of the State of Massachusetts, be transferred to Good Friday, following the custom of some of the other New England States. There are local reasons which have thus far prevailed against the proposition, and which will doubtless hold good for long time to come. The day has by tradition and by use a political significance which would be lost by the transfer. On occasions it is a “field day” for the pulpit. State and church have at least a sentimental connection in Massachusetts which is not to be overlooked. But there is an objection to the proposed change quite as serious from the religious side. Good Friday has nothing to gain and everything to lose, if made a legal holiday. The incongruity of common pastimes with the sacredness of the day would be felt painfully by those by whom it would be felt at all. Without significance to the state, it has its own meaning to the church. Better the remembrance of Christ in his sufferings and death as an act of private devotion than the public acknowledgment of the event of his crucifixion under the sanction and authority of the state.

GOVERNMENT AID TO EDUCATION IN THE NEW WEST: A COMMUNICATION FROM PRESIDENT WARD.

No better proof could be given that we are a nation than the fact that so much is done for education, regardless of geographical lines. Second-hand statesmen would have us believe that there is a bloody chasm dividing the North from the South, or that New England is in danger of being left out in the cold. But the “Peabody Fund,” the “Slater Fund,” Vanderbilt University, the work of the American Missionary Association, the New West Education Commission, the long line of Academies and Colleges on our frontiers, are a sufficient answer to such vaporings. They are all unifying our nation, and fast making its best features permanent. They will live and grow stronger long after “Mormons,” “Cowboys,” and “Ku-Klux” are gone, and studied only by students as excrescences of the past.

Generously, even lavishly, the general government seconds these private means with gifts of lands, imperial for their magnitude. For example : The land set apart for the benefit of common schools, not counting that for university and normal schools, in the Territory of Dakota is an area larger by five hundred and eighty-five square miles than the whole State of Massachusetts. Formerly it was one thirty-sixth, now it is one eighteenth; of the public land thus appropriated. That the older States might not be neglected in the distribution, their proportion has been given to them as "College Scrip." In addition to the land given for common schools, large quantities are set apart for universities, agricultural colleges, and normal schools. But none of these lands are available until the territories become states ; and this is the weak point in the system.

Immigration will not wait for statehood. Railways are now built in advance of the settlements. Every day, yes every hour, is precious for the proper shaping of society. In the general scramble for selfish preferment, there is nothing to make headway for the common good but education and religion. Theoretically, at least, the church is better prepared to enter the breach than the school, for there are the missionary organizations of the different denominations, whose business it is to see that churches are established. If only the churches knew the value of their opportunity, and their great advantage in this work of shaping kingdoms, they would pour out money, and push forward men, no matter how loudly and plausibly timid souls, theorizing at a safe distance from the front, called for a halt in the name of "Christian comity."

But no one is empowered by either public or private authority to step in at the right time, and set in motion the machinery of education. True, it is easy, with such a people as are now making these new states, to find men intelligent enough, but they are all busy. Then it takes time to organize a school district, elect officers, levy a tax, build or hire a house, and find a teacher. These difficulties are greatly increased when, as is the case now in many instances, communities are begun and towns built months before they can be legally organized. Taxes levied in such cases, while not actually illegal, still lack the formal sanction of law, and can be collected only as the citizen consents to pay them.

But suppose these objections all met. The district is organized, schools are established, but how are they to be maintained ? Wholly by direct taxation ; there is no public money. At the same time they are taxing themselves for roads, bridges, necessary public buildings, the care of the poor, the care of the insane, and the administration of justice. The last two items are always proportionately larger on the frontier than in older communities. They are also building their own homes. Nearly all are young people. Very few have accumulated capital, but must borrow money at a high rate of interest to carry on their business. But they are brave, hopeful, willing to discount the future and pay largely for the privilege.

Here is an opportunity for our government to help in a legitimate way the building of society. Let a small part, say one tenth, of the proceeds of land sales be set apart for the immediate use of schools. This would give an average of \$2,500 to each township of six miles square. Until population has increased enough to warrant admission as a state, two schools to a township will be sufficient. The sum named would build and seat two sufficiently large houses, and leave a fund which, if judiciously invested, would keep the house insured and furnish all needed maps, charts, and books of reference. The Receiver of the Land Office in each United States land district could hold this fund subject to the order of the superintendent of schools in each county. The ordinary safeguards applying to the expenditure of public money would be sufficient to prevent misappropriation of the fund. The Receiver could also be empowered to designate some person in each county who should act temporarily as disbursing agent of this fund until the county should be fully organized, thus preventing any detriment to the interests of education that might come by delay.

This money should not be given outright, but loaned, to be repaid from proceeds of the school lands when they are sold by the State. Even a low rate of interest might be demanded, not to exceed two per cent., and this interest should become eventually a part of the school fund.

The benefits of this plan are many and obvious. Schools would begin earlier in the history of towns and communities than they do now as a rule, and be for that reason more efficient in shaping society for good. They would be taught more months in the year. Better teachers would be secured; for, freed from the burden of building a house, they could pay larger wages, and so secure better service.

New states would be saved from the necessity, making a temptation usually too strong to be resisted, to sell their school lands at the earliest possible moment, and as a result getting but a small part of their true value. Could each State wait at least five years before selling an acre of their school lands, the proceeds would be at least doubled.

There would be less danger of having the school fund squandered. Under the compulsion which now exists to turn the lands into money as soon as the law will let them, not only is the land sold in some cases for the veriest trifle, but the money is unwisely invested, to the detriment of the revenue, and even to the permanent loss of large parts of the fund. Also in the rush and hurry and wire-pulling incident to getting a new state government into motion, there is too often opportunity for dishonest men to plunder this fund. But with the wise delay which this plan makes possible, the citizens can learn whom to trust with their school fund, and thus these dangers are reduced to the minimum. The plan would cost nothing to carry it out (though in these days of surplus revenue this may be nothing in its favor), for no additional officers would be needed and there would be no diminution of the public revenue.

If the subject could be discussed in Congress, the further fact might be developed that the whole system of territorial government needs revision. The present plan was possibly good enough when means of communication were meagre, and as a consequence immigration was small. But now, when the railway does in a day what was formerly the labor of a year, it is not right to be held to the same narrow rules. These citizens are extending the domain of our government, and adding incalculably to its resources and power. It is not just that, in addition to the inevitable burdens that fall upon those developing new lands, should be laid others entirely needless. We think it hard to be disfranchised because we go to the border and put all into peril for our country. It is humiliating to be treated as dependent provinces, and have our offices kept as rewards of political partisanship. It sometimes suggests 1776 when petitions and remonstrances addressed to the central government are treated with contempt. Under conditions like these, it is not too much to ask that favors like this be granted, and at once, when they are asked only for the bettering of our country.

Joseph Ward.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

THE OLD CATHOLIC MOVEMENT.

THIS movement, which began with so promising an aspect thirteen years ago, is often spoken of as being now in its decline. One great reason of this is said to be the unwillingness of the laity to make pecuniary sacrifices for its support, unaccustomed as people on the continent of Europe are to these where not enforced by law. And the powerful enginery of motive at the command of Ultramontane zeal is lacking to the Old Catholics. It might be expected, therefore, that a religious movement in Germany, thrown out suddenly upon the sea of the voluntary system, as this has in good measure, though by no means altogether, been, would need to be very vigorous to have much chance of keeping afloat. Moravianism, indeed, on the same soil, has found the utmost abundance of liberality in its adherents. But Moravianism is a movement from the very depths of the spiritual life. Old Catholicism, scholastic rather than popular, historical rather than experimental, negative rather than warmly positive, cannot lay claim to this character of obvious religious profoundness. It is no wonder, then, if it should now be found gasping for want of means. This would be rather the index than the cause of its uncertain state.

Nevertheless, although recent facts do not indicate any great energy of progress, they do not bear out the statement lately made, even by some of its warm friends, that it is merely fading out and will soon be extinct. The "Church Quarterly Review" states that on the occasion of the decennial celebration of Bishop Reinkens's consecration, which was observed on the 4th of last June, it appeared that in these ten years the number of enrolled members had risen in Germany from 35,000 to 38,500,

and of congregations from 88 to 108. Thus, having more than held its own, it gives the "Review" warrant for saying that it has approved itself to be no mere ebullition of fanaticism or hostility to Rome.

The present strength of the movement in Germany lies almost wholly in Prussia and Baden. We have not been able to gain possession of statistics later than 1882, but these are as follows, differing but slightly from those of the year before.

There was one bishop, Joseph Hubert Reinkens, formerly professor at Breslau. He received episcopal consecration, June 4, 1873, in Rotterdam, from Heydekamp, of Deventer, at that time the sole living bishop of the Old Catholics of Utrecht, whose practical separation from Rome is of old standing, and of whom we will presently speak. The episcopal succession of Utrecht is esteemed by Rome schismatical, but valid. Reinkens is, therefore, regarded by the Ultramontanes as a real though rebellious and heretical bishop. Accordingly, Pius, in his bull of anathema, stigmatized his election as "pretended and sacrilegious," but his consecration not as pretended, but simply as "sacrilegious."

Bishop Reinkens is assisted by 50 priests. In the year 1881-82 there had been 41 baptisms, 11 marriages, and 50 funerals. The contributions amounted to about two marks, or 50 cents, a head, not contemptible for a country but little used to do for itself in matters of religion. From Prussia the church received 22,047, from Baden 16,577 marks. In the Prussian budget, against the strenuous objections of Bishop Reinkens, the Old Catholic subsidies, if it suits the policy of the government to continue them at all, will hereafter be distinguished from the Catholic subsidies. This appears in direct conflict with the express acknowledgment of Reinkens by Prussia as a Catholic bishop. But what cares the Emperor's emperor for that, if he can make more by going to Canossa than by staying in Berlin?

A conference of the Old Catholics of Baden, held in Freiburg, March 25, 1882, declares that "the Old Catholics of Baden adhere immovably to their legal right to be accounted members of the Catholic Church in the pre-Vatican acceptance, and still maintain their opposition, on grounds of conscience, to the papal infallibility, in the consciousness that this protest involves, as a necessary consequence, the germ of an ultimate reform of the church in head and members." Thus we see reappearing that formula which promised so much and accomplished so little at Constance.

But we must not forget that Old Catholicism, confined as its range may appear, is not simple, but at least threefold, even throwing out Père Hyacinthe and Austria, to say nothing of similar symptoms of Catholic revolt from Rome which are starting out here and there in Spain, Italy, and elsewhere, — symptoms which may signify more than as yet appears. These three conjoint movements, one old and two new, admit of very different judgments and auguries. We might be hopeful of one, or two, while we thought lightly of the other or others. The three are, German Old Catholicism, and Swiss Old Catholicism, dating from 1870, and called out by the Vatican Council, and Dutch Old Catholicism, centred at Utrecht, dating in its completeness from about 1720, and following in the wake of the mighty movement of Jansenism. Jansenism, originating in the Low Countries, passed into France, and after a memorable and glorious struggle there, illustrated by immortal names, of which Pascal's

towers supreme, was at last crushed out and retreated to the Netherlands again, taking refuge this time in the security of the Protestant half of them. Here it purified itself from the degenerate excesses into which persecution, making wise men mad, had crowded it down in France, provided for itself (through Varlet, a French missionary bishop) a regular hierarchal succession, the validity of which Rome, as above noted, has never disputed, and even, it should seem, detached itself from such positions of Jansenism as had been distinctly condemned by Rome. It seems hard to determine now, except on an exceedingly intimate acquaintance with the quarrel, on what principle of vitality it still continued to live in separateness from general Catholicism. But we all know that the form of an ecclesiastical or political quarrel is not always the deepest reality of it. And the archiepiscopal rights of the ancient and illustrious see of Utrecht were so intertwined in the contest with a deep attachment to the doctrines of grace and a well-merited hatred of the Jesuits, who had persecuted true Augustinianism into a heresy, and had raised what, for brevity's sake, we may call a shallow Arminianism into Catholic orthodoxy, as to give the cathedral chapter of Utrecht a boldness of self-vindication which has not quailed before Rome for now one hundred and eighty years. At first it seemed as if the whole archbishopric would enfranchise itself. But Jesuitical intrigues, and perhaps unwise delays, and the shivering dread of schism, which is the weakness of Catholic protesters, brought the number of adherents down at last to six thousand. These, however, for a century and a half, have maintained their chosen position with a modest perseverance which is very remarkable. Each new archbishop, or suffragan bishop of Harlem or Deventer, as he has been chosen, has reverently signified his election to Rome. Rome, in return, has always sent a fresh bull of anathema. This has been duly read in the churches of the three dioceses, and thereupon the bishop-elect has been consecrated, as if Rome had sent a blessing and not a ban.

This self-contained maintenance of outward submission and actual independence continued until 1873, when Reinkens was consecrated, together with a new bishop of Harlem. Reinkens refused to send a notification of his election to Rome, whereupon the Dutch bishop withdrew his also from the messenger. Since then it is to be presumed that the church of Utrecht has stood clearly exempt and emancipated from the Roman obedience.

This long existence of a Catholic church, however small, under the name of so ancient and illustrious a see, cannot but have been a thorn in the side of Rome. Utrecht was small and England was great. But the pretensions of the English episcopate to a valid succession have been of little account in the eyes of Rome, while the protesting bishops of Holland have always been acknowledged as possessing this. And they and their flocks have maintained their position with a gravity of Catholic piety, a blamelessness of life, and an unimpeachableness of general doctrine and ritual, which must have silently wrought in many Catholic minds. Rome herself, it is said, could hardly be brought by the utmost exertions of Jesuitism to refrain from closing the schism by a virtual acknowledgment of their being in the right. On the Dutch Catholics at large, it is true, they have made no noticeable impression. These, one third of the Dutch people, moved by old persecutions and later slights, have most willingly gravitated into Ultramontaniam of the purest type.

It might seem as if the long protest of the little but illustrious church could not fail to go out in ineffectual silence. But she abode in faith that God had something for her yet to do in the world; and when, after 1870, she was solicited by thirty-five thousand Catholics of Germany, including the cream of Catholic scholarship, to give them a line of bishops in the consecration of Reinkeus, she might well feel that her long constraint and seclusion had suddenly broadened out into a field of honorable influence such as repaid her for these generations of waiting.

The farthest opposite and least hopeful term of Old Catholicism appears to be, or at least to have been, the Swiss. Herzog, its bishop, is a man of undoubted piety and soundness, and so, it is to be hoped, are a good part of his clergy. But the indignant declaration of Père Hyacinthe, after having tried it a while as curé of Geneva, that the movement there was in the hands of men who were neither Liberal in politics nor Catholic in doctrine, for all their pretensions both ways, appears only too good a description of a great part of Swiss Old Catholicism. It seems to have been patronized by men who wanted to persecute Christianity under the shelter of the Catholic name. Herzog appears to have been blameworthy that he has allowed himself to be hampered, we might almost say enslaved, by this negative element, positive only in its persecuting injustice towards the Ultramontanes. A fine specimen of this is seen in their having torn away the cathedral at Geneva, built by the Ultramontanes with their own money, solicited by Mgr. Mermillod in France and elsewhere, and coolly appropriated it to themselves. If there is really a nucleus of Christian faith and piety in the movement in Switzerland, it is to be hoped that Bishop Herzog and those of like mind with him will find it out and resolutely extricate it from the enveloping fibres of this bald and malignant infidelity. And the following statistics of the Swiss Old Catholic, or, as it calls itself, Christian Catholic Church, for the year ending June 1, 1882, give some encouragement to believe this. A considerable advance on the previous year is reported. There had been 895 baptisms and 1,428 confirmations, showing that the sarcastic description of them given once in the "*Nation*," as pretended Catholics who cared nothing for the ordinances of Christianity, certainly does not apply now. Bishop Herzog (who also, through Reinkeus, derives his episcopal succession from Utrecht) has in all confirmed 6,000 persons.

But while we must hold our judgment in suspense over the Old Catholicism of Switzerland, we may say of the Old Catholicism of Germany, that if, proceeding as it so largely did from the universities, it has been too scholastic, it has nevertheless been genuinely and immovably believing. All sorts of designs aimed to get hold of it at first, and it has cost time and patience to disentangle the knots of their maleficent friendship. But when the eminent lay adherent, Huber, declared it a distinctively Christian and distinctively religious movement, which, as such, had nothing to do with political parties, a malignant liberalism, balked of its expectations from it, abused him and withdrew.

The movement at once developed an unexpected cordiality towards Protestantism, as seen in Döllinger's grand tribute to Luther. Still, it is Catholic, not Protestant. In reality, it regards this old antagonism as one which we are called to leave behind. While not following Luther or Calvin, regarded as founders of denominations, it bestows upon them

such a meed of admiration as Presbyterians would pay to Wesley, or Methodists to Knox. But with England and the form of her Reformation it is evidently on the way to a thorough and most happy coalition.

If Old Catholicism has grievously fallen short of the first expectations formed of it, in forgetfulness that as Rome was not built in a day, so she assuredly will not die in a day, on the other hand, even the few statistics given above warrant us in believing that it has a meaning and a work still to be fulfilled. We may, until more reasons for despondency appear than have yet been produced, hope that it will fare with it as with the church of Utrecht. The revolt of that great archbishopric from Rome, which at first augured well for the enfranchisement of Dutch Catholicism, died down to a Gideon's band of six thousand. But after one hundred and fifty years of waiting, this is suddenly found to have a significance for Germany and for Switzerland such as might well cheer it to a longer waiting, even should these promising first fruits in this wider range in a measure fall off. And the Old Catholicism of Germany, in turn, which, if less deeply and contemplatively devout, rests upon a wider basis of thought and a bolder yet Catholic liberty in discipline, even if it should, like Utrecht, die down to comparative nothingness, after its first ambitious hopes of soon giving an archbishop to Munich and another to Freiburg may, perhaps, remain as a seed of a future enlargement as much beyond it in range as it has been beyond Utrecht.

Utrecht, it may be remarked, has adhered to the celibacy of the clergy, which, under so strong a pressure of Ultramontane hostility, we may well believe, confines the priesthood to such as maintain a good report under this condition. She was at first displeased with the German deviation in this particular, but she has thought better of it, and has signified, after all, her continued fellowship with the Germans.

Whatever may be the immediate fortunes of this or that aspect of Old Catholicism, our age, at least, is remarkable in showing at so many points men, and many men (besides that woman who o'ertops them all, Sister Augustine), who are ready to depose Rome from her supremacy, without becoming either unbelievers or Protestants, while yet they ardently admire both Luther and Calvin and the churches founded by them. Rein- kens, Döllinger, Hyacinthe Loyson, Michaud, Herzog, are men whose immediate plans may lack breadth or prove unattainable. But may we not hope that they will at least turn out to be reformers before the Reformation, gradually, by slighted but not ineffective strokes, working a breach in the walls of Rome, through which, under some mightier impulse of the Spirit of Christ than has yet fallen on them, and in some favoring time, the Christian soul of true Catholicism, distinct from Protestantism and yet not oppugnant to it, may escape from its present thralldom and the groveling superstitions which ensawathe it, and may show that Christ did not exhaust his riches at the Reformation?

Charles C. Starbuck.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE REVISION REVISED: Three Articles reprinted from the "Quarterly Review." . . . To which is added a Reply to Bishop Ellicott's Pamphlet in defense of the Revisers and their Greek Text of the New Testament, etc., etc. By JOHN WILLIAM BURGON, B. D., Dean of Chichester. 8vo, pp. xl., 549. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street.

This is a remarkable book. The learning, the daring, the wit, the vigor of style, which attracted attention to the articles at once on their appearance, are quite as striking as ever in the careful revision and not inconsiderable expansion which — although no mention of the fact is made on the title-page — they have undergone in the present volume. Indeed, some of the author's characteristics, and those unfortunately not the most admirable, are even more conspicuous than before. The book, as it stands, will doubtless find a permanent place among the "Curiosities of Sacred Literature."

Where so many quotations and literary allusions are made, one cannot, perhaps, reasonably expect that all should commend themselves. But 2 Pet. ii. 22, which the author puts upon his title-page, and again prefixes to the first article, is so gratuitously offensive that the reader experiences relief at discovering a forced explanation of it on page 335. Other references start opposite reflections to those which the Dean intended: as when he addresses to his opponents the warning, "Let not him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off;" and again, for a reply to one of his more troublesome critics, contents himself with the words, *Ὁ φροντὶς Ἰπποκλείδῃ* — apparently forgetting that, according to the story (Herod. 6, 129), this exclamation was all Hippocles had to say when expostulated with for making a sorry show of himself by dancing, half intoxicated, head downwards, on a table.

The logic of the book is not the least of its marvels. The author says (after Sir Edmund Beckett), that it is of itself enough to "settle" the Revision that the Revisers presumed to settle the Greek text in every disputed case as it came along, — "at a moment's notice," "as if by intuition," "by an act which can only be described as the exercise of instinct," "by a 'rough and ready' process," etc., etc.; elsewhere, however, he again and again declares the work to be foredoomed by its (alleged¹) adoption of the Greek text of Drs. Westcott and Hort, a text which these accomplished scholars have been thirty years in elaborating. Again: he contends that whenever in the Jerusalem chamber Dr. Scrivener, on the one hand, and Drs. Westcott and Hort, on the other, were at variance respecting a reading, the Greek text ought to have been let alone; for the rest of the Revisers "knew themselves to be incompetent," "extemporized their opinions," "were scarcely qualified to vote at all." Yet the Dean himself — for this is the main object of the book — proposes to reopen the case and adjudicate finally upon it with the *general public* sitting in the judgment-seat.

¹ This allegation, however current in certain quarters, is erroneous. As Dr. Scrivener testifies (Introduction, etc. 3d ed., p. 530, note), "The textual labors of the Cambridge duumvirate . . . had a real influence, though, as a comparison of their text with that of the Revisionists would easily show, by no means a predominating one."

But it is the author's personal qualities, as exhibited in this volume, which most demand attention at present. Though some of them are amusing, others, alas, are the reverse. The book affords an instructive study in psychology and morals. Its conceit is colossal. Not only does the Dean admonish a leading reviewer to be very circumspect when he sits in judgment on one who "has begrudged no amount of labor," "who for very many years past has given to textual criticism the whole of his time, has freely sacrificed to it health, ease, relaxation, even necessary rest,"—and parade the "eight years" devoted to one task of collation, "the five and a half years" given to another part of the same "task which taxed me severely,"—and modestly open his reply to Bishop Ellicott in the words, "Really you are so manifestly unacquainted (except at second-hand and only in an elementary way) with the points actually under discussion, that, were it not for the adventitious importance attaching to any utterance of yours, deliberately put forth, at this time, as Chairman of the New Testament body of Revisers, I should have taken no notice of your pamphlet,"—and indulge in such remarks as, "not half our references were known to Tischendorf," "only a fraction of the evidence was known to Tischendorf," "all your slipshod, inaccurate statements were obtained at second-hand," "your practice has evidently been to appropriate patristic references without thought or verification (prudently to abstain from dropping a hint how you came by them), but to use them like dummies for show. At the end of a few years (naturally enough) you entirely forget the circumstance, and proceed vigorously to box the ears of the first unlucky Dean who comes in your way, whom you suspect of having come by his learning (such as it is) in the same slovenly manner. Forgive me for declaring (while my ears are yet tingling) that if you were even moderately acquainted with this department of sacred science you would see at a glance that my patristic references are *never* obtained at second hand: for the sufficient reason that elsewhere they are not to be met with" [!]—but, beyond all this and much more of the sort, he declares that the history and the conclusions of textual criticism during the present century, the methods and the results of such scholars as Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, are "an egregious blunder," rest on "shallow empiricism," "weak superstition," "vulgar prejudice," etc., etc. The spectacle of the dauntless Dean, with flaming sword, "charging" the well-intrenched batteries of the textual scholars of all Christendom, and thinking single-handed to rout their "infatuated" hosts,—"c'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre!"

A specimen of his bearing as a controversialist is afforded by the language to the Chairman of the New Testament Revision company which has just been quoted. Unfortunately, such utterances are not isolated. A reader feels moved to ask whether the scholars of England have actually come to arms over the Revision, that the laws of common courtesy must be silent. The Inspired Word, to be sure, is higher than the highest of those whose business it is to give it free course, incomparably more august than the most venerable servant of that church which exists to preserve and illustrate it. But does loyalty to that Word compel the worthy Dean to class himself with those who "rail at dignities?" Must he use language offensive to all ears polite, in order to demonstrate his fidelity to One who spake as never man spake? From time to time, indeed, we meet such admonitions as, "Your defense must be conducted not by

sneers and an affectation of superior enlightenment; still less by intimidation, scornful language, and all those bad methods," etc., etc. — of whom, pray, speaketh the prophet this? of himself, or of some other man? All this, it may be said, however, is matter of taste. Well, then, let it pass without further dispute. Turn from the Dean's manner in controversy and look at his weapons.

He alleges (p. xxx.) that the project of a Revision "was eagerly snatched at by two irresponsible scholars of the University of Cambridge for obtaining the general sanction of the Revising body, and thus indirectly of Convocation, for a private venture of their own;" speaks of their action as an endeavor "by a side-wind to obtain for their own singular revision of the Greek text the sanction of the united body;" calls it "a manœuvre," "a furtive production" of their labors; "a text which was kept close;" "might be seen only by the Revisers, and even they were tied down to secrecy;" "under pledge that they should neither show nor communicate its contents to any one else;" and the Dean adds, "all this strikes us as painful in a high degree."

The use of *poisoned* weapons, then, is still allowable in honorable warfare! Dean Burgon knows, or at least might know, the groundlessness of the base imputation he reiterates. To specify a few of the facts bearing on this point which may be presumed to be familiar to any biblical student, facts which occur to the present writer without research and without conference: Drs. Westcott and Hort in their Introduction (p. 323) acknowledge the correction of a certain number of misprints in the first or private issue to have been furnished them by "*correspondents* in England, Germany, and America;" their text was known and publicly characterized in Germany at least as early as 1875;¹ was "freely used" by Dr. Moulton in his second edition of Winer, the preface of which is dated in 1876; yes, as far back as 1859, Dr. C. J. Vaughan, in his first edition of the "Epistle to the Romans with Notes," is "allowed by Mr. Westcott to anticipate the publication of that complete recension of the text of the New Testament on which he has been for some time engaged" . . . "the principles of which . . . will be found clearly stated in his own words which follow" — and which cover a couple of closely printed pages, set forth (with illustrations) the doctrine of historical or comparative criticism, and recognize Mr. Hort as his coadjutor. Even Dr. Scrivener, the second edition of whose Introduction, published in 1874, is referred to in corroboration of the calumny, expressly declares that their text "has been placed in the hands of a few scholars, *especially* of the editors' colleagues in the work of revising," etc., and proceeds to state its readings in such passages as he discusses in the remainder of his volume. Nay, Dean Burgon himself incidentally admits² that from a diligent study of the preface prefixed to the "limited and private" issue of 1870 he has formed a perfectly correct estimate of their "Introduction" *before its publication*. In the presence of such facts, what becomes of the charge of "furtiveness," and "manœuvring," and "unworthy secrecy?" It would be well if the over-zealous Dean could be compelled, before some public tribunal, civil or ecclesiastical, either to revoke it, or to prove it; — not for the vindication of the Cambridge professors, whose character is their sufficient defense wherever they are known, but by way of doing something

¹ See Hilgenfeld's *Einl. ins N. T.* p. 812, note.

² Page 239; comp. *Review*, p. 313.

towards allaying the unjust prejudice which his aspersions have raised against the Revision.

But the head of his offending has not yet been reached. In contrasting the Revision of 1611 with that 1881, he says, "Then . . . the Vance Smiths stood without and found fault. But in the affair of 1881 Dr. Vance Smith revises and ventilates heresy from within." . . . "He was (as might have been anticipated from his published writings) the most unprofitable member of the Revising body." [N. B. When it suits the Dean's purpose, he can call him "a conspicuous member" (p. 205).] "Why, then, at first was he surreptitiously elected?" etc., etc. (with much more in the same strain).

Now why this attempt to "move Acheron"? The writer of this notice is not "a Unitarian," nor a personal friend of the Rev. Dr. G. Vance Smith; and he takes the liberty of disclosing the fact, that what the Dean of Chichester stigmatizes as "the vile Socinian gloss which disfigures the margin of Rom. ix. 5" was unanimously rejected by the American Revision Company. Solely in the name, therefore, of the common interests of scholarship and of religion is this protest lifted against the public insult which the Dean has offered to both. He affects to be more or less informed respecting the views and votes of individual members of the Revising body; but doubtless he may be safely challenged to specify a single change in the entire New Testament which he knows Dr. Smith to have originated. Nay, he is perfectly well aware that no change appears there which was not put where it stands by the combined votes of two thirds of the Revisers present. Dr. Vance Smith, like every other single member, was of himself powerless. It was the *corporate vote* which created the change. On the members who thus united their voices rests the entire responsibility for the creative act. All this Dean Burgon knows as well as any one. Can charity itself, then, pronounce insinuations like those just quoted to be anything less than an attempt to enlist against the Revision the most unworthy motives. And, sad to say, there is many another petty and indirect appeal to the *odium theologicum* which in revising his articles the Dean has taken the opportunity to introduce. Surely the Englishman's traditional love of "fair play" must be extinct — or at least dormant — in ecclesiastical circles, or it will burst out against John William Burgon in unmistakable reprobation. Nay, as, in spite of the partisan bitterness which the book exhibits, indications are happily not altogether wanting that its author's nature has a better side, let us cherish the hope that when time has allowed passion and prejudice to subside, he will himself make the only amends in his power, — "a public retractation and a very humble apology."

As for the Revision, — plainly it must bide its time. The "previous question" respecting the underlying Greek text has been raised, and that question must be fairly and fully answered. In the process the Dean of Chichester may expect surprises. Even that scholar whom he pronounces to be "*facile princeps* in sacred criticism," "the only really competent textual critic of the whole party," and whose many and meritorious services to biblical learning every student gratefully acknowledges, will nevertheless be found — if the testimony of those who have made the same studies may be trusted — to be by no means the infallible oracle the Dean takes him for. Those "first principles" of criticism, too, — which the Dean confesses elude him, but which are only the laws

of evidence, the dictates of "round-about common sense" — will be, let us hope, so far apprehended as to deter him from reckoning manuscripts which exhibit *both* $\delta\varsigma$ and $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ in 1 Tim. iii. 16, as favoring the reading $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$. But whether in the end he be convinced of his misjudgments or not is of comparatively small account. For he proves himself to be deficient in the calmness, caution, judicial equipoise, which are indispensable prerequisites to success in criticism, — in short, to be naturally incapacitated for ever becoming a *critic*. If he will only devote his indefatigable energy and enterprise to *research*, — to bringing to light and cataloguing documents, to ransacking and indexing the Fathers, — he will earn the thanks of biblical scholars throughout Christendom.

Meanwhile, those who think themselves to have reason for believing the Revised New Testament to be the most accurate extant reproduction in English of the words of Christ and his apostles will be at liberty to treat it accordingly. In the end, no doubt, it will be dealt with on all hands *according to its merits*. Better treatment no one ought to ask for it. The final verdict upon it will be independent of the incautious, or the inconsistent, or the fulsome, or the partisan utterances of its friends on either side of the water. Even now the obligations of justice and honor towards it ought not to be set at naught by its enemies.

J. H. Thayer.

M. TULLII CICERONIS DE NATURA DEORUM LIBRI TRES, with Introduction and Commentary by JOSEPH B. MAYOR, Professor of Moral Philosophy at King's College, London. Vol. I., pp. 228. 1880. Vol. II., pp. 319. 1883. Cambridge: At the University Press.

A third volume of this work still remains to be published, containing the text of the third book of the "De Natura Deorum" and the commentary upon it; yet, in the two already issued there is much that will be of special interest and value to the student of theology and of the history of philosophy, as well as to lovers of the Latin classics.

The "Introduction" contains an historical sketch of Greek philosophy, an analysis of Books I. and II., an account of the *dramatis personæ* in this imaginary colloquy between representatives of the Epicurean, Stoic, and Academic sects (to which Cicero represents himself as listening, and of which he gives report to his readers), a discussion of the sources of each of the two books, an account of the text, and remarks upon Latin orthography.

"The historical sketch," which covers the period from Thales to Cicero, was enlarged and published by itself in 1881, chiefly, as the author states, for the benefit of "undergraduates at the university, or others who are commencing the study of the philosophical works of Cicero, Plato, or Aristotle, in the original language," finding, he adds, "other histories of ancient philosophy too long, too full, too hard, too abstract, or too vague, for a first sketch."

As thus expanded, this sketch is divided into three parts: the pre-Socratic philosophy of nature; Socrates to Aristotle, — the philosophy of nature and man; and the post-Aristotelian philosophy of man. In this last division is included "the characteristics of the later philosophy" and "Eclecticism," under which head the topics treated of are "Philosophy at Rome," and "Cicero, his character and philosophical writings, their value for the history of philosophy, and his contemporaries in this department."

The "Analysis" of each of these two books of the "*De Natura Deorum*" has evidently been prepared with great care, and will be found of much assistance in following the course of thought. That of the first book states, first, the substance of the Epicurean argument; and, secondly, the chief points of the Academic criticism of the Epicurean theology. That of the second book — which is altogether the most important part of the treatise — is particularly full and minute, presenting Cicero's exposition of the Stoic theology in detail, under the four heads: The proof of the Divine existence; the Divine nature; Providential government of the universe; and Providential care for man.

The editor, recognizing the true character of Cicero's treatise as not strictly an original work, but an "adaptation from the Greek," as Cicero himself styled his essays on philosophy in general, goes into a very thorough discussion of the question of the "sources" of each book, which includes an interesting account of the Herculanean MSS., first discovered in 1752, one of them containing a work (whose supposed author was Philodemus, a contemporary of Cicero) of such striking resemblance to a part of Book I. of the "*De Natura Deorum*" that it has been generally held to be the original of that. With regard to this question, on which there has been so much difference of opinion among critics, Professor Mayor's conclusion is that the "historical section" certainly, and the "expository section" probably, were taken both by Cicero and Philodemus from a common original, — in all likelihood Zeno, the teacher of both; that the "source" of the rest of the Epicurean discourse is doubtful, while that of the reply of the Academic in that book, and of the whole of Book II., was probably some work of Posidonius, the Eclectic philosopher, who was also one of Cicero's teachers.

That the greatest pains have been taken to procure a correct "text" for this edition is apparent from the fact that, while in the main it follows that of Müller, in the Teubner series (1878), the editor has not only, as he states, "weighed throughout the evidence, external and internal, for each reading to the best of his ability, and examined all the evidence which could throw light on the condition of the text up to the end of the fifteenth century," but also in the "Critical Notes," and in his illustrations, drawn from this work of Cicero, of the more common sources of the corruption in manuscripts, gives the reader just the information requisite for forming an independent judgment.

It is hardly necessary — such is Professor Mayor's reputation — to state that his exposition of the text in the "Commentary" is scholarly and full, leaving no important point untouched, and in the main satisfactory. Even where exception might be taken to his interpretation of some obscure or doubtful passages, the different views which have been maintained, with the considerations in favor of each, are so candidly and fairly presented, that the student receives all the aid he needs for making up his own decision.

Particularly noticeable are the precise and apt renderings of many words and phrases and the elucidation of the meaning of important words or those occurring in a peculiar sense, such as *rogator*, *auctor*, *superstitiosus*, *æther*, *natura*, and other words used as philosophical terms. The view of the origin and significance of *religio* held by Lactantius, Professor Mayor adopts, and quotes in its favor various expressions in several of Cicero's orations, such as *religione substringere* and *solvi religi-*

one; yet he admits that Cicero's derivation (given in Book II. of the "De Natura Deorum") "is supported by the old verse preserved by Gellius: *religentem te oportet esse religiosus ne fuas*, and is favored by Curtius." He might, however, have referred, also, to other passages of Cicero and to other authorities, ancient and modern, on this side of the question.

The treatment, in the notes, of difficult and nice points of syntax and forms of expression peculiar to Cicero is careful and thorough; and the comments upon the subject-matter throughout — as, for example, those in which various theological, ethical, or metaphysical doctrines of the different schools are considered, and those in which religious, legal, and political usages of the Romans are explained — are clear and concise in statement and well adapted to lead the student to an accurate and full understanding of the thought.

The ripe scholarship of the editor has certainly been applied in this work, with skill and good judgment, to a worthy subject; for the "De Natura Deorum," as Schoeman has declared, is "both the most accessible and the most complete monument of the theology of the ancients extant, presenting briefly the views of the older thinkers in this department, and in more extended and systematic form the doctrines of those philosophical schools to which, in later times, the great majority of men of education belonged."

E. P. Crowell.

THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By DR. GUSTAV FRIEDRICH OEHLER, late Professor Ordinarius of Theology, and Ephorus of the Evangelical Theological Seminary in Tübingen. A Revision of the Translation in Clarks' Foreign Theological Library, with the Additions of the Second German Edition, an Introduction, and Notes. By GEORGE E. DAY, Professor of the Hebrew Language and Literature and Biblical Theology in Yale College. Pp. xix, 594. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1883.

Is this such a revision as to make it an essential advantage to have this edition rather than that of the Clarks, and thereby to justify the putting of it into the American market to the prejudice of theirs?

The British translation is a sound and clear one. It used to be said that the Clarks' translators learned German as they went along, but their translator of Oehler had evidently learned it thoroughly before he began, and has rendered it into fluent and accurate English. The modifications of the learned New Haven editor, however, if they can hardly be esteemed essentially necessary, still add a good deal of point and precision, and improve the ease of style. It would be an extraordinary translation that would not in many places admit the file, so that if it is a predetermined thing with American publishers at any time to forestall the American market, they do well to secure as competent a reviser.

The additional advantages of this edition may be thus enumerated: (1.) Very considerable additions from the last German edition. These are by no means valueless, especially in their reference to the newer criticism. Yet we should hardly say that they present matters in so essentially novel a light as to require owners of the Clarks' edition to make a rush for the other. Advantage (2.) The greatly enlarged index of texts, now complete. (3.) The reference to the pages of translations rather than of German originals. (4.) The restoration of italics in many em-

phasized passages of the original, where the Edinburgh translation had neglected the emphasis. (5.) Much less agreeable print. (6.) One volume hard, instead of two volumes easy to handle.

On the whole, after considerable comparison of the two editions with each other, and so far as necessary with the German, we should say that the American edition stands decidedly within the line of moral permissibility.

C. C. Starbuck.

HOW TO HELP THE POOR. By Mrs. JAMES T. FIELDS. 16mo, pp. 125. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1884.

Systematic charity has ceased to be a novelty, and yet books of information with regard to it are as much needed as ever. For the improved administration of benevolence cannot fully succeed until coöperation is wellnigh universal, and such hand-books as this, simple but scientific, establishing the principles of the new method by concrete illustrations, are the best possible means for removing the ignorance and resulting apathy which still exist. This little book is both earnest and practical, and is therefore fitted for the double task of awakening interest and of turning it in right directions. It is based upon the workings of the Boston Associated Charities and the suggestions of the best recent writers, and the rules which it lays down are explained and vindicated by actual cases. It emphasizes especially the dependence of any form of organization, and of the best forms most of all, upon the services of volunteer visitors; in the words of the prefatory note, "Every page of this book is a prayer for more helpers." The discussion covers the importance and method of organizing public charities, the usefulness of weekly district conferences, the manner of investigating new cases of want, and the services that visitors may render to the children, the aged, and the intemperate.

W. E. Wolcott.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

FROM J. B. LIPPINCOTT AND COMPANY, PHILADELPHIA.

The Mystery of Creation and of Man: to which is added A New View of Future Punishment. By L. C. Baker. Second edition. Pp. 229. 1884.

FROM G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK.

The Words of Christ as Principles of Personal and Social Growth. By John Bascom, Author of "Philosophy of Religion," etc. Pp. v., 220. 1884. \$1.25.

FROM ANSON D. F. RANDOLPH AND COMPANY, NEW YORK.

The Yoke of Christ in the Duties and Circumstances of Life. By Anthony W. Thorold, D. D., Lord Bishop of Rochester, Author of "The Presence of Christ," "The Gospel of Christ." Author's Edition. Pp. 364. \$1.25.

FROM FUNK AND WAGNALLS, NEW YORK.

Pulpit and Grave: A Volume of Funeral Sermons and Addresses from leading Pulpits of America, England, Germany, and France. Containing 90 Sermons, Sketches of Sermons, and Obituary Addresses; also 450 Classified Texts, Scripture Readings, Death-Bed Testimonies, Points on Funeral Etiquette, etc., etc. Edited by E. J. Wheeler, A. M. Pp. v., 365. 1884. \$1.50.

Thirty Thousand Thoughts; being Extracts covering a Comprehensive Circle of Religious and Allied Topics, gathered from the best available Sources. Edited by the Rev. Canon H. D. M. Spence, M. A., Rev. Joseph S. Exell, M. A., Rev. Charles Neil, M. A. With Introduction by the Very Rev. J. S. Howson, D. D., Dean of Chester. Pp. xii., 539. 1884. \$3.50.

Manual of Revivals. Practical Hints and Suggestions from Histories of Revivals and Biographies of Revivalists. By Rev. G. W. Harvey, M. A., author of "A System of Christian Rhetoric," etc. Pp. xxviii., 332. 1884. \$1.25.

FROM F. A. ROBINSON AND COMPANY, NORWICH.

Clavis Rerum. Pp. xiv., 142. 1883. \$1.00.

FROM HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY, BOSTON.

Due West; or, Round the World in Ten Months. By Maturin M. Ballou. Pp. xii., 387. 1884. \$1.50.

An Historical Sketch of Sacerdotal Celibacy in the Christian Church. By Henry C. Lea. Second edition, enlarged. Pp. xx., 682. 1884. \$4.50.

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THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF MAN.

WHAT is man? What is his meaning and his final purpose? Every philosophy, every theology, every religion must give some answer. It is not too much to say that their value may be gauged by the answer they furnish. If Christianity is to vindicate its claim to absolute truth, we shall expect from it also an adequate response.

It must be a thoroughly Christian response. To look at man from any lower point of view than that proper to Christianity as distinctively the religion of Christ would be a confession of failure. The problem of humanity can be solved only in the light of Christ's revelation. The scientific, archæological, and ethical discussions which form the bulk of that division of our systematic theologies denominated anthropology have their value in their place, but in no sense do they furnish a Christian doctrine of man. Theology has here a greater work to do.

It is the object of this article to show that in *the idea of sonship revealed by Christ* are to be found the distinctive features of the Christian conception of man. It is not asserted that this idea includes all the truth which Christianity has taught man concerning himself. As Christianity itself is larger than any system of doctrine, so the Christian conception of man is larger than any single form of scriptural or doctrinal representation. But upon no other form has Christianity so deeply stamped its meaning. The Fatherhood of God gives us the truest and most comprehensive conception of the divine nature. The sonship of man is its pregnant correlate.

Our examination of the subject must start from the Person of the Redeemer. The Incarnate Son is the perfect Revelation. As

in Him God is revealed in his true character, so that He could say, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," so humanity is revealed in Him in its true meaning. To know Christ is to know man in his perfection; it is to catch the divine secret of his essential being. Now, since Christ was divine, we might expect that his life in manhood would manifest and illustrate humanity pre-eminently upon the side on which it is allied to God, namely, in the moral and spiritual life. Accordingly, we find in Him the realization of man's true relation to his Maker as a son or child of God, a revelation at once of human capacity, duty, and destiny. What is the nature of this sonship? In a word, fellowship with God and moral and spiritual likeness to Him. It has its deep, unfailing springs in the prevenient love of the divine Father. It is the manifestation of a corresponding love. Its vital element is a personal, intimate knowledge of God. It involves trust, dependence, perfect obedience. Its meat is to do the will of the Father in Heaven. It does not exclude, nay rather it requires, a process of moral development, in which temptations withstood and discipline cheerfully undergone, in the freedom of an uncoerced will, yet only through the power of the Father, take a prominent place. It voices its communion and its needs in prayer. It glorifies the Father by making known his perfections in the mirror of a filial life, and the testimony of a filial love. Not least—may we not even say greatest—it manifests itself in the love of brotherhood to all whom the Father loves, devoting itself in absolute self-sacrifice to the task of restoring his other children to his fellowship. It was this perfect revelation of sonship that received the seal of the Father's approval at the great crises of the Saviour's ministry, "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased." And here we need not hesitate to employ, as explicative of Christ's filial humanity, the title Son of God. It is true that it belongs to Him in a special and unique sense, in which no man can share it with Him. The New Testament teaches the metaphysical oneness of the Son with the Father, clearly distinguishing his preëxistent divine nature from our human nature, into which He entered at the incarnation, and calling Him in this higher sense the Son. But granting all this, it is also true that the term Son designates that characteristic in the eternal relations of God which can be exhibited in manhood and imitated by men. The essential relation must indeed underlie the personal and spiritual relation. It is unique, transcendent, incomprehensible. But the conceptions of Fatherhood and sonship give us that which is comprehensible, capable of revela-

tion not only to humanity, but in humanity and of being copied by humanity. When God made men in his own image, He made them capable of entering into a relation to Him like that in which the divine Son had eternally stood to the divine Father. He provided from the first for a unique revelation of sonship in humanity, in which the eternal relation should be manifested, not partially but perfectly, in One who should be at once Son of God and Son of Man, who should stand in such a central and universal relation to the race that in Him the divine and the human sonship should be forever united and all things in heaven and earth reconciled through Him. Father and Son are not terms that hide, but terms that reveal. We forget that the person of Christ is of itself the highest revelation, when we thrust back into the incomprehensibilities of an eternal metaphysical relation these names so luminous with spiritual meaning, which were intended to give us the saving knowledge of God. Nor may we ignore the probable fact that though, from the first, God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, yet it was only through the consciousness of a moral and spiritual sonship won by obedience to his Father's will that the profounder consciousness dawned upon Him of his eternal oneness with God. We do not, therefore, when we say with Paul, "God sent his Son, that we might receive the adoption of sons," employ incommensurate terms, but rather express in its highest conception that filial relation which constitutes men "partakers of the divine nature."

In the light of Christ's person and teachings we have revealed to us the actual state of man as a sinner. Sin, as has been truly said, is not a doctrine but a fact. The Bible spends little time explaining its nature and origin and its place in the divine plan. Christianity takes sin as it finds it, an awful reality, and goes to work to remove it. Christ, by his revelation of sonship, makes known at once the essential character and the guilt of sin. It is the complete opposite of sonship. The sinful spirit is the contradiction of the filial spirit. It defeats the divine purpose in man, putting self in the place the Father ought to have, and substituting pride and self-sufficiency for humble trust and dependence. It makes communion with God impossible. There is, indeed, a natural sonship of which no man can divest himself. By virtue of creation and by their original spiritual likeness to their Maker, as well as by their capacity for the communion of love with Him, all are his children. The Bible begins with the doctrine of the divine image in man. Christ, in the Sermon on the

Mount, taught the universal Fatherhood of God. Paul, standing on the Areopagus, illumined with new meaning the words of the heathen Aratus "We are his offspring." The divine image is inalienable. One of the mediæval theologians said of it, "Even in hell, though it may burn, it cannot be destroyed." It is the essential element of manhood. It is the pre-supposition and point of attachment for redemption. But the manhood revealed by Christ was something higher than this. The natural sonship is only the starting-point for the moral and spiritual. The latter must be achieved in the intercourse of loving union with the Father. And consequently, since the sinner is alienated and separated from God, he can in no true sense be called his child. And yet, since the divine voice speaks in his conscience and proclaims his relationship to his Father and his duty to Him, he knows himself to be guilty. He wanders in the world his Father has given him, a child who has sold his birthright of life and blessedness, orphaned by his own evil choice. There is an unsolved antinomy in his life. He is out of harmony with himself, his fellow-men, and the world, since he is out of harmony with his heavenly Father. Of all beings in the universe his condition is the most pitiable. If the Christian conception of man tried to grasp his essence as it finds him in the state of sin, it would end, as the human philosophies and even the religions do, in hopeless failure. Our prevalent scientific philosophy tries at the same time to do justice to the fact of sin and yet to explain it as no sin at all, only partially evolved conduct, and between the two stools it falls to the ground. Christianity, having found the meaning of sin in the revelation in Christ, goes on to further complete its conception of man by its doctrine of redemption by Christ.

The atonement has for its object to bring men into that spiritual sonship to God which Christ has shown to belong to the true idea of humanity. It recognizes the fact that there is a true sense in which men are unable, since they are sinners, to obtain their birthright. There are two parties in this relation, and therefore there must be reconciliation. Horace Bushnell has somewhere spoken in his inimitable way of the divine tact and consideration for mankind which led God to save men by a man. But it was more than a condescension of divine love; it was a necessity of spiritual law. Only the perfect and universal Man could reconcile God and men. Only by a complete human experience, or rather, only by such a human experience as was possible to the Son of Man, the central Man, could He so enter into the solidarity of the race as to

become its true spiritual head and representative, and so make its peace with God. The divine Son wrought out in human life a perfect sonship, in which the divine and the human were inseparably blended. It was likewise the perfect realization of brotherhood with men. It was not merely the physical and natural oneness of the Saviour with mankind that gave Him his capacity as a Redeemer, but that personal oneness which was the result of his life of filial obedience to his Father's will of redemption, and in virtue of which He became in all points like his brethren. Not alone with reference to the resurrection body did Paul say, "The first man Adam became a living soul. The last Adam became a life-giving spirit." In Christ a new spiritual power was revealed in manhood for the redemption of men. It is in the high region of his personality, where the divine and the human were perfectly one in the realization of the filial relation with the Father and the brotherly relation with man, that the atonement reveals its profoundest meaning. So long as we rise no higher than the moral sphere, and attempt to illustrate the atonement by legal analogies, we fail to catch the secret of its efficacy. But when we see in the Saviour's sufferings and death the perfecting of his sonship in humanity and his brotherhood with men, the reason begins to dawn upon us why it avails to bring many sons into glory. It was more than example, more than the manifestation of that Fatherly love of God which has power to soften the obdurate heart. In his perfect filial obedience, faithful even unto the death of the cross, Christ verily made propitiation for human sin, since in it He manifested at once the divine displeasure towards sin and the divine will of mercy towards mankind, thus declaring God's righteousness and honoring his holy law.

And so it comes that in the Christian conception of man the true manhood is conditioned by redemption. The Son of God has vindicated the right of sonship for humanity, for He has made the filial relation once more possible. His death is a pledge to God and men of that possibility. And now in the divine economy of grace the Father's favor is given to the sinner without the need of waiting till it has been won by him. Christ himself has won it for every soul who will accept Him for its Saviour; the Son of God has won it from God, the Son of Man for men. By faith, on the ground of his atonement, men may come into the filial relation with their heavenly Father, and be accepted by Him and made partakers with Christ of his love and favor. In the legal phrase which Paul, fresh from the teaching of the Jewish law, so

often used, God justifies the sinner, — that is, accepts him as if he were righteous, in order that he may achieve righteousness. In another phrase, also Pauline, which tenderly presents the same truth under the conception of sonship, God adopts the sinner, taking him to be his child and endowing him with all filial privileges, in order that he may become in heart and life a son. Nor does this objective act of God's grace stand alone. There is an inward change wrought, no less indispensable to the realization of the life of sonship. The subjective complement of the divine justification or adoption is regeneration, the new birth. In the depths of the soul, where lie its ultimate springs of action, the divine Spirit and the human will — in one complex act which none but a superficial philosophy dare claim to have analyzed — together work a new purpose, a choice of God as the supreme end, a union with the Father through the Son. It is a change that is an entire revolution, a new creation. Through the birth-throes of this great crisis the child of God is born, the soul enters into the new life of filial love and receives the spirit of adoption whereby it cries, *Abba, Father*. And now the true manhood is begun. As Martensen says, "The ego in man, his personal identity, is the same in essence after regeneration as it was before ; but by regeneration the essential principle of the ego is realized." Up to this time the Christian conception of manhood has been only a possibility. In the new birth it has come into real existence. He who falls short of the filial relation to God falls short of manhood as Christ defined it and made it possible. But the adopted and regenerate child of God, though he be the veriest infant in spiritual things, has entered into the heritage of the true humanity. He looks out upon a new horizon. He lives in a new world.

But the Christian conception of man remains spiritually and ethically imperfect, if we look merely at the genesis of the new life. The realization of sonship is along the line of a process of religious and moral development which presses forward to perfection. That selfish and unworthy view of Christianity which stops short with its negative aspects, and emphasizes chiefly the relief from punishment it affords, is based upon a total misconception of its nature. As well represent natural birth solely in the light of an escape from death, and ignore the life and growth of which it is the beginning. Justification and regeneration are not a goal, but a starting-point. They are not ends in themselves, but means to a far higher end. Christian salvation has for its aim nothing less than to redeem men from the power of sin and to bring them into

conformity with the perfect manhood in Jesus Christ. It cannot rest satisfied with the rights and privileges of sonship, but must also have the reality of it. And the process by which this result is reached conforms to the principles which underlie the Christian conception as we have thus far discovered it. Christ setting the example, Christ furnishing the power, are the two facts that regulate the Christian life. The Saviour's life drew its inspiration and power from his communion with his Father. The disciple's life is hid with Christ in God. He is united with the Father and the Son in loving fellowship. He abides in Christ as the branch in the vine. Christ's Spirit is the power that moulds his life. And yet in it all there is nothing merely physical or magical. The personal Father enters into personal communion with his child. The mystical union with Christ is a personal union of conscious reciprocity. The indwelling of the Spirit is the personal abiding of the Father and the Son in the soul. It is the bane of theology that it is forever going down into the sphere of the physical to explain the spiritual, forgetting that the analogies of force and unconscious life-processes which it employs can only incompletely and figuratively express the higher truths with which it deals. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. Here are two wholly different realms. The life of sonship is a life of personal fellowship with God. A fellowship of faith, it is true, and not of sight. Still faith is a real knowledge. It apprehends its object and experiences its reality. It belongs to the region of certitude, not of conjecture or probability. The prayer in which it finds its natural utterance is not a casting of vain words into an empty air, but a real communing with the Father of spirits and the Saviour of souls. The first truth of the new life is the personal presence of God and the power of intimate and filial converse with Him. And here lies the secret of the perennial power of the Christian conception of man. It grasps the essence of humanity at the highest point, namely, in man's personal and spiritual relations to God, and thus it necessarily comprehends all the lower elements in human development. Redemption begins at the top and works down. The ethical and the physical cannot but partake of the regeneration of the spiritual. Set a man right with God, and keep him right; let him grow in intimacy and fellowship with the Father and His Son Jesus Christ; and the lower ranges of his life cannot but be affected and progressively brought into subjection to the higher. It is the low and imperfect theory of Christianity which leaves out of view the

necessity of personal union with God, letting religion stiffen into formalism, and faith degenerate into intellectual assent to doctrine, that permits a defective morality and a barren life. But the more the filial spirit is formed within, the more the whole nature and activities of the man become conformed to the ideal of a complete Christian manhood. The life of love to God realizes itself in obedience. Dependence upon the Father and acquiescence in his will become the spiritual atmosphere of the soul. Temptations, trials, discipline work together for good. Selfishness is progressively overcome. The love of sonship begets the love of brotherhood. Those virtues and beauties of character which belong to the lower ideal of manhood manifest themselves and are sanctified and elevated to Christian graces. Gradually Christ is formed within, the image of the well-beloved Son impressed in deep, clear outlines upon the filial life.

But the Christian conception of man is capable of a larger application. We pass from the ethics of the individual to the ethics of society. Mankind in its broader relations comes within the scope of Christianity, which aims at the rehabilitation of the race as a whole. The designation Christ ordinarily gives this broader destination of man is the kingdom of God. But the idea of the kingdom is only formally different from that of sonship. The Sovereign is at the same time the Father. The principles of the divine government in the kingdom, so far as it relates to the children of God, are the principles of Fatherhood. The exalted Lord of the kingdom is the divinely-human Son, made Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead. The establishment of the kingdom on earth advances precisely in proportion to the acknowledgment of God's Fatherhood and the sway of filial love. It is to "Our Father which art in Heaven" that Christ has taught us to pray "Thy kingdom come!" More and more, as in the progress of doctrine in the New Testament the Jewish mode of thought yields to that universalism which is characteristic of Christianity, the kingdom falls into the background and the filial relation takes its place. But the truth it embodies remains in full power, the idea of an organized humanity doing God's work in the world, spreading his truth, working out his triumph. God's Fatherhood, man's sonship in the exalted Son, the brotherhood of men, — in principle and hope for all men, in reality for all believers in Jesus Christ, — this one idea in triple correlates, dominates the Christian conception of humanity, and gives the scope of Christian effort. It has from the earliest days of Christianity set

the problem of humanity in a new light. "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son," — "That we might receive the adoption of sons," — "And this commandment have we from Him, that he who loveth God love his brother also," — these are the truths that can effect the regeneration of mankind. In virtue of them Christianity has been able to lay hold upon the great teleological organs of society, shaping them to its use, so as to secure the organization of religious and moral power, and to bring the activities of the race more and more under its sway.

First of all, the *Family*. It is not correct to say that God has taken the analogy of the parental and filial relation to figure forth his eternal relation to the Logos, and his relation to us through Jesus Christ. Rather He created mankind upon the eternal model, and made the parental relation an image of the heavenly things, that it might ever turn men's hearts in loving trust to himself. From the Christian point of view, the family is the human unit, — not the bare unity of isolated individuality, which has no separate right of existence according to the Christian principle, but the organized unit, involving in its oneness multiplicity of members and variety of functions, here, too, like that unity of God which is manifold. As sin has gained its power in the world through heredity, so is grace to win its triumphs largely thus. Christianity accomplishes its best work in the home, where the human filial love is so readily transformed into love to the heavenly Father. If the Church Catholic, in vindicating for the children of the Christian household the right to that seal of God's Fatherly grace which is the sign of participation in the privileges of the children of God, cannot lay its finger upon a direct command, it has certainly caught the deepest meaning of Christianity and applied one of its truest principles. Christian nurture has still greater triumphs to achieve for Christ, when — as must be the case sooner or later — we shall have receded from that individualistic conception of humanity which obscures half the truth of the New Testament teachings respecting the family, and shall have restored to its place the Christian idea in its full meaning and beauty.

And next, *Religion*. For this Christianity has produced its adequate instrumentality in the church, the earthly agency by which the advancement of the kingdom of God is effected, as the family is the earthly agency for perpetuating it among men. Here, also, the constitutive principles are sonship and brotherhood. In the New Testament ideal the visible church is through and

through permeated by the invisible. The former, as an outward and operative institution, must derive all its efficiency from the latter. It belongs to the essence of the church that it is a company of sons in living communion with the Father and with each other through the glorified Son. Its means of grace, its sacraments, its worship have for their object to draw closer the bonds of sonship and brotherhood. All else is of subordinate importance. The particular polity is a means to the higher end, serviceable just so far as it attains that end. "There is one body, and one Spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all." Papacy, prelacy, presbytery, independency are to be judged by the success with which they carry out these objects and bring in more fully the kingdom of God. The same conception shapes the work of the church. Within, the brethren labor for each others' good, that all may attain unto the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a full-grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ, — manhood, brotherhood, sonship in the knowledge of the Son. Without lies the world, God's wandering children, the Christian's brethren in possibility and hope, to be won for Christ. Here is revealed the missionary destination of the church, which will not cease until the race is united in brotherhood under the Father in heaven. Truly a grander thought has never illumined the human mind.

Nor does the Christian conception of man leave out of view the other organs by which the great functions of society are performed. The state, the school, science, art, all come within its scope. There is no distinction of secular and religious in the Christian idea. The eternal Son created those needs and activities in man from which these institutions have grown. Their archetypes existed in his eternal creative thought. They were made by Christ and for Christ. At last they must receive their Christian meaning. The constant recognition which the Bible gives to the *State*, as a divine institution, is most significant. Not even in the apostolic days, when Christianity and the world confronted each other in the sharpest contrast, is one word uttered of revolution or opposition. The powers that be are ordained of God. The principles of Christianity could, in their own peaceful but irresistible way, take possession of human government just in proportion as they should take possession of mankind. The more the fundamental ideas of the kingdom of God come to be the living, operative

forces in the world, the more must the earthly kingdoms feel their transforming influence. Christianity carries within it the power of healing all abuses and righting all wrongs, and pledges its truth that the time will come — though it may be far off, very far off — when the Fatherhood of God and the love of Christ shall be the moving powers of human government, when wars shall cease, and human brotherhood be universally acknowledged. The *School* also falls under the domination of the Christian principle. It stands between the family and the church as one of the most powerful instrumentalities in training children for the divine Father. Christianity, it is true, lays its first claim upon the spiritual and religious in man, but it takes into its ideal of sonship, likewise, the intellectual and the physical. It must lay its hallowing touch upon every faculty of man, and bring all into subjection to Christ. Unsanctified intellect, unsanctified power are Satan's chief instrumentalities. The spirit that would not merely deliver the school from the power of sectarianism, but also unchristianize it, is at variance with that of Christ. And, lastly, we may not in this survey ignore *Science* and *Art*. Truth and beauty are divine, and therefore they are Christian. Even heathen thought has recognized the correlation of the true and the beautiful with the good. The love of them is an evidence of the divine in us. In Christ are hidden all treasures of wisdom and of knowledge. He is the soul of all beauty. It is true we can see now in the world about us but dim traces of the lineaments of the Son of God. We behold truth but in fragments, and beauty but in glimpses that tantalize us, while they draw us onward and amaze us with the thought of the perfect truth and beauty that are somewhere in the universe, that are really in the Son of God. But in the progress of true science and art more and more fully Christ and the Father will be revealed to men and will impress their image on mankind.

Along this line of thought we are brought to the Christian doctrine of man's final destiny. Here likewise the idea of sonship is formative of our theological thought. Whether we look at the individual or the race, the dominant principles which have already guided us still direct our faith. First of all, the guaranty of individual immortality lies in man's natural relation of sonship to God. It is the image of the Father in the soul, the free spiritual personality, so different from anything in nature, so great in its powers and its possibilities, that forces upon us the conviction, apart from Revelation, that we are not merely natural existences

but partakers of that eternity which belongs to God himself. And there is a true sense in which Christ, by that revelation of sonship which was characteristic of his wondrous human personality, brought life and immortality to light for all men. But we have to do here not so much with man's natural likeness to God as with the new humanity which Christ has made possible. Sonship and eternal life, as Christ used the terms, are synonymous. To know the only true God and Jesus Christ whom He hath sent, this is life. The perfected son must abide forever with the Father. He is an heir of the ages, since he is the child of the Highest, and the joint-heir with the well-beloved Son. The love that led to the sacrifice of the Only-begotten cannot stop short of the full development and perfection of the child bought with the price of his sufferings and death. Christian theology and ethics alike find their consummation in this perfect good. The redeemed son has attained his chief end; he glorifies God and enjoys Him forever. It is not the enjoyment of mere pleasure, the merely subjective happiness; of that there is no lack indeed; but that does not give us the essential character of the heavenly life. That which is highest in sonship is communion with the Father and the Elder Brother, and serving them in the blessed obedience of love. The beatific vision is not the ecstasy of rapt delight. It is the seeing face to face, knowing even as also we are known, living in the full intimacy of the glorious Ones, doing their glorious will. And conversely, the fate of those who fall short of God's purpose of love is elucidated by the same principle. To miss sonship is to miss eternal life. The words of doom are, "I never knew thee. Depart from me!" If the meaning of Heaven is found in communion with the Father, the meaning of retribution is found in separation from Him.

And so we are brought to the destiny of the race. The last scene is unrolled before us in the drama of prophetic revelation. Second coming, resurrection, judgment, consummation. The Son is revealed in the power and glory of the Father. The physical nature of man, last to be reached in the order of salvation, is made like to Christ, — the physical manifestation of sonship, or, as Paul puts it, the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body. The Son appears as the Judge, and sonship is made the criterion of judgment. All wrongs are righted, all evil is removed. The creation itself also is delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. There are new heavens and a new earth.

As the Christian conception begins with sonship, so in sonship it reaches the utmost verge of its vision. Even the apostle of the eagle eye, who gazed unflinchingly upon the glories of the world unseen, bids us here to cease our inquiries. "Beloved, now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if He shall be manifested, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him even as He is. And every one that hath this hope set on him purifieth himself even as He is pure."

Lewis F. Stearns.

THE FATE OF SYMBOLS — ILLUSTRATIONS FROM MATHEMATICS.

"What perishes in the general struggle which throbs through all history is the limitation of the individual and the limitation of the nation."

God in History, by C. C. J. BARON BUNSEN.

It has often been said of arithmetic and algebra, as of analysis in general, that they relieve the mind of effort by converting a mental into a mechanical process. In the use of their symbolic language errors may be made and wrong conclusions drawn, as in the language of ordinary life. But these errors are clerical, orthographical, as it were, due rather to careless writing than careless thinking, and are corrected by the eye without mental exertion. Having once mastered the grammar, the intellect is thereafter relieved of labor and manipulates signs as it could not notions. While this is in the main true, this labor-saving machine of the intellect, which like other machines enables it to accomplish what were otherwise impossible, is the creation of the intellect itself, and a creation which has cost it no little effort. However mechanical the applications of the sign-language which results from a substitution of symbols for ideas, the substitution itself has been far from a mechanical process and has a history quite independent of the results to which it has led, — a history of which the curt definitions of the text-books give no hint. This development, moreover, has been characterized by methods of which the ordinary deductive processes of the applied science know nothing. If Sir William Hamilton, when he said, "Of observation, experiment, induction, analogy, the mathematician knows nothing," meant the mathematician, and not the mathematical engineer or mathematical physicist, it would be sufficient to point to his great

namesake, observing, experimenting, hazarding conjectures even, in the inner world as the biologist does in that without. Illustrations of this fact would not be without interest, but would lead us too far from our subject.

There is another misconception, growing out of such definitions as that "mathematics is the science which draws necessary conclusions." If the physicist furnish definite data, it will undoubtedly draw therefrom certain necessary conclusions; but it has also its own data, which, though arbitrarily imposed, it has nevertheless repeatedly found occasion to modify. It does not, therefore, present that character of fixity and permanence with which it is often invested. In an age when change is so rapid as to be frequently identified with instability, and agitation obscures the fact of progress, mathematics have been appealed to as a summit above the tide and beyond the power of the current. It is not necessary, however, to consider the recent proposition to bury Euclid, or to make an excursion into the ghostly realms of n -dimensional space, to find the evidence of change and reconstruction, that is of growth, even in this science whose progress is commonly confounded with that of its applications. This misconception is due to the fact that elementary instruction is more occupied with imparting a knowledge of the use than the evolution of the machine; and, on the other hand, no department of history is so poor in its bibliography as that of mathematics. The great workers in this field are more concerned in the creation of a future than in the explanation of a past, and only genius can fitly undertake this explanation. But aside from its ever increasing correlations with other sciences, the pure science of mathematics itself presents the spectacle of constant growth, the stimulus coming mainly from those departments in which it works. They are ever sending up the cry, "Come over and help us," and while their practical outcome, their telephones, dyes, and motors, their art in short, is not the result of mathematical formulæ, the advance of their philosophy and science is conditioned upon the perfection of the analytical instrument. Its development has been a gradual one. Like development in other sciences, it has encountered obstacles and passed through periods of conflict when it seemed at war with itself and hopelessly involved in contradictions; for the same structural laws of the mind govern the evolution of concepts, whether they be arbitrary, as in mathematics they seem for a time to be, or whether, as in physics, they are conditioned upon our knowledge of the relations between the material objects of thought. The

definitions, and symbols of the one, like the theories of the other, are in a state of flux, and both flow under the same laws of intellectual progress. It is here proposed to exhibit this growth as it has actually occurred, confining ourselves, however, to a single, and that the simplest, line of progress.

We derive the idea of unity from the contemplation of any single object, and the simplest definition of number is that of aggregates obtained by adding unity first to itself, and then, successively, to the aggregate last attained. This process has no limit and may at any time be reversed, the reverse process being subtraction. So defined, numbers may be added in any order and under any mode of grouping; whence the commutative and associative laws of addition. The *repetition* of any one number gives rise to the process of multiplication. As a process of equal additions, it is identical in nature with that of the successive addition of unity; the associative, commutative, and distributive laws of multiplication, therefore, follow immediately. The converse operation, division, has for its object the separation of a number into a given number of equal parts, and the determination of the value of one of these parts.

The simplest definition of a fraction results from the subdivision of unity into equal parts, the denominator indicating their number, and the numerator the number taken. It may here be objected that fractions are not numbers in the sense of the previous definition. And so they are not, if number is restricted to simple aggregates of unity. Its meaning must be so extended as to include aggregates of the subordinate units into which unity is divided. With this proviso, fractions may be added and subtracted, understanding by addition and subtraction processes which seek such a fraction of unity as shall measure the sum or difference of the fractions of unity to be added or subtracted. Moreover, since the denominator of a fraction expresses a part of unity which may be repeated, the multiplication or division of a fraction by a whole number is simply the multiplication or division of its numerator.

But, as yet, the definitions of multiplication and division exclude the use of a fraction as a multiplier or divisor, for the former operation has for its object the repetition of a number as many times as there are units in the multiplier; and the latter, its separation into as many equal parts as there are units in the divisor, — operations which are unintelligible if the multiplier or divisor is a fraction. The original definition must, then, be made

more comprehensive, if the operations previously limited to whole numbers are to be extended to fractions.

Number is therefore redefined as the result of comparing a quantity with any other of the same kind; that is, as a ratio. Multiplication now becomes a process of finding a number related to the multiplicand in the same way that the multiplier is related to unity; and the modified definition of division is, the process of finding a number which, multiplied by the divisor, reproduces the dividend. The necessity for the restatement of these operations is obvious. Multiplication, for example, was before a process which always increased the multiplicand, but which, now that the multiplier is fractional, may render it smaller. In fact, all the rules before established must be reconsidered in the light of the new definition. The terminology itself has acquired a totally different significance. Thus the word *times*, previously indicating the repetition of the same act, undergoes an extension of meaning when carried over into this new process of fractional multiplication. The definition of a fraction itself requires modification. As indicating only the separation of unity into equal parts and the taking of a certain number of them, it restricts both the number of the subordinate parts and the value of one of them to whole numbers. But such is no longer the necessary meaning of number. Hence the necessity for the revision of all operations on fractions, for the purpose of showing the possible reduction of all processes involving complex fractions to the case in which their terms are entire; that is, the reduction of the fractions themselves to a common unit. This is important in view of what follows.

It may be here noticed in passing that, at this early stage of development, a conception arises, the elucidation of which is usually reserved for a later period, — the conception of a limit. The fraction $\frac{11}{12}$, for example, expresses the division of unity into twelve equal parts, and the taking of eleven of them. But if we seek to express it as a ratio in terms of tenths, hundredths, etc., of unity, we have .91666 . . . , a variable number which increases constantly, and yet, under the law of increase assigned it, never reaches a certain fixed and definite value. This value is its limit. Now while the conception of a limit finds its principal use in the higher mathematics, and is so generally reserved till required for service, it and other like conceptions ought to be rendered familiar to the student when they first arise. Not, indeed, that they should there be pressed into immediate service, but they should, as far

as practicable, be explained. For a clear and connected view of symbols and operations is best secured by studying them as they occur in the philosophical development of the science. To defer their presentation is to reproduce the gaps and delays which attended the actual historical growth, to leave the mind groping among the difficulties which beset their evolution, and to render abrupt and disconnected what should be continuous and natural.

The above illustration of a limit shows that, if we extend to fractions the process applied to number as previously defined, namely, its division into subordinate units, we are likely to encounter a difficulty. In other words, it may prove impossible to express the fraction in terms of any number whatsoever of the units assigned. Or, to state the case in another way, suppose the squares of the entire numbers 1, 2, 3, . . . , to be formed. These squares, 1, 4, 9, . . . , will differ from each other by more than unity. Hence the square roots of the whole numbers which are comprised between these squares must lie between the corresponding numbers 1, 2, 3, . . . ; that is, they must be fractions. But no fraction, unless it be a whole number in disguise, to whatever power it may be raised, can yield a whole number. Hence, so far as our definition of number is concerned, these numbers have no square roots. The only escape from such an anomaly is to admit into the fraternity of number the ratios of such numbers as have no common measure. These incommensurable ratios obtrude themselves in the course of our investigations, and cannot be ignored ; like that of the diagonal and side of a square, which refuse to be measured by any common unit we may assign to them, and which indeed may be proved to have no such common unit of measure. And it would be well for circle-squarers, who, as De Morgan observes,¹ never try "to cross the square," to observe that the circumference and diameter of a circle have in like manner been *proved* to have no common unit of measure.

Here, again, an extension of meaning of the word number requires the revision of previous definitions, operations, and nomenclature. We must, for example, redefine *equality* as affirmed of incommensurable ratios.²

To abbreviate and generalize the statements of arithmetic, signs and letters were soon employed, giving rise to the formulæ of what Newton called Universal Arithmetic. Its letters a , b , x , etc., are

¹ *A Budget of Paradoxes*, p. 321.

² See *Des Méthodes dans les Sciences de Raisonnement*, Duhamel, Part II. ch. vi.

erroneously termed quantities. They are obviously not the quantities themselves referred to in the problems, nor are they symbols for them; they are symbols for the numbers which measure them. In short, they are general symbols of number, and should be so denominated. The signs $+$ and $-$ of this generalized arithmetic are precisely what they were before, symbols of operation only, indicating addition and subtraction; and none of the laws governing the transformation of the expressions arising from the substitution of letters for figures suffer any change. We have to deal only with old friends in a new symbolic dress. Since, then, $+$ and $-$ indicate operations only, $+a$, or $-b$, convey no meaning whatever when taken by themselves, and herein lies the distinction between Arithmetic and Algebra, with which latter Literal or Universal Arithmetic is so often confounded.

But while nothing in our definitions thus far takes any notice of these unintelligible combinations, $+a$, or $-b$, the operations grounded on these definitions persist in yielding them as results. They exist, although as yet they have no *raison d'être*. Thus, while the operations of literal arithmetic seem to offer no difficulty, being identical in form with those previously applied to the numbers which the letters represent, it is far otherwise with the interpretation of their results. For how evaluate $a - b$, when a is not adequate to subtract b from? Or how interpret $-b$, or even $+a$, when, in view of the conjunctive meaning which alone is attached to the prefixed signs, these expressions must be terms of a polynomial to convey any meaning whatever? As before, an alien knocks for admission, and admission is evidently conditioned, not only on the extension of the meaning of number, but also on that of the prefixed signs.

The interpretation afforded by the coördinate system of Descartes, confined as it is to geometric quantity, was incomplete, though suggestive, and the difficulty was not fully cleared up before the opening of the present century. Zöllner,¹ Schultze,² and others have shown how much of modern speculation in astronomy and natural history is prefigured in the writings of Kant, and it is in Kant's quantitative and qualitative modes of quantity that the key is found to the interpretation of these isolated monomials affected with the $+$ and $-$ signs. Quantity, affirms Kant, cannot be completely represented without quality. Duration, for example, may be measured, but the representation is incomplete except as we further regard it as a time future or a time past. But, so

¹ *Natur der Kometen.*² *Kant und Darwin.*

far as the monomials $+a$ and $-b$ are concerned, only antithetical qualities are suggested. Hence the extension of the meaning of these symbols, as representative not only of number, that is of the measure of quantity, but also of its opposite qualities; a and b being symbols, as before, of the number or measure, while the qualities are distinguished by the prefixed signs $+$ and $-$. These symbols, then, become complex symbols, not as representing complex quantities, but as representing both magnitude and quality, and as such they cease to be the symbols of pure number, and become symbols of the two modes of quantity now regarded as extensive and intensive; and as heretofore called numbers, although strictly symbols of number, they may now be termed quantities, although strictly the representatives of quantity considered under the double aspect of quantification and qualification. Thus, for example, $+a$ is a definite amount of future time, $-b$ a definite amount of past time; and the signs which had previously rendered results unintelligible become necessary for their interpretation.

Every symbol is now of the form $+a$, or $-a$, and any polynomial expression, although written $a+b-c$ for the sake of brevity, is really $+a + (+b) + (-c)$. The late Professor Clifford has drawn a very arbitrary distinction between the Science of Quantity and the Science of Pure Number.¹ He defines the Science of Number as "founded on the hypothesis of the distinctness of things," that is, as dealing only with discrete aggregates; while "the Science of Quantity is founded on the totally different hypothesis of continuity," that is, it deals only with continuous aggregates. The distinction between continuous and discrete aggregates is a very obvious and important one, but wherever the "hypothesis" of discontinuity is changed for that of continuity, the measuring number becomes continuous instead of discrete number. A definition cannot restrict number to one hypothesis. It is the measure of quantity, and the quantity may be essentially discrete, as a row of marbles, which excludes altogether the hypothesis of continuity; or it may admit of conception under either hypothesis, like a line, which may be regarded as made up of other finite lines or of points. Thus duration, essentially continuous in nature, may be measured by hours, and so admits of the hypothesis of discontinuity. But the nature of the number which measures duration, or any other quantity, will correspond to the hypothesis under which it is conceived to increase or diminish. Suppose, for example, from having a rate of motion 5, a body acquires a

¹ *Lectures and Essays* (Philosophy of the Pure Sciences), vol. i., p. 337.

rate of motion 6. As a continuous quantity, the velocity passes from the initial velocity 5 to the final velocity 6 by passing through "no end of intermediate states." What becomes of the corresponding measure of this continuously changing velocity during the interval in which it changes from 5 to 6? For it is impossible that there should be any intervening instant when the rate has no corresponding numerical expression. If the line A B, whose length is a , flows and becomes A B C, of length $a + x$, it is measurable throughout the whole interval. Under a hypothesis of discontinuity, we are at liberty to write $a + x = a + 1$; but we are also at liberty to suppose the line to flow continuously from the length a to the length $a + 1$, and to follow mentally the corresponding change in its measure is no more difficult than to follow mentally the change of the line itself. The mere evaluation of $a + x$ for any instant of time, whereby it becomes say $5\frac{1}{2}$, does not affect the law of change. What, indeed, is $\pm x$ in the science of continuous quantity? Not the quantity itself. Not its symbol, however abstract the investigation. The x is its measure, a number, though an abstract one, and $\pm x$ differs from x only as the signs designate also the intensive mode of what is measured. Thus the symbols of the method of fluxions itself are symbols of number; and if continuous number is a fiction, a science of continuous quantity has no meaning. The act of evaluation is a reversion to a definite aggregate, a suspension of the law of change, but has no bearing on that law before or after the instant considered. "Five sevenths of ten," says Clifford, "is nonsense. Let us, then, treat it as if it were sense, and see what comes of it. A repetition of this process, with every impossible operation that occurs, is supposed to lead in time to continuous quantities." The same might be said of all continuous quantity, if its conception is approached in the same way. Repeated bisection of a line, we might say, is "supposed" to lead to continuous quantity. The truth is, Clifford *assumes* the existence of continuous *quantity*, but would have us *realize* completely in thought the ultimate nature of *continuous number*, a conception no more complete in the case of linear distance than in that of number. The assumption of any continuous quantity carries with it the assumption of a corresponding continuous measure, and the distinction to be drawn is the distinction between discontinuity and continuity, not between number and quantity. Professor Clifford refers to the distinction drawn by the ancients, who divided magnitude into two kinds, one continuous ($\tau\acute{o}$ συνεχές), which they distinguished from the number

which measured it, the other discontinuous ($\tau\acute{o}\ \delta\iota\epsilon\chi\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$), or number itself. But these definitions, aside from the fact that Aristotle (from whom they are quoted) considered time a form of number,¹ belong to a period when no mathematical investigation of continuous quantity, as such, was known, to which the conception of number as continuous could be applied. And how can absolute, indivisible unity enter into such a science of relations? Unity itself is divisible, and divisible without limit, and its constituent elements are as evanescent as those of any phenomenal quantity. We are under no necessity to pass from 5 to 6, distinct as they are from each other, *per saltum*. The chasm can be filled by vanishing fractions, precisely as that between two determinate lines is filled by points. The difficulties which attend the effort to completely conceive of continuity are not in question, but they are no greater in the case of number than in the case of that which it measures. To deny continuity in the former is to assert that, while a line of 5 feet in length can become one of 6 by passing through no end of intermediate lengths, these lengths have no measure.²

Returning to the extension of meaning assigned to negative quantities, it is evident that a reconsideration of the old terminology and a reëxamination of all previous definitions and rules of operation is once more necessary. Addition is obviously a new operation, for it is no longer a purely numerical process. The quantities added are no longer considered only as measurable, and their combination must take into account a difference in quality as well as magnitude. In its application to geometry, for example, this process becomes a stepping back and forth on a directive axis whose two directions correspond to the antithetical qualities of linear quantity. The signs + and — themselves have a complex meaning, as serving not only to distinguish between distance in one direction and that in the opposite, but also as representing new processes of combining quantity; processes which can be called addition and subtraction only as one step in either direction can be said to be combined with another. *Sum* has a new signification, and *equality* comes to mean equivalence in the sense that a series of successive steps in either direction is equivalent to a single step from the initial to the terminal point of motion. All rules of operation must undergo a like modification, for they must be such as to indicate the quality as well as the magnitude of every result.

¹ *Phys.*, iv. 14.

² See Evelin, *Infini et Quantité*, p. 119 et seq.

The choice of the signs $+$ and $-$ to distinguish quantities of opposite qualities arose naturally from the fact that monomials having these signs were the very results which called for interpretation. But it was doubtless not foreseen at the time how happily this choice was to simplify and abbreviate the sign language, by making the same symbol indicative of both the qualitative mode of quantity and the operations to be performed upon it.

As in previously mentioned cases, however, extension of meaning brings with it new limitations. Important as is this last generalization, it fixes at the same time a very arbitrary limit. For while it is possible to consider every quantity under these antithetical aspects of distance north and south, time past and future, strain compressive and tensile, money gained and lost, etc., there are relatively few which, like time, can be conceived of *only* in this way. As a complete science of space, for example, Algebra is inadequate, and Sir William Rowan Hamilton's definition of it as the Science of Pure Time is singularly expressive.

This limitation, clearly foreseen now, was not at first anticipated ; but the manner in which it was encountered in the actual operations of the new calculus may be very easily exhibited. It has been observed that all the former terminology, if retained, has acquired a new significance. Factor, product, multiplication, etc., stand for a new order of ideas. Let us examine the word factor. The original subtractive meaning of the negative sign has been retained, but this sign possesses now an additional meaning as an operator, since when written before any quantity, as a , it has the effect of converting that quantity into its opposite. As a factor then, $-a$ performs a double office, changing that on which it operates both as to amount and kind. As these two operations are entirely distinct in nature, the order in which they are performed is immaterial, and the operation symbolized by $(-a) \times (-a)$ may be also expressed by $---a a$, or $---a^2$; or, finally, since every successive application of the sign $-$ is to change either of two qualities into its opposite, by a^2 . But under the new convention, we have only two kinds of any particular quantity, and therefore what has heretofore been designated as a square can arise only from the operations indicated by the following two groups of symbols, $(-a) \times (-a)$, or $(+a) \times (+a)$, from neither of which $-a^2$ can result. It follows, therefore, that negative quantities can have no square roots, and the combination $\sqrt{-a^2}$ has no meaning. A part of the indicated operation may be performed, and the result written $a\sqrt{-1}$, but there remains the unintelligible $\sqrt{-1}$. The most singu-

lar property of this unmeaning symbol is that, when used under the rules which govern our intelligible ones, it leads to results otherwise known to be true. Thus it may be made to yield all the formulæ of plane trigonometry if, as De Morgan quaintly expresses it, it be treated as "a fellow-subject of the other symbols, with a mask over his features."¹ So admitted into our operations, $\sqrt{-1} \times \sqrt{-1}$ becomes -1 for the reason that $\sqrt{a} \times \sqrt{a} = a$, and analogy at once suggests an interpretation of this so-called imaginary. For inasmuch as $\sqrt{-1}$ when used *twice* as a factor appears from the above to be equivalent to -1 , whose effect is to reverse the quality of a magnitude, when used but *once* it should produce but *half* that effect. But if we are dealing with Time, there is no such thing as fractional reversal. Time is either Time past or future. Plus-time and minus-time are thinkable, but $\sqrt{-1}$ time is not. If, therefore, $\sqrt{-1}$ is to have a field of significance, it must be with reference to quantities which admit of conception under other than two antithetical aspects. Hence its *geometrical* interpretation; for in geometrical magnitude we have variety which is not limited to antithesis. Retaining then the definitions of $+$ and $-$ as symbols which respectively preserve and invert, $\sqrt{-1}$ may be defined to semi-invert the linear magnitude before whose representative symbol it is written. Or, generalizing still further, $\sqrt{-1}$ will have meaning in all investigations of quantity which implies direction, such as force, velocity, etc.; that is, of *vector* quantities, which can be represented in magnitude and direction by directed right lines.

The geometrical interpretation of the symbol $\sqrt{-1}$ converted Single into Double Algebra, and extended the field of operation from the line to the plane. This extension Hamilton (W. R.) carried one step farther into tri-dimensional space, by the Quaternion Calculus. But this step was very different in its nature from the last. Unlike the above, it was long distinctly before the mind as a desideratum, and the problem was not what to do, but how to do it. Enormously complex formulæ resulted from the attempt to effect this extension by means of the existing notation. Before, the obstacle to advance was the unintelligibleness of certain combinations of symbols; it was now the lack of all adequate symbols whatever. In the one case the symbols had outrun the thought, in the other the thought for a long time outran the symbols. When the extension was made, however, limitations were again imposed. For the Quaternion Calculus destroyed the uni-

¹ *Trigonometry and Double Algebra*, p. 42.

versality of the commutative law in multiplication, so that a product cannot be written indifferently rq or qr . In the algebra of pure space, an apparently final limit to further extension seems to have been reached in Quaternions, and it is for some its reproach that it refuses to recognize the fourth dimension which for a time haunted the mind of its inventor,¹ and is preëminently the science of a space of three dimensions.

The resistance which attended the above development constitutes one of its most curious features. The successive breaking down of barriers, although they were arbitrarily imposed, was at the time seriously felt to be subversive and to involve a contradiction in fact, as well as in terms. Multiplication by a fraction, for example, is now so thoroughly understood that we can scarcely realize how it should ever have occasioned any difficulty. Yet this difficulty can be readily reproduced. We have but to restrict the process of multiplication to whole numbers for the beginner, to cause him inevitably to regard it as (what it then really is) simply a short method of equal additions, the invariable effect of which is to increase the multiplicand. When, therefore, a process is called multiplication which renders the multiplicand less, we can sympathize with Recorde's scholar, who felt not only the inconsistency of designating so radically different a process by the same name, but could not see how multiplying a number by another could possibly make it smaller. Professor Kelland, who cites this illustration of the difficulty which attends the extension of definitions from Recorde's Whetstone of Witte (1558), remarks further that Euclid, "who dared not venture on fractions," could, "in his logical and unbending march, never have attained to this new view of the process of multiplication which crept in by the advance from whole numbers to fractions."²

So, again, of isolated positive and negative monomials. The transitional steps from arithmetic to algebra can now be so clearly indicated that we are surprised at the fog which first attended them, and wonder that the demolition of the barriers erected about the science of pure number should ever have troubled any one's sense of security. These simple steps appear to us as did some of Euclid's propositions to the commentators mentioned by Proclus, who affirmed that the very asses would admit them without demonstration. If, however, we recur to the writings of the transitional period, when words to which long usage had at-

¹ *Lectures on Quaternions*, Preface, p. 60, *et seq.*

² *Introduction to Quaternions*, Preface.

tached definite meanings were suddenly put to new uses, and, on the other hand, new ideas seemed contradictory and meaningless, as couched in the old terminology, we can understand the distrust occasioned by those who so flippantly subtracted twelve from two and manipulated quantities which they affirmed to be less than nothing. How, says d'Alembert, can $1 : -1 :: -1 : 1$, which is true, be true if the negative quantity is less than zero? (How, indeed, if quantity is not so defined as to include these negative "quantities," and we do not know what "less than zero" means! When Hamilton writes $k^5 = k$, we must first know what Hamilton means.) For, being less than zero, he continues, it is less than one, and we then have the absurdity that the means of a proportion can both be less than the extremes. Leibnitz denied that -1 could be a mean proportional at all, maintaining the curious distinction that while a negative number could enter into our calculations, it could not enter as a term in our ratios; exactly as $\sqrt{-1}$ was subsequently admitted into operations, which, however, led to nothing except as it was eliminated before their completion. (Writers in other sign-languages than that of Mathematics, some of whom objected to the use of unreals and imaginaries before the mist which enshrouded them was cleared away, would do well to remember and follow this *sine qua non* of mathematical reasoning on such symbols; namely, their complete elimination before the conclusion is reached, or that what was an assumption in the premiss should be no more in the result.) Carnot, commenting on the above proportion, argued that if -1 was less than nothing, it was of course less than one, and therefore the second term was less than the first; and since the fourth must be less than the third, -1 would be at one and the same time both greater and less than unity. Names, especially in scientific classifications, often shadow forth the thought lying back of the word; and those words, *unreal*, for a long time applied to the negative roots of equations, and *imaginary*, subsequently applied to the square roots of such quantities, sufficiently indicate the point of view from which they were regarded. During the periods of actual extension, the very foundations of the science seemed to be called in question.

In some of the cases above mentioned, where the extension of meaning involves so great a change in the nature of the operations and the interpretation of the results, it might seem desirable to adopt a new nomenclature. It is certain that the employment of the same word for the denotation of distinct things has produced great confusion. On the other hand, the growth in the meaning

of words has contributed to the brevity and generality of the language as a growth in their number could never have done. A principle of permanence is, moreover, observed, whereby quantities, as they degrade, do not fall out of the categories in which they are classed, and general rules of operation are so stated as to include the various kinds of quantities.

It would not seem possible, at first thought, that difficulties of interpretation should grow out of the combination of symbols of which the meanings are well-defined and mutually consistent when not in combination. For the laws which govern these combinations are framed directly upon the meanings of the symbols combined. Yet this is precisely the way in which the difficulties above cited arose. They did not originate with adventurous or captious spirits who get themselves or others into trouble through the love of it. They *presented themselves*, as it were, in the course of a legitimate use of symbols previously defined. The barriers were encountered because, under a natural law of progress, they stood in the way. And mathematics is not the only science in which conceptions have been called in question because they ventured to grow. The fact is, the symbols were capable of more meaning than was first assigned to them, and the contradictions disappeared when this lack was supplied. Only that which was put into them could be extracted from them, but they could consistently contain more. Furthermore, while in its origin every symbolic calculus is purely arbitrary, when it encounters such obstacles in the course of its development the direction of subsequent growth is no longer an arbitrary one. It is predetermined; first, by the assumptions already made, unless indeed they be entirely abandoned and an altogether new calculus framed; or secondly, by certain properties of the magnitudes with which it deals, properties which often enter disguisedly into the statement of problems, although left out of the meanings arbitrarily given to the symbols. Suppose, for example, the following problem of *Literar Arithmetic*: A boy was one half as old as his mother a years ago; now he is one half as old as his father. How much older is his father than his mother? Now the conditions of the problem are explicit, but they involve a doubtful element, for the mother may be older than the father, and in that case the result will involve an impossible subtraction. Intensive quantity has crept into the statement, but is not represented by the symbols. We have in fact two hypotheses, on either of which the symbolic statement may be expressed. If we choose the wrong one, the result

will indicate an impossible operation, and to obtain the right result we must recur to the original statement and change the hypothesis. But this change is made only in virtue of the intensive property of duration. To say "how much younger" instead of "how much older," taken in connection with the change in sign which this change in statement produces in the result, is to interpret negative quantity. This interpretation, therefore, is not arbitrary, for no meaning can be assigned if the conditions of the problem do not admit of a change in the intensive mode. If there is no choice of hypothesis in this respect, and the conditions cannot be regarded from any other point of view than that first taken, there is no possible interpretation, and the conditions really involve an impossibility of which the result is the indication. The new definition of the symbol $+a$ is therefore constrained by the nature of that which it represents, and this definition enables us to remove at once all ambiguity from the results, without being under the necessity of making provisional hypotheses and going back to change them if our choice happened to be a wrong one. It is, in other words, a generalization by means of which both cases are provided for in one general statement, process, and result.

Like conditions controlled the extension of meaning which gave significance to the imaginary $\sqrt{-1}$. The growth of a symbolic calculus is not a purely arbitrary synthesis. $\sqrt{-1}$ does not admit of *any* arbitrary interpretation. Like a compound word, its parts hint the nature and limit the range of its significance. The meaning already vested in the minus sign foreshadows its *versor* character, the conventions already adopted limit the amount of version, and the nature of quantity restricts its field of operation. Its explanation is therefore neither assumptive nor absolute, but consequential and limited. The extension takes place in the direction of geometry, because elsewhere quantity does not offer the requisite variety, and new conceptions of quantity are not likely to be called into existence by the necessities of transcendental formulæ. The growth of the science shows a continual addition to the meaning of symbols, but none to our knowledge of either number or quantity. The mathematical treatment of continuous quantity is a comparatively recent one, but its formulæ did not suggest the idea of continuity. Aristotle defined it, and Euclid admitted it in his postulates. The intensive nature of quantity was not suggested by the plus and minus signs, although they did lead, if not oblige, us to take it into account. The conception of two dimensions was not acquired by the interpretation of $\sqrt{-1}$, nor that of three di-

mensions by Hamilton's ϵ . The progress made consists only in the perfecting of the symbolic form of expression or in the creation of what Hamilton called his calculus, a new *organ of expression*, and so is but the better adaptation and adjustment of language to those conceptions of quantity and space which are derived from the universal consciousness.

The analogies between the growth of mathematics and that of other sciences are striking. It is peculiar to human methods that wherever we extend a boundary we also fix a limit. New conceptions and syntheses are also new limitations. Wherever we conquer a province from those outlying spaces of darkness which in every sphere of inquiry baffle our efforts to see and to know, we forthwith intrench and wall it about with a barrier which must be destroyed by those who come after us before they can see beyond it. The record of human history is the record of the overthrow of these limitations which great men, in their very greatness, impose upon their fellows, which nations and races have imposed upon humanity, and which humanity seeks often to impose upon God. These barriers mathematics encounters in the inner world of mental activity, — barriers which arise now from its own arbitrary conventions, now from the finite powers of the human mind. In passing them, it also, for a time, seems to waive its pretensions to clear statement and logical consistency, to start anew with generalized concepts and processes in a wider and more fruitful field of activity. The observation of external nature, which furnishes mathematics, regarded as a tool, with the material which it interprets, is paralleled by like processes of observation, induction, even experiment, in the inner world of thought where the tool itself is whetted for service. And this to an extent which few realize.¹ The purely deductive method which characterizes its applications does not preside over its growth. The prediction of Neptune, or Hamilton's anticipation of experiment in conical refraction, belong to these its applications as an instrument of research, and as such its value cannot be over-estimated. Physics writes over its door the inscription of Plato, and with a meaning far beyond his thought for whom the conic sections were but intellectual playthings, the modern physicist, who recognizes them as the pathways of suns and atoms, repeats the words *Divinity geometrizes*. But, besides the world of natural phenomena where the tool is an instrument of research, is another where the weapon is forged;

¹ See Address of Professor Sylvester before the Mathematical and Physical Section of the British Association, Exeter, 1869. *Nature*, vol. i., pp. 237, 261.

where induction, analogy, imagination, invention play their part in the development of the science itself,—a science which Gauss named the Science of the Eye.

The resistance which attends progress in other departments has its parallel also in the struggle which accompanies that of mathematics. Here also unrecognized factors are continually modifying systems in which they had no place. The struggle is not so intense, but it is none the less real. So far from being an endless chain tied to a few fundamental conceptions, its subject-matter and symbolic form are undergoing constant change. The difficulty of keeping pace with its ever-increasing abstractions is chiefly an intellectual one, and it thus escapes the resistance which springs from the heart. Primitive thought, however vague and indefinite, is full of concrete images which appeal to the imagination and evoke the affections. Humanity at large parts regretfully and painfully with its toys. Who can follow the history of religious symbols, from the rude objects of worship in fetichism through all the imagery of animal and human forms to the highest planes of religious development, where the divorce between the concrete and the abstract is most completely effected, without sympathizing with those who at the critical periods resented the fall of Baal? without realizing the difficulty of keeping pace with that abstract contemplation which soars beyond the reach or need of earthly symbols? without understanding why, in the temple which to-day is filled only with a Presence, or contains at most only an altar from which the statue of the god has forever disappeared, the Person rather than the Principle is still the dominant source of power and of peace? In this same difficult and high path of abstraction the science of mathematics marches. The beginner encounters at the very outset the peculiar difficulties which are inherent in abstract symbols. In trigonometry he puts away his lines for ratios with an effort, and, further on, that hitherto most real thing *force* eludes his grasp as it turns out to be only a time-rate of momentum generation. Here, too, symbols become identified with that which is symbolized, and the modification of one seems to threaten the other. Here, too, structures which are provisional come to be regarded as permanent, new factors are unwelcome visitors, reconstruction seems destruction, and men who have themselves contributed to progress obey at last the law of intellectual inertia and declare for absolute rest. And, as already remarked, while the subject-matter does not so closely touch the hearts and interests of men, the difficulties of apprehension constitute a resistance quite as real. For leadership

is always isolated, and the forces of progress work always against the inertia of the masses.

To his essay on History, Emerson prefixes the following lines:—

“I am the owner of the sphere,
Of the seven stars and the solar year,
Of Cæsar’s hand, and Plato’s brain,
Of Lord Christ’s heart, and Shakespeare’s strain.”

Amid the wreck of the material world, this stanza is like the inspiring blast of a bugle. No alienation of our mental estate. We are all eldest sons in the line of succession. Men, cities, nations, rise, culminate, and disappear. But no destruction, however complete, includes thoughts with things. The products of mind survive the work of the hand. Rubbish of a middle age may hide them, a whirlwind of fanaticism may sweep them out of sight, but the renaissance is sure, and the hand of the Arab who sets the torch to the library transmits the seed-corn to posterity. But Emerson declares also for the duality of the truth, — though he does not trouble himself with the task of reconciliation, — and we are conscious that much of our heritage is of very obsolete worth. That, however important as a stepping stone, however valuable now as completing a record, it contains much that is only an object of curiosity, and which, but for its correlations with the before and the after, would provoke only a smile. Many a thought is there, once a reality, but which has proved only a fiction, and, like the crystal spheres of the old astronomy, belongs to-day only to poetry: many a mental structure in which mind once dwelt and rested now claiming only the interest of ruins. All advances are characterized by this negative, destructive process, which calls out both regret and protest. Under the extension of education, whereby more men to-day think and investigate than ever before, whereby idiosyncracies of belief and points of view are multiplied, this instability becomes terrifying, for it is ever in the front, while reconstruction lags behind. All the old edifices seem honeycombed by these new workers who swarm in every department of inquiry, scrutinizing, comparing, questioning, till the whole body of knowledge appears only a flux, and the soul, like the dove, if it leaves its ark, looks out over an infinite ocean, and sees no resting-place.

But as the clouds lift and the smoke of conflict clears away, as the passions which these questions touch subside, has it not been, and therefore will it not always be found, as in the case of that science which happily is free from the influence of hopes and fears,

that not only have new horizons been opened, but that the new includes all the old, nothing has been lost in the fray, and only the limitations have perished.

A. S. Hardy.

ARNOLD OF RUGBY AND THE OXFORD MOVEMENT.

IN his trenchant address at Liverpool, with its ringing changes on *lucidity*, now more than a year ago, Mr. Matthew Arnold said that he supposed many of his hearers had been reading the account of the Oxford movement in the lively volumes of "that acute but not always good-natured rattle," Mr. Mozley. This movement was full of interest. It had produced men to be respected, men to be admired, men to be loved, men of goodness, learning, genius, and charm. But could they resist the truth, asked Mr. Arnold, that *lucidity* would have been fatal to it? "The movers of all those questions about apostolic succession, patristic authority, primitive usage, postures, vestments, — questions so passionately debated, and on which he would not seek to cast ridicule, — did they not all begin by taking for granted something no longer possible or receivable, build on this basis as if it were indubitably solid, and fail to see that, their basis not being solid, all they built upon it was fantastic?"

This very polite and positive bowing out of the High Churchmen is the more interesting when we remember Mr. Arnold's pedigree, and that Arnold of Rugby was the stoutest opposer of the Oxford Movement at its birth, and the founder of that party in the Church of England which has alone, in the Church, been able to oppose the movement with anything philosophic, worthy, or attractive, from that time to this. There was no man whom Newman and his followers found so directly athwart their course at every point, none whose words were constantly so ringing and emphatic against them, none whose successes they so much feared and dreaded. And it is interesting to note, in these echoes of the bitter conflict, in Mr. Mozley's *Reminiscences*, how, if the "rattle" may ever, indeed, be said to be bad-natured, it is chiefly so, so far as the really prominent men of the time are concerned, in the chapter on Arnold. Really bad-natured it is perhaps a trifle too severe to call Mr. Mozley even here; but he certainly manages to

present about as untrue a picture of Arnold's work and character as it would be possible to present in so few pages. What the several proportions of malice prepense and mere obtuseness are, each man who understands Arnold and reads these *Reminiscences* may settle for himself. Our own impression of Mr. Mozley's habitual honesty and good nature is such that we regard his depreciations as, for the most part, only another evidence of the powerlessness of the Tractarian mind to understand so large a man as Arnold.

To Arnold's "intense energy of character, his deep sense of a calling which he had to obey, and of a work which he had to do," it was impossible that Mr. Mozley should not bear witness, if he was to write of Arnold at all. But so far as Newman and his colleagues were concerned, he declares that all the time that Arnold was expressing himself about them "with his constitutional warmth and decision," he was "ignorant, and worse than ignorant, of their character and their cause." "Better had he never heard of them," Mr. Mozley goes so far as to say, "than acquired so ridiculous a misconception." "What else, however," he asks, "could be expected from a man who in 1832 published in successive pamphlets his full belief that the House of Commons could easily and quickly so modify the Prayer-Book that all English churches, sects, and denominations would be found shaking hands in the closest brotherhood and accord before the end of ten years?"

Better had Mr. Mozley never heard of Arnold's pamphlets on Church Reform, we are tempted to retort to this, than acquired so ridiculous a misconception. What sort of justice this does to one of the profoundest discussions of the relations of Church and State which has ever been written, and to the only scheme upon which any long life is possible to the English Establishment in particular, every reader of Arnold's pamphlets, or of the analysis of them which Dean Stanley gives in his memoir, will quickly determine. It is certainly an unpromising enough beginning for any very intelligent chapter upon Arnold.

But Arnold was not simply ignorant of the character and cause of the Oxford men. He was also, according to Mr. Mozley, "a disappointed man," chagrined because his pamphlets did not get a better reception. He was bothered and nettled, in particular, by a Tory clergyman, one Litchfield, who used to satirize him in the Rugby neighborhood, and fell into the nervous fear that he was living in a jungle, with a Litchfield behind each rustling reed; and, having, "like many other good and great people," "a temper

of his own, and rather a warm one," he wreaked his disappointment upon the High Churchmen, — and hence his Edinburgh Review article upon the "Oxford Malignants," in the Hampden controversy. Newman's friends, we are told, were astonished beyond measure when Arnold's friends proclaimed with confidence and pride that he was the writer of the article. They had accepted the character of Arnold as an "amiable enthusiast, drawn in by Bunsen;" but it was certainly not in the character of the "amiable enthusiast" that he appeared in this article. Strangely enough, the only indignation which the garrulous High Churchman seems able to see in the article, even at this writing, is "the indignation of a man disappointed of a mighty ambition." "Which was the true Arnold," he asks, "the writer of the pamphlets and of the sermons, or the writer of the article? Was it the dove assuming for the hour the sombre plumage and shrill screams of the hawk, or the bird of prey that, as often as it found convenient, could glisten in the sun and coo like a dove?" And the not at all ambiguous *coup* with which he dismisses Arnold, so far as the direct discussion goes, is the observation that "it is too true that very good gentlemen will sometimes denude themselves of their Christian livery when they enter the anonymous arena."

This parting benediction is quite gratuitous and beside the mark. Arnold did not enter the anonymous arena in writing the Hampden article. It is quite true that the articles in the "Edinburgh Review" were published without the writers' names. But there were very few articles of any interest or moment of which the authorship was not well enough known. Dr. Arnold's authorship of the article in question was an open secret from the beginning, or rather no secret at all. He wrote about it with the utmost freedom to all his friends, even if he did rebuff Lord Howe for his meddling in the matter, and certainly he did not presume upon any screen of anonymousness to "denude himself of his Christian livery" or any other livery that he was in the habit of wearing. There was absolutely nothing in the article, moreover, which he did not repeat in a thousand ways before and afterwards; and he would probably have liked nothing better than the privilege of reading the whole, from the pulpit of the Sheldonian, to the clergy who hurried up from all England to vote condemnation of a book which they had never read. That Newman and his friends should have expected anything different from Arnold, if he spoke at all, and that Mr. Mozley should ask whether the writer of the pamphlets and sermons or the writer of the arti-

cle was the true Arnold, shows what a flimsy synthesis the Oriel estimate of this "amiable enthusiast" was.

But Arnold's article upon the "Oxford Malignants" was not only thoroughly characteristic, if, indeed, as Dean Stanley observes, containing the most vehement and personal language which Arnold ever deliberately used; it was also thoroughly just. What did Arnold charge against Newman and the Convocation? In the first place, and chiefly, he would never have written the article but to say this, that what they were doing in condemning Hampden was "merely lynch law." If Hampden had preached or published heresy, let him be tried by the proper judges, either the Bishop or the Vice-Chancellor, assisted by the six Doctors of Divinity. But what they were doing was merely lynch law; and they might just as well run down any other man who was unpopular with the dominant party in Oxford, and say that they had no confidence in him, and therefore pass a *privilegium* against him without giving him any trial. All of which was strictly true, and there was absolutely nothing else to be said about it by any truthful and decent man in his sober senses. This, moreover, Mr. Mozley himself now practically admits. What does he say? Not only that "any reasonable person may doubt the validity of an act depriving the Professor of privileges appertaining to the very essence of his office," but that it was really an "audacious act." The only excuse which he is able to conjure up for the judgment which was passed on Hampden for a book in which a few alarmists scented something unusual is, that "all England looked to Oxford to protect the orthodox doctrine," and, since there was no time for the members of Convocation to read the book, "there must either be such a trial of it, or none at all." Arnold's own vehement words against the authors and supporters of the act do not charge a greater culpability than is frankly enough confessed by Mr. Mozley, with all his disposition to make the best showing for his friends that is possible. "A great university, the most important theological university in the world, — for Oxford was now the only rival of the Vatican, — pronounced the strongest possible condemnation of a book and of its author, inflicting upon him an injurious and penal deprivation," while "the great mass of the multitude that inflicted this penalty were very, if not entirely, ignorant of the book which was the *corpus delicti*." "The country members of Convocation, as fast as they came up," he says, "implored their resident friends, with pitiable importunity, to tell them all about it, generally in vain, for their resident friends knew

as little about the book as themselves." A pamphlet drawn up by Newman himself in one night, and almost at one sitting, containing such extracts from the lectures as showed their more suspicious features, but often most misleading in their isolation from the context, and altogether inadequate to give an idea of the scope of the work, was briskly circulated; "and this pamphlet," says Mr. Mozley, "became the text of the controversy, to the shame, it must be said, of many who could have turned to the original lectures, and, as self-constituted judges, ought to have done so."

How did this work, which "had to be done first and criticised afterwards," appear afterwards to those who had done it? If Samuel Wilberforce and Mr. Gladstone, whose testimony Mr. Mozley quotes, are to be considered representative, it appeared just as it appeared to Arnold at the time. Both of these men wrote to Hampden, many years afterwards, to apologize for their part in the matter, and to confess that when they voted against the lectures they "in truth knew nothing about them." Mr. Gladstone's letter, Mr. Mozley tells us, was written "in the very abyss of penitence and self-humiliation" for an act which had been, he said, "clearly wrong." And since it was a principle which Bishop Wilberforce urged upon the Oxford students "to entertain no doubt, but stamp it out as they would a spark in a magazine, and recoil from it in horror," it is safe enough to believe that there was nothing very explosive in Hampden's book if he was not disturbed when he did read it, a dozen years after condemning it.

Was Hampden really in the right, and was his cause the cause of truth? Mr. Mozley is right enough in thinking that this is the most important question. Hampden's point was that the scholastic theology had overloaded and corrupted the primitive and true gospel of Christ, making the church of history and to-day a false embodiment of genuine and essential Christianity. And this, of course, is where men divide. Newman and his followers saw in the complex theology and high ecclesiasticism of the mediæval church the very fulfillment of the Christian ideal. Arnold believed Hampden's lectures to be "entirely true in their main points;" and he said, "I should think that the wholesome air of such a man's lectures would tend to freshen men's faith, and assure them that it had a foundation to rest upon, when the infinite dishonesty and foolery of such divinity as I remember in the lecture-rooms and pulpits in times past would be enough to drive a man of sound mind into any extravagances of belief." And however remarkable the development of ecclesiasticism in the Church of England itself, in the

years since 1836, we do not think there is much doubt as to how the world's general thought has been settling this class of questions since Arnold wrote.

Arnold saw hope and reform for the church and religion in going forward; and only in going forward; Newman and Pusey saw them only in going backward — and hence the men must needs clash at every point. Their conceptions of the church's functions and authority, and of the true method of religious inquiry, were diametrically opposed. If it be said that Arnold was ignorant and worse than ignorant of what the Tractarian cause and conceptions were, the only answer is, of course, the reference to what he wrote about them — and he was pretty busy in writing about them for ten years; and we venture to assert that, so far from misconceiving the aim and drift of the movement, he was precisely the one man in the Church of England who did understand the movement truly, and whose discussions of it, leaving alone side-issues of small moment, go directly to what the whole development of the movement has proved to be its distinctive and essential features. Arnold would have been the quickest to admit all the attractive personal elements in Newman and the other men of Mr. Mozley's book; he would have had no quarrel in the world with them over Clapham evangelicalism or Gregorian chants; he would have commended Mr. Mozley's interest in Gothic architecture and catenary curves as harmless and altogether civilizing, and have rejoiced with all his heart at the superiority of the churches built by Gilbert Scott to those of fifty years ago; and he was far too much of a historian and antiquary himself to have any feelings but kind ones for the "Library of the Fathers" and for all the really important work done by the Oxford men toward awakening a deeper historical consciousness in the church. But were Newman's personal magnetism, the Gothic Revival, or an interest in Justin Martyr the characteristic and really significant things in the Tractarian movement? The significant thing was its revival of the baneful and decaying sacramentarian idea of the clergy and the church; and time will make it quite clear, and has already made it quite clear, that Arnold was right in understanding the movement to mean just this and in directing his discussions of it to nothing else.

Almost the only subject insisted upon in the first two volumes of the "Tracts for the Times" was the importance of "the Apostolical Succession" of the clergy, and the consequent exclusive claims of the Church of England to be regarded as the only true church in England, if not in the world. In other words, as says Dean

Stanley, "the one doctrine which was then put forward as the cure for the moral and social evils of the country, which Arnold felt so keenly, was the one point in their system which he always regarded as morally powerless and intellectually indefensible, as incompatible with all sound notions of law and government, and as tending above all things to substitute a ceremonial for a spiritual Christianity." This "heraldic or succession view of the question" Arnold could "hardly treat gravely; there is something so monstrously profane," he said, "in making our heavenly inheritance like an earthly estate to which our pedigree is our title. And really what is called succession is exactly a pedigree and nothing better; like natural descent, it conveys no moral nobleness, — nay, far less than natural descent, for I am a believer in some transmitted virtue in a good breed, but the succession notoriously conveys none." The Popish and Oxford view is that "the church (that is, in their sense, the clergy) is a sort of chartered corporation, and that by being attached to this corporation any given individual acquires such and such privileges;" whereas Arnold maintained that "a man's relation to any church is quite a thing subordinate and secondary, although, where the church is what it should be, it is so great a means of grace that its benefits are of the highest value." "We were not to derive our salvation," he said, "through or from the church, but to be kept or strengthened in the way of salvation by the aid and example of our fellow Christians, who were to be formed into societies for this very reason, that they might help one another, and not leave each man to fight his own fight alone." A man's salvation was something that lay between himself and God; and his belonging to this or that church "had no more to do with the matter than his being born in France or in England, in Westmoreland or in Warwickshire."

This, of course, struck at the very foundation of the High Church system. A good man was not safe, Keble and Newman said, unless he belonged to an episcopal church; Arnold retorted that this was equally unchristian with saying that to belong to a true church would save a bad man. He was very far from doubting the expediency of episcopacy in the Church of England; but "to insist on the necessity of episcopacy," he said, "is exactly like insisting on the necessity of circumcision. Both are and were lawful, but to insist on either as *necessary* is unchristian, and binding the church with a yoke of carnal ordinances; and the reason why circumcision, although expressly commanded once, was declared not binding upon Christians is much stronger against the binding

nature of episcopacy, which never was commanded at all; the reason being that all forms of government and ritual are in the Christian Church indifferent and to be decided by the church itself, *pro temporum et locorum ratione*, 'the church' not being the clergy, but the congregation of Christians." The unity at which the Anglo-Catholics were aiming, and which has always been "the idol of Judaizers," was a formal, worthless, and impracticable thing. "The true and most precious unity has never been lost, but in all times and in all countries there has been a succession of men, enjoying the blessings and showing forth the fruits of Christ's spirit, in their lives and in what is truly their religion."

Mr. Mozley drolly observes that "as Arnold's own turn was to speculation and skepticism, he had but scant practical aim." If the case for his "skepticism" depended simply upon the case for his "scant practical aim," it would certainly be a very poor case. It would be hard to think of a man in whom the theoretical and the practical were more immediately joined together than in Arnold, or one whose speculations were more immediately suggested by and directed against practical evils and abuses. Whatever province he touched — society, education, politics, or the church — it was with the hand of the practical reformer, and his hand was immediately felt. There were very few fresh and open minds which came under his influence which he did not also send away inspired with the spirit of practical reform. It was chiefly the practical element in his mind which made him so impatient with the Tractarians, which prompted his most fiery utterances against them, and made him so quick to see the *reductio ad absurdum* of many of their positions. "These men would exclude John Bunyan and Mrs. Fry and John Howard from Christ's church, while they exalt the Non-jurors into confessors and Laud into a martyr." "There is something almost ludicrous in the way in which — speaks of Calvin and some of the great living writers of Germany as of men laboring under a judicial blindness. It is vain to argue with such men; only when they ascribe a judicial blindness to Calvin and Zwingle or to Tholuck and Bunsen, one cannot but be reminded of those who 'with lies made the heart of the righteous sad, whom God had not made sad,' or of those who denied St. Paul's apostleship and spirituality, because he was not one of the original twelve apostles, and because he would not preach circumcision." Mr. Mozley, we imagine, would not quarrel with Arnold greatly for saying that he never found a really great man in any of the old English Divines, and that if he had spent his time in reading them, he would have

read a great many very indifferent books; for Mr. Mozley calls them "a wordy race." But the composure of every Tractarian must certainly have been very much disturbed by Arnold's opinion that there was more of Christianity in any one of Mrs. Sherwood's or Mrs. Cameron's tracts than in all the two Oxford octavos.

The priestcraft and succession doctrines, the Oxford view of the sacraments, and all the magnifying of ritual were abhorrent to Arnold. "They are the very errors," he said, "which, in studying moral and religious truth, I have continually had to observe and to eschew." If he spoke vehemently against them, it was only as he spoke vehemently against whatever he counted mischievous; and the Oxford men, and especially the instigators of the attack upon Hampden, were in no wise so conspicuous for "dove-like sweetness and simplicity" that they, of all men, may safely hasten to prefer the charge of being a "hawk" against any theological controversialist. Vehement Arnold certainly was. He did not hesitate to say that he regarded the movement, in its general and inevitable tendencies, as a mere aggravation of the worst superstitions of the Roman Catholics, while stripped of that consistency which stamps even the errors of the Romish system with something of a character of greatness. Whatever of genius, of goodness or attractiveness there might be in Newman or Pusey or Keble or Froude, the movement upon which they were launching the English Church was one which would run into a great system of ritualism and spend itself in miserable and childish quarrels over petty forms and externalities. There had been fanaticisms born of great and noble ideas and working to great and noble ends; but this was to be a fanaticism for "a dress, a ritual, a name, a ceremony, a technical phraseology, — the superstition of a priesthood without its power, — objects so pitiful that, if gained ever so completely, they would make no man the wiser or the better; they would lead to no good, intellectual, moral, or spiritual."

Emerson speaks somewhere of the fatal certainty of names; and the fact that the name which has come to indicate most clearly to most men the distinctive thing in the Oxford system — has become indeed the well-nigh universal name for the system — is *Ritualism*, is one strong witness certainly to Arnold's just insight.

We believe that Arnold saw the movement in its true proportions and was altogether right. No man would deny, none certainly can do it rightfully, that the movement which began at Oxford has been the means of purging the English Church of much dead and cumbrous material, that it has stirred the church to new life

and useful activity in a hundred directions, that it has stimulated useful and neglected studies, that it numbers to-day among its clerical adherents a far greater number of men of both intellectual and moral force than belong to the old Low Church party. But more rapid far than the development of any salutary practical forces in the movement has been the development of a ritualism and sacramentarianism as minute and imperious as those of Rome itself, strengthening every deadening superstition and turning men back into children; while as a scheme of religious thought it has been simply reactionary, has set itself against the sure results and inevitable tendencies of modern science, and made it necessary for a great section of the English Church to travel a hard road twice.

All this Arnold clearly foresaw, and he fought the movement fearlessly from the beginning. If he lacked insight, as Mr. Mozley charges, he certainly never lacked courage. The thought of his chronic shivering in fear of satirical Tory parsons in the jungle is merely laughable to any serious student of his life and books. Such a thought could find permanent lodgment only with men of the Boswellian stamp, like Mr. Mozley, with whom personalities play so paramount a part, and who, incapable themselves of a broad outlook like Arnold's, imagine that satirical Tory parsons must needs be as troublesome as they try to be, or as troublesome to large men like Arnold as they would be to middle-sized men like themselves. Mr. Mozley observes in another place, with the utmost apparent seriousness, that a single word dropped by Newman at Rome, which chanced to reach Arnold at Rugby, fell on him with the weight of a papal excommunication—taken off some years afterwards, he is kind enough to assure us. This was in 1832. The terror of the new popes was evidently somewhat dispelled four years afterwards, for in 1836 we find Arnold writing a word to Whately, which we would seriously commend to Mr. Mozley's attention. "I never yet in my life," he says, "made any application for preferment, nor have I desired it. But I confess, if Hampden is made a Bishop, I wish that they would put me in his place at Oxford. I think under present circumstances that I could do more good at Oxford than at Rugby. I could not supply your place, but I could supply it better than it is supplied now. I should be of weight from my classical knowledge, and I am old enough now to set down many of the men who are foremost in spreading their mischief, and to give some sanction of authority to those who think as I do, but who at present want a man to lean upon. And though the Judaizers hate me, I believe, worse

than they hate Hampden, yet they could not get up the same clamor against me, for the bugbear of apostolical succession would not do. Furthermore, my spirit of pugnaciousness would rejoice in fighting out the battle with the Judaizers, as it were in a saw-pit; and, as my skin is tough, my wife's tougher, and the children's toughest of all, I am satisfied that we should live in Oxford amidst any quantity of abuse unhurt in health or spirits." To one an ocean away from Oxford it is hard to detect in this the tone of the paralysis of "excommunication" or the ague of terror. Indeed, we have wasted quite too much space over the imputation of lack of courage in Arnold. If there was ever a man who never feared the face or word of another, it was he; least of all could he be upset by the mock thunderbolts of this new Vatican.

But it was not simply with the *priestcraft* of the Oxford men that Arnold came in collision. It was also with their spirit of resistance, shared indeed by the whole conservative part of the church, but of which they seemed to have a double portion, to the results and methods of modern science, in their application especially to the Bible and religious doctrine. Arnold may almost be called the father of scientific biblical criticism, and of the new doctrine of inspiration in the Church of England; while the temper of the Oxford men is very well indicated by a passage in Mr. Mozley's book. "Arnold's volume of 'Rugby Sermons,' " says Mr. Mozley, "was not received favorably by Newman and his friends, not so much on account of the sermons themselves as on account of a note on Genesis xxii., in which Arnold laid down that the Almighty could not do an immoral thing, and that consequently if we thought anything wrong, we were bound to believe that He had not done it. This, of course, struck at every miracle and every extraordinary act for which is claimed a preternatural sanction, if in any respect whatever it does not accord with our most sentimental or our most abstract notions of morality. Rightly or wrongly, the note was fully believed at Oxford to have been written with this comprehensive and destructive design."

The Tractarian measure of destructiveness is of very much the same value as its measure, in Arnold's case, of terror. Arnold, in what he wrote upon inspiration and the Bible, was of course simply striking in upon the course in which all that is thoughtful in the church has followed him. Tractarianism was the apotheosis of the traditional, and to nothing was it more terrible than the modern inquiries concerning the composition and character of the Bible. A questionless credulity — that was what it stood for.

"Stamp out a doubt as a spark in a magazine," Samuel Wilberforce said. Arnold would have every man able to give a reason for the faith that was in him. "It is not scriptural," he wrote to Stanley, "but fanatical, to oppose faith to reason. Faith is properly opposed to sense, and is the listening to the dictates of the higher part of our mind, to which alone God speaks, rather than the lower part of us, to which the world speaks. There is no end to the mischiefs done by that one very common and perfectly unscriptural mistake of opposing faith and reason, or whatever you choose to call the highest part of man's nature. This you will find the Scripture never does; and observing this cuts down at once all Pusey's nonsense about Rationalism. What he abuses as Rationalism is just what the Scripture commends as knowledge, judgment, understanding, and the like; that is, the moral reason acting under God, and using, so to speak, the telescope of faith for objects too distant for its naked eye to discover. And to this is opposed, in scriptural language, folly and idolatry and blindness, and other such terms of reproof. According to Pusey, the forty-fourth chapter of Isaiah is Rationalism, and the man who bowed down to the stock of a tree was a humble man, who did not inquire, but believe. But if Isaiah be right, and speaks the words of God, then Pusey, and the man who bowed down to the stock of a tree, should learn that God is not served by folly."

But nowhere do the careful rationalism of Arnold and the blind traditionalism of the Oxford High Churchmen come into more striking contrast than in the personal relations of Arnold and Keble. Of all the leaders of the Oxford movement, it was Keble whom Arnold knew the best. Newman was elected into the very Fellowship at Oriel which Arnold vacated; but Arnold had no personal acquaintance with him until he came up to Oxford as Professor of History, five years after the Hampden controversy, when he was thrown into his company at Oriel, and they became good friends, and so parted. But Keble was Arnold's intimate friend from the beginning of Arnold's student life at Oxford, and tenderly loved by him to his life's end, despite the long coldness on Keble's part, arising from their radical disagreement on points so vital. Keble was his confidant and counselor during the days of doubt and struggle which preceded his ordination. What sort of counselor he was we learn from a letter of his to Justice Coleridge, which Dean Stanley has preserved in his "Life of Arnold." "I have not talked with Arnold lately," he wrote, "on the distressing thoughts which he wrote to you about, but I am fearful,

from his manner at times, that he has by no means got rid of them, though I feel quite confident that all will be well in the end. The subject of them is that most awful one, on which all *very* inquisitive, reasoning minds are, I believe, most liable to such temptations — I mean the doctrine of the blessed Trinity. Do not start, my dear Coleridge; I do not believe that Arnold has any serious scruples of the *understanding* about it, but it is a defect of his mind that he cannot get rid of a certain feeling of objection — and particularly when, as he fancies, the bias is so strong upon him to decide one way from interest; he scruples doing what I advise him, which is to put down the objections by main force whenever they arise in his mind, fearful that in so doing he shall be violating his conscience for a maintenance' sake. I am still inclined to think with you that the wisest thing he could do would be to take a young pupil and a curacy somewhere or other, and cure himself, not by physic, that is, reading and controversy, but by diet and regimen, that is, holy living."

This bald confession certainly sets the author of the "Christian Year" before us in a most extraordinary light. But who shall say that it was not prophetic of the spirit of the whole Oxford movement? Arnold is openly advised to put down his doubts "by main force," whenever they rise, and to be ordained in the midst of them, professing to believe what he does not, and trusting that, in the busy work of the ministry thus entered on, the doubts will somehow or other be forgotten or outgrown. And this Keble calls "holy living"! What would Arnold have called it in 1836? What value would he have set upon a faith thus obtained or thus maintained, at the cost of honor and uprightness? Yet we gather from Mr. Mozley's book that this sort of drugging was not rare among the clergy of the English Church at the time. Mr. Mozley tells us that he argued with a troubled friend of his own in very much the same manner that Keble argued with Arnold. "My general argument was," he says, "that we were bound to accept the teaching of the church, and that in so doing we were in no danger of guiltiness. But while I talked in this strain," he frankly adds, "I was fixing a deep disquiet in my own mind, which remained, and indeed still remains." As indeed it should; for the whole method is surely no less profane — indeed, far more so — than the procedure of the shallow and optimistic religionists of the *Aufklärung*, to whom conviction of sin is all one with the hay fever, and who can only direct the troubled soul to the Grand Manan. It is not by stifling doubts or going around them that

men ought to find peace and strength, or that they ever can do it, but only by going through the doubts, trustfully and with open eyes, to a faith fixed firm in clear convictions, whatever its final content.

As for Keble, it is doubtful whether he ever got beyond this melancholy standpoint to the end of his days. With all that was beautiful and saintly in Keble's character, he was, in very much, most limited and unattractive. Mr. Mozley himself — a most partial witness — tells us that there was no getting on with Keble without entire agreement and submission. He very soon lost his temper in discussion, and raised the pettiest matters into tests of loyalty and orthodoxy. His sympathies were most one-sided. He was smothered in the embrace of a narrow-minded section of the aristocracy, and his whole thought was untrue to the actual state of things in the world. His attitude towards the scientific spirit of the time may be inferred from Mr. Mozley's story of how he once had an argument with Buckland on a coach-top, all the way from Oxford to Winchester, in which he finally took his stand on the conceivability and indeed certainty of the Almighty having created all the fossils and other apparent outcomes of former existences in the six days of Creation. Rather an appalling lack of *lucidity* here, very truly! Mr. Mozley charitably urges that it must have been at the end of the journey, and only when he was hard pressed, that Keble would have delivered a *dictum* like this — and we sincerely hope so; but if this be indeed an exaggeration, it is only an exaggeration of his habitual manner of viewing the relation of the Bible and tradition to religious and scientific truth. In the eyes of the Oxford men it was fatal to doubt; and if fatal to doubt, then, to use Mr. Mozley's words, "superfluous and indeed very foolish to inquire."

Keble is undoubtedly to be looked upon as the flower of the Oxford movement — for in Newman the movement moved beyond itself. Keble's theology, Keble's churchmanship, Keble's rectory and life and character, and the whole constitution of his mind, are the precise fulfillment of the Tractarian ideal. The intimate relation between his thought and character is striking. The character is certainly one of rare beauties; and let the thought have credit for all it can do. In that crowded and exciting time we think of no other whose life was so completely a mirror of his doctrine, and whose doctrine was so completely a mirror of his life, save only Arnold. And Arnold's life, no less pure and spiritual and fragrant than Keble's, was a life infinitely truer to the

actual state of things in the world, infinitely richer in practical aims, infinitely fuller of the heroic and inspiring, a life great in its faithfulness to the present and with the promise of the future. If the opposing tendencies in religious thought were to have their fate settled by the character of the two representatives, there is little doubt, we think, as to which has the more virtue in it, and the greater fitness for the work of the world.

"In the whole mass of the Tractarian literature," says Mr. Mozley, with his characteristic, blunt honesty, — for blunt honesty is his characteristic, however he sometimes strays, — "there is very little biblical criticism — none, it has been said, besides Pusey's 'Minor Prophets' and Keble's metrical version of the Psalms — or social philosophy; no original views of duty, and not much to meet the great problems of the age, though a good deal to impede their solution." In contrast with this, we remember another passage. It is where Mr. Mozley is speaking of the hundreds of Arnold's "oracular utterances," chiefly upon political or social subjects, which were current at Oxford. They might be only what everybody knew or thought, but Arnold had made them his own by his vigor and terseness of expression. "What I remember most," says Mr. Mozley, "is a prophecy that labor and capital would before long be in collision, and that the struggle would be severe and the issue doubtful. Having myself lived some years in a manufacturing town, I was sufficiently aware of the collision and the struggle, but what I seemed to learn from Arnold was that labor would meet with unexpected reinforcement from the philosopher, the philanthropist, and the statesman." It will not, we hope, be thought too presumptuous in us to say, what conviction compels us to say, that, if Mr. Mozley had steadily sought to possess himself of what it was that Arnold was thinking about, in this alone we believe he would have gained more practical and valuable wisdom than the whole series of "Tracts for the Times" could impart, or all the discussions of Oriel common-room upon the Priesthood, the Succession, and the Real Presence, the Sarum usage, and the catenary curve.

Edwin D. Mead.

PROHIBITION IN KANSAS.

THIRTY years ago Kansas was a place to which Indians were sent to get them out of the way of civilization. When the Kansas-Nebraska Bill became a law, May 30, 1854, there were not more than one hundred and fifty white persons within the territory. Nearly seven thousand times one hundred and fifty persons are now here, laying the foundations of the central State of the Union. The area of Kansas is greater than all of New England increased by a second Vermont and two additional Rhode Islands. Within these limits began the conflict with human slavery which was destined to go forward until the nation was forever freed from that curse. John Brown and others wiser than he doomed slavery in Kansas. Then Kansas sent one half of her able-bodied men to help put down the slaveholders' rebellion, and left upon battle-fields mortally wounded a larger proportion of her soldiers than any other State in the Union. This youthful State is to-day the leader in another war. First of all the States she has written in her constitution a prohibition of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage. Whether this be as wise as her early repudiation of slavery, and whether in this too she anticipates the destiny of the nation, we may leave to the future historian to decide. Even the constitution of Kansas, by its ineffectual prohibition of lotteries, warns us that reforms may fail despite constitutional assertions favorable to them. Yet without presuming to anticipate the verdict of history, and not being over-confident of the effects of a prohibition written in a constitution, we may, for the benefit of all who are discussing means of deliverance from the curse of rum, tell the story of the way that this growing State is taking, and set down the apparent results thus far achieved.

It is only a little more than five years since this question of constitutional prohibition was presented to the people by the action of the governor approving the bill which had passed both houses of the legislature. It is not yet three years since the law made in pursuance of the amendment went into force. Much time was necessarily consumed in test cases brought first to determine whether the amendment had been legally adopted, then to discover how far certain provisions of the law would be sustained by the courts, so that prohibition has not yet had more than two years to test its worth by actual experiment. Add the fact that for more

than a year a man opposed to prohibition has been the governor of the State, and it need not surprise us if the results up to this hour are not the total abolition of the liquor traffic.

Such success as has been attained has been reached through the political parties that exist for other ends than temperance, if for this end also. The temperance people of Kansas have never yet organized in a separate party. There have been one or two futile efforts, but they were such conspicuous failures as to discourage further attempts. In the year 1873 Hon. D. C. Haskell was nominated for governor of the State by a temperance convention which met at Leavenworth; but he at once declined on the ground that the cause of temperance would be hindered by a third party. A similar body nominated John P. St. John in 1876, and he declined for the same reason. The results justify the wisdom of these leaders in temperance reform.

The present position of the State on the liquor question is the outcome of many and persistent efforts for the suppression of intemperance. The most notable of these before the ever-memorable campaign which secured the adoption of prohibition was the so-called "Murphy Movement" of the winter of 1877-78. Thousands signed pledges to abstain from all intoxicating liquors as a beverage. Very many persons thus bound themselves who felt no fear that they would ever become drunkards, but surrendered their own liberty to aid weak brothers. Some towns then closed up their saloons and have kept them closed ever since. Yet in that winter's work little was said about closing the saloons. The chief aim was to induce the drunkard to leave his cups. It was insisted that such liquor laws as existed should be rigidly enforced; but no debate between license and prohibition was even tolerated. The speakers commonly urged that the first thing to do was to unite all temperance men against the use of liquor as a beverage; that the discussion of the best methods of restraining or abolishing the traffic might be left to a later hour.

When the Republican party, which is always victorious in Kansas, held its convention in the fall of 1878 for the nomination of State officers, the delegates came up from districts that had been thoroughly canvassed and deeply moved by temperance orators, yet the question of prohibition was not before that convention and St. John secured its nomination only as a compromise candidate, the great mass of the convention being divided hopelessly between two other candidates. So far was the Republican party from planning a prohibition campaign that St. John was early warned

that his temperance speeches made while he was a candidate for governor would cost him votes. The returns showed that the party was not intensely in love with temperance. St. John was elected, but by a majority much less than that given to the other candidates on the same ticket. Yet in his first message to the legislature he, who has since been named the apostle of prohibition, urged only such a modification of the existing local-option law as should make its provisions applicable to the whole State. Personally he was in favor of prohibition, yet was not willing to risk the loss of all restraint of the liquor traffic in a vain attempt to abolish it. In this the governor fairly reflected the temper of the more thoughtful men among the prohibitionists in the State at that time.

The legislature from which the accidental temperance governor asked local option gave to the people the question of constitutional prohibition. The prohibitory amendment in its present form was written by Hon. N. C. McFarland, now land commissioner at Washington. It was introduced into the senate during the debate on a strong local-option law. The debate extended through the month of February without agreement. At length the opponents of temperance legislation proposed to the temperance men to substitute for the local-option bill, on which they could not agree, the bill for constitutional prohibition. Of course this was done only to dispose of the entire question. The record shows that all senators present voted to submit this question to the people. The history of the hour shows that both sides regarded the movement as a defeat of temperance legislation. It required a call of the house and a night session to get the measure through the legislature. Senators who had voted for it were said to have become alarmed when they feared that it would pass the house, and to have worked energetically to defeat its passage. The governor, who had not recommended this policy, heartily welcomed it; and temperance men throughout the State seized the opportunity so unexpectedly presented to try the temper of the people on this question of prohibition. Even some who doubted the outcome threw themselves earnestly into the debate, lest the failure should in any measure be attributable to their negligence.

Among the many blessings of Kansas must be reckoned her freedom from legislatures every other year. After the adjournment of the legislature of 1879 there were nearly two years in which to discuss the proposed amendment before the people with no fear of hostile legislation in the interval. The time was well

used by both parties. No question was ever more widely or more fully discussed. If there was a single individual in the State who did not hear both sides before the time came to vote, he failed to improve not one chance but a hundred. On this question every man in Kansas had more than a fair chance.

The amendment was carried by a majority of eight thousand. But the reëlection of St. John by an increased majority, although he had earnestly advocated the adoption of the amendment, speaking in almost every county of the State and in some places more than once, this is even better evidence than the vote for the amendment that the people willed it. It is also an evidence that the canvass for the constitutional amendment had increased the temperance vote of the State.

The legislature of 1881, chosen in the midst of the discussion of this question, gave us, after careful consideration, a law which has thus far withstood the assaults that the whiskey power has made upon it, and has proved invulnerable at every point. The last legislature refused to change the law, and by an overwhelming majority denied the request of the present governor for a resubmission of the question of constitutional prohibition to the people. The effectiveness of the law may be seen in the fact that seven out of nine of all the cases brought under it in the last two years have resulted in convictions. One wholesale liquor-dealer from another State has paid the costs of a suit to learn that he cannot collect in Kansas for liquor sent here to be sold contrary to the laws of the State. The ground of the decision was that it was an immoral contract and could not be enforced. A county attorney who disregarded the law, neglecting to prosecute notorious offenders in his county, has been ousted from office by an action brought in the Supreme Court of the State, and this, too, by the decision of a jury one half of which were not favorable to the law. Other officials have taken warning. Suits that lingered are pressed to trial, new prosecutions are begun, and saloons are closing in anticipation of the result.

Thus it appears that the public sentiment aroused by the temperance meetings in the winter of 1877-78 gave the needful conditions of success when, by a blunder of the anti-prohibitionists, the question of constitutional prohibition was given to us for settlement. The temperance men, more thoroughly aroused and more numerous than ever before, accepted in earnest the challenge made to them in sport, and by a vigorous campaign, which lasted nearly two years, carried prohibition so overwhelmingly that even the de-

feat of St. John, when nominated for a third term, and the election in his stead of a gentleman who was and is an avowed opponent of the prohibitory policy, has not even apparently checked the progress of the reform. The largest temperance convention that ever met in this State assembled at the capital in January, 1883, when the anti-prohibitionist governor was being inaugurated. The State Temperance Union was then reorganized, and its treasury replenished. This Union is composed of men of all parties, and is the effective instrument of persistent temperance reform. Its able lecturers traverse the State and keep public sentiment active, its treasury aids prosecutions, and its officers see that no legal aid is lacking to the enforcement of the law in any part of the State. The existence and the work of such an organization is an evidence and an assurance that prohibition is not here a mere wave of reform, to advance and recede by turns.

There were 708 open saloons when the law went into operation. There are not now, three years later, more than 220. Last November, reports were collected from sixty-six counties of the State, all the more populous, and it appeared that then there were 313 saloons remaining, more than half of the number being in a single county. Since that report the saloons have been closed in Hays City, Lawrence, Topeka, and, a recent report says, Wyandotte. But this might mean only that the form of sale had changed.

Of course there is a great deal of liquor used as a beverage in the State. No statute, however well enforced, cures depraved appetites. The express companies take packages of liquors to their various offices within the State, and deliver them to any one who presents an order for them. Some individuals send for ten gallons at a time, and sell it in pint bottles under various names. Beer is sold as "Stomach Invigorator Bitters."

Yet there are some indubitable signs that drinking is less common and less reputable than it was a few years ago. When the late Mr. Haskell was nominated for Congress the first time (Fort Scott, 1876), he was visited at his hotel, after retiring, by a drunken crowd of politicians, who insisted upon his rising and drinking with them; and when he refused they poured whiskey over him in a vain effort to force him to swallow it as he was lying in bed. At the convention which nominated his successor this year there was no drunkenness, and there were no men who were inclined to repeat that disgraceful scene. The political conventions, at which a few reckless men were always found to disgrace their associates by their drunken foolishness, are now meetings of

sober men. This fact has been matter of common remark, and is an indication of a notable change in public sentiment on the liquor question. During the recent special session of the legislature I was at the capital, and conversed with legislators from different parts of the State about the enforcement of prohibition in their respective districts. The testimony was uniform — from men who had voted for the amendment and from men who had vigorously opposed it — that the law was well enforced.

Newspapers that ridiculed the policy have first become silent, and then have acknowledged the success of prohibition. A recent notable illustration of this is the "Topeka Commonwealth," one of the ablest and most influential daily papers in the State. Less than one year ago it remained a strong opponent of the prohibitory policy. Two years ago it protested vigorously (but vainly) against putting a prohibition plank in the Republican platform of this State. Yet, in its edition of March 30 it thus speaks: "Public sentiment has undergone a revolution. The prohibitory law has been longer on trial, and it now has friends where two years ago it had opponents. In many localities of Kansas, even in this capital city (a city of 25,000 people), it has been demonstrated that the open public sale of liquors can be prohibited." This is very notable testimony coming from a paper that not only lent no support to the cause of which it declares the success, but even threw the weight of its great influence in favor of the opponents of the cause that it now proclaims triumphant. Perhaps the editor means to give us a hint of his own conversion when later in the same article he says: "A large number, impressed by the results of the enforcement of the law, have accepted the views of the prohibitionists." But this is no singular instance. The press of the State are very largely to-day on the side of prohibition. The exceptions are noticeable from their singularity.

There have been changes in men, also, that are as remarkable as the changes in newspapers. Mr. John A. Martin, of Atchison, is the proprietor of a large daily paper that has long deservedly ranked among the better papers in the State. He has been an opponent of the prohibitory policy. Yet he has recently declared to a newspaper reporter, "I have no idea that prohibition will cut any figure in this year's canvass. We regard it as an accomplished fact in our State, and there is no room for further agitation." The gentleman who said this is one of the oldest residents of Kansas, one of the leading politicians of the country, secretary of the National Republican Committee, and just now a candidate

for the suffrages of the people of Kansas. Considering his personal views on the question, and his past relation to it, his testimony to the success of prohibition has not a little of the force of evidence given by an unwilling witness contrary to his own interests. We may fairly take what the former opponents of prohibition concede as the present measure of its success.

The peril of the hour is, that under cover of apparent success there may come real defeat. If men who do not believe in the principle of prohibition are admitted to places of power in the State, they can render the constitutional prohibition against liquor as ineffective as the constitutional prohibition against lotteries now is. If candidates for positions on the State ticket will take open ground with the prohibitionists they can safely be trusted, otherwise not. The war is not over. A few battles have been fought and won. Victory seems certain to the prohibition forces; but if they throw away every advantage, and permit an enemy or a friend to use their power and powder for his own ends, it goes without saying that, even if the result be assured, the war will be a long one. While brewers contribute in a convention in Michigan to influence ballots in Kansas, he is a little too sanguine who says that the war is over. Prohibition in Kansas is secure only if its friends retain political power in the State.

James G. Dougherty.

THE CHURCH SCHOOL. — CRITICISMS AND SUGGESTIONS.

WHILE there is no divine warrant from the Bible for organizing and maintaining the Sunday-school, such as we have for our churches, the Christian reasonableness of the institution has set it out upon its second century with an assured authority that no one would care to question.

It is, to be sure, no such an affair as its early life gave promise of. Robert Raikes would not have dreamed that the magnificent institution which claims the time, thought, and money implied in the modern Sunday-school could ever have grown up from the modest undertaking of which he was the father.

In some respects I imagine Saint Robert would deplore the results which have come out of his little enterprise, and perhaps he would go so far as to say, as did some of our wise New England

pastors, that better had the Sabbath-school never have been born than to have grown up to cripple the home training and the pastoral instruction which it has supplanted but by no means made good the place of.

It does not necessarily follow that the evils which are connected with an organization are incident to it and inseparable from it. They may be of such a nature as to be in no sense an outgrowth of its life, but, on the other hand, exist in spite of it, and cease to be as soon as the real life of the institution fully asserts itself.

That there are such parasitical forces at work upon our Sunday-schools is known and deeply deplored by its best and wisest friends. Such a man as Dr. Vincent, who may well be called the Luther of the Institution, loving and serving it as none but a real reformer can, has been forced to criticise it most sharply, among other matters saying that it is marred by frivolity and irreverence, that its teaching is often very superficial, that there is want of enthusiasm in its scholarship. And, wise man that he is, he does not hesitate to say that by all means he would have a child attend public worship rather than the Sunday-school, if he cannot attend but one,—a course directly opposed to the modern heresy, which has made the Sunday-school the children's church.

A prominent educator in one of our western cities has given as his deliberate conviction that the training which the boys and girls have in Sunday-school militates against the discipline of the "day schools," and that he would not hesitate to choose as pupils children out of homes with the training of which the lawlessness of the modern Sabbath-school had not interfered, rather than the average Sunday-school scholar. There are not a few pastors who are looking forward with extreme anxiety to the future of the church as it shall fall into the hands of the young people whose Christian life has been developed in the modern Sunday-school. What kind of hymns and music shall we have? what kind of preaching? who will pay for the prize chromos for attendance in the coming church? I found out the secret of the life of a high-pressure church, with its sensational pulpit and extravagantly salaried choir, when the man who had for years superintended the Sabbath-school told me how much it cost him to buy the cake and candies that he gave to children, most of whom have more of such things at home than they need.

The Sunday-school is of value only as it serves the church well. When the interests of the servant are conserved at the expense of his master, either the servant should change his course or be dis-

missed. Solomon has something of this sort to say when he writes there are two things for which the earth is disquieted: for a servant when he reigneth, and an handmaid that is heir to her mistress. It is to avert this calamity that not a few pastors have come to the decided conviction that, for its own sake and for the sake of the church, the Sabbath-school should be reformed.

To adequately consider this matter, we must keep clearly in mind that there is a sharp and clear distinction between church schools and mission schools. The former are for the benefit of children who have Christian homes, the latter are composed of children whose parents cannot or will not attend church.

The radical idea of these two classes of schools is different, and, while it is true that to the pupil in the mission school the institution should stand in the place of fireside and pulpit instruction, it does not at all follow that the church school should have any such aim before it. With this thought in mind, a few suggestions concerning our church Sunday-schools may not be untimely.

Is it at all necessary to say that, when confined to its appropriate sphere and doing its appointed work, no institution ought to be more sacredly cherished than the Sunday-school? Those of us who have watched the growth of our churches the past few years cannot have failed to observe the appropriateness of calling this institution the nursery of the church. But a nursery will not take care of itself, nor should it become the centre of authority and power in the house.

With these thoughts in mind, I would insist upon it, as a fundamental principle, that a church school should recognize the existence of family religion, or, in other words, that the pupils of such a school should be expected to have home instruction upon, or at least home study of, the lesson.

We appear to have gone upon the basis that the Sabbath-school, in relation to religious truth, holds the same place that the secular schools do in ordinary instruction; and this mistaken notion could not have done the harm that it has, had we given the two kinds of school equal scope. When we send our children to the public school, we expect that out of thirty hours in the school-room they will have from twelve to fifteen hours of study. The Sabbath-school is, on the other hand, simply a place for recitation, and we take no pains to see that even as much time is taken in learning a lesson as is taken in reciting it. Nothing can be more harmful to a child's spiritual life. Information taken in without the cost of study is both cheap and worthless. If our children studied

Exodus as they do grammar, or Matthew as they do arithmetic, or the catechism as they do geography, they would have a far greater relish for the truth than they now have.

The only way to secure genuine love for anything is to be thorough with it. Our only hope in the case before us is to see to it that the children prepare their lessons at home. It is not feasible to afford Sunday-school study hours and teachers to see that they are enforced. There should be study hours at home and the helping hand of that best of all teachers, the parent. 'We shall never get beyond the divine philosophy which underlies the command, "And ye shall teach them your children, speaking of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, when thou liest down, and when thou risest up." Christian parents do not begin to know what they are losing in their own spiritual life by neglecting to teach their children, as thereby they may keep fresh their own religious views while they feel the inspiration that comes from contact with minds first catching a view of the truth that may have become uninteresting to those who are older from its very familiarity.

We need the inspiration which some of us have found as we have taught our boys the Latin and mathematics which we learned but did not appreciate twenty years ago. It makes us young again to revive these scenes. And none the less will our spiritual life be rejuvenated by hearty coöperation with our children in the pursuit after divine truth.

We are all by and by going to awaken to a consciousness of the perils that threaten our family life, and, closing our ears to the clamor which has driven us into public life, we shall begin to draw closer our curtains, close some of our doors, and fan the dying embers upon the altar of our household religion.

The difficulty has been that the Sabbath-school as an institution has had such vast force of life that it has grown at the expense of the family. That force can but be baneful which saps the life of any divine institution. The two ought to grow side by side. They can do so. Objection may be taken to the method herein proposed of securing recognition of home religious training, on the ground that in every church school there will be many children whose parents are unbelievers. But it is in such cases as these that the beneficence of the principle will be seen. If such parents know that home instruction is a *sine qua non* of attendance upon the school, they will see to it that their children study, and will prize the institution because of its thoroughness. Very few of them will

teach their little ones infidelity, while many, in trying to impart the truth to their children, may be brought under the influence of truth in its most attractive and persuasive form, and truth is never powerless.

Another fundamental principle in this matter is that the Sunday-school must recognize the fact that the church exists before and above the school, — in other words, to put the truth in a practical way, of the two the child should go to church rather than to the Sunday-school, if he can attend only one.

To be sure, the child may miss the picture-paper. If so, subscribe for it as you do for your own paper; he will prize it the more. The very freeness of our Sunday-school papers is cheapening them in the estimation of the children. Of course it will be a source of grief not to meet one's playmates and enjoy the sly conversation that is dexterously wedged into the breaks in Sunday-school exercises. It may be that the child will feel the need of the money that he has hitherto earned in securing new scholars, but it is to be presumed that money can be secured for him in ways fully as unobjectionable. Perhaps the dear child has come to live on the story-books with which too many of our Sunday-school libraries abound, but the sooner he has learned the damage to heart and head which such trash occasions the better it will be for his future.

No doubt there will be a rebellion in prospect of an exchange of Sunday-school for church. But it is to be hoped that the child's preferences are not superior to the parent's principles. Most children prefer candy to potatoes, but few have parents who feed their offspring upon sweetmeats instead of substantials.

The preaching of the gospel is a divine institution, and parents run a fearful risk in allowing their children to neglect it. In addition to this, the church needs the children in the congregation. The minister is in danger of philosophizing rather than preaching, unless he have the children before him in the sanctuary.

And more than this, the teaching of the pulpit, from the nature of the case, is more valuable than that of the Sabbath-school. There are very few laymen who have had the time or the opportunity to acquire well-balanced views of truth; and if it be the case that there is power in the truth in the direction of converting the soul, how marvelously important it is that the presentation of the truth should be not only entertaining but sound.

The whole argument upon which is based all the collegiate and theological training of our ministry is in force when the question

is being answered who are to teach the children divine truth. No one ever knew too much to teach a child. The more complete our training the better will be our hold upon the truths which our children need. How the children must have enjoyed Jesus' teaching and preaching! A sermon which an average child cannot get anything out of will not be of benefit to an average congregation, if it will be to any congregation. And a child whose training does not include listening to a thoughtful, serious presentation of the truth from the pulpit is not in the Christian way.

There is need of mental heroism which will inspire our children to seek after instruction rather than to simply allow themselves to be entertained. There is ruin in many directions in an institution which effeminates by a round of exercises that awaken interest rather than devotion, and which subsidizes by the giving of prizes and premiums, and picnics and Christmas trees.

Enterprise has run away with our religion in many directions. If a new departure signifies a return to good old ways that ought never to have been abandoned, there is room for it in the direction of the relation of the children to the church.

I cannot believe that the Sunday-school is necessarily a foe to the home and the church. It is the abuse rather than the legitimate use of the institution which has made so many parents childless, so far as having children to go with them to the kingdom is concerned. It is a deplorable thing when a little child loves and imitates and obeys a nurse-girl rather than his mother, unless the nurse is superior to her mistress. Has modern Christianity found an institution which can supplant the divine institution, the church?

The Sunday-school, rightly used, is one of the choicest gifts of God to the world. Its flexibility, its enthusiasm, its personal contact of teachers and pupils, its fund of suggestions and help derived from the thoughts and prayers of faithful workers the world over give it marvelous power; and as long as children love to be with each other, and men and women love children, and the time of our youth is the best time to receive religious impressions, so long will we cherish and care for the Sabbath-school.

And that it may do the most for the church, the home, and the world, there are three lines upon which it will seek to secure the best results.

1st. In respect of its general management. The success of an organization depends upon its head more than upon any one thing. As much care should be taken in the choice of a superintendent of

the Sunday-school as in the selection of a pastor. There may not be as broad a field to choose from, but no pains should be spared to secure and support the best man for the place. He will from the very nature of the case love the souls of children, and believe that they can be early won to the Master. He will have faith in the truth, and in the power of the Holy Spirit to enforce the truth, and hence will not rely upon anything short of this to accomplish his work. He will never sacrifice the instruction of the scholars to mere exhibition of forces. His company will rarely be on dress parade; it does not exist for May-day-training.

2d. In respect of its teaching, the Sunday-school cannot aim too high. Nothing is more hopeful in this direction than the zeal and wisdom of many leading Sunday-school men, as they are affording each year better appliances for the aid of teachers in our Sunday-schools. It is a pernicious practice which gives to a newly made young church member a class in the Sabbath-school simply because it will do her good to teach.

The world of modern literature is so full of covert infidelity, and the business world of so many false maxims of trade, and the world of fashion is so unchristian, that we need as religious instructors of the young those who have sterling integrity of character, culture, trained minds, who can command the respect and admiration of their pupils. This does not always imply great learning or profound ability, nor surpassing elegance of appearance. It is the result of a Christ-like life, upright dealing, fair ability, and careful, patient labor.

Some of us are getting out of conceit with our public school system, because it takes coarse daughters of ill-bred homes, who, in virtue of graduation from the high and training-schools, are entitled to teachers' certificates, and places them in charge of children who have been taught gentle manners, have refined sensibilities, and a keen sense of honor. And as fathers and mothers shall come to care as greatly for the piety as they do for the manners of their offspring, as earnestly for their instruction in the principles of the kingdom of heaven as they do for their information concerning science and art, they will more and more demand that those who teach their children in the Sabbath-school shall have mental, moral, and spiritual fitness for their positions.

3d. In respect of the attainments made by the pupils. Studiousness and excellence of behavior in the Sunday-school should have their reward, as they do in secular schools, by regular promotion.

Not, indeed, that our Sunday-schools should ever encourage the curse of working for marks, or seeking promotion for promotion's sake. It is possible to secure excellence for excellence's sake, but to do this the pupil must not fail of knowing that virtue has its legitimate reward. It may answer for men who have subjected themselves to prolonged moral training to declare that they do right solely because it is right without the slightest expectation of reward, with utter indifference in respect of the consequences. The average child holds a philosophy which links happiness with holiness. Not that he needs prizes or rewards, save such as are legitimately connected with faithful work, namely, the opportunity to do better work. We sometimes blame our larger boys and girls because they abandon the Sabbath-school. They are moving on in their studies which they pursue in the intermediate, the grammar, and the high school, but when Sunday comes, they must go into the same class, and with the same teacher and the same kind of instruction which they have had for years past, and be expected to be interested. They will not be interested unless they are profited. They cannot be profited if they must be classed with others who, having abandoned their studies for business or to be idle, are neither able nor willing to pursue sacred truth in a scholarly way. Make it possible for bright young men and women to gain the best things intellectually and spiritually in the Sabbath-school, and there will be no difficulty in retaining them. They will be fewer in number, in proportion to those of their own age, than will be found in the lower classes. The same is true in our public schools. The higher classes are made up largely on the basis of the survival of the fittest. The only point that I desire to make is, that the Sabbath-school ought to have an atmosphere which should permit the "fittest" to survive.

But why more? It is a well-nigh thankless task to suggest radical reforms in an institution which, because it is sacred, regards itself as above the reach of ordinary secular principles and methods. Is it not time to learn that an institution, because it is holy, should be for that reason none the less sensible? Piety ought to cease paying a premium to sentimentalism. Religion and tact ought never to be divorced. The more holy the work we are engaged in, the more careful should be our scrutiny of the methods which we employ, and the more solicitous should we be to win success.

There is no work of the church of to-day which has larger possibilities for usefulness than that which we are trying to do in our

Sabbath-schools. These possibilities will never be met until the threefold cord — the home, the church, and the school — is made perfect by the perfection of each strand. That the drift of thought in our day is in this very direction is one of the most hopeful signs of the time.

“Let us live for our children” is the watchword of the hour. There are three who should hear it, and with it conquer the world for Jesus, — the Teacher, the Pastor, and the Parent; and the last is first, if the first is not last. The three together can do what either two without the third could never accomplish.

James G. Merrill.

PROTESTANT MISSIONS IN EAST AFRICA.

[*Continued from page 404.*]

THE London Missionary Society chose for its position in the missionary advance Lake Tanganyika and its vicinity. Mr. Arthington offered them £5,000 to plant a station and keep a steamer on the lake. This proposal was accepted March 15, 1876, and the Rev. Roger Price, who had had long experience in the South African missions of the society, was sent to make preliminary investigations. One object was to find out whether ox-wagons, such as are commonly used in South Africa, could not with advantage be substituted for the native carriers. The first experiment was very successful. Mr. Price, with his bullock-wagons, reached Mpwapwa from Saadani in seventeen days, and, after a short rest, made the return journey in sixteen. The missionary company, with a complete outfit, such as the experience of pioneer missions demanded, including smiths' and carpenters' tools, surgical instruments and medical stores, surveying instruments, canned provisions, etc., was assembled at Zanzibar. Oxen and Kaffir drivers were brought from the Cape, and the expedition began its advance.

The wagon train got on but slowly over the bad road; the oxen began to die, and in a few weeks of 105 only 20 were left. In consequence of this failure a long delay occurred. Mr. Price and another missionary returned to South Africa. Embarrassed by the difficulty of moving their heavy stores, a great part of which were still on the coast, and awaiting instructions from the authorities at home, the corps, now reduced to four men, remained for several months encamped at Kirasa, forty miles from Mpwapwa.

At last arrangements were made with Broyon, a French trader,

to forward the bulk of the stores, and leaving one of their number, Dodgshun, to accompany him, Messrs. Thompson, Hore, and Hutley set out from Mpwapwa June 12, 1878, and arrived at Ujiji on the lake, August 23d, having made a good journey of seventy-three days. A spot was selected for a station three miles from the town of Ujiji, but hardly had this been done when Thompson, the leader of the expedition, died (September 22, 1878). Dodgshun, following with the goods caravan, reached Uyui in the end of December. Beyond this point difficulties arose with Mirambo, who seized all the goods. After vain efforts to recover them, Dodgshun pushed on to the lake. He reached Ujiji March 29, 1879, and, worn out by labors and anxieties, died eleven days later.¹ The work of the missionaries in Ujiji was hindered by the influence of the Arabs and Moslem Wasuaheli, but they made progress in gaining the friendship of the natives. Mr. Hore explored the lake, and made the important discovery that the Lukuga River is its outlet, thus establishing its connection with the drainage system of the Lualaba-Congo.

In the spring of 1879 the society sent forward a new expedition under the lead of Dr. Mullens, the foreign secretary of the society. Dr. Mullens died at Chakombe, near Mpwapwa, in July, 1879; his companions, the Rev. W. Griffith and Mr. Southon, a medical missionary, reach Ujiji September 23d. On their way they recovered, at Urambo, the goods which the king had seized.

Upon their arrival, the mission divided its forces. Mr. Hore remained at Ujiji. Dr. Southon returned to Urambo, two hundred miles from the lake, to work among the Wanyamwezi, Mr. Griffith and Mr. Hutley crossed the lake and established a station at Mtowa, in Uguha, the gateway leading from Tanganyika to the west. Three more missionaries followed them, one of whom, the Rev. D. Williams, died, and the other two soon returned invalided. Mr. Hutley, also, had for the time to withdraw, leaving only three men in the field.

In 1880 James Stevenson, Esq., offered the London Missionary Society and Livingstonia mission on the Nyassa, to give £4,000 to connect the Nyassa with Lake Tanganyika by a ten-foot road, and to maintain steam communication on the lakes. The London Society, on its part, was to keep a steamer on Lake Tanganyika, and establish a new station at its southern end. The

¹ It was afterwards found that the seizure of the goods by Mirambo was made in the belief that they belonged to M. Broyon; when he learned that they were the property of the mission he returned them.

Scotch mission to build a road from the point near the northern end of the Nyassa to Malinwanda, about fifty miles, where they will have a station. The Central African Trading Company will maintain communication on Nyassa and the rivers, and undertake the maintenance of the road after its completion. A glance at the map shows the great advantage of this route. Instead of eight hundred miles of carriage, goods can be transported by water all the way, except the portage around the rapids in the Shiré (Murchison Falls), and somewhat over two hundred miles between the two lakes.

In May, 1882, a large reinforcement set out from England. Five ordained missionaries, two artisans, and a sailor, accompanied Mr. Hore returning to his post. They took with them a steel life-boat in sections; a larger vessel, the steam-launch *Good News*, followed by the *Nyassa* route. At the end of October, 1882, two of the company reached Urambo, where they learned from Mr. Coppleson the sad particulars of Dr. Southon's death, one of the heaviest losses the mission has suffered. He was wounded in the arm by the accidental discharge of a gun in the hands of a servant. Mr. Coppleson was sent for from Uyui and amputated the arm, but unfortunately not high enough. A second operation was necessary, but it did not save his life. After great suffering, he died July 26, 1882, thirty-one years old. One of the missionaries of the last company, Mr. Penry, turned back sick, and died at Kisokwe April 23, 1883, the sixth death in the London Society's Central African mission.

Captain Hore and Mr. Swann, with the life-boat, reached Ujiji February 23, 1883, and by this time, no doubt, the steamer is also on the lake, as the sections had safely reached the head of the Nyassa several months ago.¹

On the Nyassa the Scotch Free Church has a strong mission. The first suggestion of an extension of the work in this direction was made more than twenty years ago. Livingstone in 1865, when the guest of Dr. Wilson, of Bombay, expressed his wish that the Free Church might establish a mission on the heights near this lake. In the winter of 1873-74 the question of a mission in Central Africa was discussed with fresh interest, and the Nyassa was chosen as its field, largely upon the advice of Dr.

¹ Summary at the last reports: *Ujiji*, Captain E. C. Hore, A. J. Swann; *Urambo*, Rev. Messrs. T. F. Shaw and W. C. Willoughby; *Uguha*, Rev. Messrs. W. Griffith, D. P. Jones; at the south end of the lake, — station not yet fixed, — Rev. J. H. Dineen, Messrs. A. Brooks, J. Dunn, artisans.

Stewart, whose experience and success in the South African mission of the society gave great weight to his counsel. Conference was had with the other Presbyterian Churches of Scotland. The Reformed Presbyterian Church agreed to take part in the support of the mission, as did also the United Presbyterian Church, which gave for the work the very able medical missionary Dr. Laws. An understanding was also had with the Church of Scotland in reference to the mission which it proposed in the same region. At the head of the expedition was Lieutenant E. D. Young, R. N., who had been two years with Livingstone and had also visited the Nyassa in the Livingstone Search Expedition. Beside the Rev. Robert Laws, medical missionary, the corps consisted of two engineers, one of them a blacksmith, a carpenter, a seaman, and an agriculturist. They took out a steam-launch, all of steel, named the *Ilala*, from the place of Livingstone's death, beside two boats for river service. The expedition landed at the mouth of the Zambesi, July 23, 1875, the *Ilala* was put together and steamed up to the Murchison Falls, where she had to be taken to pieces and carried around the rapids to the upper Shiré, forty or fifty miles through a rough country. This, the most difficult part of the task, having been successfully accomplished, the little steamer was put together again, and proceeding up the river entered the lake October 12th. After some exploration a site was chosen for the station on the west side of Cape Maclear, and the name *Livingstonia* given to it. Four more men joined them in 1876, one of them a medically educated clergyman, William Black. Warned by the disasters of the Universities' mission in this region, the missionaries had received the strictest injunctions that no active interference with the slave trade must be attempted. Their very presence, however, served as a check upon it. Young was relieved in October, 1876, by the Rev. Dr. Stewart, and returned to England. The mission was now called upon to help in the establishment of the mission of the Established Church at Blantyre, on the highlands, east of the Shiré, in the vicinity of the Murchison Falls, and during the greater part of 1877 the force of the *Livingstonia* mission was thus divided. Death removed two of the most energetic workers, the Rev. Mr. Black, and Shadrach Ngunana, a Zulu catechist from the school at Lovedale. No great opposition on the part of the natives was encountered. A school was opened, and soon reached an attendance of over thirty, — the boys assisting the mechanics in their work, and learning the use of tools. The confidence of the people was shown by the increas-

ing population about the station. The year 1878 was one of progress. A church and school building was completed; also a storehouse with walls of sun-dried bricks. These, as well as the woodwork of the buildings, were the work of natives. A very dry season was unfavorable to agriculture, nevertheless thirteen acres of land had been reclaimed; two acres were in sugar-cane; the walks around the station had been planted with cocoanut palms, blue gums, and mango trees. The attendance on the Sunday services had risen to an average of 120, the school had 65 pupils on the roll with an average attendance of 40. The medical work had rapidly increased. Missionary journeys had been made among some of the neighboring tribes. In 1879 Mr. James Stewart, C. E., of the mission staff, and Mr. J. Moir, of the Trading Company, explored the northern end of the Nyassa and the fine plateau between it and Lake Tanganyika, a great service both to missions and science. Miss Watterson, a medical missionary, was added to the staff, and before the year closed had Bible reading, sewing, cooking, and housekeeping classes, beside numerous patients.

In the following year it was decided to remove the principal station from Cape Maclear to Bandawe, on the west side of the lake, about the middle of its length, and a site for a sanitarium was selected in the mountains, thirty or forty miles away, at Mombera. It was also resolved to establish a station at the northern end of the lake among the Choongoos. The working force of the mission was increased by six Zulu evangelists, trained in the South African missions of the society. In consequence of a great migration of Zulus some generations ago, numerous powerful tribes around the lake can be reached in that language. At Livingstonia services were conducted entirely in the Chinyanga; preaching was also kept up in Mpango's villages, not far away.

The explorer, Mr. Joseph Thompson, writes of this mission: "Where international effort has failed¹ an unassuming mission has been quietly and unostentatiously realizing in its own district the entire programme of the Brussels conference. This mission has proved itself in every sense a civilizing centre. By it slavery has been stopped, desolating wars put an end to, and peace and security given to a wide area of country." The first baptism at Livingstonia took place March 27, 1881, and the next day the headquarters of the mission were removed to Bandawe, where a manse and houses for the artisan evangelists had been built. At

¹ Referring to the plan of the international scientific stations.

Cape Maclear, the work was left for the time in the charge of the native catechist Namalambé. Mr. Stewart, having undertaken the construction of Mr. Stevenson's Lakes Junction Road, was released from mission work. Other changes in the staff were made necessary by sickness, but it was speedily brought up to its full strength.

The year 1882, in the Nyassa region, was a time of wars and rumors of war, but the mission was not disturbed by them. Great progress was made in every direction. At Bandawe a brick school-house was finished, beside workshops and other buildings. Mombera, in the midst of a tribe of Kaffir descent and tongue, was occupied by a Zulu evangelist, Wm. Koyi, who was afterward joined by Mr. Sutherland, as teacher. The chief having given permission to preach, congregations of as many as 1,500 gathered in his kraal. A school is to be opened at once. A school was also begun in the vicinity of Malinwanda's village, on the lakes road, which had been constructed from Karonga, thus far, and the Rev. Mr. Bain took charge of the work there. The attendance on Sunday service at the central station ranged from 150 to 1,000, and in the surrounding towns from 50 to 400 or even 700; four natives had been baptized, 3,104 medical cases treated, 300 boys and girls were in the schools. The whole of the New Testament, beside a number of hymns, has been translated into the Chin-yanga, the language of the people on the southeast of the lake. The cause of missions and of civilization, in this region, has recently suffered a great loss in the death of Mr. James Stewart, C. E., which occurred August 31, 1883, while engaged in construction of the lakes road.

The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, in 1875, sanctioned the establishment of a mission to East Africa, and a pioneer, Mr. H. Henderson, went out with Lieutenant Young's party. The main body of six men, with Dr. T. T. Macklin at their head, arrived at Quilimane August 9, 1876, and reached the highlands east of the falls in the Shiré, October 23d. The original design had been to plant this mission on the Nyassa, at some distance from that of the Free Church, but the shifting of population along the shores of the lake, due to the incessant slave raids, caused a different course to be pursued. The spot chosen for the station, which bears its name, Blantyre, from Livingstone's birthplace, is about half way between the river Shiré and Lake Shirwa. It is on a terrace, over three thousand feet above the sea; the climate is cool, the soil fertile, a fine stream is close by, timber is abun-

dant, the neighboring tribes friendly. No other mission in East or Central Africa has so many natural advantages. The station was laid out by Dr. Stewart and Mr. J. Stewart, C. E., of the Free Church mission. Two main roads were constructed at the cost of the two churches, one leading to the foot of the cataracts, thirty-five miles, the other to the upper Shiré above the falls, somewhat longer. The industrial side of the mission work made rapid progress. By the end of 1877 ten acres were under cultivation. The missionaries were learning the language, and translating into the Chiao parts of the Scriptures—first Genesis, Jonah, Matthew—and the shorter catechism, “somewhat simplified.” The school enrolled one hundred scholars; an out-station was occupied at Zomba, forty miles north of Blantyre on the south side of the mountain.

One familiar with the history of missions in East Africa could scarcely read without anxiety, in successive reports, that Blantyre was become “a home of refuge for the slave,” and that the number of fugitive slaves about the station was increasing. Otherwise every word that reached Europe was most encouraging. There was, therefore, no little surprise as well as chagrin among the friends of missions in Scotland when, in April, 1880, Mr. Andrew Chirnside, F. R. G. S., published his pamphlet, “The Blantyre Missionaries, Discreditable Disclosures.” The author, who had visited Blantyre in August, 1879, on a hunting expedition, charged the missionaries with taking the law into their own hands and punishing the natives with great cruelty. An alleged murderer had been shot with their consent, if not at their command; for minor offenses men had been mercilessly flogged, or imprisoned in a pit; at Zomba they had been engaged in armed encounters with the natives,—as he called it, a war. A special commissioner, the Rev. Dr. Rankin, was sent out, whose report showed that although Chirnside’s pamphlet was somewhat highly colored, there was substantial ground for most of his accusations. The finding of the Committee on Foreign Missions was, that “various acts of cruelty, retaliation, and indiscretion have been committed by several of their mission agents, between September, 1877, and September, 1879.” The Rev. Mr. McDonald, the head of the mission, was at once recalled, together with two of the artisans. Dr. Macklin, who was already at home, was discharged from the service of the mission. The difficulties and abuses were found to have arisen chiefly from the harboring of runaway slaves, and from the excessive zeal with which the industrial department of the

work had been pushed. It was decided to drop this branch of the work altogether; and very strict instructions were given to the missionaries in regard to their interference with slavery. A new staff was sent out and the work begun again. Anxieties have more recently been caused by the threatened Portuguese occupation of points on the Shiré or the lake, and by rumors of war between the Makololos on the river and Chipatula. The mission has been called to mourn the death of two of its members, Mrs. Nicholl, only six days after her arrival, and, a week or two later, Mrs. Duncan, who had been for four or five years at Blantyre. More recently surveys have been made looking to extension in the direction of Lake Shirwa.

We cannot take leave of these missions without referring to the great support they have received from the Trading Company, under the management of Messrs. J. and F. Moir, who, with ten or twelve European subordinates, operate from Quilimane to the head of the Nyassa. Nothing can do more to make the work of the missionary in Africa successful than the establishment of honest Christian commerce, instead of the Arab, slave, and ivory traders, or, as on the west coast, and now in Madagascar, of unprincipled Europeans with their rum and brandy. Such a work, done in a Christian spirit, is more than an auxiliary to missions, it is a mission itself.

In 1880 the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, at the suggestion of the Natal Zulu Mission, decided to extend their work in the direction of Umzila's kingdom, a large region south of the Zambesi River. As the Zulu is spoken throughout that country, the missionaries and native helpers from Natal were prepared to go to work in the new field without the usual delay of learning the language. The Rev. Myron W. Pinkerton, one of the younger members of the Zulu Mission, was invited to organize an expedition to make the necessary preliminary explorations. He returned to America for a short visit, and left his family here until he should be ready to settle in the new field. He left New York May 15, 1880, and after many delays and accidents on sea and land reached Inhambane October 3, 1880. On the 19th of October he set out for Umzila's country, accompanied by Mr. E. Jourdan, an American ship officer, and John Pohleni, a Zulu Christian. On November 3d they reached the borders of a famine country, and while waiting for provisions to be brought up Mr. Pinkerton was taken ill with fever, and died on the 10th.

October 9, 1880, the Rev. E. H. Richards and wife left America

to join Mr. Pinkerton in his undertaking. They learned before landing at Natal that Mr. Pinkerton had fallen by the way. Mr. Richards stayed in Natal studying the language until May, 1881. Then, as no other missionary could be spared to go with him, he started with two native Christians to join Mr. Jourdan at Inhambane, and try again to reach Umzila's country. After the usual African delays and trials, Mr. Richards began his inland journey June 24th. He was well received all along the line of his march, and had many invitations from the different chiefs to establish missions in their countries.

On October 10 the party reached Umoyamuhle, the king's city. They found Umzila a fine looking man, with an intelligent, pleasant face and manners. He received them kindly, and after several interviews consented to their establishing a mission in his country, asking for five missionaries and their wives to come and begin the work among his people. He insisted upon the families coming, for he wished the missionaries to stay, if they came at all, and urged their coming quickly. The country Mr. Richards described as a delightful garden, with plenty of hills, woods, grass, water, food, etc. The people are divided into two classes, the Amatonga (the original owners of the country) and the Amanguni, the Zulu lords, with Umzila for their chief. The Amanguni speak pure Zulu, the court language. The Amatonga have a dialect of their own, but are quite familiar with the Zulu.¹ Mr. Richards returned to Natal as soon as he had reached this understanding with Umzila.

Mr. Richards and his wife held themselves ready to go in with Mr. Wilcox (whose wife would follow soon after) to possess this land. But no native Christians could be found willing and ready to go with them, so they were forced to wait until another May, hoping for more men from America and praying that some Zulu Christians might be found ready to consecrate themselves to the work. In the mean time Mr. Wilcox asked and received permission to explore the country about Inhambane, with the view of planting a mission station in that field. In the Board Report of 1883, the latest information in regard to this mission to Umzila's country is that Mr. Richards and wife are still waiting for reinforcements. Mr. Wilcox has just gone again to Inhambane to begin the mission work there, Mr. Richards assisting him, until the way is open to the Umzila mission; Mrs. Richards helping in a girl's school in Natal.

¹ *Annual Report A. B. C. F. M.*, 1882, p. 18.

It was my desire to include in this paper some account of the Roman Catholic missions in Central Africa, and also of the work which, in pursuance of the plan of the Brussels conference, has been done by the international scientific expeditions and stations, we should then have before us all the forces which are now at work to change the face and the heart of Africa; but I have already exceeded my limits and must leave this part of my plan to some other hand. One thing comes out in this rapid survey of a part of the work: through all East Africa, covering twenty degrees of latitude and extending eight hundred miles inland, missions have been planted, and they will not be withdrawn. The cost in life and money has been great and will be greater, but the church will not count it too much for the regeneration of a continent.

George F. Moore.

BAPTISM IN THE "TEACHING" AND IN EARLY CHRISTIAN ART.

IN commenting in the April number of this Review on the injunction in the "Teaching" to administer baptism in a given case by affusion, reference was made to the testimony of Christian art.

It may be of service at this time to submit this evidence in some detail. We shall not attempt an exhaustive review of it, but merely such a presentation as will clearly indicate its character and bearing. The figures which are introduced are obtained by photo-engraving from plates published by Father Garucci in his "*Storia dell' arte cristiana*," or by Commendatore De Rossi in his "*Bullettino di archeologia cristiana*." Their interest, especially in the form here presented, is quite exclusively archæological. The early Christian artists rarely exhibit proficiency in drawing, and when their productions are divested of color and reduced to mere outlines, the lack of skill becomes conspicuous. Yet, for the purpose now in view, such sketches are of no little value. Those who examine them can see at once for themselves whatever these early designs may embody of the Christian tradition, respecting one of the sacraments of the Church.

Figure 1 is a copy¹ of a fresco in the Crypt of St. Lucina, the oldest part of the Roman catacomb of St. Callistus. The extreme

¹ Figures 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 are from Garucci's plates.

antiquity of this section and of this picture is generally conceded. Leading authorities agree in assigning to it a date prior to the close of the second century.¹ It depicts one man unclothed stepping up from water, which reaches a little above the knee, and with his hand joined to that extended by another clad in a tunic



FIGURE 1.

and standing on a bank or shore. In the air hovers a dove holding, apparently, a twig or leaf in its mouth.² There seems to be no reason for questioning the ordinary interpretation of this picture, that it represents the close of the baptism of Jesus as described in Matt. iii. 16: "And Jesus, when he was baptized, went up straightway from the water: and lo, the heavens were opened unto him, and he saw the Spirit of God descending as a dove and coming upon him."³

¹ Cf. Roller, *Les Catacombes de Rome*, vol. i. p. 97 (Paris, 1881), De Rossi, *Rom. Sott.*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 3.

² In De Rossi's plate the form of a leaf is not apparent as in Garucci's, and the water lines are less confused. The fresco is much effaced, yet the main features are plainly discernible.

³ Victor Schulze, *Die Katakomben*, pp. 313, 314 (Leipzig, 1882), says that we should recognize in this fresco the baptism of a member of the family owning the burial chamber. The dove signifies that he died soon after receiving the rite. Schulze objects to the common interpretation that such a representation of Christ in Christian antiquity is not to be thought of, and that the twig which the

The originals of Figures 2 and 3 are to be found in two of the oldest of the six so-called "Chambers of the Sacraments" in the Catacomb of St. Callistus proper. These two chambers belong to the first period of excavation, — a period whose date has been quite definitely ascertained, — and there is no disagreement among competent judges as to the contemporaneous origin of the decorations. This carries them back to very late in the second or very early in the third century, with probably a short interval of time between the two.¹



FIGURE 2.

dove carries shows it to be Noah's dove, the bearer of heavenly peace, and not the Holy Spirit. The first objection is of no weight. The absence of drapery is a mere historical and ritual incident often repeated in later pictures. (See Garucci, *Op. cit.* i. 372 ; also, Figures 6 and 7.) The twig held by the dove cannot give the key to the interpretation to the neglect of the main action. Schulze himself really assigns to the dove a double office. It symbolizes at once Noah's dove and the spirit of the subject of baptism. The artist may have made another combination.

Garucci proposes an interpretation founded on Ps. lxxix. 1, 2. (*Op. cit.* i. 422.) But the picture says nothing of "deep waters" and "floods." He admits, when he explains his plate, that the common understanding of the picture may be correct (*ib.* ii. 8).

Another very ancient fresco, in the Catacomb of Prætextatus, Rome, is claimed by Roller as a representation of the baptism of Christ. Garucci concurs in this explanation. We have not reproduced it because no thoroughly trustworthy copy has yet been published, and from such evidence as we possess we cannot deem it a baptism. If it should prove to be one it would exhibit the rite as sprinkling or affusion alone, for there is no other indication of water than the sprays about the head. See Roller, *op. cit.* i. 102, also Pl. xviii., 2 ; Garucci, *op. cit.* ii. 46, with *tav.* 39, 1 ; De Rossi, *Bull. di arch. crist.*, 1872, p. 64 ; Northcote and Brownlow, *Rom. Sott.* ii. 145-147 ; Parker, *Catacombs*, Pl. xiii. Mr. Parker admits this and associated pictures to be "probably of the third century," but omits from his drawings very important features given by Roller, Garucci, and others.

¹ Schulze, in his valuable *Archäologische Studien über altchrist. Monumente* (Wien, 1880), goes into a thorough critical discussion of the frescoes in the Sacrament chapels. As to their date he expresses a general agreement with the results of the archæological and architectonic investigations of the brothers De Rossi. He thinks, however, that the series of pictures to which Figure 3 belongs is probably at least two decades later than the group which includes Figure 2. That the entire cycle of the six chambers, he remarks, "belongs to

In the one picture a man, wearing a toga and holding a roll in his left hand, lays his right hand upon the head of a boy who stands



FIGURE 3.

in water which seems to be scarcely ankle deep.¹ In the other the copious sprinkling or affusion of water is made conspicuous, and the recipient of the rite is a little more deeply immersed. Schulze speaks of the water as reaching to the knees, but none of the plates, whether De Rossi's, Garucci's, Roller's, or even Schulze's so represent it even in Figure 3.

De Rossi, in guarded phrase, calls this standing in the water a "slight immersion" (*poca immersione*), and says that the water is hardly up to the knees (*appena fino alle ginocchia*).² With this qualification, the description is still rather strong as applied to Figure 2. M. Roller says that the neophyte has entered the river scarcely to the ankle-bone.³

We have thus in each of these three oldest representations of baptism (1) the administrator of the rite represented as standing upon dry ground, (2) more or less robed, while (3) the subject of baptism is unclothed, and (4) is partially in the water. Looking at Figure 3, which Schulze rightly regards as more realistic than Figure 2, we see (5) the actual administration of the rite by a sprinkling so abundant as to be more properly described as an affusion.

The simple question then is, whether in chambers whose manifold decorations reveal unmistakably the Christian spirit, which very the first half of the third century appears to be indisputable." Schulze is a Protestant, a "Docent" in the University of Leipsic, and aims with commendable though not entire success at a purely scientific treatment of Christian archæology.

¹ In Figure 2 Garucci finds the rite "which in the Catholic Church is called confirmation" (p. 12). Waiving the question of an anachronism this interpretation overlooks the fact that the subject of the rite is still standing in the water. According to Tertullian, confirmation, or the laying on of the hand, was administered after the candidate had left the water and other ceremonies had been performed. See Schulze, *Arch. Stud.* p. 56, who cites Tert. *De resurr.* c. 8; *De bapt.* c. 7. If it be supposed that the artist has represented in one view various moments of baptism, including confirmation, this is possible, but does not affect the use we have made of the picture.

² *Rom. Sott.* ii. 333.

³ *Les Catacombes de Rome*, vol. i. p. 131.

soon, if not already, were under the care and administration of the church of Rome,—then, as Irenæus recognizes, the most representative church in existence,—the rite of baptism could thus be depicted if the apostles had definitely and absolutely prescribed a different mode as essential and necessary? The question seems to us to be answerable only in one way. The early Christian consciousness, the primitive tradition, admitted liberty in this matter. And it is scarcely possible that in this recognition it could have misunderstood the apostolic teaching. Rites, we know, were enlarged, accumulated, perverted, but a substitution at this early date of one rite for another, an abandonment of baptism for something that either directly or by obvious and necessary implication the apostles had taught is not baptism,—this is something very different and incredible.

It will be replied that authorities differ as to the age of these pictures. But this is incorrect. De Rossi's remarkable discoveries, his thorough investigation of details, his combination of evidence gathered from every department of archæology, have secured for his main conclusions almost universal acceptance.¹ And other

¹ Roller states (*Op. cit.* i. p. 125) that De Rossi's earlier topographical investigations led him to fix the date of the pictures before us approximately in the time of Pope Fabian (A. D. 236–249). It is characteristic of the man to form his judgments thus cautiously and tentatively, and to test them by all appropriate criteria. So far as I have noticed, the leading later histories of art imply the general correctness of his judgment as to the dates of pictures in the Catacombs. Among eminent archæologists we know of but one who dissents, the late Mr. J. H. Parker, C. B., F. S. A. In his work on the Catacombs (Preface p. xi.) he roundly affirms of their pictures: "There are no religious subjects before the time of Constantine." So sweeping a declaration shows that Mr. Parker is rather uttering a ringing Protestant protest against the zealotry which treats everything in the Catacombs as a relic from the age of the Martyrs, than expressing a sober critical judgment respecting particular pictures. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Parker does not himself apparently adhere to this dictum, for on page 72 he seems to refer several paintings of Scripture subjects to "the second or third centuries." As his opinion is so much quoted in this country, it is fitting to notice not merely that it stands alone, but that it cannot fairly be cited as of authority. Mr. Parker's judgment in architecture is of much weight. This was his specialty. And it is noteworthy that in this department his authority sustains generally De Rossi's architectonic conclusions. But Mr. Parker was not a specialist in respect to paintings. The writer was much helped by him, as well as by Mr. Hemans and De Rossi, in his studies in Rome of the early Christian monuments, and in matters of construction has a very high appreciation of his services and ability, but in a question of the age of the paintings in the Catacombs other considerations demand attention, and the opinion, it is confidently believed, will not be questioned by any one conversant with the facts, that in this sphere either of the other two gentlemen named has shown himself far more competent to render a decision.

independent studies, as those of Hemans, Schulze, Roller, and others, have strengthened this unanimity.

It will be further objected that, even if the antiquity of these pictures is probable, their interpretation is doubtful. The best authorities disagree. The same objection arises in respect to every teaching of the New Testament. And there is the same gratifying progress in respect to the teaching of these early pictures as in respect to that of the Canonical Scriptures. When the pictures are allowed to speak for themselves, there is not much room for doubt as to their meaning. The weightiest name in opposition to those who find unmistakable evidence of affusion in the Catacomb pictures is Victor Schulze's. In his work on the Catacombs he says: "The representations of baptism in the period before Constantine, amounting to three in number, all show subjects past the age of childhood (*erwachsene Täuflinge*), — in two cases boys of perhaps twelve years, in the third a young man. The act is performed by immersion."¹ And by immersion is meant submersion. Fortunately, in another work² the author gives us his reasons for this summary judgment, and it is evident that the decisive one is derived not from the pictures, but from the patristic evidence that immersion was the established mode of baptism. That is, since Tertullian and the church generally, at the time these pictures were painted, knew only baptism by immersion, we must interpret these pictures to signify the same thing. And so Schulze supposes that the sprays of water flying in all directions from the head of a boy standing perfectly erect and motionless in water quite below his knees are produced by his having just dipped! Singular water and no less remarkable boy! It is one of the benefits accruing from the discovery of the "Teaching," with its unmistakable testimony that baptism does not necessarily and always imply dipping or plunging, that the pictures can now be allowed to tell their own story without being forced to agree with Tertullian or some other church teacher or father. And when this lesson is fully learned we believe that there will be no more doubt as to the meaning of these and other pictures in the Catacombs than there will be about the meaning of the Gospels when a truly scientific exegesis is established.

But we are reminded here that De Rossi himself interprets these pictures to mean immersion. And perhaps it will be added that Kraus and Martigny recognize the same signification. They do use the term immersion in connection with these and similar

¹ *Die Katakomben*, p. 136.

² *Archäologische Studien*, p. 55.

frescoes. But they do not intend, by immersion, submersion, nor attach to it primary importance. A not unnatural misunderstanding of De Rossi's language deserves to be set right, and the correction will answer for any similar misapprehension of Martigny or Kraus. He entitles his paragraph on the mode of baptism represented in these pictures: "*Il rito del battesimo effigiato per poca immersione e simultanea infusione dell' acqua*" (the rite of baptism represented by slight immersion and simultaneous affusion of water). In his exposition of the subject he calls special attention to the "slight immersion of the boy and the affusion or aspersion of water upon his head and upon his body," and adds that the conception of the rite (*salutare lavacro*) in the Callistan pictures, and other monuments which he cites, "is principally expressed by the water sprinkled upon the head and upon the whole person."¹ And elsewhere he speaks of baptism by contemporaneous partial immersion and affusion of water upon the head and upon the person."² So when Martigny uses the phrase, "la simple immersion," he refers to standing in water, which in one of his pictures does not even cover the feet.³

Nor can anything more favorable to submersion, so far as we can discover, be derived from the learned and sometimes fanciful expositions of Garucci. He does, indeed, say that the lad (*giovanetto*) represented in Figure 3 is wholly immersed in a shower of water ("*immerso interamente in un nembo di acqua*"), but he immediately adds: "which bath is represented by great sprays of sea-green, thrown with the pencil around his [the lad's] person and even above his head. And thus baptism is represented." Baptism represented by sprays of water, even if suggestive of a shower of the same, is at most a symbolical immersion, and the moment symbolism is allowed in this matter a literal submersion is abandoned. Garucci's general position respecting the mode of baptism in the ancient church is, we judge, fairly shown by the following extract from the "*Teorica*": "Most ancient and especially established was the rite of immersing the person in the water, and three times the head also, while the ministrant pronounced the three names: it is not, however, to be believed that baptism never took place otherwise. Because when, for the occasion, either the amount of water requisite for immersion, or the capacity of the vessel, was insufficient, or when the condition of the

¹ *Rom. Sott.*, i. pp. 333, 334.

² *Bulletino di archeologia cristiana*, 1876, p. 12.

³ *Dictionnaire des antiq. chrét.*, pp. 82, 83.

catechumen was such that it would have been dangerous for him to be entirely plunged in the waters, or for some other weighty motive, there was a substitution of the baptism spoken of as that of Infusion or Aspersion, by pouring or sprinkling the water on the head of him who was receiving baptism, while he stood either within a vessel which did not suffice to admit him wholly, or outside of this and upon the dry ground."¹

Symbolically, however, there is no doubt that the original conception of baptism implied that the whole person was the subject of the purifying rite, and therefore it was natural and fitting, and doubtless was the primitive and ordinary practice, to apply the water to the entire body.² When, somewhat later in the century in which these frescoes were painted, Cyprian expressed his approval of clinic baptism by sprinkling, he uses the expressive and instructive phrase, "the divine abridgments," (*compendia*),³ meaning that any less total use of water than immersion is an abridgment of the full rite, though equally effective when sufficient reason exists for such curtailment. The representation in art of the candidate as standing in water is doubtless part of the symbolism which is more fully expressed in literal immersion, but which for good reason may be sufficiently expressed, even though only the head be sprinkled.

¹ "Antichissimo e solenne fu il rito d'immergere la persona nell' acqua, e tre volte anche il capo, al pronunziare del ministro i tre nomi : non è pertanto da credere che altrimenti non si battezzasse giammai. Perocchè mancando al bisogno o la copia di acqua richiesta all'immersione, o la capacità della vasca, ovvero essendo la condizione del catecumeno tale che gli fosse pericoloso il tuffarsi interamente nelle acque, ovvero per alcun altro grave motivo supplivasi col battesimo detto di infusione od aspersione, versando o spargendo l'acqua sul capo di colui che si battezzava, stando egli or dentro una vasca che non bastava a riceverlo tutto, o fuori di essa e sulla terra asciutta." *Op. cit.* i. 27, 28.

² The offices of the Syrian church of Jerusalem illustrate this conception, and all the more so because they appoint affusion as the mode. The priest, as directed, first lets the candidate down into the baptistery. Then laying his right hand on the head of the person to be baptized, with his left hand he takes up water successively from before, behind, and from each side of the candidate, and pours it upon his head, and *washes his whole body* ("funditque super caput ejus, et abluit totum ipsius corpus"). See Chrystal's *History of the Modes of Christian Baptism*, p. 123 *et seq.* So in Cyprian's letter to Magnus the form of the question proposed is, whether those "who obtain God's grace in infirmity and languor are to be accounted legitimate Christians because they have not been bathed [immersed or plunged], but *thoroughly besprinkled (perfusi)* with the saving water."

³ The word is mistranslated in Clark's *Ante-Nicene Christian Library*, vol. viii. p. 311.

But these early pictures of affusion do not stand alone in early Christian art. Their testimony to the freedom of believers in the use of this sacred rite is perpetuated by a chain of witnesses running down through the centuries.

On the frieze of the sarcophagus of Junius Bassus, who died A. D. 359, a lamb lays his foot on the head of another lamb, while a stream of water descends from the beak of a dove.¹

About the same date Christian families were living on the Esquiline, of whom numerous traces were discovered only a few years ago (1876), and among these the fragment of a glass cup, which is represented in full size in Figure 4.² A young girl stands un-



FIGURE 4.

der a stream of water flowing from an inverted vase hanging by a garland. A dove, with an olive-branch in its beak, is descending upon her head, on which rests the hand of a lost figure. On the right of the neophyte in the Figure—the design was to be seen by looking into the cup and through its walls, and the en-

¹ See the engraving in Northcote and Brownlow's *Rom. Sott.*, ii. p. 261, or Martigny, *Op. cit.* p. 27.

² Figures 4 and 5 are copied from a Plate in De Rossi's *Bulletin Fasc. 1*, 1876. In the first and second *Fasciculi* for that year are explanatory articles. Cf. Martigny, *Op. cit.* p. 82. Schulze (*Arch. Stud.*, p. 58) dates these figures near the close of the third century. This is probably a misprint. They belong to the latter part of the fourth or beginning of the fifth.

graving shows it reversed — is a priest, named Mirax, in tunic and pallium, and with a halo in its simplest, perhaps earliest, form, a mark of dignity, not of sainthood. He appears to be looking in the same direction as the girl, and to be speaking of her, as indicated by his gesture. She is clothed in the white garment worn by newly-baptized persons, and its folds and the action of the right arm and hand indicate that the right knee is bent and raised as if she were ascending the steps to leave the font. Of her name remain only the letters Alba. Possibly it was Albana. The natural supposition is that the priest is presenting her, at the completion of the rite, to her parents and friends. The hand upon her head may be that of a sponsor. The glass was engraved as a memorial of her baptism, and the designer combined in the representation actions which were not contemporaneous, but successive.



FIGURE 5.

the godfather shows — stands in a basin or shallow font, under a sheet of water represented as falling from the starry skies, from which descends also the mystic dove. Around the design appears the inscription (not copied in our engraving): "To the innocent spirit whom the Lord has chosen. He rests in peace, a believer, the tenth day before the kalends of September."¹ It is a memorial of a child who had died soon after baptism.

In another much later, though ancient representation, — a bas-relief from Monza, — a dove holds in its beak a vase reversed, from which the water descends on the head of Jesus. Sometimes, as in the bas-relief already referred to, — that of Junius Bassus, — the water flows directly from the dove. Such a design appears in an enameled silver spoon from the fourth century, — perhaps the first half, — of which Martigny gives an engraving. The boy stands in a basin, and the only water represented descends from the dove.

¹ "Innocenti spo quem elegit Doms pausat in pace fidelis X Kal Septembres." "Sept" is repeated.

Additional examples are cited by De Rossi and others. The association of representations of affusion with the familiar objects of household life as well as with the diptych of the metropolitan church of Milan, with elaborately carved sarcophagi or other marbles, with church mosaics, the altar-piece of St. Ambrose, etc., would seem to indicate how accustomed the minds of men were to other conceptions of baptism than that of dipping or plunging.

Of mosaics, two in Ravenna are specially noteworthy. One, Figure 6, is usually referred to about A. D. 450. The original can still be seen in the Ursian Baptistery, "S. Giovanni in Fonte."



FIGURE 6.

On the right of our Lord, who stands in the Jordan with the water up to the waist, is seen the Baptist standing on a rock projecting from the bank, and bending a little forward as he pours water upon the head of Christ from a shell which he holds in his right hand, while his left grasps a jeweled cross (*crux gemmata*). The dove is represented as in direct descent. On the left

is the river-god Jordan. Portions of the mosaic may have been changed by "restorations," but the original design is unchanged.¹

The other mosaic to which we have referred is in the ancient Arian Baptistery, now called "S. Maria in Cosmedin," and is about a century later (c. A. D. 553). It treats of the same subject — the Baptism in the Jordan, — and in a similar way.



FIGURE 7.

Richter calls attention to the youthful appearance of Christ in this mosaic, and says that it is almost boyish, and unlike any other kindred representation. But the general method of early Christian art in other departments — frescoes, bas-reliefs, etc. — is the same. Sometimes, as in a marble of which Roller gives an engraving taken from a photograph,² Jesus appears as a mere youth, a symbol for reciprocity and humility.³ These two mosaics thus perpetuate the main elements of the representations given in the Catacombs centuries earlier.

We will not follow the history further down. The later repre-

¹ *Mosaiken von Ravenna*, p. 11 (Wien, 1878). The meaning of the letters I X I N is not known ; Garucci suggests *Iesus Christus justificat nos*, or *justificatio nostra*, or *illuminatio nostra*. ² *Op. cit.* ii. 143, Pl. lxxvii., 3.

³ In this bas-relief the water falls in two streams from an elevated rock. Jesus kneels in the larger stream, while the other falls upon his head, and also into a vase which the Baptist holds as if to complete the rite by affusion.

sentations are tolerably familiar by frequent reproductions, and enough has been adduced for the purpose of showing a steady tradition of Christian liberty as to the mode of baptism.

The fact offers several important suggestions in connection with present discussions.

It illustrates the naturalness, and so has a bearing upon the antiquity, of the recently discovered "Teaching of the Apostles."

We might expect that a tradition so established in Art would find literary expression. And we have seen that the absence of such evidence before the middle of the third century has in fact led one distinguished archæologist to do violence to the text of the mural decorations of the Catacombs, as traditional assumptions have led theologians to do violence to the text of Sacred Scripture. This, in our judgment, is pressing the argument from silence too far. But, however this may be, when a document now appears affirming, with a manifest consciousness of fidelity to apostolic principles, — the gospel of the Lord, — the admissibility of a baptism which is not dipping, but pouring, it is easy to see that we simply have appearing in literature what the testimony of Art prepares us to receive. In fact, there is a double advantage. The "Teaching" helps to a natural interpretation of the pictures, and the pictures strengthen the impression of naturalness which is so marked a feature of the "Teaching." And if the representations in Art show a wider range of variation than does the "Teaching," this does not impair the force of what has been said. In both cases alike the fact is clear that baptism — the rite, and not merely the word — did not mean to the early Christians exclusively sacramental submersion or dipping. Pouring, to Egyptian Christians, or wherever the "Teaching" was written, might also be baptism. Pouring, to Roman Christians, with partial immersion — perhaps without it — was also baptism. The two testimonies concur at the point of Christian liberty. And this brings us to an exceedingly practical and important question.

A large body of Christians devoted to our common Lord, zealous in good works, decline fellowship in sacraments and church membership with their fellow believers because of alleged defect in the mode of administering baptism. This position is taken under a conviction of obligation to adhere rigidly to what are deemed the instructions of our Lord and his apostles. These instructions, of course, are found in the New Testament. They rest on interpretation. And as this has to do with the usage of words and historic facts, Baptist scholars have studied with utmost painstaking the pa-

tristic and other testimonies from the ancient Church. We think that the strength of their position in the historic field has not been duly appreciated by many of their opponents. The ordinary practice in the church, we cannot doubt, was in principle very much what the "Teaching" indicates; that is, the regular, ordinary mode, the full realization of the symbolism of the rite, required submersion or a complete covering with water. And Baptist scholars have fairly pressed this fact in support of their argument as to the apostolic practice. Words did not wholly change their meaning in passing from the first century to the second and third centuries. Neither did rites entirely lose their substance. It is right and proper to argue back, therefore, from language and usages in the later time to what was instituted in the apostolic age. If immersion was the only recognized mode in the time of Tertullian and his contemporaries, and there is no evidence of change in language or practice in the intervening years, we may fairly presume that it was the only mode in the apostolic age. If "baptize" means "dip" solely in church administration, it meant "dip" as uttered by our Lord, and, as we have said, looking at church usage and patristic testimony, the Baptists, in our judgment, have had the best of the argument, so far as historic fact merely is involved.

But the case, even within this narrow sphere of reasoning, is now much changed. Archæology is no longer a matter of guesswork. It has taken up the principles and methods of science. It has established facts pertinent to this question which are beyond reasonable doubt. And it shows a tradition of liberty, a consciousness of right of variation in mode, which makes it impossible to understand the historic fact any longer as before. Submersion was not the only recognized mode. Baptism did not mean sacramental dipping, plunging, or covering with water exclusively. A person affused or partially covered with water was baptized — other conditions of the rite being duly regarded. So the monuments unmistakably testify. Now comes in the "Teaching," carrying the evidence of liberty of variation back close upon, if not into, the apostolic age itself. It will not do to repudiate such testimony and fall back simply on the New Testament. It is a question of the meaning of the New Testament. And if, as all Baptist scholars have done indefatigably, it was right to use sub-apostolic and later testimony when it favored immersion as the only mode, it cannot be wrong to use it when it disfavors immersion. If it was fair to press it before, it cannot be fair to ignore it now.

The question, as we have said, is a very serious and wide-reaching one. It affects the work of missions at home and abroad. It is a painful spectacle to see Christians separated from each other, disunited and in conflict over the very sacraments of their faith, in the face of heathenism in China and India, or at home in the face of indifference, doubt, and unbelief. Never was there greater opportunity for effective Christian work. Never, therefore, was everything that divides and hinders so much to be deprecated, so much to be searched out and destroyed. Nor will it be questioned, we presume, by any one that it is essentially schismatic for a church to set up, as a universal and indispensable condition of participation in the sacraments, an administration of them which is not plainly enjoined. It is not divisive to obey the New Testament. It is not failing in Christian coöperation to adhere to a divine command. But it is incumbent not to withhold divine sacraments from any to whom they belong, not to set up our own understanding of God's Word as a bar to Christian fellowship in ordinance and aggressive work, so long as there is a reasonable doubt whether our interpretation does not impose more than the Lord himself requires. And this, as we see the matter, is precisely the problem which the Providence of God in the discovery of this new document and in other ways, at this time when Christians are pressed and burdened with the painful sense of their divisions, brings to those who have insisted upon immersion as the only admissible form of baptism. With increased light comes augmented responsibility. We do not presume to judge as to their duty. We do not claim that the new evidence decides the question as to the mode actually practiced by the apostles. Still less that it determines what is the preferable mode, or the one that is most expressive and effective in its symbolism. We have no doubt ourselves that immersion has been practiced from the beginning. It may continue to be observed to the end. Our sole contention — or rather the question we would in all kindness and love of Christian unity and coöperation respectfully submit — is simply this: Is it possible to justify the maintenance of the doctrine that baptism, in order to be baptism, must always and everywhere be administered by submersion without a "Thus saith the Lord," which, if ever spoken, would have made impossible the seventh chapter of the "Teaching" and the further revelation of the church's consciousness of liberty in the early representations of baptism in Christian art?

Egbert C. Smyth.

EDITORIAL.

THE RESPONSE TO THE NEW CREED.

THE response, while not a unanimous, is a general and hearty Amen. The relative number of those who disapprove appears to correspond with the proportion of dissent on the part of the Commission. It is not more than two in twenty-four. The weight properly belonging to adverse opinion is not, of course, as easily estimated. But more than a month of discussion shows beyond question that the Congregational denomination, as at whole, warmly approves the new statement of doctrine. Sober second thought has confirmed the first favorable impression. It was expected that there would be sincere and earnest objection. No gift of prophecy was needed to foresee that some conscientious and eminent Congregationalists would be disappointed. They certainly are not to be blamed for expressing their dissatisfaction with the result. If they had been satisfied, however, an overwhelming majority would not have been, and with equally good reason.

We have been too recently reminded of the unsoundness of the majority to accept popular verdicts as decisive. In evil times the remnant, not the multitude, is on the side of truth. Also, in matters of faith, as Luther used to declare, one should believe so as to be able to say Yes, even if all the world says No. Religious convictions cannot be controlled by a show of hands. But the value of a popular verdict depends on the kind of multitude from which it proceeds, and also on the kind of question with which that multitude deals. It would be absurd to say that the emphatic endorsement of this weighty document by the great body of Congregational clergymen and laymen is not in itself profoundly significant. In this case the Christian consciousness is to be trusted. Such a response from such a source could not be elicited by a statement dangerously erroneous in its utterances or fatally defective in its silences.

It may also be affirmed that if the creed were merely or chiefly a compromise it would have gained no such response. Indefiniteness and silence can do no more than to obviate hostile criticism. In such matters approval can be secured only by positive and clear declarations. That the character of the framers of the creed has had some influence on those to whom the creed was offered cannot be doubted. But the confidence inspired lay in the certainty that such men would never present a mere compromise as the result of their consultations. That the confidence was not misplaced is demonstrated by an article in the "Independent" of April 10th, from Professor Fisher, who was a member of the Commission. The article has unusual value both as showing that there were cogent reasons for every doctrinal statement, and also as showing his

own opinions on certain theological questions. It seems that Dr. Alden has printed the creed with such additions as he considered indispensable. Professor Fisher takes these up one after another to explain why they were not incorporated in the creed of the Commission. Convincing reasons are given for adhering to the phraseology of the Nicene Creed respecting the Trinity, and for omitting the words "vicarious" and "expiatory" from the article on Atonement. But most significant of all is that which Professor Fisher says concerning the Bible and the final judgment. The Bible was not declared to be an *infallible* record, for the excellent reason that the vast majority of scholars believe that it is not. If the record is infallible, "it would compel every one to explain the inconsistent chronological and other numerical statements in Kings and Chronicles by referring them all to a corruption of the original text, an assumption which, in the opinion of numerous judicious scholars, would shake our confidence in the authenticity of the Scriptures to such an extent as to imperil the foundation of the main doctrines of revelation." The Commission did not affirm that the issues of the last judgment "will be determined by the deeds done in the body," first, because the quotation as found in the Epistle to the Corinthians applies only to those who have embraced the gospel, — ministers and professing Christians, — and also because there were good reasons for rejecting the proposition itself. "The old Protestant view adopted by the Reformers (except Zwingli), that all the heathen and unbaptized infants perish, is no longer held. The Calvinistic doctrine that only elect infants are saved has gone by. Leading theologians of Germany in recent times have adopted the opinion that those who have not heard the gospel, and therefore have not rejected it, or at least that certain classes of such, have the opportunity given them beyond the grave of accepting Christ as a Saviour. This opinion of late has spread somewhat in England and in this country. . . . Most of the Commission judged that these are questions to be thought out and fought out in the schools, as Dr. Newman would say — independently of all pronunciamientos. They judged it best to confine themselves to the customary statements on the subject of future punishment." If any one believed that the Commission proceeded on a basis of compromise in essentials, this unqualified statement must convert him to another opinion.

It was a work of supererogation for the Secretary of the Commission to testify that the proceedings were characterized throughout by fairness and freedom, for every honorable man took that for granted.

Some are gratified, as was predicted in the April number of the Review, to make the discovery that adherents of the new theology believe so much. Dr. Hodge, writing in the "Presbyterian Review," is relieved and delighted to find that the new departure accepts as much evangelical doctrine as is embodied in this creed, and the same feeling has found expression in other quarters. It seems to have been thought

that those who are identified with the new movement in theology are in their opinions little better than infidels, and in their influence a great deal worse. In a period of suspicion, misunderstanding and even misrepresentation are unavoidable. Those who suffer must bide their time with patience. Even the sanctified human nature of Christian controversialists is not absolutely free from prejudice. But may not those who have been doggedly misrepresented claim the simple right, in view of their honest acceptance of this creed, to be dealt with as of the household of faith? While we do not profess to be in the secrets of any new movement, or to be the representatives of any party, new or old, but only to maintain that which we ourselves believe, we do venture the assertion that what is called the new movement in theology is grounded in sympathy rather than opinion. There are wide differences of doctrinal belief among those who are characterized as adherents of the new theology. The bond that unites them is the bond of sympathy. Together they contend for candid investigation of truth. They are one in seeking to find the sources of spiritual life and power in God's revelation of redemption. They know each other by a spiritual rather than an intellectual instinct. It will be no strange thing if those who are most vitally identified with this living tendency are found to be more in accord with the ancient evangelical faith of the church than those who are swiftest to accuse them of heresy. It is not unlikely that their thought of the great doctrines of the Person of Christ, of Sin, and of Atonement, and, back of all, of the Christian conception of God, will prove to reproduce those truths in a scriptural and spiritual integrity not found in the opinions for which orthodoxy is persistently claimed.

That is a shallow judgment of the creed and of its reception which thinks a "victory" has been gained for the new theology or for any party. The new creed and the new impulse in religious thought and life are results of the same causes; the rising tide which cannot be pushed back is beneath them alike. Such a creed with its cordial welcome can be a victory for the new theology only in the sense that, by its practical agreement with the new tendencies, it shows in how broad and deep a current they really flow. It is sheer ignorance which asserts that certain men are introducing new views, are causing unrest, are disturbing those who would gladly be let alone in the faith of their fathers. They are merely expressing and explaining the deeper conceptions of spiritual truth which are taking possession of the churches. The creed does the very same thing. The new theology did not produce the new creed, for both are borne along on the same deep under-currents. Least of all should the creed be condemned because it is satisfactory to the friends of progressiveness in religious thinking. It is too late in the day to decide on important matters by calling names.

The creed meets a hearty response, but let us not therefore set too high a value on that which is only a statement. It is but a *credo* after

all. It only formulates what the mass of evangelical Christians already believe. Its uses are limited by the very fact that it is a creed. It has not even the authority which their creeds have for other great bodies of believers. It is an index of the best religious thought of an untrammelled denomination. It merely summarizes the conclusions which have been reached by many minds thinking and working independently of each other in the one great kingdom of the Lord. As such it has no small value. But it is only indicative, not creative nor authoritative. It does not tell Christian men what they ought to believe nor what they must believe. It merely states what Christian men, looking honestly into each other's faces, do believe. It has its response because, for the most part, it says so well what the many had been believing, but what no one alone would have been able so adequately to express.

THE PERSONALITY OF A CITY: A LESSON FROM CINCINNATI.

THE causes of the riot at Cincinnati are now before the country. The impression has been made, through the explanations given, that the reasons were chiefly local. The immediate and moving cause was at once seen to be the failure of justice. But other causes, more remote and general, leading up to this, such as the location of the city on the southern border, the withdrawal of a large part of the native population into the suburbs, the steady concession and surrender of moral opinions and customs to the demands of the foreign element, and the political and religious, or irreligious, history of the city for the past generation, have been so fully set forth and emphasized that other cities, differently circumstanced and of different growths, have assumed, with more or less assurance, exemption from a like calamity. The press of other cities has not appropriated in a large way the lesson from Cincinnati. Just now the discussion has gone over into the question of how to handle mobs, — a question which cannot be too thoroughly considered, but which evidently is not the greatest, if it is the first, question demanding attention. The machinery for suppressing a riot must be at hand, and must be sure to work with precision, but better still the avoidance or removal of those things which incite the riotous spirit. Certainly a riot ought to be without grounds of moral support.

The following extract from a private letter, written by a gentleman of the highest authority, suggests the lesson which we wish to enforce while the public thought is turned toward Cincinnati: —

“Superficially, it has been for some years known here that a few unprincipled men at the bar have found their profit in bribing juries, or packing them, which is the same thing. This has been as notorious in civil as in criminal cases. Honorable men in the profession have had the humiliation again and again of having clients say to them, ‘We are satisfied to be guided by you in our business, but if we are sued, we must employ so and so, who somehow have

a way of getting verdicts.' These men are, of course, part of the 'machine.' They 'set up' the conventions, put their own creatures in place about the Court House — are known to have power gained by unscrupulous rascality. They have often dictated the nomination of judges, or have been so feared by those desirous of remaining on the bench as to prevent real independence. The wretched election of judges by popular vote has had its part in the rotting process. All this came to a head in the Berner case, in which an atrocious murder of an employer by his hired men, confessed to have been planned and executed for the sake of robbing him, was found to be only 'manslaughter' by the jury. The indignation meeting was a sincere one, full of only honest wrath at the hideous perversion of the forms of law. I refused to join in the call for it, or to attend it, because I feared some bad result from the accumulated excitement. The attempted lynching of the prisoners on Friday night was by the less instructed, but still fairly intelligent and upright people who were at the meeting. The burning of the Court House on Saturday night was by the worse class who always come in to do the devil's work when better men have so far forgotten themselves as to open the door."

Nothing so arouses a community as the miscarriage of justice. Society will endure any corruption, even that of the ballot, more patiently than the corruption of the courts. But the department of justice, which in the present instance was first neglected, then corrupted, and finally violated, belongs to the organization of every city. Together with other well-known departments it makes up what may be called the personality of the city. Every city has such a personality, distinct from its business, distinct from its social and religious life, distinct from many of its permanent institutions. The city proper, the corporate city, is a living organism within the city at large, assuming the guardianship at every moment of property and education and morals and life. Good citizenship demands loyalty to this not ideal, but real and supreme personality. But judged by this test we have few good citizens. The best men are seldom good citizens. They add greatly to the reputation of the city at large through their character, their enterprise, their attainments; they add nothing to the security or honor of the city proper. The city at large reaps the advantage of their munificent benefactions; the city proper suffers from their indifference and want of respect. They decline to take part in the administration of its affairs, they evade its just requirements, as in jury duty, they neglect to attend the meetings which determine its elections. Hence a city not infrequently acquires a personality entirely at variance with the character of those who represent its social and business life. A city may be conspicuous at one and the same time for the integrity of its leading business houses and for the maladministration of its departments.

And the reason for this, as has been intimated, lies not only in the want of devotion to, but in the want of respect for, the city as a political entity. No political significance has been allowed to it at all comparable to that given to the state or even to the town. The whole attitude of

mind on the part of better men has been wrong. They have simply used the city. They have thought of it chiefly for its advantages. A metropolis is largely made up of people whose interests are not those of birth, but of ambition. They have been drawn thither for fortune or name. No inherited responsibilities rest upon them, and they do not readily conceive the idea of purely civic responsibilities and obligations. The average voter of the town is far more faithful to his political duties than the average voter of the city; and doubtless because the town has less to offer in the way of mere personal advantage. The country trains toward political duty through the absence of great personal opportunities; the city trains away from political duty through the excess of personal opportunities.

There are, however, signs of a growing respect for the personality of the city, the city corporate. One sign is that its political life is beginning to appeal to the ambition of young men, who have heretofore given themselves entirely to commercial or professional careers. Examples of young men like Mr. Lowe, of Brooklyn, and Mr. Roosevelt, of New York, are suggestive and hopeful. They are not afraid of "politics," nor of politicians. They lay their plans and pursue their end with a persistence and courage such as we should expect from them in business. They satisfy John Foster's idea of the type of goodness necessary to "make bad men uncomfortable,"—the "formidably active" type. We have had enough of "reform movements" and "reform tickets." Something deeper and more permanent is needed in municipal government. And the promise of this better thing is to be found in the response of young men native to a city and identified with its larger interests, as they give themselves to the practical study of the art of administration and to the practical work of political control.

Another sign is the growing agreement of the more earnest citizens about methods of administration, specially when moral issues are concerned. The city has been the battle-field on which legislators have fought for contending theories. The temperance issue has suffered peculiarly in the city from frequent changes of policy. The advocates of one method have looked on with indifference and contempt while the other method has been on trial. But in this, and in other issues of a moral bearing, men are slowly learning that it is best to "take the strength" out of the existing law, whatever it may be. An incomplete and insufficient enactment fully executed is seen to lead up to the better law. The educating force of Law and Order Leagues toward good laws cannot be overestimated, and these leagues are training-schools in citizenship.

And still another sign is to be seen in the growing purpose to separate the administration of the city from party politics. The necessity for this separation is becoming apparent to the whole country. Doubtless more than one presidential election has been affected by the trade between

politicians of the city of New York against the State. The danger from the spoils system is seen to be more imminent and more uncontrollable in the city than elsewhere. The mob element lies close at hand ready to take advantage of any popular dissatisfaction, of any expression of spasmodic justice. Let us not forget the order of events at Cincinnati. The crowd which attempted the lynching of the prisoners on Friday night was made up of the "less instructed, but still of fairly intelligent and upright people." The mob which burned the Court House on Saturday night was made up of the "worse class which always comes in to do the devil's work when better men have so far forgotten themselves as to open the door." It is the terrible earnestness of men acting under the sense of injustice and corruption which "opens the door" to violence. The mob element, which is becoming a permanent factor of the city, is not of itself necessarily dangerous. The mob which originates purely in the mob spirit can be quickly controlled under an efficient police system. The real danger lies in that neglect of duty on the part of citizens through which corruption comes in, and for which there may seem to be no remedy except through violent methods. Distribute the earnestness which finds vent in occasional reforms and revolutions into duty, and the danger is averted. When the safety of the city is put first in the daily thoughts of all good citizens, the city is safe. When the honor of the city is sufficiently regarded, the city is honorable in the eyes of all men. The lesson from Cincinnati is a lesson touching the sacredness and worth of the city in its corporate personality.

DR. EZRA ABBOT.

THE sketches of the late Dr. Ezra Abbot, written for one of our leading religious journals by two of his friends and collaborators, show in a very striking way his rare gifts and attainments, and perhaps rarer moral qualities. Besides accrediting him with abilities and acquisitions which put him at the head of our biblical scholars, they reveal a surprising unselfishness in disposing of the results of his work. Professor Thayer assigns as a reason for his not leaving "such a memorial . . . of his wholly exceptional gifts and attainments as his friends had a right to expect," the fact that, "Few men have been more appealed to than he for information and counsel. He gave gratuitously and unsparingly to all. As was recently remarked by a friend, 'He has spent his life in reading other people's proof-sheets.'" This tribute excites an admiration for the man warmer even than that felt for the scholar. The beneficence which gives time, talent, and strength which would surely yield fame is far finer than that which bestows money. The generosity of our "great givers" pales before that of a man of whom President Woolsey could say, "he surpassed all men whom I ever knew in his readiness to serve others who had but few books on hand and did not know where to look for in-

formation. Dr. Abbot was not only willing to give advice to persons consulting him, but to a great extent by personal labor, when he was full of work of his own, he saved to authors preparing their books a multitude of hours by spending his own much needed time in their service." The other qualities ascribed to Dr. Abbot by these friendly but discriminating critics complete the picture of a Christian scholar. The high intellectual qualities, the tenacious memory, the balance of judgment, the critical sagacity rested upon a moral basis. His "honesty of desire to find out the truth," says Dr. Woolsey, "shows a basis of uprightness which insured to him high confidence and respect." The great deference which his associates of the New Testament Revision Committee paid to his judgment in matters of textual criticism was a tribute to his candor no less than to his superior knowledge. Theological partisanship — indeed partisanship of any kind — seemed impossible to him. Such an illustration of the noblest type of the scholarly life, in its high integrity and quiet unselfishness, has perhaps not been given by any life completed among us since the untimely death of Prof. James Hadley, of Yale College. There is a marked similarity between the two men, with strong points of contrast. Both left an impression of consummate scholarship not shown in any single achievement. Both possessed in an eminent degree the judicial temper which characterizes the first order of mind. Both were gifted with remarkable tenacity of memory. Here the resemblance ceases. Professor Hadley was more versatile, but paid the penalty of his versatility by not attaining in any one department the preëminence which Dr. Abbot held in textual criticism.

It is scarcely necessary to point out the supreme value which such a life as Dr. Abbot's has in reminding the church that the distinctively Christian virtues may be as fully exemplified in the character and career of its scholars as of its missionaries or reformers, and so helping to correct the tendency to find in the "Christian worker" the one ideal of excellence. But it is perhaps worth while to emphasize the fact that Dr. Abbot's supremacy as a scholar was in that class of studies the pursuit of which is in some quarters thought to be prejudicial to, if not incompatible with, the development of the religious life. He was above all things a biblical critic. "In discussions on the meaning of the passages before the company," says Dr. Woolsey, "he was more on an equality with the others; yet no one surpassed him. All deferred to his judgment," as has been said, "with regard to questions of textual criticism." His critical gift found its fullest employment in this department, but it was freely exercised upon the contents as well as the language of the New Testament. His essay upon the authorship of the fourth Gospel, the most important treatise which he has left behind, is the best illustration of biblical criticism which American sacred literature affords. The question at issue, so vital to religious interests, is discussed in a thoroughly judicial temper. The evidence is as calmly weighed as if the

claims of what purported to be a poem by Horace or an oration by Cicero were under consideration. There is something judicial even in the single touch of sarcasm, "Individuals differ widely in their power of resisting evidence opposed to their prejudices, and the author of 'Supernatural Religion' has few equals in this capacity." Such criticism shows in every calm word its conviction of the rightfulness, not of its conclusions only, but of its method. Its firm tone always expresses the consciousness of going to work in the right way to seek the truth. Its impression of fairness is due to its conceding the justice of the principles on which its opponents are proceeding. It is always saying, "you are right in assuming that this is a historical question, to be settled upon historical grounds. Let us see whither the facts will lead us."

It is not a rationalist who thus calmly claims the right to apply critical processes to the most precious portion of the New Testament. Dr. Abbot was a devout Christian from his youth. Those who recall his student life at Bowdoin College remember him as attending the Sunday morning prayer-meeting, and leading it when his turn came, reading out of his Greek Testament the lesson of the hour. His friends of later years testify to the impression of piety which he made upon them. President Woolsey writes, "I claim no especial intimacy with him, as it regards his higher feelings and deeper faith. I have supposed him to be in his Christology an Arian; but he has said some things in regard to his feelings — short simple utterances — which implied to me a faith in Christ, the Saviour of the world, and an endeavor to do God's will, which seemed to be susceptible of no other interpretation than that he had sought and found God, and as such I regard him." Says Professor Thayer, "No one ever privileged to associate much with Ezra Abbot will need to be told that he was one of the most sincere and humble disciples of Jesus. Every one who knew him well, and who himself cherishes aspirations after heaven, will hope to meet him there. . . . I often noticed how naturally his thoughts gravitated — or rather ascended — to the loftiest themes, with what evident satisfaction he would speak of the spiritual refreshment given him by some recent sermon of his fervent young pastor. The deep undercurrent of his soul set toward that blessed shore, on which his feet now stand." Did Dr. Abbot then do violence to the deeper impulses of his nature in prosecuting biblical criticism? Was it in violation of his better feelings that he assumed the validity of the historical method in ascertaining the authorship of the fourth Gospel? Would he have been a better Christian if he had been a less eminent critic? Would one who loved him and who knew the effect his favorite pursuit was having upon his character have wished that he might abandon it, to engage in "studies which warm the heart"? If so, the calmness with which a judge sums up the evidence in a trial for murder shows an icy heart. No one, not blinded by religious prejudice, can help seeing that Dr. Abbot's moral qualities alone enabled him to discuss questions in which

he was deeply interested without passion. The interests of religion and of truth demanded that the Scriptures should be treated as a historical product with candor and thoroughness; he gave his best energies and highest gifts to the work; he served the church nobly in doing it, and receives her grateful acknowledgment for his services and her praise for the lofty spirit in and out of which they were rendered. May those who join in paying honor to his memory be consistent enough cheerfully to concede to biblical science its rights on the critical as well as on the constructive side; and at least allow the name of Christian workmen to those who with less shining gifts are following in his footsteps!

“SATISFACTORY, BUT —.”

CONGREGATIONAL ecclesiastical councils, called to ordain or install, have long been accustomed to vote upon the motion “that the examination of the candidate be deemed satisfactory, and that the council proceed to ordain or install.” Of late we hear occasionally of proposals to substitute for this time-honored formula one which conveys more or less of dissent from particular opinions which the candidate has expressed during the examination. The forms of modification vary, but phrases like the following are sufficiently exact to illustrate the method proposed: “*Voted*, That the council deems the examination *so far* satisfactory that it will proceed to ordain (or install).” Or, “*Voted*, That the examination be deemed satisfactory, and that we proceed, etc.; *but* we desire to place on record our dissent,” etc.; or, “we commend to the candidate a careful reëxamination of,” etc.; or, “*Resolved* (1), That we proceed, etc.; (2), that in so doing we express no approval of the opinion,” etc. Usually such proposals are rejected; but now and then they appear in the “Result.” To our apprehension they are offered on a misunderstanding of the meaning of the usual formula, “*Voted*, That the examination be deemed satisfactory.” It may be best to change the formula, so that the usual motion will simply be to proceed with the services of ordination or installation. Yet after a careful and sometimes protracted examination has been held, and this fact duly entered on the records of the council, it is natural and fitting that the result should be definitely stated as the basis of the subsequent action; and we know of no better formula for this purpose than the customary one. What does it mean?

The theory of the action of a council in such cases is a very simple and obvious one. The council meets to advise the church whether or not it can have fellowship with it in its choice of A. B. as its pastor; and, as involved in this, whether it can fellowship the candidate. The real question before it is always at bottom one of ecclesiastical fellowship. And this is not a matter of “ifs” and “buts,” of “so far as” and “while we,” etc. Fellowship is always either given or withheld. The only effective act is the ordaining or installing act. If this is performed, no

qualifications or resolutions appended affect its completeness in the least. A pastor ordained by a council is received into its full fellowship, has all the rights and standing a council can bestow, and no one can question his presence and powers in any ecclesiastical convocation because of any "riders" which may have been appended to the council's vote. The vote is a mere matter of words save as expressed in act. It is therefore a stultification and absurdity to append these "ifs" and "buts." It is like saying, "I will do this, if or but," and then doing it without any regard to the expressed condition — a procedure which in any important matter in private life would impair confidence either in the sense or the integrity of any person so conducting himself. If councils wish to retain the respect of men, they cannot afford to impeach in words a religious teacher whom, in act, they immediately proceed to recognize and fellowship in this very capacity.

The word "satisfactory," in the ordinary formula, means, and only can mean, that the council discovers by the examination that there is the requisite basis for fellowship. Either this is found, or it is not; and the record should agree with the fact.

We say that it cannot signify more than this. We mean that it cannot so long as councils are fairly chosen and the qualities characteristic of Congregational churches and ministers remain. It might be possible, by picking a council and keeping it conveniently small, to bring together men who either would not know their own minds well enough, or would not possess sufficient intelligence and mental activity to withhold them from expressing agreement with the candidate in all his utterances. But we have never known such a council. Or there may arise such a candidate that he would grace a chair of infallibility; but an American Congregational council has not yet seen his like. Noah Webster could not write a dictionary without expressing in his definitions a preference of cranberry-sauce to apple-sauce. We doubt whether, if even in so obvious a matter he should make this declaration before a church full of Congregationalists, or before a council not picked more carefully than either cranberries or apples ever are, his opinion would be deemed by all "satisfactory." It is impossible that an examination ever should be pronounced satisfactory, if by this is meant that every member of the council indorses every doctrinal or ecclesiastical position taken by the candidate. One man holds that God is governing the world by two systems, one for Christians, another for heathen; another believes that such a dualism is contrary to the nature of God and the absoluteness of Christianity. Whichever position is taken by the candidate, somebody is not satisfied. But the examination shows that the candidate will preach to all whom he can reach: "There is none other name," and the man holding one opinion and the man holding the opposite may be alike satisfied that this preaching is sound and salutary, and that they can fellowship the preacher and the church in giving and receiving such truth. They

vote, therefore, that the examination is "satisfactory," though one or the other must be dissatisfied with the candidate's opinions as to the salvation of the heathen. So one man believes that the satisfaction theory of the atonement requires its limitation to the elect; another, that the governmental theory leaves out of account God's essential righteousness; another, that the manifestation theory fails to recognize anything to be manifested, and each is pretty sure to have his turn of being profoundly dissatisfied, if he attends a sufficient and probably not very large number of councils. But each, in every case, may find that the candidate puts at the basis of every offer of divine forgiveness, and into every penitent and believing Christian life, as its fountain, the sacrifice offered on Calvary. And so each can vote in every case, notwithstanding his particular dissatisfaction, that the examination is "satisfactory," meaning by this that he is ready to fellowship the man who thus preaches and the church that chooses him as its pastor.

We conceive that wrong is done to a candidate when a council votes to fellowship him, and at the same time condemns some of his opinions. He is set over a people to be its religious teacher by solemn act of council, and then the council says to the people: "Look out or he will lead you astray." That is, the kiss of fellowship is also the sign of betrayal.

Wrong is equally done, as we have already intimated, to the good name and influence of councils. They are a salutary conservative power. With the multiplied tendencies which exist to an independence which is heedless of common obligations and rights, it is important to maintain their position in public confidence. But this cannot be secured by doing a thing and at the same time doing something at variance with it.

Nor can any interests of truth be thus conserved. No honor is done to any doctrine by putting it into a minor resolution when the major one receives into full fellowship the person who declines to accept it. It may well be that this man or that advances opinions which will not stand the test of time and experience, that one or another fails to appreciate the value of this mode or that of stating a particular doctrine. It may be that friendly counsel, intercourse with his brethren in the ministry, will conduct such an one farther along the pathway of truth than he has yet advanced. And it may also be that some young man may be wiser than all his teachers or examiners, and have something to give which they have not yet found. And however this may be, the proper method of promoting the maintenance and progress of truth is not a deliverance which is impaired and probably nullified by an inconsistent or disparaging act. Ordaining councils are not commissions charged with the office of framing creeds. They have another function. If they find a man worthy of fellowship, it is their duty to give it; if unworthy, to withhold it. Anything other or beyond belongs to other organizations and occasions. There are abundant and more fitting opportunities for counsel, admonition, discussion, or whatever may be of service in the defense and advancement of the faith of the Church.

ARCHÆOLOGICAL NOTES.

NEXT to seeing with one's eyes the very soil of ancient Babylonia, we must rank the life-like reproduction of its wonderful monuments. Such is the "Bronze Ornaments of the Palace Gates of Balawat," published by the Society of Biblical Archæology and contained in the library of Harvard University. The band of bronze, "looking like a gigantic hat-rack," when found in 1877 by Mr. Rassam and, when cleaned by Mr. Ready, recognized to be enormous folding gates twenty-one to twenty-six feet in height, and six feet each in width, are there taken as by a photographer. The green color of the bronze is perfect. In chased work are double tiers of pictures recording the campaigns of Shalmaneser II. 859-825 B. C.

To survey the four parts of the publication is to come in contact with the wide range of Assyrian life less than two centuries after Solomon. One plate represents an attack on a city in the country of Hamath and the fight of the enemy outside the gates. The low, unwieldy battering-ram is lunging viciously against the walls, and captives, with tied hands, are driven in a mournful drove by a eunuch on horseback. Another city with towers is bursting into flames, and burly, bearded soldiers, in scale-armor, from under trees watch the progress of the destroying element. Here fugitives are grasped by the hair and decapitated with the sword. There heads lie in heaps like those of Ahab's seventy sons, or handless, feetless bodies are impaled on stakes. One series of plates begins with a camp in which a eunuch is sentinel and two men are engaged in domestic work, it may be kneading bread, within a royal tent. Farther on we see an army crossing the Armenian mountains. The exertions of the charioteers to get the horses over the rugged paths are shown sometimes by their taking hold of the wheel, sometimes by their tugging at the bridle. At last the sea of Nairi, that is, Lake Van, appears, figured like a river, where the king stands with eunuchs and musicians. A high tripod is before him. He holds a tilted cup, from which he pours a libation. Oxen and sheep in droves stand meekly waiting the sacrifice. Grotesque creatures of the lake put forth their heads claiming their share of the feast.

Still another series shows a procession to the sources of the Tigris and the process of carving the royal image on a rock like that of the Nahr el Kelb at Beirut. Another represents the people of Carchemish bringing tribute, and reminds us of the black obelisk of Nimrud. The monarch stands before his pavilion. A brilliant body-guard attends him. The bow is in his hand. And the conquered file before the conqueror, bearing wine, aromatic woods, gold, precious stones, and driving sheep, oxen, spirited horses, the two-humped Bactrian camel, quite as we should expect from the inscriptions. It is touching in the captive train to see women and children walking before the men, their bodies bare, their faces sad, though their necks are not, like those of the men, tied with rope or notched in a stick by the long-robed guard. This very interesting and valuable collection of pictures is edited with an introduction by Dr. Samuel Birch, and contains descriptions and translations by Theophilus G. Pinches.

Our readers will perhaps recall our references in the January number of the Review to a series of articles, seven in number, on the "Importance of Assyriology to Hebrew Lexicography," published in the *Athenæum* by Friedrich Delitzsch, Professor of Assyriology at the University of Leipzig. Many will be glad to have them reprinted and revised in a little volume of seventy-one pages. The name of the book is "The Hebrew Language viewed in the light of Assyrian research." In the preface the author disclaims two things. One is attempting to explain *everything* by Assyrian. The other is unjust warfare on his part against the ninth edition of Gesenius's Dictionary. In the latter case he limits his censure to points where the editors have erroneously deviated from the correct views of Gesenius himself, or have failed to recognize what Fürst and Levy had already anticipated. The worth of Dr. Delitzsch's little work is in inverse proportion to its size. Accuracy, erudition, and enthusiasm mark its contents as a whole, and make them of singular fascination and value for Old Testament interpretation. The April number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* gives an admirable view of it. We have space only for a single sample of its affluent materials, drawn from page fifty-five.

"The Hebrew and Assyrian *šar*, *šarru*, 'prince,' 'king,' exhibits the same primary signification. The Hebrew word is usually derived from a supposed stem, *šharar*, 'to govern,' this meaning being obtained by the assumption that 'to govern' is literally 'to divide,' or, rather, 'to dispose,' the root being *sar*, 'to cut.' *Šarru* being the name of the king in Babylonia and Assyria, we naturally look for an Assyrian etymology of the word. Now in Assyria *šarâru* is 'to shine,' *šarûru* is the magnificent splendor of the stars, of the rising sun (*šarûr šamsi*). It is a synonym of the common Assyrian word *mêlammu* (W. A. I. ii. 35, 7 e. f.) especially applied to the splendor of royal majesty. Tiglath Pileser I. styles himself 'the bright day whose splendor overthrows the four quarters of the universe.' Observe also the proud appellation *šamaš mâti*, 'the sun of the country,' often used by Assyrian and Babylonian monarchs. It cannot be doubted that this explanation of *šar* is in full accordance with oriental modes of thought."

Whether in an introduction to a new Hebrew dictionary or in a Hebrew dictionary of his own, which we are happy to be assured has been compiled along with his greatly needed Assyrian Dictionary, Dr. Delitzsch may be certain of a warm welcome for his wide research and masculine thought.

The quarterly statement of the Palestine Exploration Fund for January, 1884, reprints from the "London Times" of December 29, 1883, an interesting letter by Ch. Clermont Ganneau. Its subject is "Two Inscriptions of King Nebuchadnezzar on Lebanon." M. Pognon, recently assistant consul at Beirut, is the fortunate discoverer. Already he was known favorably to the learned world as the author of "The Inscription of Bavian." M. Ganneau tells us that he was one of the most brilliant scholars of the *École des Hautes Études* when he himself lectured there, and pursued Oriental archæology under his own instruction. The texts were engraved on the rock in Wady Brissa, one of the wildest valleys in the Eastern Lebanon, six miles from Hermel, a village near the Orontes, marked by a famous Phœnician monument. The two inscriptions face one another on the right and left of the path running through the hollow of the valley. They measure 5.50 metres in breadth by 2.80 metres in

height. In script, one is archaic, the other cursive cuneiform, together covering nineteen columns. A bas-relief accompanies each. The first depicts a personage with the Assyrian tiara, seizing an animal (perhaps a lion) which stands erect upon its hind legs. Behind this was originally the image of a deity, now effaced, but still made sure by the fragmentary words, "To the Goddess who exalts, who inhabits the temple of Goula the temple," etc. The second bas-relief represents a man worshipping before a tree. He wears a cap curious in shape, with closed points like the mitre of a bishop. Each inscription, though different in text, begins alike with the title of Nebuchadnezzar, "Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, the illustrious Pastor, the servant of Merodak, the great Lord his Creator, and of Nebo his illustrious son, whom His Royalty loves."

It was to be expected that the condition of the inscriptions would be mutilated. This is the case to a deplorable degree. In one text the bottom, in the other the middle, is missing. The latter was the work of a Maghrabi, if M. Pognon's information be correct, a treasure-seeker cutting through the rock. Certainly the stone appears to have been cut away to the depth of several inches with an iron instrument. Notwithstanding the defacement, M. Pognon has read the enumeration of the wines on the table of the god Merodak and of the goddess Zarpanit — a list already familiar to us from the Phillips Cylinder.

The site of these inscriptions seems to M. Pognon to be *architectural* rather than *military*. Here was a timber-yard of Nebuchadnezzar! In the marred arrow-heads the great king is speaking of buildings which he is erecting in Babylon. What we know from other texts of the quantity of wood consumed in the monarch's sumptuous temples and palaces makes Lebanon one great lumber tract. In one of these inscriptions Nebuchadnezzar says, "I have employed for the wood-work of the Chamber of Oracles the largest of the trees I have had conveyed from Lebanon." M. Ganneau recalls the Latin inscriptions of Upper Lebanon, engraved on the rock by hundreds and reserving for the state, in the name of the Emperor Hadrian, the pine, the larch, the fir, and the cedar for the imperial fleets. It is not improbable that the two inscriptions of M. Pognon are edicts of preservation for the forests of the crown. If so, the Babylonian king was a model for American legislators, as the French government, in its appointment of an Assyriologue to a consular post adjoining Assyrian remains, is a suggestion to the American government respecting our present consul at Jerusalem, the Assyriologue, Dr. Selah Merrill.

It is a pleasant coincidence that the "Journal Asiatique" of December last has an annotated translation, by the same youthful French scholar, of the inscription of Mérou-Nérar I., King of Assyria. By ingenious reasoning M. Pognon shows that the date of this prince is a century at least before Tiglath Pileser I. What is a text running back thus to the thirteenth century B. C.? Simply the most ancient of all texts edited in Assyrian properly so-called. This venerable monument is in archaic characters. Since these are used in the latest period, however, especially if ornamenting a palace, M. Pognon prefers to call the letters *Capital* letters. He has transcribed them into the cursive character. This matches the Egyptian *hieratic*, being suited to rapid writing. The seventy-nine lines relate to the restoration of a temple. Their chief

interest lies in the imprecations which we copy. Observe their particularity and their superstition.

"When in time to come this temple shall become old and fall to ruin, may the prince then on the throne restore it. Let him put in place my inscription, reinscribing the name there written; Asshur will hearken to his prayers. Whoever shall erase the name which the temple bears and substitute his own, and whoever shall remove my inscription, destroy it, cast it into the river, burn it in the fire, hide it in the ground, place it in a secluded spot where it cannot be seen; whoever shall cause it to be taken by a rebel, by a stranger, by an enemy, by a mutineer, by a tribe in revolt, by any person soever, or whoever shall think of doing it any other mischief, may Asshur . . . who inhabits the temple E-Kharrieh-Kourra, may Anu, Bel, Ea, Istar, may all the great gods, the Igigi of Heaven and the Anounak of earth, strike him violently with their hands; may they raise against him in wrath a dire malediction; may they obliterate from earth his name, his race, his retainers, his family. Let their august mouth order the devastation of his land and the annihilation of his people and of the boundary-marks of his frontiers. May Mérou overwhelm him in a deluge of woes; may he send into his land tempest and noxious wind, rebellion, destruction, whirlwind, want, famine, drouth, and poverty; may he sweep his country like a tempest; may he heap it up with ruined mounds."—*Month of the Offering of the Gods, 20th day Eponymy of Salmanan-Karradan.*

Such remains confirm for the hundredth time M. François Lenormant's brilliant investigations in Chaldean magic. All the more do they emphasize the void which was made by the death of this great scholar, December 9, 1883. He was a savant and a Christian. The American public, hardly a twelvemonth before his end, had received in English his "Beginnings of History." Professor Francis Brown, in the introduction to this remarkable work, called attention to the author's rare versatility. What was there said, "He has been by turns traveler, excavator, essayist, decipherer, grammarian, historian, editor, and can point to productive labor in all these pursuits," has found confirmation from every quarter since his early demise. The whole ancient world was his textbook. Born in 1837, he was not yet twenty-one years old when his first published work, "Essai sur la Classification des Monnaies des Lagides," won for him the numismatic prize of the Académie des Inscriptions. This was in 1856. In the "Academy" of March 8, 1884, Professor A. H. Sayce of Oxford pays a fitting tribute to his memory. He speaks, as only a friend and fellow-worker could speak, of Lenormant's gigantic powers of work, his wide sympathies, his quickness of perception, his unrivaled erudition. A born antiquarian, he walked in the light of the connection between oriental studies and classical archæology, till he made others recognize it like himself. He was intellectually a channel between Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Few scholars, if any, were equally at home with him in the monuments of Western Asia and in the remains of classic antiquity. The list of his publications is enormous. When we reflect that he died ere he had completed his thirty-seventh year, we are amazed at his productiveness. He must have made mistakes; and pedants were not wanting to brand them. That these became stepping-stones to truth and growth speaks volumes for his sincerity and docility. His transparent thought and lucid style were not his only claim to honor. From the day when, a youth of fourteen, he wrote his letter to M. Hase on the Greek tablets of Memphis, down to the moment when, on his bed, languishing from a wound received in the siege of Paris, he pondered

the question of the Hittites, Lenormant was an original, suggestive, and inspiring thinker. His "Manual of Ancient History" has enlarged the bounds of existing knowledge. Assyriology owes him a debt for his acute and profound Accadian researches. Preëminently was he a first-hand investigator and popularizer of recondite knowledge. Alas, that his great works on the "Propagation of the Phœnician Alphabet," the "History of Money in Antiquity," and the "Masterpieces of Greek Art" must remain torsos still. The man who could clothe archæology with flesh and blood, the theologian who brought the monuments to be witnesses to the Old Testament, has passed from earth.

W. Flinders Petrie, the author of "Pyramids and Temples of Gizeh," has been engaged by the Egypt Exploration Fund to conduct operations in the Delta. Thanks to Professor Maspero's generous coöperation, the necessary concession has been obtained from the Egyptian government, and operations have been begun at San (Zoan-Tanis?). It is understood that M. Naville, who opened the society's first campaign with the discovery of Pithom in the Wady Tumilat, will not be present on the scene of action. His variorum edition of the "Livre des Morts" engrosses his whole time. But he will edit the inscriptions found by Mr. Petrie.

Professor A. H. Sayce tells us in the "Academy" of January 19, 1884, p. 51, that his recent tour in the Fayûm has been an archæological disappointment. The remains of the Labyrinth at Howâra do not justify Herodotus' praises of the edifice. The most interesting antiquities in the district are the vast mounds of Krokodilopolis with their streets of ancient brick houses and the two ruined monuments which stand side by side at Biahmu. The corner of one of the latter exists to prove that it was once a pyramid with an angle like the pyramid of Medûm. In size and in cutting the stones reminded Professor Sayce of Medûm. So, also, did the absence of cement to join them. Murray and Baedeker's accounts he pronounces alike incorrect. In the same letter he speaks of three clay cylinders in the Bûlak Museum which M. Maspero has lately exhumed at Tell Defenneh (Pelusiac Daphne), a little west of Kantâra on Suez Canal. They were inscribed with Babylonian cuneiform characters and were all records of Nebuchadnezzar. Very badly written and treating only of the royal building in Babylon, these cylinders were plainly meant to be memorials of his conquest of foreign countries. They are thus curious proofs of Nebuchadnezzar's invasion of Egypt. All three begin, "Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, son of Nabopolassar, King of Babylon, am I."

The next letter in the "Academy" of February 2, 1884, p. 84, is redolent of palms and bees near the temple of Seti amid the ruins of ancient Osiris. Among the *graffiti* covering the walls of the two chief temples Professor Sayce copied thirty-three Carian inscriptions, two only of which were known before, forty-four Cypriote, and more than sixty Phœnician. Of the Greek inscriptions most are of the Ptolemaic era. The most honest, if not edifying, asserts, "I, Nicanor, am come with Heracleia—drunk." Before taking the postal boat for Luxor, Professor Sayce paid a visit to a newly-discovered statue of the Goddess Sekket at Uladaihweh. The statue is of great size and exquisite finish. It bears the cartouche of Amenophis III. Near by are fragments of stone with the titles of Rameses II. Not far away is a tomb containing two

chambers, in one of which are seated images of the proprietors of the tomb. The same group, seated in the midst of the Egyptian Trinity, is sculptured at the end of the second chamber, opposite the entrance. Two heraldic lions, back to back, are on the right of this chamber. They support the setting sun. In form and position these lions reminded him of Asia Minor and Babylonia, bearing a striking resemblance to the famous lions of Mykênæ. Sayce regards sculpture a sure mark of Asiatic influence, exercised on Egypt through wars of the XVIII. dynasty. Girgheh, he thinks, with Mariette, occupies the site of the long-lost, long-sought city, which was the birth-place of the founder of the united monarchy of Egypt.

The learned Oxford Professor is not alone in bringing spoils from the land of the Nile. European museums and the modern press do their part in the fascinating work. Professor Maspero has unearthed in the Turin collection, where it was slumbering like the mummied kings of Thebes, the Egyptian version of the fable of the Belly and the Members. It opens as follows: "Case of Belly versus Head: wherein are published the pleadings made before the supreme judges in the presence of the President, who kept watch in order that the Liar should be unmasked." The boastful speech of the head succeeds, claiming to be queen of all the body, "whose eyes see, whose ears hear, whose nostrils inhale the air, whose mouth has the gift of speech." This was found at Turin and appears in Maspero's III. fascicule of his "*Études Égyptiennes*."

In his new handbook to the Bûlak Museum the same accomplished authority differs from Mariette in some important points. One is the funerary cones of baked clay and stamped, which have been an enigma to explorers. Mariette thought them to have been boundaries, marking the extent of land belonging to each grave. This seemed plausible; for they were found buried in the sand in front of the oldest tombs of the Theban necropolis. Maspero takes them, however, to be imitation bread-offerings. Their powdered white coating is, in his view, the mixture of fine white flour and salt which was presented sacrificially to gods and dead alike. In his own words, "Just as at Memphis, under the ancient empire, geese and loaves carved in stone were destined to provide the dead with geese and loaves which should endure forever, so at Thebes they provided the deceased with bread more durable than real bread. Thus the image of an object offered in this world procured for the soul the reality of that object in the next world. If we do not find cones at Memphis, it is for the reason why we do not find stone geese at Thebes. Each city followed its own customs, and we need not look to find those customs prevailing elsewhere."

The above facts are from the "Academy" of December 8, 1883, and January 12, 1884. The number of February 23, 1884, contains the widely quoted letter of Miss Amelia B. Edwards. In this she mentions and laments the wholesale demolition among the ruins of Upper Egypt. "Where the cliffs overhang the Nile, the tunneled tombs, with which these precipices are terraced, are blasted, smashed, and shot down by hundreds of tons daily." To arrest this vandalism, Maspero has organized a corps of archæological police. If excavation loses, preservation gains. This novel band consists of twenty-seven local guardians under the control of six inspectors. They are to patrol the Pyramids, Abydos, Denderah, Thebes, and Edfro. With these coöperate the pupils of his school of

native archæology, in which young Egyptians of talent are taught modern European and Egyptian hieroglyphs. From their ability to read royal cartouches they will make excellent overseers of excavations.

The American School of Archæology at Athens is stimulating our English brethren to write at least in favor of a British prototype on Grecian soil. Professor Goodwin's forecast of the establishment of such an English school the present year is perhaps sanguine. None the less does the "*Athenæum*" of February 9th contain a summary of the learned Professor's appeal to Americans for a permanent endowment. "Teachers of Greek letters and art in the higher institutions of the United States need such a school. There can be no better fitting of such instructors than eight months' study of Greece herself. To learn the secret of her architecture through acquaintance with her temples is an ideal method. What can be finer than to explore Greek geography and history by visiting Greek battle-fields and famous cities, and tracing great lines of communication through mountain passes? If one know modern Greek in its literary form, so as to speak it, he knows ancient Greek more livingly. Where the ordinary teacher of Greek would be profited by this course, an archæologist would be still more the gainer from the inexhaustible material at hand. Under Professor Goodwin, it appears that besides frequent meetings for reading and discussion, the eight students in attendance last year produced papers on the following subjects: the Pnyx; the Erechtheum; the life, poems, and language of Theocritus; the Inscriptions of Assos discovered by the American Expedition; the value of modern Greek to the classical student, and the Theatre of Dionysus of Athens."

It is pleasant to learn from the London "*Times*" ("*Mail*") of March 21, 1884, that Mr. Sterrett, of the American school at Athens, accompanied Mr. W. M. Ramsay in his explorations of Asia Minor in 1883. The two gentlemen explored the Phrygian mountains north of Kara-Hissar, the chief seat of the pre-Hellenic civilization of Phrygia. Three inscriptions and several monuments rewarded their toils. One of these seemed to Mr. Ramsay of the first consequence. Professor C. Robert, of Berlin, agrees with him, owning the debt of science for his discovery of reliefs bearing on the history of Greek art as influenced by Asia Minor. "Of especial importance, in my opinion, are (1) the rock portal, as giving the original type of the Ionic column, and setting at rest all doubts as to its derivation and significance; and (2) the Cybele relief, the lions of which are closely related to those of Mykênæ." The aim of the explorations was mainly topographical, and render possible for the first time an intelligible map of the country. Incidentally, Mr. Ramsay and Mr. Sterrett copied 450 inscriptions. Of these the most noteworthy are (1) the letter of Trajan thanking a lady of Pessinas for gifts of garments; (2) a series of Christian inscriptions from A. D. 121 onwards. Mr. Ramsay's diligent and fruitful researches in his life-field are commended by scholars like M. Waddington, M. Georges Perrot, Professor Kiepert, and Professor Mommsen. Professor Ernst Curtius says, "Mr. Ramsay's researches are of great importance for the history of the Greek people. . . . Thanks to him the Asiatic home of the Hellenes has been rediscovered, and the oldest sculptured relief in European Greece, which hitherto stood entirely alone, the device of the Pelopidæ, has found many parallels in Phrygia. . . . The rock sculptures of Phrygia are the oldest

Runes of pre-historic Greece. . . . But we are not dealing with a foretime which is without history. The mingling of Semitic and Aryan nationalities, the formation from various centres of distinct empires, the oldest military roads with their stations, — these are questions the answer to which must be given by topography. . . . Here is virgin soil for the student of early European history, and for a work of lasting value beyond the powers of any hasty tourist. . . . Mr. Ramsay, with an intelligent appreciation of the monumental materials, unites the historical and geographical insight necessary for a right understanding of the problems connected with them." If we refrain from further detail, it is because our readers can consult the "Boston Daily Advertiser" of April 8, 1884, where the whole letter is republished. The immense value of these explorations should be a new spur to the support of the American Archæological School at Athens. This we may add to the immediate result of enabling Mr. Ramsay to continue the path marked out by Leake, Stewart, and Hamilton. Christian scholarship hails with gratitude the new opening of the "world between Greece and Assyria, between Europe and the East."

We are on *Greek* ground still when we epitomize the paper of Mr. A. Lang on the "Iron Age in Greece," published in the "Antiquary" of March, 1884. Professor Sayce's view was that the introduction of iron-working into Greece is very late. One of his arguments was the surprise of a Spartan, about 550 B. C., according to Herodotus, who saw iron beaten out by a Tegetan blacksmith. Mr. Lang submits that iron-making might have been an art long practiced in Greece, but practiced in the mystery which many crafts affect. On the other hand, "Herodotus says Glaucus of Chios invented the soldering of iron, and he was certainly earlier than 550 B. C." Professor Sayce claims philology and archæology accord in requiring a late date. Mr. Lang shows that philology, in the person of Max Müller, declared in 1863, "iron was *not known* to the Aryans before separation," and in 1868 said, on the same point, "there can be no doubt iron *was known* and its value appreciated." Archæology, in the person of Schliemann, vacillates not less absurdly. When he wrote "Troy" in 1876, "Schliemann found no iron, but believed it existed." "When he wrote 'Ilios,' 1880, he had found iron, but believed it did not exist." Dr. O. Schrader, Professor Sayce's favorite authority, Mr. Lang says is against him. For he cites Homer as a witness to the early use of iron in Greece. According to Schrader, while coinage is still unknown to Homer, payments are made in *iron* and other metals by way of barter. Homer uses iron as synonym for sword. Moreover, the Parian marble assigns the invention of iron to the mythic date of Minos, and Strabo says Sophocles regarded the imaginary Dactyli as the first inventors and workers of iron. These dates are vastly prior to 550 B. C. Mr. Lang concedes the force of Sayce's argument from the absence of iron remains in the older Greek sites. Corrosion and decomposition might, however, account for this, and it is a well-known fact that not a shard of iron of the pre-celtic age exists. That iron was used in the Great Pyramid is beyond dispute, according to Mr. Petrie. For a final settlement of the question, iron remains, in connection with archaic potteries on undoubted and undisturbed Greek sites, seem essential. It is to be hoped the Oxford Professor will notice the foregoing vigorous counter-statement to his own article in the "Journal of Philology," 1883.

From Greece we pass to Rome and Signor Rodolfo Lanciani, who was

the first to announce the discovery of the Atrium Vestæ to the "Athenæum." In last October, he says in the issue of January 19th, "people abroad cannot conceive faintly of the impression which every one in Rome felt in stepping over the threshold of the Atrium Vestæ, in entering those cloisters, the marble population of which is increasing in number and in importance every day. The noble, dignified portrait-statues of the *virgines vestales maximæ* are there standing in a long array, ready to welcome the visitors and glad to have recovered possession of the house which for eleven centuries has been the witness of their joys and sorrows, the depository of their secrets, and from which they were brutally expelled in A. D. 394." The "Athenæum" of February 2d contains from the same pen some interesting notes on the subject brought before our readers by Principal Bancroft in our March number. Signor Lanciani adverts to the importation of the worship of Hestia from Alba. Because fire was not easy to procure from friction or flint, each village kept a common fire (*focus publicus*) in a central hut. Numa Pompilius found this custom in the curiæ. Instead of abolishing he perpetuated it in a round straw hut on the borders of the Velabrum between the Palatine and the Capitol, where was a public market. At the famous shrine thus begun the care of watching the fire was committed to four virgins. Servius Tullius raised the number to six, and in the fourth century A. D., it was increased to seven. The directorship of the Atrium Vestæ and of its sisterhood belonged to the oldest virgin. She was called *Virgo Vestalis Maxima*. In prestige she equaled, if she did not excel, the empress herself. Secrets and documents of state and wills of emperors were intrusted to her. The vestal virgins as a body were peace-makers. In this benignant capacity they were sought by Cæsar in his quarrel with Sulla, and Vitellius in his fight with Vespasian. Since the virgins were received under ten years of age, they might become *directresses* when still young. This did not often happen however. The vitality and the domesticity of the nuns stood in the way. Few left the Atrium at the termination of the legal term of thirty years' service. "So the *vestalis maxima*, as a rule, coupled with the dignity of her position the dignity of old age." Julia Silana became a maxima after seventy-four years. Occia, the predecessor of Torquata had been the superior of the college for fifty-seven years. Signor Lanciani hoped to find records with the names of the vestal virgins, the dates of their coöptation and death, and most of all the list of the lady-abbesses. He was disappointed. His consolation is the splendid set of pedestals with statues and eulogistic inscriptions raised to the honor of the *vestales maximæ*. Alas, that four fifths of them should have succumbed to the lime-burners and stone-cutters of the Middle Ages. But thirty-six have been preserved, twenty-eight being recovered in the Atrium itself. He gives fourteen. The most striking is Flavia Publicia, A. D. 247. "She was tall and queenly in appearance, of noble demeanor, of a sweet and gentle, if not handsome, face." Seven of her pedestals have been found already. Hardly less notable is an unknown abbess of rare chastity, modesty, and learning. The date is June 9, 364. Her name is erased, in all probability, Lanciani suggests, because of her conversion to the gospel. This would be a similar conquest of the new faith to that named by Prudentius Paristeph, hymn 2.

Returning home, it remains to chronicle the approaching "Summer Schools of the American Institute of Hebrew." These are three in num-

ber, being located at Chicago, Chautauqua, and Worcester, respectively. To the scholarly enthusiasm and magnetic power, as a teacher, of Professor William R. Harper, Ph. D., of the Chicago Baptist Union Theological Seminary, these schools are due. Their aim has been twofold: (1) They seek to enlist and fix the interest of the ministry in the ancient language of the Old Testament. (2) They are meant to encourage men of special gifts and aptitudes to undertake advanced Semitic study. The Hebrew Summer School is also intended to supplement the Hebrew Correspondence School, which, within two years, has grown from a membership of forty to a membership of over five hundred. Its main features are admirable. They embrace and emphasize the principles of induction, memorizing, and translating at sight. The classes are elementary, intermediate, progressive, and advanced. Last year at Chicago the beginners' class, numbering sixteen, committed to memory the first chapter of Genesis, translated critically Gen. ii.-xii., did a little extempore translation in Samuel and Psalms, memorized three hundred words, and learned the essentials of the grammar, a portion of the noun excepted. This was from July 11th to August 16th. So excellent a record is likely to be equaled, if not surpassed, the coming year. The advanced class, among other things, then discussed the historicity of the Book of Jonah with great interest and profit. This year it will grapple with "Driver's Hebrew Tenses" and with Hebrew synonyms and poetry, studying exegetically Genesis xlix., Deuteronomy xxxii. and xxxiii., and Judges v., and translating at sight in Kings, Ruth, Lamentations, and Ecclesiastes. Zeal and application are needed in the pupils. The instructors come equipped with experience and devotion. Professor Harper is a host in himself. Mr. Gurney and Mr. Price are young men of great teaching and linguistic ability, who have been under Professor Harper's instruction for five years and are his aids in the correspondence work. Add to these, at Worcester, such competent and honored teachers as Professor C. R. Brown, of Newton Theological Institution, Professor H. G. Mitchell, Ph. D., of Boston University, and Professor D. G. Lyon, Ph. D., of Harvard, and the faculty is seen to be very strong. But this is not all. Special classes are organized in Chaldee, Syriac, Arabic, and last, but not least, under Professor Lyon, in Assyrian, for which some six or eight applications for admission have already been made. There are also to be lectures from some of the foremost biblical scholars in America. Among these we notice with gratification the names of Professors Bissell, Briggs, Denio, and Rev. P. A. Nordell. With a healthful home in Worcester Academy and a high ambition to succeed, the school, with its 175 members, has the promise of a splendid month. We do not know of an expenditure of ten dollars' fee and four weeks' time better fitted to unlock the archæological and philological treasures of the Word of God. The Worcester Summer School of Hebrew opens August 5, 1884, at 2 p. m. It follows the Chautauqua school, which continues from July 22d to August 19th, as this will follow the Chicago school, whose sessions are from July 1st to July 30th. After the first week Professor Harper will teach in person the first sections of the elementary and intermediate classes each for two hours a day, the progressive class in the study of Gesenius' Grammar, and the advanced class in their grammatical work and in the study of Genesis xlix., Deuteronomy xxxii., xxxiii., and Judges v. The best wishes of every scholar go with him.

John Phelps Taylor.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE ONE MEDIATOR. Bampton Lectures for 1882. By PETER GOLDSMITH MEDD, M. A., Honorary Canon of St. Alban's, etc. London : Rivingtons. 1884.

This volume of the Bampton Lectures is not up to the standard of many of its predecessors. It bears no comparison with Bernard's "Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament," Liddon's "Our Lord's Divinity," or others that might be named. The principal thought of Canon Medd's book is comprehensive and elevated, but the development is disappointing. The thought is that Christ is more than a mediator between God and sinful man; that the creation of the Universe and its administration, as well as the redemption of sinners, is included in his Mediatorship. The salvation of man is but "a special function of a larger office, a result of a wider mediatorial relation in which he stands to unfallen as well as to fallen natures, indeed to all created existence." This view is sustained by the prologue of John's Gospel and by Paul's representations of Christ as the head not only of the church, but, antecedently, of the whole creation. Thus considered there is ground for the belief that, if man had never sinned, the Incarnation would have been accomplished as the means of perfect communion between man and God, and also as vitally related to all created intelligences. The view thus opened has grandeur and is in complete harmony with various declarations of the Bible. It removes some restrictions by which the Incarnation has been narrowed. It is a view, however, which is held by nearly every profound theologian, and which is clearly set forth in many doctrinal systems, from several of which Canon Medd makes copious quotations.

The first two lectures contain about all the writer has to say on this great subject. The remaining lectures consist of obvious reiterations and amplifications of the original theme. There is extended comment on the theophanies of the Old Testament, the angel of Jehovah, the visions of the prophets, mediation through the law and the ritual, the successive events of Christ's life in their sacrificial aspect, and his continued mediation since the ascension. It is remarkable that in a work on this subject the attempt is nowhere made to get beneath the fact of mediation to its necessity and characteristics. There is no hint of a philosophy of the atonement, but only devout recognition of the reconciliation effected.

Problems which perplex all intelligent students of the Bible are approached and disposed of with an enviable serenity which can be gotten only of unenviable ignorance. Concerning Christ's predictions of his second coming for example, he says: "Looking closely at the twenty-fourth chapter of Saint Matthew, we discover a clear line between the first and second portions of the great prophecy. Surely our Lord himself has given us the key to the primary application of the first portion in his words repeated with all but verbal identity by the three Synoptists: 'Verily I say unto you, this generation shall not pass away till all these things be fulfilled.'" The key, hung where it is, happens to be the very thing which makes such an interpretation difficult.

Again, Christ's mediation in the unseen world between his death and

resurrection Canon Medd accepts as real. He thinks that the preaching to the spirits in prison was a proclamation of mercy to souls in Hades. But his opinion is carefully stated that for all souls eternal destiny is decided during the earthly life, and that the mercy offered to those who were disobedient in the time of Noah was not to all, but to such as "at the very last, when there was no longer escape from the awful and sudden judgment of the flood, turned to God with a repentance which should preserve or rekindle the spark of life within, and so render it possible for their spirits to be saved, albeit we know not in how forever diminished glory and beauty, in the day of the Lord Jesus." This explanation has at least the merit of originality.

The book is an incompetent handling of a great theme. The writer is more pious than philosophical. One indication of the quality of his thought is found in his free use of capital letters. When he employs them with such words as grace, love, truth, sacrifice, body, law, judgment, dispensation, veil, presence, priesthood, we are almost sensible of the unction with which they were uttered, and can hear the churchly cadence of tone with which the lectures were delivered. Such a book, whatever value it may have for devout believers who are edified by pious meditation, has no value as a contribution to thorough discussion of the biblical, critical, and doctrinal grounds of our Lord's mediatorial work. It does not accomplish the objects of the Bampton lectureship.

George Harris.

THE IDEAS OF THE APOSTLE PAUL, translated into their modern equivalents by JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE, author of "Self Culture," "Ten Great Religions," "Events and Epochs in Religious History," etc. Crown 8vo. pp. xiv., 436. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1884.

Is the distinctive value of Paul's writings derived from their author's spiritual and intellectual endowments, or from his personal connection with the risen Christ? To this crucial question Dr. Clarke heartily gives the Christian believer's answer. Paul's teaching, in his view, flowed from the experience of Christ which began at his conversion and was ever after the dominant feature of his inner life. "It was not a vision of Christ, but Christ himself, who appeared to Paul. He was seen, not by his outward eye, but by an inward revelation. . . . The mighty light which shone around, so that the dazzling brightness of that terrible desert mid-day sun was eclipsed by it, was only the external part of the miracle. Paul saw something else, heard something else, which his companions did not see nor hear. He stood face to face with the majestic tenderness of the transfigured Redeemer. . . . Trembling, his eyes dark, his soul full of a new light, he rose and went to Damascus, and there heard from a Christian voice the words, 'Brother Saul, receive thy sight, and be filled with the Holy Ghost.' So there he became a Christian, there he was taught to know Jesus. . . . What a fearful resolution was Paul now called upon to take! It was to give up everything he had loved and lived for; to join the feeble sect he had been persecuting. . . . It was necessary for Paul to have the aid of his fellow Christians in passing through this awful crisis of his being, and Ananias was sent to pray with him. While he prayed, the outward sight returned, and at the same moment that inward strength and new life was given which was to do such a mighty work in the world."

A representation of Paul's teaching which finds its root in this supernatural experience must be essentially evangelical in the true sense of the word. Instead of saying with the rationalist, "not Paul but Jesus," Dr. Clarke would say with the church catholic, "Jesus as revealed in and through Paul." His clear conviction of the value of Christianity as a remedial work of God underlies his interpretation of the Pauline writings. He finds in them a body of truth about God in his relations to man. If some of the doctrines which the church catholic has found in them are to be set aside, it is because they are not deducible from the apostle's words. In these is to be found in its fullest statement Christianity, the hope of the world. Dr. Clarke proceeds to state those truths as he conceives them to have lain in Paul's mind, taking occasion to controvert the Calvinistic interpretation of the Pauline writings. His exposition is marked by his usual clearness and force, and sometimes rises into true Christian eloquence. Evangelical feeling glows in his justification of prayer. "I am inclined to think . . . that the best things are had for asking. Experience sometimes confirms the saying of Jesus, 'Blessed are those who hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled.' If prayer is the soul's sincere desire, uttered or unexpressed; if it is the flight of one alone to the only God; if it is a perpetual seeking, knocking, asking in spirit and in truth, then I think that those who ask receive; those who seek find; to those who knock, the door is opened." Dr. Clarke's restatement of the Pauline teaching brings it into accord with the conceptions of that type of Unitarianism represented by Dr. Channing. It is claimed by him that the passages in which the distinctively orthodox views have been found, examined by the methods of modern exegesis, do not yield those views. The authority of German scholarship is appealed to with a confidence which can only be accounted for by supposing that Dr. Clarke has not found time to examine the works of the most distinguished later exegetes of Germany. It does seem strange that the sweeping statement, "that Paul never regarded Christ as God, is the opinion of the leading scholars of the Continent, who study his writings with the perfect impartiality of emancipated critics," is supported by the single authority of Baur, whose department is history, not exegesis, and whom Dr. Clarke elsewhere controverts as twisting facts in the interest of his rationalistic theories. Why are Olshausen, Tholuck, De Wette, Meyer, and Weiss, to all of whom Dr. Clarke elsewhere refers, passed over? This hasty and incorrect assumption is a serious blemish upon the book. The exegesis which Dr. Clarke offers as a substitute for the orthodox explanation of leading passages also shows a lack of appreciation of the scientific method of the German scholars.

For example, in arguing that the doctrine of a vicarious atonement is not found in Paul's writings, the meaning of Romans iii. 25, 26, is said to be, "God has made Jesus such a mercy-seat where man can commune with Him by faith. . . . It is a manifestation of his present immediate love. It shows that God is just, as well as merciful, in forgiving our sins, because his forgiveness takes them away and leaves them in the past."

Dr. Clarke's rendering of *ἱλαστήριον* by "mercy-seat" instead of "propitiatory sacrifice" has high authority in its favor, though in our opinion not the highest. But the scholars who so render it find the propitiatory meaning in it. The blood of the victims sprinkled on the cover of the ark, or mercy-seat, made it the place where God's pardoning grace, obtained through the sacrifice, was localized in the Hebrew symbolism, so

that the mercy-seat was inseparably connected in the Hebrew mind with propitiation. That Paul conceived of God as made propitious by Christ's death is evident from his words, "through faith in his blood." It is also evident from his adding, "To show his righteousness in passing over sins that are past." Dr. Clarke's paraphrase, "his forgiveness takes them away and leaves them in the past," is a perversion apparently due to the use of the English version; τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων means, of course, sins which formerly happened. Paul says that God showed himself righteous in forgiving these sins by setting forth Christ as a blood-bespinkled mercy-seat (if we accept this rendering), that is, representing to mankind a forgiveness procured through the Saviour's death. Dr. Clarke claims that Paul says in Romans v. 10, that "when we were enemies to God we were reconciled to Him" (that is won to his friendship) by the death of his Son. But the clause in the preceding verse to which this statement corresponds is, "while we were yet sinners Christ died for us," that is, as the apostle explains, died for us as a man might die for the sake of a friend, — take his place. One of the passages in which Paul has most plainly taught the vicariousness of Christ's death, Gal. iii. 13, "Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us," Dr. Clarke has scarcely noticed. It must also be said that it should not be affirmed that Paul has taught the ultimate salvation of all, on the strength of 1 Cor. xv. 28, "God shall be all in all," without at least mentioning those passages in which he has said that some will be finally lost.

Dr. Clarke says of Paul: "Notice the precision of his language. Each phrase has its own exact meaning, every word tells; he uses no vague generalities." He also, as we have said, owns the value of modern exegetical scholarship in its elucidation of Paul's writings. He therefore obliges us to subject his representation of those writings to exegetical tests. That it will not, in its distinctively Unitarian features, bear these tests may be safely asserted. Modern exegesis has certainly shown that the distinctively evangelical tenets are imbedded in Paul's writings. It has also shown that some of the Calvinistic tenets against which Unitarianism revolts are not contained in them.

Many passages in the book show a spiritual appreciation of Christ which is thoroughly Pauline. The words, "Paul regards the whole creation as tending towards Christ, and meant to be ultimately redeemed by the fullness of his love," remind us of those other golden words of the apostle, "No man can call Jesus Lord, but by the Holy Ghost."

Edward Y. Hincks.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WRITTEN DISCOURSE. By THEODORE W. HUNT, Ph. D., Professor of Rhetoric and English Language in the College of New Jersey. pp. 362. N. Y. A. C. Armstrong & Son.

This book is designed for the use of students in the higher classes in colleges. The objects proposed by the author, as defined by himself, are as follows: to give a true definition of discourse; to establish guiding principles to reveal the basis of discourse in a true philosophy of the mind, to present the true relations of the science and the art of discourse, to connect the study of discourse with that of literature and language to reveal the close relations of discourse to a practical knowledge of the world and human life; to make emphatic, throughout, the moral element in discourse.

The treatment is in two parts. Part I. includes the topics: definition of discourse (1); parts of discourse; material and media of discourse; processes of discourse; laws of discourse. Part II., definition of discourse (2); qualities of discourse; forms of discourse.

Although the title of the book is "The Principles of *Written Discourse*," the relations of composition to oral address are not neglected. The author says: "In presenting the subject of discourse we shall not be careful to make either of its divisions — written and oral — prominent at first over the other. We treat the subject of discourse in its comprehensiveness as the expression of our thought in language. We study its laws and processes, its qualities and objects applicable alike to the writer and orator. This being done, there are two specific courses to be followed, in addition to this general one, arising out of the desire or purpose of the writer to deliver his composition publicly."

The title is intended to limit the treatment, in order that elocution and extempore address may be left to other and special works.

Professor Hunt has recast the materials common to the standard treatises, wrought in with these the results of his study and reflection guided by his experience as a teacher of the art and practice of rhetoric, constructing the whole into a system from his own point of view. And it is from the latter we discern the peculiar excellence of his work. He conceives discourse as a transaction. It is a communication of thought and feeling from one person to another, or to many others. In writing for readers, the mind and the heart are in action, the expression is by the medium of language; in reading, the mind is in action in interpretation, the heart in sympathy. In oratory, the whole personality is in action in the transmission of thought and feeling, by vocal and bodily signs of thought and emotion. The aims are information, conviction, persuasion, and incitement of the motive forces, in order to decision or action, or both.

It is evident that a true and complete theory of discourse must be based on psychology and the nature and laws of expression. The writer and speaker must employ their powers normally, and must deal in the same manner with the powers of the reader and hearer. And the media of communication between these must be natural to both. And in practice there must be a distinction between absolute and relative expression. The former may be sufficient to *record* thought. The latter is efficient to *communicate* thought. It is not enough that the writer utter himself; he must convey himself to the reader. The first form of a discourse, in the mind of the writer, may be conditioned by the laws of mind and language; the last form must be adapted to the receptivity of the reader. Otherwise there is no *transaction*.

We have before us, accordingly, an attempt at a *rational* rhetoric. The following quotation will present this aspect of the treatise.

"The science of discourse is not a mental science formally viewed. It finds therein, however, its basis, laws, and suggestive method. He will utterly fail in this department who attempts the study out of its relations to the laws of the human intellect, and thus fails to connect at every point the external forms of expression with the inward action of the soul. The student must be familiar with these mental powers, their laws, methods, and conditions of action. He must be acquainted with the mind he is using and addressing. He must know how the mind works; must understand his nature as mental, moral, and emotional. In a word, he must know man in his complex character. Here is seen

the psychology of discourse. It is an art whose discussion need not be metaphysical, but shown to be based upon those fundamental facts which have been derived from a close observation of our mental processes. Discourse is the art by which rational minds express themselves in a rational manner. He is doing a most valuable work in the interests of this art who ever insists upon thus exalting it above the purely verbal into the higher realm of the philosophic and mental."

This is the master-idea which has possessed the author and given direction and form to his work. Discourse is a rational process of expression in order to *impression*. As, for example, "the theme should be suggested by the specific *object* or *purpose* we have in writing." "The most necessary business of the exordium," says Aristotle, "is to throw light on the *end* for the sake of which the speech is made." "The special form which a discussion may assume depends on the special *object* in view." "Our conclusions should be composed and expressed for the sake of *effect*." As to vocabulary, "we are to use the best words in the *circumstances*." "Mere verbal power is one thing. Mental power *transmitted* through appropriate language is another."

The writer of this notice for a short time taught rhetoric in the College of New Jersey, was not satisfied with the text-books in use, and, feeling the need of better, urged Professor Hunt, on his appointment to the chair of the department, to prepare a book on the method above described. After the patient labors of many years it is finished and in our hands. But allowing his personal interest in the author and the volume, he is conscious of no partiality in commending the book to the attention of teachers and students, and to writers and speakers. He is confident that a careful study of it will be rewarding even to those who have been well taught and have learned much by experience.

Joseph T. Duryea.

BALZAC. By EDGAR EVERTSON SALTUS. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1884.

It is surprising that in the country of novel readers one hears so seldom the name of the inventor of the modern novel. French novels are as much read here as in France. The latest and the worst are in great demand. This discriminating and finely written analysis of Balzac's work should encourage lovers of French light literature to go to the fountain head. Mr. Saltus appreciates Balzac at every point; his artistic perfection of detail; his return and his fidelity to nature; his wonderful construction of an entire society; and, greater still, what he happily calls his "discovery of woman," — all are dwelt upon in a style which would give interest to a less fruitful theme.

The explanation of the scheme of the "*Comédie Humaine*" is full of suggestions of its greatness, and he disposes of the claims of those who consider it immoral in few words. "In his books he has, it is true, agreeably painted the seductions of vice, but its contagious and destructive effects are rigorously exposed; and through all the struggles of his characters probity, purity, and self-denial are alone triumphant. In what then does his immorality consist? In his vast conception it was necessary, he explained, here to signalize an abuse and here to point out an evil; but every writer who has an aim and who breaks a fresh lance in the domains of thought is invariably considered immoral. Socrates was im-

moral ; Christ was immoral : both were persecuted by the people whom they reformed."

Mr. Saltus' own words will also best show his opinion of Balzac's return to nature. " 'The Peau du Chagrin' marked the first return in the nineteenth century to the real and to the true ; it gave a fresh impulse to expiring literature, and constituted the corner-stone of the Realistic school, which has found such able exponents not only in the De Goncourts and Flaubert, but in Dickens, Thackeray, Tourgénéff, and a host of lesser lights."

Not less truly he characterizes Balzac's treatment of his female characters. In comparing him in this respect with other French writers from the middle ages down he says : "It is well to point out that when but the female was seen by these writers Balzac discovered the woman, — a difference surely as great as between the bottle and the wine." Again he says, "In his portraiture of women not a single type is lacking. Herein he is unexcelled and unsurpassable. That which Euripides considered as the most terrible of all misfortunes, and De Maistre nothing but a beautiful animal, found its most graphic expression through him."

The slight sketch of his life is all good, but especially so in what relates to his mode of work and habits of thought. The very names of the personages in the "Comédie Humaine" have a charm which makes it a pleasure to read the little sketch of the one hundredth representation of "Mercadet," translated from "Le Constitutionnel." Those bits of wisdom and wit chosen from the thousand great thoughts which crowd his pages are admirably calculated to show his peculiar genius and increase the number of his readers.

The complete list of his works, including those which were only projected, is of value to a lover of Balzac, and must have been difficult to obtain.

L. M. B.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

FROM THE CATHOLIC PUBLICATION SOCIETY COMPANY, NEW YORK.

A Catholic Dictionary, containing some account of the Doctrine, Discipline, Rites, Ceremonies, Councils, and Religious Orders of the Catholic Church. By William E. Addis, Secular Priest, Sometime Fellow of the Royal University of Ireland, and Thomas Arnold, M. A., Fellow of the same University. Pp. vi., 897. 1884.

FROM E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK.

History of the Canon of the Holy Scriptures in the Christian Church. By Edward Reuss, Professor in the University of Strasburg. Translated from the Second French Edition, with the Author's own Corrections and Revision, by David Hunter, B. D., late Scholar and Fellow in the University of Glasgow. Pp. xii., 404. 1884. \$3.00.

FROM J. B. LIPPINCOTT AND COMPANY, PHILADELPHIA.

The Mystery of Creation and of Man : to which is added A New View of Future Punishment. By L. C. Baker. Second edition. Pp. 229. 1884. \$1.00.

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TRANSITION PERIODS IN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

By transition periods in religious thought I mean those of change in its form or substance, spirit or methods. I say change, not progress. Movement is not necessarily progress, though it always attends on it, and is essential to it. It may be its necessary condition, yet not in the direct line of advance, and it may sometimes embarrass us to determine whether or not it is the adjuvant or accompaniment of it. Like a river, it may be deflected into a lateral or reflux course, or be perturbed into eddy and meander, in flanking some headland lying directly across its main direction, which otherwise it could not pass; or it may have to climb by a zigzag path some height whose steep ascent it could not directly surmount.

Such as yet indeterminate movements often perplex us. They may or may not be auxiliary to true progress; and our perplexity may lead to false judgment and false treatment of them; may betray us into careless and disastrous confidence, or into unwarranted and mischievous hostility or alarm; and this very much according to the different prepossessions with which we approach them. There may be, also, varieties of opinion as to what is the direction of genuine progress, what are its tests, and what the true objective goal.

On all these accounts I avoid using the term "progress" in the statement of my theme, as my object in this paper is to inquire into the treatment of transition movements whose character and tendency may be regarded as yet indeterminate — an inquiry apparently of especial relevancy to the present time, as the dangers and difficulties of a transition period seem to many looming up before us and waiting around any mistaken judgment and action of ours in regard to it.

And first, one of the gravest dangers is that of supposing that such transition periods can be avoided, or are in their nature necessarily evil. Such periods, welcome or unwelcome, coveted or dreaded, are sure to come, coming on the world like a barometric storm, cyclonic at times in both suddenness and force, or like the slow and silent approach of spring, — or winter, if you will; still it is in the ordinance of nature and the order of life that they should come. It is a necessity of social progress by the very idea of the term, and is inwrought with its history and philosophy in all the past. Such changes are incorporate with the life of the world, synchronous with its life-pulses and the forces of its progressive building and uplift. "Behold I make all things new," is the divine declaration of the consummation of the coming of the kingdom of God. Mind, science, thought, feeling — the architects of that kingdom — must be in perpetual flux in all below God's throne in the eternal approach of the finite to the Infinite and Unapproachable One.

Movement is the law of all living things and of subsistence in the material universe. Especially is this true of intellectual and moral being. If mind lives, it will move. If thought lives, it will change with the changing standpoints and outlooks of man's eternal self-hood in the infinite universe. God is forever one and the same; but such is not man nor the aspects of the infinite being he is to traverse.

Certainly there must be transition periods of thought in all things to which human science attaches. Truth is eternally the same, but man's science of that truth is not so. His capacity, culture, experience, and mental position are mutable factors.

A conflict with this law of transition in thought were as hopeless as a conflict with that of the seasons or the roll of the world.

Nor were it desirable to arrest it if practicable or supposable. It were an attempt to antagonize a necessity of our own moral and intellectual life. It is true that change may be disaster, ruin, death. Still, for finite man, life and growth, transition and progress are indissolubly united. Change of truth in some regard, as of aspect or relation, form or essence; or of new analyses, syntheses, developments, — novelty, in some form, seems essential to its sustained life-force. God passes before us ever the same, yet eternally new as the ever-rolling skies. Agitation that waits on change may derange, dislocate, undermine, destroy; yet it shakes off, eliminates, and drives away dead things; it roots and anchors deeper and firmer the living growths, and makes proof of what

cannot be shaken and will remain. The waters of life are a river, no standing pool. Life flows ; stagnation is death.

When I speak of transitional periods, I do not imply that any periods are without transitional movement. The eternal flux of mind never stops. It were a syncope of the world's heart were it to do so. But in some periods the current of change flows with more rapidity, certainly with more visible rapidity and manifest force than at others. The tendency to revise, reform, amend, and rehabilitate, and the impulse to innovation or revolution, are more decidedly and boldly self-pronounced.

The life of the world goes on by pulse and paroxysm rather than by continuous uniform stress. The transition period is that of long hidden and silently working forces, suddenly coming to outburst or outflash, or, to change the figure, of floods long, and it may be slowly, accumulating, then suddenly breaking their barrier and rushing into rapids.

But, however occurring, it is of the gravest importance to be able to recognize their approach and to know how to treat them when they come. Not to be prevented or arrested or beaten back any more than the tides of the ocean, by mere awe of authority or by denunciation or anathema, still they may be moderated, moulded, guided, enlightened, and pervaded by a beneficent intelligence and purpose, under wise appliances.

Such movements, if they come with kindness, candor, logic, and argument, are certainly to be met with a kindred spirit of fairness, charity, and reason.

If they come with a different spirit and method, little is gained by imitating them in this respect. Truth can always afford to be patient, calm, kind, temperate, candid, liberal, charitable. Matters of grave logic and reason are not to be met by innuendo and fling, nor by crimination and suspicion, nor more, by beautiful enthusiasms or gush of pious pity and goodish platitudes, but by sober, serene, earnest, and severe reason and logic.

Transition periods are those of great opportunity as well as of great dangers ; they are pivotal and plastic for the issues of a vast future. They often determine the direction, quality, and consequence of religious thought for a cycle of centuries. The question of their treatment, therefore, becomes one of vast consequence. It often gives them their distinctive permanent strain and spirit. Often they are plastic and amenable to wise, kindly, candid reason, while they may be made passionate, malign, fanatic, and anarchical by mere invective. The movement may

often be enlightened, regulated, and rightly attempered, which cannot be beaten back or stopped. It is of vital importance, then, that we recognize such periods on approach and know how to deal with them wisely when present. For, as we do this or fail to do it, they will do us good or evil; or at least much of their possible good may be lost, and much of evitable evil may be incurred.

Ordinarily they are not difficult of recognition. Often we are conscious of their approach as of something abnormal and bodeful in the air, as the chill of the iceberg on the sea or the hot pulse of the cyclone on the atmosphere. There is a murmur in the deeps or on the heights as of the coming earthquake or tempest; something strange, if not out of nature, out of wontage, seems to be abroad and about us. New modes of thinking, feeling, speaking, manifest themselves as gradually coming on, significant of change now in process, or already accomplished and soon to be pronounced, — a change which, whether called reform or revolution, is destined to shape the present to new issues, and leave much of the past behind it.

The old forms of thought are not usually reasoned down or voted out, or formally repudiated. They usually pass silently into disuse, as no longer representing existing phases of feeling or belief in the public mind. They have lost their working power. In their place, in like manner, without formal election or decree, new forms that better meet the existing condition of mind and of working force will gradually and silently be installed. The change may be wise or unwise, permanent or transient; may be passionate and spurious, or legitimate and rational; may be for the furtherance or the hindrance of the truth. That is not the present question. We are now simply inquiring of the signs of the approach, independently of the character of the change. Changes necessary as requisite steps in the advance of all progressive science and culture may be reasonably expected; yet even these may be intemperate, violent, and inordinate, and require prudential forecast and judicious treatment.

Of course every outcry of arraignment or exultation from the camp of unbelievers is not to be regarded as heralding the advance of a transition period. Indictments of Christianity and prophecies of its downfall are always rife with those offended with its ethics or its creed and alien from its spirit. With such the wish is father to the crimination and prediction.

Nor is the actual coming of such periods in such cases any assurance of their reasonableness, righteousness, or beneficence.

There has ever been, and ever will be, until there is a spiritual renovation of the race, frequent defection and revolt from Christianity because of hostility to its very essence and spirit. Society is ever full of volatile, uneasy, restless spirits, to whom unrest is chronic, and indeed is their only repose. It is useless to fashion things for their relief: quiet to them were torture. But there may be voices that are truly cries from the deeps, as of "spirits in prison," of souls restless, troubled, anxious, earnest, truthful, sincere, that long unspeakably for light, clearness, and rest, amid the problems and enigmas of the universe, as it seems to them, unsolved by formulated theologic thought, in which, perplexed, they recognize ghost-like forms that were living oracles in past eras, but are dumb or Delphic now. There are such minds, against whom the charges of irreverence or insincerity were most unjust, and by whom they would be repudiated and resented as false, bigoted, and cruel. Unquestionably, the character and destiny of such persons will be largely affected by the treatment which transition movements in theologic thought may receive. For the sake of such persons, and for the sake of truth itself, it were wise and well we should study rightly to recognize and deal with transition epochs.

Whenever, therefore, a chasm seems gradually growing between faith and culture, and between Creed and Belief, and formularies current and ancient seem gradually losing their hold and power with the public mind, — with the mind of the thinking and scholarly, the scientist and philosopher, and with the common sense and feeling of the million as well, — there is a suggestion that we pause and interrogate these phenomena: what is their cause, significance, and monition? What has severed things naturally so allied? and what remedy is practicable for healing that unnatural and disastrous schism?

And first, why is this severance? Is it because the formulated creed is no longer in accord with the Christian consciousness of the age, — a consciousness instructed by more careful study of Scripture and by the spirit and utterances and life of Christ, as well as by general culture and intelligence increasing with the years, and so dogma and reason and conscience are at variance? or is it because the spirit of the age is wild, wanton, worldly, idly conceited, infidel? and if so, how came it so? How came the public mind into this morbid, corrupt, and portentous condition?

In either case the situation demands grave heed, and will furnish matter for important inquiry and instruction. If it is caused

by a seeming conflict between revelation on the one hand, and natural science and our moral consciousness on the other, it will be well to inquire into the cause of this apparent conflict; whether possibly something defective or fallacious in our theories of revelation, inspiration, interpretation, or canonicity, or of the validity and authority of ecclesiastical precedent and tradition, or something at fault in our philosophical method or logic in the application of those theories, may be in any degree responsible for it. If the difficulty has originated from a false conception of Revelation as the disclosure of a perfect moral system, requiring or admitting no suggestion of hypothesis in relief against seeming defect or hardship, it is well we should be recalled to the obvious and necessary fact that the Scriptures could present to us only fragments, not the entirety of a moral system; isolated peaks, not a complete landscape; special glimpses, not a synopsis of chainwork whose interstitial links are lost from sight; and it may behoove us to inquire whether the attempted welding of these isolated fragments into one continuous, compact, adamant system, precluding all relief against its immediate stringency by hypotheses of interstitial links not yet brought to light, has not put an unnecessary strain on the faith that accepts such a system; and also whether that strain has not been intensified by false views of the validity of authority of ecclesiastical precedent and tradition, forgetting that mere time is far from being an infallible warrant for truth and authority in a world where next oldest to the kingdom of heaven is the kingdom of hell. Questions of this order, especially relevant and exigent in transition eras, require to be treated with the candor and calmness of an unimpassioned logic, free but reverent, animated simply and supremely with the love of truth and of Christ.

Animated with such a spirit, and feeling the transition pulses — whether of health or fever — from all the past — from Judaism and Paganism to Christianity; from the patristic to the mediæval church, and on through the periods of the Lutheran reform, the philosophic revolt and religious eclipse of the 17th and 18th centuries, and the crimson saturnalia and catastrophe of the French revolution to the reaction to Christianity, evangelistic or rationalistic, of our times, — standing in memory and continued appulse of all these movements, coming oft in most “questionable shapes,” and “bringing with them airs from heaven or blasts from hell,” the Church may still look with the courage of hope on the agitation of the present, confident that the Burning Wheels are out on the

floods, and this very tumult of the waves may be part of the coming of the Lord. And the thought seems pressing on the hour whether a theology to a greater degree embracing Christ as its living centre, regarding Him as the personal, consummate revelation of God, subordinating Lawgiver, Prophet, Psalmist, and Apostle, — himself *the truth* and the supreme and ultimate test and interpreter of all revelation, — would not do much to harmonize seeming discrepancies attaching to inchoate stages of a progressive theologic development, by the final expression of himself by God in the Christ of the New Testament.

But the Church cannot well ignore extensive, persistent, and pronounced tendencies to transition movements, from whatever causes arising. If morbid, capricious, irrational, they point to diseases it may be vital to recognize and, if practicable, remedy. But not uncommonly they indicate some real grave cause imbedded in its theology, some incongruity or conflict with the living reason and moral consciousness of the world: an incongruity and conflict which must be relieved, or it will peril the faith of men; at first, it may be, of the thinkers, but, subsequently, of the million. History points to such incongruities and conflicts in the past, and emphasizes the need of giving them timely heed. Some dogmas once consecrated in the belief of the church, and championed by the greatest intellects and its noblest and saintliest men, and bound fast by adamantine logic in its creed, if now pushed on the world, would drive it into infidelity. The monstrous dogma of the eternal perdition of young infants, and of others who from *mere defect of baptism* were doomed to wander forever without the Gates of Light, — a dogma numbering among those accepting it such names as Augustine among the Fathers, and as Dante among the grandest minds of the Middle Ages, — would, if now persisted in, wreck the faith of the age. Terrible is the strain brought upon men's loyalty to Christianity by a theology claiming to be its exponent, which seems to them, as in the case above, to place the God of the Scriptures in conflict with the eternal sentiments of right and mercy and love which He has planted in the human soul. Something must give way in such a case, something must move, either this gloomy theology or the throne of God. Their faith in the God of Revelation as disclosed in the creed or that in the ineffaceable instincts of their moral nature must yield. In such cases, adhesion to the creed is the destruction of belief.

Such a strain has been laid on Christian faith in past ages. It is not impossible it should be so again. Tendencies to any such

result should engage our inquiries, on indications of the approach of transition periods. True, the dogma above noted is of exceptional atrocity. But the fact that it could exist and command the championship of such men as defended it makes it not incredible that something similar, if less monstrous, should linger, even in ages that have learned to abhor that dogma.

Whenever the current and time-honored creeds cease to command the beliefs or emotions of men, and seem no longer congruous with the moral instincts and intuitions of the million or the culture of the learned; when old formularies are disappearing from the pulpit and from literature, whether addressed to the savans or the masses; — whether it be that those formularies have lost position in the belief of preachers and writers themselves, or are ignored from a consciousness of their repugnancy to the convictions of the multitude, and their incompetency to serve longer as instruments for the conversion of men, — then, whatever may be the cause, it is time to hang out storm signals.

It is certain that the mind of society will not long remain quiet in this incongruity between a nominally accepted creed and the actual utterance. Something must soon change. In what direction shall the change be, and how best met, becomes an urgent rational inquiry. Either the approaching movement must be resisted, stopped, and turned back, or such modification of the old creeds must be yielded to it as shall put them more in harmony with the mind of the age and the living beliefs of men, and such as shall tend to imbue the transition movement with a kind, sober, and temperate spirit and bring it under wise and beneficent control.

The first impulse will naturally be to suppress, because of those tendencies inherent in society which always antagonize change. These are termed conservative, and, kept within wise degree, they are truly so; but beyond that, becoming absolute and dominant, they are the deadliest of destructives, and kill even what they would conserve.

This instinctive antagonism to change is constituted of elements that may be beneficent or maleficent in kind or degree. There are vested interests of position, reputation, influence, or of wealth, place, power, representing a constant inertia and a disposition to hold things as they are. Society has adjusted itself, its thinking, feeling, acting, to the existing status, and has learned to find repose in it. Transition disturbs and annoys it, offends its self-complacency and sense of security, and provokes its resentments by alarming its fears. So it shrinks within its bristling prejudices,

like a porcupine within its quills, ready to wound any touch that would incite movement.

To many, moreover, because of their special idiosyncrasy, change is ever distasteful and fearful. They start back with natural terror from the perspective of advance. To leave present intrenchments and venture beyond the range of present ideas seems like a plunge into chaos. This feeling drives multitudes, often of the most estimable and worthy, the philanthropic and the timid, the sincere lovers of church and society and of order and truth, as well as the indolent, the selfish, and the placeman, into the ranks of conservatism and opposition to the new movement. An opposition which, with its various elements, it were most unjust to denounce as characteristically selfish or bigoted, for it will naturally have some of the noblest and purest elements blending with it, whose antagonism to hasty, rash, capricious, or ambitious change is an instinct in society for its self-preservation. But conservatism is a check, not a motor, and its function as a check is to regulate and moderate, not to stop transition. Change is growth and life.

But the danger is lest, on the appearance of the signs of change I have indicated, in the first alarm the impulse should be toward immediate, arbitrary, stringent repression. No chapters in human history are more opprobrious than those which record such attempts; none more disastrous and ultimately more hopeless. No resentments are more passionate or cruel than those evoked on both sides at such time by the policy of absolute, unreasoning repression, whether by physical or moral force, — resentments usually the more vehement and bitter in proportion to the consciousness of incompetency of logic, and especially so in realms of religious thought. Here, change, displacement, or modification of that which, with time and custom, has come to be regarded as a divinely established order, becomes audacious sacrilege; and the sense of assault on ourselves becomes intensified, in our eyes, to that of an outrage on God and his truth, and an impious recreancy to Christ and his church. Then partisan or selfish passions consecrate themselves as vindicators of the insulted honor of Christ and the violated majesty of Heaven, and as the executors of divine wrath against dissidents and gainsayers.

But like begets like, and by a natural reaction against felt injustice, the repressed reformer becomes embittered into the fanatic and anarchist, and poses in his own thought, and soon in the eyes of the multitude, as a confessor and a martyr, a champion of Christ and his truth against stupid bigotry or hypocrisy or spirit-

ual despotism, that by human tradition and arrogant philosophy would drag down Christianity into dishonor and unbelief. Meantime, conservatism, alarmed, rushes on the incipient movement to stamp it out as one would a flame kindling on our dwellings, and often only to scatter into a conflagration what it would extinguish.

If the movement lies deep in reason and Christian consciousness, the attempted repression will, at the most, only effect a surface arrest or reflux, as futile ultimately as the storm surge against the profound tides of the ocean. Repression, failing, tends to a stronger and more serious outbreak. The dammed-up river accumulates a mass for a mightier overflow. The peaceful stream breaks into rapids or a devastating inundation. Repression without removal of cause were impossible, and, could it succeed, most disastrous. It would only make wider the divergence between theology and the living reason and conscience of men, relegating it to incredulity and impotency or oblivion.

Happy will it be for the Church if, instructed by the scandals and disasters of past theological controversies, she shall have learned a more excellent way, and recognizing the inevitableness of transitions as the method of progress, she shall see to it that they be wrought and imbued with a spirit of truth and love; and that when one, foretokened widely by signs such as above noted, and numbering among those to a degree favoring it many whom the Christian public has learned to love and trust as candid, devout, and wise Christian men, should come forward reverently and temperately, with suggestions of change, presented in a spirit of ingenuousness, sober reason, and love, it shall meet with a kindred spirit of candor and logic and a charity not prejudging it as unchristian because it suggests change, or charging against it all the excesses or crudities liable to attach to the initial period and the extreme left of all reforms. When this shall be the attitude of the Church toward such movements, and when those engaged in them shall hold fast patience of faith and hope and love, with sobriety and humbleness of mind alike under suspicion or flattery, denunciation or panegyric, with trust in Christ and truth, moving calmly on, discarding of the past only what, having served its purpose, can, being retained, only obstruct the growth to which it had ministered, — even as the tree kindly drops in autumn the leaves once beautiful and ministrant, but now withered and dead, — and admitting such changes only as shall prove themselves legitimate offshoots of the one original life-germ, THE ETERNAL CHRIST, — when such a phase of a transition period shall appear, then indeed

will the Captain of our salvation lead his Church by living fountains of waters, and her day-star of progress, emerging from the murky, storm-vexed, sometime crimson past, shall shine higher and higher to the perfect day.

But some may urge, "Such a spectacle has never been seen in the history of the world; its appearance will only open the Millennium." True, and until something like it becomes fact there will be little approach to a Millennium; but it still is an ideal to which all ought to aspire, and one for attaining which we all ought to strive and pray perpetually, and we can accomplish much by individually so doing, though its full realization may be in the distant future. Transition movements are sure to come, and they will surely do us much good or much evil, according as we treat them. Even those which are not genuine nor of beneficent impulse can seldom fail to disclose to us some truth, some danger or defect, or some opportunity it much behooves us to know. And certainly he must be blind who does not recognize grave aspects of change on the present hour, and he can have little sympathy with the cause of Christian truth in the world, or but slight appreciation of the vast issues that are opening, who does not regard the aspect of the times with gravest interest, whether of hope or solicitude, and feel impelled in no partisan interest, but for the love of Christ and his truth, to urge at this time the vital importance of caution, calmness, candor, and charity.

It is of vital consequence that we be prepared to meet these issues with minds so instructed and armed that we be not driven from our steadfastness or our charity. Let us beware of the delusion into which past ages have been so prone to fall, of imagining that, with us or our times, theology has become a finished science, fixed, complete, and changeless in substance and form, all innovation upon which is laying presumptuous hands on a divinely perfect temple, and that consequently all change or modification suggested is profane and mischievous. Let us not forget that theology must be a progressive science while it is a study of the Infinite by the finite, and while, though one of the factors is immutable, the other is perpetually changing, in stand-point, faculty, and competency. We can now clearly see that without transitions in the past, that were deprecated and anathematized in their time, Christian faith would have been shipwrecked. Let us beware lest, in disregard of past experience and of the philosophy of progress, we exasperate, and make malign and disastrous, movements we are impotent to suppress, but might by kind and candid treatment guide to beneficent issues.

Let us, on the other hand, beware of imagining that we of the present time are called, as new creators into a virgin field, into the science of theology, with a new revelation and an abjuration of the past, embarking church and society on a chartless and unknown sea of wild and anarchical speculation. Let us remember the methods of true progress are not destruction, but development; not divulsion, but engrafting. Nor let us ignore Christ's promise of his perpetual presence with his Church, and of the ever-abiding gift and guidance of the Holy Spirit who should keep the things of Christ in perpetual suggestion and remembrance;—a promise which, if it has accomplished nothing true and permanent in theologic science in the eighteen and a half centuries past, can give but little assurance of ever doing so.

Let us not forget the process of past progress, that it has been gradual, disciplinary, educational, from the simple and elementary to the deeper and higher knowledge of the things of God; that it has been by holding fast certain great central and primordial facts and organic and germinal truths (or, perhaps I should say one person around whom these truths and facts gather, and in whom they inhere),—facts and truths clearly revealed, but for the most part separate from their systemic or philosophical relations,—that it has been by holding fast these facts and truths in their gradual unfolding under the Divine Spirit, to the gradually enlarging culture and competency of the Church, that whatever has been accomplished of genuine theologic progress in the past has been achieved.

Let us not, therefore, look at transition as of course ill-boding or malevolent. Change is not necessarily hostility, nor modification of form a destruction of substance; on the contrary, it is often the conservation of the principle and the necessity of the life. The amputation or excision is the saving from death. Reform vitalizes and guards order; it enables truth to protect itself. Removing appanages unlimbers the ordnance; it disengages the sword-arm. Retrenchment of accessories is often casting away the mail that with the progress of time only cumbers and fetters. It is the abandonment of a redoubt whose indefensibleness exposes the whole line. Modification may come not to destroy, but to fulfill, and the abandonment of the old form may be the advance beyond the need of it. The type is embodied in life. The grain has developed to fruitage because it has died.

Persons may shrink from any modification of any article or element in a system, lest it should sweep away or subvert the entire

structure in which it inheres, and this often with reason. With some minds and with some doctrines there is this danger, of which it is well to beware. On the other hand, persons may repel a modification not because it is not logical or scriptural, but it seems to them to remove or impoverish the motives which in their view are essential to give power to Christian truth over the minds of men.

To this latter order of thought and feeling it may be said, in the first place, that such treatment of the question of a religious truth is neither rational, philosophical, nor reverent. For, in the first place, truth can be permanently built on no falsehood, and if any system of truth is made to rest on such a foundation, it is in perpetual danger. The sooner the illusive support is removed and one real placed under it, the better and safer for truth itself and the world. And, in the second place, in the question, What is truth? the supreme inquiry is not concerned with the motive forces resulting, in our view, from a certain belief, or with its consequences in other directions, but with the truth itself, — what are the positive, intrinsic, or scriptural evidences of it? Our first great quest is truth; the consequences we leave to the God of truth.

But, indeed, how to create or sustain motives best adapted to save a soul or a world is a question which we are often little competent to determine. I learn this from the history of the world. I believe firmly in a God of Reason and Love, and Almighty, and that his reason and love run through all the history of the world and adopt the measures and methods most potent to restore it. But how the world's history has wrought towards this result is a problem too high, too vast, too complicated for me. The scheme I see actually at work seems little like one I should have devised to create motive forces requisite to regenerate it; I see that Almighty Reason and Love go forward in the scheme of saving the race on a plan beyond my power of thorough understanding in the historic and natural realm. It must certainly be so in the moral realm; and I am as little entitled to sit in judgment on the form and method of motive forces in the one case as the other. It certainly then behooves me, in the interpretation of Scripture given by divine inspiration, to accept the natural construction of language God has chosen to employ, and not to force upon it an import in accordance with my ideas of what He should have said in order to the highest incitement to repentance and salvation. The latter is clearly presumption and irreverence. In this question of motive forces to the best result in the exegesis of Scripture, I find I am a learner (*a disciple*), not a master; that it is mine to listen, not to

dictate — to simply interpret, not prescribe the mind of the Revelator.

Again, nothing is more deceptive than our reasoning to doctrines from motives probably resulting from them. As God is truth, we believe truth is in the end the mightiest of things, and on it wait the strongest forces, stimulant or suasive; and if a statement claims to be sustained by Scripture and our rational consciousness, it is to be tried by them, and it is illogical and irreverent to decide on reception or rejection of it on the ground of supposed consequence to motives, though the fear of evil from a false judgment may well bring the mind into the white light of perfect candor in forming its decision.

Nor can we tell what degree of stringency from immediateness, absoluteness, or certainty of consequences may give motives their most beneficent influence on character and action. For example, it were most illogical to postulate the exegesis of 1 Pet. iii. 19, 20, on the ground of the supposed effect of a certain interpretation of it on the motives to the immediate repentance of the individual, or to the enterprise of missions to the heathen world. We might suppose that if it were clearly written by revelation over this world, "Here and now only is probation and salvation possible. To those unsaved here is reserved in the world beyond only the blackness of darkness forever," it would be the strongest motive to bring men to Christ. Or we might suppose if the term of human life were definitely fixed and made known to men, like that of a man under sentence of death from the courts, it would conduce most mightily to securing his effort for personal salvation against the known day of his death; or that if in every case with the offer of salvation the preacher were authorized to announce absolutely that that offer was single and final, and that with its acceptance or rejection would be settled irrevocably the everlasting doom of the hearer, it would be the strongest measure to induce immediate acceptance of the gospel. We might so think and so reason. But it has not so pleased God to deal with man. He has not placed him under the stress of such absolute, immediately certain, and irrevocable results. He deals with him in long-suffering, telling him the crucial and final crisis is sure to come, — to come he knows not when, — and that it may be now; and leaves him with that play of motives under certainty of law and ultimate issue, but under uncertainty of time, which seems thus, in Divine thought, to be best adapted, in the long run, to secure the salvation of man.

We may certainly believe God's long-suffering is wiser and stronger than man's instantaneousness and absoluteness of limitation. Nor need we fear that if in some cases the possibility of an offer of salvation through Christ beyond this life to those for whom He died, but who never heard of Him in this, may be suggested conjecturally by the revealed fact that once Christ "went and preached to the spirits in prison," — we need not fear, if through the natural exegesis of this passage a chink of light is allowed to open in possible cases into the fearful mystery of the world beyond the grave, that thereby is operated a jail-delivery of the Abyss, or that the doctrine of a future retribution is swept away; or that its unspeakable terrors are obliterated or minimized, while stands at last over it the final doom, with the blazon on it of Christ's own words of "eternal punishment," prefigured by the awful symbol of "eternal fire." Even could the tremendous time measures or the imagery used by Christ be conceived of as reducible below their seemingly obvious and natural meaning by theories of etymological import or figurative enhancement, retaining the lowest significance any sane interpretation could bear, still they would be fearful past thought. A fall from Sirius, could astronomy demonstrate it as sunk less deeply in the heavens than the Pleiades, would not cease to be an unspeakable horror.

But while transition is to be regarded as in itself neither hostility nor disaster, yet we are not to forget such is the contexture of our thoughts, wrought through time and custom, that change in any single article in the scheme of old and time-honored beliefs not unfrequently imperils a whole system of correlated and associated truths. He is indeed a rash man who contemplates such change without grave solicitude, and he incurs a fearful responsibility who abets it without solemn deliberation and under the force of weightiest reasons. No one can tell how far such change may reach in some minds, or what disturbance it may work in the field of religious thought; or how many beliefs may stand behind that one which you propose to displace or modify; or to what extent a slight disarrangement may endanger the whole structure of creed and character, as in the case of Prince Rupert's drops, where a fracture of some minute filament causes the entire crystallized globule to crumble instantly to a mass of vitreous dust.

No one can tell what discomfort and distress, what impairment of reverence and faith, what deterioration of sentiment and life may be behind some seemingly slight displacement among things long regarded as determinate and sacred in the realms of relig-

ious thought. There is danger, often, of slaughtering many truths in killing one falsehood, of uprooting much wheat in extirpating one tare. There is hardly any false belief but becomes in time organically inwrought with many true ones. Many truths are often in some minds partially based on fallacies which being removed, the superstructural truth is undermined and is liable to carry with it many others, linked with it by association, in its fall.

Now, these considerations should not lead us to shield falsehood, or to defend truth on false grounds, doing which is sure in the end to expose truth itself to disaster and defeat. But they should admonish those who are aspiring to accomplish what they believe to be beneficent reforms in the domain of religious belief that they deal with minds which have received valuable truths, though on an insufficient basis, in a spirit of gentleness, tenderness, and considerate caution, and to replace the false, as fast and as far as it is removed, with the true, lest faith and falsehood perish together. In some cases they may find it necessary, in order to save the wheat, to let the tares grow with it until the harvest; that is, to let the fallacies and the truths grow together until their results differentiate and separate them. Nothing, however, forbids meanwhile to smother the tares by a richer culture of the wheat.

These considerations warn against rash, premature, violent, or ambitious innovation; not to resist all transition, which, being borne on by the life-forces of society, is sure to come, but to proceed positively, rather than negatively; to supplant falsehood by the fostering of truth, rather than beginning with denunciation of errors and prejudices; and in the patience and love of Christ to remember his significant aphorism, "No man having drunk old wine desireth new, for he saith, The old is good."

But it may be asked, By what criterion shall we know that transition is true progress? How distinguish, amid multitudinous and perpetually new-coming movements, the genuine from the spurious? First, true progress will be an outgrowth, not a divulsion, from the past. If nineteen centuries have failed to discover and develop the primordial germinal truths of Christianity, we can hardly expect nineteen centuries more will find them. Progress must be outgrowth or none. Change of form, hue, envelope may be, and a fall of dead branches and withered leaf and petal, but still it will be the same tree.

The past has not been mere empiricism and mistake. The

process has been by development and fulfilling, not by destruction and substitution. The new will be recognized as an off-shoot, springing genetically from the old.

You will also recognize the genuine movement by its spirit. Does it breathe the gentleness, the candor, the temperance, the tenderness, the patience, the charity of Christ?

You will know it by its trend; that will be Christward. Its system of truth and life will be Christo-centric. Out on the drifting deeps our anchorage, cynosure, and goal will be the eternal Christ; the same yesterday, to-day, and forever; forever the same, yet ever new, with everlasting unfoldings of nature and relations, and, with new revealings into the infinite, ministering in the eternal unveilings of his beauty the endless novelty that attracts and quickens to endless progress.

The lifted-up Christ alone will draw us securely on through storm-vexed transitional eras. His is the name above every name which is named in this world and also in that which is to come. He is the Revelator of revelators, the Revelation of the revelations of God, the direct outshining of his glory and the express image of his person. Above Prophet, Apostle, Psalmist, and Lawgiver, He is the ultimate exponent, interpreter, and summary of all.

To Him alone the Spirit is given without measure. He alone is the image of the invisible God, the First-born of the whole creation. In Him alone dwells all the fullness of the God-head bodily. In his face alone is seen the glory of the Father. He alone of the sons of Adam may say, "None cometh to the Father but by me," "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," hath seen the true face of God toward fallen man. Christ is the fulfillment and consummation of all Scripture and its final supreme interpretation. He is **THE TRUTH**; He is the norm to which genuine revelation must conform; He is the test and gauge of inspiration, of its genuineness and degree. Variance from Him marks imperfect inspiration. He overrules in all Scripture; conformity, accommodation must harmonize all other utterances to Him, not his to them. He is the unchangeable model of the divine to man.

Christ is above and before Christianity. He proves it, but is himself self-proved; He upholds the entire system, is not upholden of it. The centre of all true theology, like the sun, He coördinates, illumines, and sways all. Relevancy to Him gives comparative rank and value to all doctrines. In Him are the supreme forces of the gospel,—forces which draw, not coerce. He is

the ideal to which all churches and all souls aspire, the upbuilder and uplifter of the world and of the kingdom of God.

The beauty of God revealed in Him will be the eternal drawing force — a force that will last with the moral nature of man and the moral universe, a beauty which can never be eclipsed nor tarnished, more than a star, and which shall never go down in the depths of time. Over the remotest ages of the world and over the City of Light it will shine, the sun that never sets.

The transition that lifts up Christ and sets the face of the Church toward Him, that enthrones Him in the centre of its theologic system, and makes Him the supreme and ultimate self-expression of God to the world, overruling all others, and conforming them to itself, and testing by itself the genuineness and degree of all inspiration, — such a transition movement, we feel, could not bear very widely from the truth, nor, while thus centralizing, need it be regarded greatly with alarm.

Should it swerve, a mightier force than that which binds the Pleiades or Orion would call it back.

T. M. Post.

THE ENGLISH PRE-RAPHAELITE AND POETICAL SCHOOL OF PAINTERS.

IN studying any individual or school whose work is characterized by a vigorous departure from accepted methods, we long for some abstract standard of values by which to judge the new comer, out of hearing of the clamor which contemporary prejudice is sure to arouse. Let us try to find such a standard by considering the two great phases in which the artistic impulse manifests itself.

The instinct that impels men to artistic work is, primarily, the instinct for creation. Man, made in the image of the Creator, yearns, like Him, to create, to embody truth; exercising thus, in his small measure, the divinest of functions.

Creation is of two kinds. One form of it is *imitative*, using the word in a very high sense.

This seeks first the material aspects of things. Fascinated by the glories of nature and the picturesqueness of life, it renders the varying phases of these without inquiring too narrowly into their meaning. We may say of this form of creation that it begins with facts, and attacks all subjects from the outside.

The other form of creation is *constructive*.

This seizes upon the principles and sources of power which underlie material facts, and wielding these with the divine energy of the imagination, it produces new forms and combinations with which to delight and elevate us. We may say of this form of creation that it begins with ideas, and attacks all subjects from the inside.

In these two distinctions we recognize the old battle-cries Realist and Idealist; two parties whose opposition has kept human thinking fresh and vital for hundreds of years. Each of these parties tries to put down the other, but, in fact, they are as mutually dependent as the magnetic poles. Neither could exist without the other. All vital truth results from a combination of the two. They are so interwoven, in the very nature of things, that if we can distinguish between two men, or two schools, as Realist and Idealist, as a tree may divide into two trunks from its root, yet on the trunk named Idealist we shall find, as on a tree, further ramifications and subdivisions, which will give us Idealists with realistic sub-tendencies; and on the trunk named Realist we shall find branches whose prevailing realism has yet an ideal quality.

All this renders the task of classification very difficult. If we could set the sheep on one side and the goats on the other, without any lingering preference for the sheep, the task of the impartial critic would be an easy one; but when we find an unmistakable goat comfortably wrapped in woolly fleece, or a sheep masquerading with a pair of goat's horns, we are tempted to abandon the whole subject as a hopeless confusion. Our best help is a firm grasp of the broad distinction between Realists, those who approach nature from the material and visible side, and Idealists, those who seek first the unseen forces and spiritual truths of which material facts are the symbols; but we must not expect to find the greatest men in the extreme wing of either party.

The terms Realist and Idealist are far from satisfactory, but they are the best we have. If we can hold fast to them, and yet keep our heads clear in the presence of a Realist with an ideal method like Corot, or an Idealist with a realistic method like Holman Hunt, making allowance at the same time for the effect of individual, national, and reactionary tendencies, we shall start on our journey with a fair equipment.

The first great division among artists as Realists and Idealists should be made the ground of *choice of subject*, since this is

what most reveals the inner man. All artists must come, with more or less distinctness, into one or the other of these great divisions. If Realists, they choose their subject chiefly for its fitness to display the movement of contemporary life, or the beautiful forms, striking contrasts of light and shade, and delicious combinations of color, which appeal to them as fragments of the divine harmonies of creation. If Idealists, they are moved by some abstract and poetical conception, and seek for material forms chiefly as the means of embodying it pictorially. This last, when carried to an extreme, has been stigmatized as "literary art," and it is doubtless true that there are some pictures by this Idealist school which would be equally, perhaps more, successful as poems or narratives. The stigma that has been applied to the Realists, on the other hand, is that their works lack elevation and moral dignity.

The first broad division having been made on the ground of choice of subject, we next look at the *treatment* or presentation of that subject as practiced by different artists. Here we leave the pair of simple and easily distinguished tree trunks, and get among the branches. We shall often find the ideal bias of a painter prevailing throughout his work, and so with the realistic bias, but we shall quite as often find the contrary to be true. We shall see an Idealist like Holman Hunt, for instance, evolving from Jewish tradition a subject called the "Scapegoat," and then taking a long and wearisome journey to the shores of the Dead Sea (Ruskin applauding meanwhile), in order to paint locality and accessories with a literal fidelity to fact which must certainly be called realistic.

On the other hand, we find a man like Corot, who was a Realist, because manifestly inspired by the charm of external nature in its tenderest, freshest phases. Yet, in treatment, he was, above all, an Idealist; painting from memory or sketching only for a brief hour at dawn, in order to filter out from his impressions everything that did not express and enhance the delicate freshness, and subtle, poetic charm which appealed to him in nature above all else. Such treatment as his sacrifices facts to impressions about facts, which are their ideal aspects. Thus we have an Idealist with a realistic treatment, and a Realist with an ideal treatment.

This question of treatment is one of great importance, pictorially speaking. Modern Realists reverse our whole point of view by declaring that the first and most essential equipment and test of an artist is his ability to render the aspects of nature in a

broad, simple, fluent manner, which shall be at once true and picturesque. They declare that if this be wanting no amount of poetical conception or appropriate imagery is of the slightest value in a picture, considered as a picture; but that such a conception should be thrust out of its gilded frame, and shut between the covers of a book, whence it can no longer make any appeal to the vision, except through the medium of the imagination. There is a deep truth here, for if we would discriminate between the sister arts, we must certainly call Poetry the Idealist, and Painting the Realist of the pair. Painting must appeal to the senses first, and through them to the imagination, but it should have a care not to stop half way, as sometimes happens when the Realists do not aim higher than the realm of the senses. The Idealists in painting often err in an opposite direction, by giving us allegorical and symbolic works, whose meaning challenges our curiosity, but which have little charm to hold our senses in thrall.

But to return to the question of treatment. When brought face to face with any object or scene to be transferred to canvas, artists fall into two divisions, according to their tendency to see things in masses or in details. All artists love truth, but with some it is truth of *fact*, with others it is truth of *relation* that attracts. The conscientiousness of some leads them to such devout and minute rendering of one detail after another that the general effect is sacrificed. These we may call *Realists in treatment*, like many of the English school. Others feel that no detail is worth emphasizing for a moment if it detracts from the general effect. They will sacrifice any small matters of fact rather than lose the retiring planes of distance, or the broad sweep of light, out of their pictures. These are *Idealists in treatment*, like most of the French school. The facts directly under their eyes do not appeal to them so strongly as the larger and more general truths, whose very largeness prevents their being easily grasped.

The highest success in art, as in all else, comes, of course, from striking a just balance between special and general truth, since neither can be ignored; but this is the prerogative of those giants of art who have both wings of the soul so strongly feathered that they are at once Realists and Idealists and incline only in a small degree either to one side or the other, according to temperament and circumstances. As our two trunks proceed from one root, and are the same in essence, so a complete human being, if we could find him, would combine in himself the utmost of both possibilities.

If we were to sketch for ourselves the ideal spiritual equipment of the perfect artist, we should have the following : The two forces (which, for want of better names, we have called Real and Ideal) will both be potent in him, and strive for mastery, mutually restraining and reacting on each other. A special love of things that can be seen must be his charter as a painter, rather than a poet. For subjects he must dream dreams and see visions with the inner eye of the imagination, while the figures in these dreams and the scenery of these visions must rise up panoplied with all the splendor of light and shade, form and color, of which his soul has drunk deep at nature's fountain since his boyhood. Thought and expression will be one with him, because his brain children are born full grown and full clad, and he loses neither time nor force in nursing them and weaving for them appropriate garments. His treatment must be the result, first, of a thorough study of nature's separate facts in their individual dignity. Then, these facts must be distilled in the alembic of his imagination, and transmuted into fluent pictorial speech, clear, balanced, rhythmic, and expressive. Are we not describing Tintoretto ? and Michael Angelo, too, except that he was of sterner mould, and cared less for beauty than for thought and power ; and Titian, who loved beauty supremely, and yet gave to his figures an ideal propriety of expression. Raphael was more of an Idealist. Velasquez, Veronese, and Rubens, on the other hand, leaned towards Realism. Velasquez impresses us as a great narrator of all that he saw about him. In looking at the works of Veronese and Rubens we feel that it was only custom which led them to paint religious and allegorical subjects. What they really loved was human life : Veronese the stately gorgeousness of Venetian life, with its slow water ways and abundant sunny leisure ; Rubens the rollicking, robust life of a more northern clime, which inspired him to paint scenes of joyous festivity, or to deluge canvases with cataracts of superbly painted flesh and drapery ; the amount of flesh being, as a general thing, largely in excess of the amount of drapery.

Coming down to modern times, we find the French school to be unquestionably realistic. It arose as a revolt from the tedious classicism of David and others, which had nothing to say to the modern mind, because its subjects were remote, and in its treatment there was nothing that recalled the freshness and beauty of nature. It was an Idealism gone to seed. Seeking truth and liberty, the modern French painters have returned to nature, and, by worshiping external beauty above all other, have proclaimed

themselves Realists. At the same time their intellectual grasp, delicate discrimination of values, and superb *technique* require us to call them Idealists in treatment.

French art is important in this connection, because it is the one most accepted in this country; the one by whose standards we unconsciously measure all new work. Nothing could seem a greater contrast to the work of the French school than the pictures by the Englishmen Rossetti and Burne Jones, photographs of which have found their way to us of late, and aroused deep interest. These pictures seem surcharged with meaning, but what that meaning may be, it is not easy to tell at a glance. They certainly do not resemble nature, and therefore we pronounce them the work of Idealists, as they assuredly are.

Strange as it may seem, however, it is probable that they are the outcome of the same *Zeitgeist* which brought about the realistic movement in France. Both came from the quenchless thirst for truth, purer truth, higher truth, truer truth, than man had had before. Prosper Mérimée makes the remark that the revolt in France was against the literary spirit, while in England it was animated by the literary spirit. It would perhaps be truer to say that in both cases the revolt was against dead conventionality, but that the French painters were men of revolutionary tendencies and inclined to deify natural instincts; while the pre-Raphaelite movement had for its leader Rossetti, a born mystic, deeply versed in mediæval lore, and one in whom the poet was as great as, if not greater than, the artist. It was not to be expected that the *Zeitgeist* should speak with precisely the same voice through two such different mediums.

So we have French Realists protesting on one side of the Channel, and English Idealists protesting on the other; both against the same evil, but without mutual sympathy. Both declared that they sought truth and a return to nature, but the French Realists grasped at the impression produced by nature, which is its ideal form; while the English Idealists, protesting against conventionality in subject, sought in matters of treatment a realistic copying of facts, one by one. In this Ruskin encouraged them by telling the younger painters to go to nature, "rejecting nothing, selecting nothing, scorning nothing," — excellent advice, if he had but added "digesting everything."

Thus we have the curious spectacle of Holman Hunt working up in the East every detail of the Syrian tools to be painted in his picture called the Shadow of the Cross, and elaborating every

muscle in the form of the Saviour, with sincere intent thereby to honor the truth, yet producing, by the very strenuousness of his effort, an effect so unlike life and truth as to be positively repulsive. Across the Channel we have the French Impressionists, pushing their theories to the point of caricature, and the "*plein air*" school, the vanguard of the Realists, who insist that all out-door subjects shall be painted literally out of doors. These also place themselves in the precise condition necessary for observation, though what they seek to observe is an effect rather than the facts which compose it. They sacrifice everything to the rendering of some hitherto unrecorded phase of nature's glitter and high light, and startle us with pictures about as far from our habitual thought of nature as the Shadow of the Cross itself. One thing is certain, the two schools can never be made to agree, or admit for an instant the rightness of one another's point of view; and yet are they not animated by the same love of truth, the same desire to paint things as they really are?

Frequent reference has been made in this paper to the works of Holman Hunt because he is a marked example of that Realism in treatment which so prostrates itself before the facts of nature that it ends by losing sight of the larger truths, and so produces an unnatural effect, and defeats its own object.

Millais has something of the same quality. These two men, with Dante Gabriel Rossetti, are the three best known painters in that group of seven men who associated themselves together under the name of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood nearly forty years ago. The other four were Thomas Woolner, a sculptor and poet, James Collinson and Frederic George Stephens, both painters, but better known, the first as critic and the last as poet, and William M. Rossetti (brother of Dante Gabriel), who is both poet and critic.

Other names might be included in the school, but these alone formed the Brotherhood. The leader of the movement, a man of most magnetic and inspiring personality, was Dante Gabriel Rossetti. He was at this time about twenty years old, full of passionate earnestness and deep conviction. It was he who gave the name Pre-Raphaelite to the Brotherhood. This name was chosen partly "to flutter and exasperate the artistic big-wigs of the day," but seriously, because the young protesters hoped to get rid of the tiresome fetters of conventionality in art by a return to its infancy, before any rules had been laid down for its behavior.

Seeking the artistic atmosphere of the painters before Raphael,

it is not surprising that they caught also something of their manner and flavor of asceticism. This is very obvious in the earlier pictures by Rossetti, in none more than in his earliest, the *Girlhood of Mary Virgin*, which is one of his best. Later, he emerged from this phase into a broader and more splendid development of his powers, and became less a pre-Raphaelite than a poetical painter.

With regard to this merging of the Pre-Raphaelite idea in the poetic, these words of Professor Sidney Colvin are in point: "The pre-Raphaelites felt that they could express their love of beauty more freely, if they could bring back their art to the childish attitude of the earlier poets, and create an unscientific and uncritical No-Man's-Land of beauty and enchantment, where all the figures of all the world's history and all the offspring of the world's imagination might be free to roam together among flowery groves, and greet one another in joy or sorrow, wearing whatsoever apparel they pleased, and conversing with one another in whatsoever guise they would." He adds that in an unsimple and affected age the effort to be simple and natural at first involves quaintness, awkwardness, and even the appearance of a special affectation; and that the progress of the school has consisted in getting rid of this appearance, and proving that "despite archaic expression," its ideas are at once modern and classical, in fact, "perennially lovely for all generations."

That the poetical creed was a development of the pre-Raphaelite, and not an abandonment of it, will be manifest if we remember exactly what the pre-Raphaelite creed was. One of their number puts it briefly, as follows: "The three things on which they laid great stress, in *descending* ratio of importance, were (a) serious and thoughtful selection of subject-matter; (b) sincere invention of incident and detail germane to the subject; (c) anxious care in realizing all details according to the visible facts of nature." In other words, they begin with the idea, and evolve their subjects from the inner world of the imagination. Having done this, they strive to express their idea by appropriate symbols; then execute every detail with an "anxious care," which, as we have seen, is not always successful in making things look like nature.

Here two contradictions appear, and such curious ones that we cannot afford to pass them by. The school, and Rossetti as representing the school, revolted against conventionality in one form only to fall deep into it in another. They would have no more

conventional subjects and time-worn accessories, rightly regarding such as mere husks from which the seed, with its life and germinating power, had departed ; but they adopted in treatment a symbolism, which was in the highest degree conventional.

Rossetti invented strikingly original subjects, and original renderings of them, but he expressed his thought by a symbolism, both of form and color, into which so much more meaning was packed than could be understood without profound study, that his pictures have as little to say to the ordinary beholder as the most vapid of the works which moved his scorn. It is practically almost as bad for a picture to mean too much as to mean too little. All symbols are but conventions, and the effective use of them consists in catching them at the point where they are most fully irradiated by the truths which they summarize. The danger of a symbolism like Rossetti's lies in its being, if not arbitrary, at least so remote from the knowledge of most persons that the intellectual effort required to understand his pictures threatens to defeat their charm.

The second contradiction of which we have spoken lies in the fact that while the intellectual is so predominant in most of Rossetti's works that it is difficult to understand them without profound study, nevertheless he and his school have suggested to contemporary criticism such unpleasant adjectives as "fleshly" and "sensuous."

That Rossetti had a most passionate soul is evident. That his intellectual faculties were well balanced by his sensuous faculties is proved by his extraordinary power as a colorist ; but both these faculties in him were spiritual above all ; and if he and those whom he influenced have painted pictures and written verses to which the epithet "fleshly" can be applied, is it not, perhaps, because both thought and passion in them work on the high plane of the spirit, and things seem to them pure and safe which to lower natures are fraught with dangerous suggestion ? Rossetti sometimes wrote with a frankness as startling as that of William Blake, of whom he was a great admirer, but no one has dared to tax Blake with impurity, because it is so evident that, seer-like, his vision pierced through and cast aside all material symbols to grasp the spiritual truths beyond. No one was more surprised and hurt than Rossetti by the storm of unfavorable comment which assailed some of his pictures and poems, more especially the latter.

It is doubtless true that a certain disinclination to the sacri-

fice of leaving things vague, which we notice in his pictures, led him to print a few lines which had better have been withheld, and which he afterwards suppressed. It is only fair to mention, however, in justice to the whole effect of Rossetti's life-work, that long after the public controversy on this point had subsided, Mr. Robert Buchanan, whose article in the "Contemporary Review" had started the discussion, said, in a private letter from which we quote verbatim: "I was unjust, most unjust, when I impugned the purity, and misconceived the passion of writings, too hurriedly read, and reviewed *currente calamo*."

We must not expect to find in Rossetti a moral teacher or an inspirer to noble deeds, for he was neither. His work, both in poem and picture, was given to proclaiming the supremacy and eternal sanctions of beauty. In beauty he believed, with fervent faith, and he made no attempt to square that faith with the grave problems of life and duty which confront men in all ages. That he recognized the difficulty of such squaring is shown in his picture of the Sphinx, where Youth is seen dying of the mystery which has saddened his being. A moral may be drawn from such pictures as *Found and Hesperia* and *Rosa*, and such a poem as "Jenny," in all of which Rossetti depicts the degradation, breakage, and pain which come from preferring low loves to high ones. But Rossetti never exhorts; he only paints two forms of beauty, seeming to be spell-bound by each in turn. In his *Lilith* we have that beauty of sense which ends in self and bondage, and in his *Sybilla Palmifera* that ideal beauty whose service is perfect freedom. In their contrasted sentiment these two pictures remind us of Da Vinci's *Profane and Sacred Love*, and of Blake's stanzas:—

"Love seeketh only self to please,
To bind another to its delight,
Joys in another's loss of ease,
And builds a Hell in Heaven's despite."

"Love seeketh not itself to please,
Nor for itself hath any care,
But for another gives its ease,
And builds a Heaven in Hell's despair."

Lilith is a modern rendering of the mythical bride of Adam, who is said to have held sway over him before the creation of Eve. She is more forcibly portrayed in Rossetti's poem called "Eden Bower." The *Sybilla Palmifera* is one of Rossetti's most impressive pictures. The Sybil looks at us with eyes absolute in knowledge and power. As Rossetti himself wrote:—

"Hers are the eyes which, over and beneath
The sky and sea bend on thee, which can draw,
By sea, or sky, or woman, to one law,
The allotted bondman of her palm and wreath."

That the "one law" is the law of God, whose first canon is righteousness, Rossetti does not tell us. He only tells us that the law is compelling. His poet's faith overleaps the centuries of renunciation and sacrifice, through which man must struggle before he can receive his great inheritance of beauty and power with stainless hands and an undoubting heart. Rossetti's work may stand as a purple line of prophecy side by side with that crystal utterance of Wordsworth, which is so clear that a child may read:

"Serene will be our days, and bright
And happy will our nature be,
When love is an unerring light,
And joy its own security."

Rossetti was in a way the source of the æsthetic revival which to-day finds so many ardent disciples and calls forth so many jeremiads. He is said to have started the craze for blue china, ecclesiastical brasses, antique cabinets, incense burners, etc., by hunting such things out of remote corners of London to adorn his house at Chelsea. In his picture of Mary Magdalene at the House of Simon the Pharisee is seen the first use of the sunflower as a gorgeous decorative object. We may trace back to him the increased color and beauty of our homes, and thank him for introducing to us a very genuine source of enjoyment.

The three noted painters among the original pre-Raphaelites were, as has been said, Rossetti, Millais, and Holman Hunt. As they were men of marked individuality, the differences between them soon became manifest, and they should therefore be considered separately.

The three were curiously near each other in age, Hunt being born in 1827, Rossetti in 1828, and Millais in 1829.

Of Holman Hunt enough has already been said to indicate the uncompromising realism and attention to detail which he has brought to his work. Judged by a purely artistic standard he cannot rank high; but his moral earnestness, candor, and conviction command our reverence and impress us through his works. The faces he paints are never vapid, but rather over-intense in expression, and there is great beauty of detail in his pictures, though these details often refuse to fall into the ranks of orderly subordination. He is said to have studied patiently the current

artistic creeds and conventions of his day, but to have rejected them at last because they seemed to him flimsy and artificial. His taste for subjects with a direct moral or spiritual bearing, and the assiduous pursuit of facts which his extraordinary physique enabled him to undertake, encouraged many persons, especially among the English clergy, to hope that he was to found a new school of religious art. In this they were disappointed. They failed to see, as many still fail to see, that truth is too large and gracious a goddess to be hunted down in detail and captured like an entomological specimen. She will be worshiped in the spirit, and if we try to corner her with a microscope she slips away with a laugh, and we find only dry dust in our hands.

Holman Hunt studied Jewish feet in Jewry, only to have a lady of that race remark, on seeing his picture of Christ in the Temple, that he had introduced the pedal peculiarities of the wrong tribe.

John Everett Millais is the only one of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood who has become a popular painter. In his earlier pictures, such as *St. Agnes Eve*, and *Satan Sowing Tares*, we find a weird poetic feeling, together with a realistic and unselecting treatment. It was this last quality which allied him to the other members of the Brotherhood, their moralizing and symbolism adhered to him only superficially, and were soon thrown off. He surpassed them all in mastery of technique, and when he was about twenty-three he made a great concession to the insatiable British appetite for anecdotal pictures by painting the well-known *Huguenot Lovers*. The public who, despite their animadversions against the Brotherhood, had regarded its shibboleths with a secret awe, were as much delighted as if a god had stepped down from the home of the Immortals to entertain them with a picture-book. Millais became extremely popular, and has continued so ever since, though his work is very uneven in quality. He is a prolific painter of portraits, especially of children.

Rossetti is much the most interesting man of the three. His individuality was very marked to begin with, and some circumstances in his life tended to develop it in an exceptional manner. One of these circumstances was the seclusion in which he lived. Finding the general public quite incapable of understanding what was so real and so dear to him, he ceased to exhibit his pictures, and withdrew into a small circle of friends, in whom he inspired a profound devotion. Shutting himself up in his house at Chelsea, he seldom quitted it except to drive at night, or to take exercise in his walled garden. This being the case, it is not surprising that

his pictures lack the freshness of the out-door atmosphere and become introspective, and in a few cases morbid and even unwholesome, despite his brilliant imagination and great originality. The nature which he painted was brought in to him from without, both literally and in an ideal sense too. He excelled in the rendering of cut flowers, and of wondrously wrought draperies, rather than of leafy glades and murmuring streams. He lived and thought in a strange atmosphere, mediæval, mystical, and weird. If his ideality in treatment were equal to his ideality in subject, he would persuade us to lend faith to this atmosphere and breathe it with him, when we look at his works; but, unfortunately, a lack of simplicity and unity in much that he did leaves the spectator in a cool and critical mood, even before some of his most impassioned pictures.

Why this lack of simplicity and unity, which haunts all the pre-Raphaelite school, should be the concomitant of an aim as lofty and ideal as was theirs, it is hard to understand. It probably comes from the fact that they have not dared to trust nature as the voice of God, yet at the same time hold man's soul superior as being God's highest utterance and the crown of all his works.

The best and most ideal of the French Realists, like Millet and Corot, less troubled by moral and spiritual doubts, and with stronger instincts for classification, accept nature as the "what" to paint. For the "how" they trust their own highest instincts, and prefer to work chiefly from memory, and to dwell on the larger and more permanent qualities in nature. They group natural facts in masses in order that these masses may, by their carefully discriminated relative values, utter broad, coherent statements of truth. The Englishmen, on the contrary, weighted by their sturdy moral ancestry, pass over the "what" and the "how" to grasp at the "why," and with deep purpose to find the sources of things, become Idealists, and call in nature only as a means of expression. Their hearts tell them that nature and beauty are divine, yet, finding a conflict between beauty and duty, which they are too serious minded to ignore, they study nature in a half-slavish, faithless way, as if she were a despot to be feared rather than a mistress whose spirit they might catch, and so mould the details of her service to higher forms in accordance with the divine norm which lies at the basis of each man's individuality.

Rossetti's power of putting expression into the faces he painted was very great. He handled colors with extraordinary ability, but he used them, either consciously or unconsciously, in a symbolic

way. In some of his most pregnant pictures he seems to have made prominent dark tints instead of light, blues and greens instead of yellows and reds : a reversal of the ordinary scheme of color which reminds us of two lines in a poem by his sister, Christina Rossetti, about one who has gone out of this visible life, and which hint at the strange antitheses which we meet as soon as we penetrate beyond the material world.

"Darkness more bright than noonday holdeth her,
Silence more musical than any song."

These pictures are profoundly introspective. They make us feel as if we were looking into the shadow rather than into the light ; into the depths of the soul rather than into the outer world. They tell us of a mysterious, intense, palpitating life, which to us is darkness, but which throbs so near us that we sometimes catch its pulses even in this open daylight world where the fluid forces of the spirit are petrified into material shapes.

In many of Rossetti's later pictures he abandoned models, and painted the same ideal type of face. This he insisted on beginning with ultramarine and white, thinking that by working over such a basis, he could best express his mysterious conceptions. The effect was livid. In form, too, the type became exaggerated. The dark hair was massed like a thunder-cloud above the mournful, penetrating eyes. The mouth was too ample and sinuous, and the fingers too long and twining to be agreeable.

Sometimes Rossetti came out into the sunshine, and was content to bring his unsurpassed power as a colorist to the rendering of the features of an ordinary mortal in the golden light of day. *Lilith* and *The Beloved* belong to this class of pictures. They are wonderful achievements. Never did painter of any age or school invent more marvelous harmonies of clear, pure tints, so combined that they enhance or modify each other almost without the use of gray. Rossetti seems to have seen things always in the near foreground, and his pictures frequently remind us of mosaics, with the added brilliancy of stained glass. Perspective and the gradations of distance had no charm for him. His conceptions were always highly original. The *Venuses* he painted were draped wholly, or in part, and in arrangement were the very antipodes of the conventional.

A curious proof of the fact that he was, on the whole, more in his element as a poet than as a painter, is found in two pictures from his enchanting poem called the "*Blessed Damosel*." One is a sketch in colored chalks, reddish-brown, gray, and green. Only

the Damosel's head and shoulders are seen as she leans over the golden bar, with the lilies "lying asleep, along her bended arm." Back of her head is clear space, and one leafy branch overshadows her. We feel that she is in a realm high up, pure, spacious, and full of light, and that the picture interprets and helps the poem. In the oil painting of the same subject, the Damosel is robed heavily in blue, with pale pink stars in her hair. Three angels fill the space below the golden bar. Beneath them the lover is seen lying in his loneliness near a stream in a dark wood. Above the Damosel, in the thick groves of Paradise, couples of reunited lovers, about the size of birds, in dark blue robes, are seen embracing among the greenery with an amusing fervor. The whole coloring is dark and rich. Every inch of space is filled, and great bunches of roses are massed along the parapet, lest there should be a gap. The whole effect is stuffy and like an opera-box, and we feel as if we must rush out somewhere to breathe.

Abstract and unearthly subjects demand a very light medium for their expression, — a medium which retires even as it reveals them. They cannot be solidified into material forms without verging on the absurd, unless the artist have power to combine his symbols in such harmony and contrast that they shall address our sense of beauty in a rhythmic, modulated language of their own, quite apart from their symbolic meaning. That this double triumph can be achieved is shown in much of the work of Burne Jones.

Many of Rossetti's pictures can be studied through photographs, and they all require study. How they Met Themselves is a good example of the weird quality of his genius. A design for Tennyson's "Palace of Art" is in the extreme pre-Raphaelite manner. Dante's Dream is one of the largest and most celebrated of his works. The only picture he painted of an incident in contemporary life is called Found. This is intensely dramatic, and shows us the crouching form of a poor, lost girl, who has been found in London, in the early morning, by a countryman, the lover of her purer days. She shrinks from the recognition which sets her wretched life before her with unutterable poignancy. The scene is on a bridge, and the nearness of the dark river current, where so many like her have sought oblivion, is a fine imaginative touch.

The poetical school into which the pre-Raphaelite school developed takes in other men whose work is of great importance.

Passing mention may be made of two who are known in this country by photographs from their pictures. These are Simeon Solomon and Albert Moore. The pictures which have come to us from Solomon are chiefly groups of ideal heads of an impassioned and mysterious beauty, though somewhat sentimental and lacking in force. They have a subtle flavor of renunciation and pain. When he gives us two heads in a remote spiritual atmosphere, one a man's head and one a woman's, side by side, yet not looking at each other, with the title "Until the day break, and the shadows flee away," he makes us feel that these are two lovers, whom death, or fate, has separated till the eternal morning. The poignancy of the contrast between love and death, and the unearthly and sacramental quality imparted to love by death's separating and reuniting power, are favorite themes with many of the poetical school of painters.

If these profound thoughts tire, one cannot better refresh one's self than by turning to the pictures by Albert Moore. He renders to perfection the beauty and pure pagan joyousness of natural life, untroubled by a doubt. His charming goddesses in thin classic drapery are always sporting in groves by the sea, or gracefully handling fruits and flowers. We recall the works of the Frenchman Hamon in looking at them. The poetic No-Man's-Land in which they dwell, if different from that of Rossetti and Burne Jones, is at least equally remote from our work-day world.

G. F. Watts is a man of rare power. In some of his pictures he reminds us of the great men of the past. He is an Idealist through and through. The broad reach of his thought and his capacity for seeing the relations of things kept him apart from the pre-Raphaelite movement, which was, after all, a very partial one, but he is a poetical painter in the truest sense. Some of his works are elemental in their depth and grandeur. Mr. Beavington Atkinson says of them that "they seem to typify acts in creation, and eras in the history of the human race." Watts's love of the "grand style" in art has made him seek for grand spaces in which to work out his conceptions. He has executed many frescoes, and even offered to decorate the great hall of the Euston Square Railway Station in London for the cost of the scaffolding and colors; so desirous was he to raise English taste to an appreciation of the higher possibilities of art. The English climate, however, has proved so disastrous to fresco that Mr. Watts has turned his attention to mosaic as a more permanent medium of expression, and he has prepared many fine designs to be executed in that material.

When he takes up such a subject as "The people which sat in darkness saw great light," he troubles himself as little about accessories or situation as did Michael Angelo in painting his Creation of Adam. He gives us an ideal conception of an awakening to life and hope such as might take place anywhere in time or eternity. The figures in this wonderful picture are those of two men, an old woman, and two children. They are almost without drapery, and are as grand as the Theseus of the Parthenon. They are grouped on a mountain top, perhaps; at any rate no local quality obtrudes itself. One of the men is turning his face calmly and strongly to the light, while the other, with his back to it, sits bowed in darkness. The old woman lifts her veil and looks with longing wonder, half afraid to believe in the great heritage to which the sleeping babe in her bosom will soon awaken. The other child, a boy of five or six years, rejoices in the new glory with open-mouthed delight.

A picture by Watts called Love and Death has been photographed, and is known here. Poor Love, rainbow-winged, flutters and drops in hopeless agony before the stern advance of the great gray-clad figure of Death. A dove on the door-step mourns the loss of its playmate.

Edward Burne Jones, born in 1833, is of Welsh descent. As so often happens with artists he had to find his vocation. At Oxford he met William Morris, the poet, a man only six months younger than he, and they formed an intimate friendship. Midway in his college course he saw Rossetti's picture of Dante painting an Angel, and it was like a revelation to him. He sought the friendship and help of Rossetti, who was six years his senior. Rossetti gave him the truest sympathy and encouragement, and persuaded him to give up his intention of entering the church, and to become a painter. A likeness of Burne Jones at about this time may be found in Rossetti's picture of Mary Magdalene at the House of Simon, in which he served as a model for the head of Christ.

He paints, as did Rossetti, both in oil and water-color. The management of the latter by both these painters is very exceptional. They do not seem to prize it for its special qualities, such as simplicity and transparency, but by using a great deal of body color, and working elaborately with rich, dark tints, they produce an effect hardly to be distinguished from oil. One cannot quite understand the grounds of their preference when they employ it.

Burne Jones is an Idealist in choice of subject and in treatment. He draws his themes from the world of the imagination, and embodies them in symbols which he handles with an ideal grasp. Like Rossetti, he does not give us the sweep and freshness of the out-door air, but rather bids us hold our breath, as in the atmosphere of a dream. His color is either so rich and glowing that it reminds one of Giorgione, or else he handles it in a merely conventional way, painting some pictures wholly in shades of bronze green, or in gray and dull gold, as in his *Golden Stairs* and *Wheel of Fortune*. His reason for this singular treatment is doubtless his desire to subordinate the color to the thought, and let it be quietly and agreeably decorative without calling any special attention to itself.

Burne Jones succeeds in making us believe for the time being in the *No Man's Land* to which he seeks to transport us. This is owing to his grasp of the essences of things, but still more to his instinct for seizing upon, and making the most of, the decorative and picturesque possibilities of whatever he paints. The result is a coherence and unity of expression which is the most ideal of qualities in treatment. He arranges his chosen symbols according to an ideal pattern of beauty in his own mind, and that pattern is so fair and so convincing that we accept it with joy. Burne Jones's world is not the natural world, as all must agree, perhaps it is not even a possible world, but it is such a beautiful world that we are glad to enter it and have our senses charmed by the graceful forms and melodious colors that greet us there. In his picture of *Hope*, how agreeable to the eye, without regard to their meaning, are the bright branch of almond blossoms and the dark bars of the prison which shut her in. Her hand within the veil appeals chiefly to our intellectual faculties, it must be confessed.

The beautiful *Golden Stairs*, the profound and mysterious head of the figure of *Fortune*, and two series, called respectively *Orpheus* and *Eurydice* and the *Days of Creation*, have all been photographed.

In the first of the six paintings which represent the *Days of Creation*, the color is very grave and simple, but as each succeeding day brings a new angel, holding mirrored in a globe her fresh miracle of creation, the color, like the design, grows richer and more complex, till, in the sixth, it swells to its full diapason, and the angel of the seventh is seen preluding on a stringed instrument the great harmony that rose to heaven when God saw that his work was good.

The Orpheus and Eurydice series was painted to decorate a pianoforte. The designs are all charming. Everything in them is slightly conventionalized, as good decoration must be. This is seen in the stiffness of Eurydice's weeping maidens, in the flat, conventional forms of the trees and plants, and in the sinuous arrangement of lines throughout, which keeps in mind the serpent whose bite was the source of so much woe.

In another picture by Burne Jones we see two lovers in a sunshiny garden, half hidden in roses and sung to by birds, forgetful of everything but their present happiness. The thread of their life floats round them in a golden coil, ascending at last to a solemn arch, under which, mantled in heavy falling drapery, sit the three Fates, who, holding the end of the golden thread, are about to sever it.

Love which binds and death which severs, infinite passion and infinite pain, — between these lies the whole gamut of the poet.¹

Helen Bigelow Merriman.

FREDERICK MAURICE IN PRESENT THOUGHT.

THE "Life of Frederick Denison Maurice"² is a singularly compact and unique biography. The story has almost the character of an autobiography. It reflects, like a photograph, the strong and peculiar features which belonged to Maurice's intellectual and religious life. His books are always self-revealing, and his letters are only shorter and often more varied expositions of the opinions which find expression in his formal writings. To some the biography will be wearisome from its steady thoughtfulness and prevailing monotone; but to others its vivid portraiture of Maurice's inward and thoughtful life will be its irresistible charm. Colonel Maurice has been true and just to his father's memory, hiding nothing that ought to be revealed, but is at times too reticent on points concerning which the general public is not adequately informed. The views of his contemporaries as to Maurice's work and influence would

¹ A collection of photographs from the pictures of Rossetti and Burne Jones, including most of those mentioned in this paper, may be seen during the summer of 1884 at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.

² *The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice.* Chiefly told in his own letters. Edited by his Son, Frederick Maurice. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo, pp. 566, 726.

have seasoned the biography, and presented a more complete picture of the man in relation to his times. He is set forth too entirely by himself to be seen to the best advantage. Colonel Maurice is not the same kind of a biographer that Dean Stanley was in the case of Dr. Arnold. He has no historical perspective. He is too close to his subject. But, with these drawbacks, he has given us a singularly faithful account of what his father said and did, without the flagrant sins of partiality and undue glorification which are peculiar to family memoirs. He understood his father and has presented him, from his birth on August 29, 1805, to his death on April 1, 1872, as he actually lived and thought. In the following article the biography will be used less to set forth the details of his life, which were few, than to show how he grew to be the intellectual and influential man he was, and how in the two lines of social advance and spiritual direction he became the great leader of his time and in some sense the teacher for the future. He was the foremost man in England in a great religious movement which has been felt hardly less in Germany than in New England, and may almost be described to-day as a New Reformation.

“My Puritan temperament” — a phrase which he employed in many letters — indicates that Frederick Maurice understood what forces had gone into his blood, and it is in the study of these forces that you find the keynote to the life of the man. To an unusual degree he was the child of his ancestors. He came from the Puritan stock that had stood by Cromwell in the Civil Wars. The elder Maurice had deflected to Unitarianism of the type of Priestley and Belsham during his own education, but still retained the Puritan tone and temper in everything but the doctrines, and even these he returned to with some vehemence in middle life. The Puritan temperament was in young Maurice’s blood, and the Unitarian education was in his heart. Each member of his family went his individual way. The household represented as many different faiths as it had persons. His home had strictness, without severity of discipline. From fictions of all kinds, modern or romantic, he was carefully excluded. Nothing took hold of him, no objects in nature, whether beautiful or useful, like social or political subjects. He took great interest in a heavy and somewhat narrow book, “Neal’s History of the Puritans,” and owed much to the direction which it gave to his thoughts. His father made a companion of him in all his practical schemes for social improvement, whether connected with general problems of national

education or those of parochial organization or of large public interest. Much even of the forms of his belief when he became a Churchman came from his study of the "History of the Puritans," and all his early life had a theological complexion. As early as his ninth year he used to listen to long discussions about the Bible, the divinity of Christ, and kindred topics, and even when younger he was often found concealed behind the gooseberry bushes, reading the Bible. He also read largely in the best works in English literature before leaving home for the University of Cambridge. The divided religious interests of his family influenced him powerfully. Those years were to him years of moral confusion and contradiction. He had no boyhood. There was never a time when he was not thinking. He had not passed his fifteenth year when he had begun to block out his ideas for the future. The great wish of the boy's heart was to reconcile the various earnest faiths which the household presented. In one of his autobiographic fragments, he says: "The desire for Unity has haunted me all my life through; I have never been able to substitute any desire for that, or to accept any of the different schemes for satisfying it, which men have devised." Again, in the same fragment he says: "I not only believe in the Trinity in Unity, but I find in it the centre of all my beliefs; the rest of my spirit when I contemplate myself or mankind. But, strange as it may be seem, I owe the depth of this belief, in a great measure, to my training in my home. The very name that was used to describe the denial of this doctrine is the one which most expresses to me the end that I have been compelled, even in spite of myself, to seek." In 1840, in a letter to a friend, he says: "I believe some of the earliest impressions I received in my life, which most people would think, and I myself often thought, were of the wrong kind, requiring to be especially counteracted by other thoughts, have yet, on the whole, exercised a most beneficial influence over me, and have determined more than any other the tenor of my life, so far as it has been consistent or right. Doctrines about liberty of conscience, the unity of God, and such like, which I may feel to have been most crude and wrong, have yet had such a strong, determining influence over my mind and character, that all feelings and truths which have come since may be said to have adapted themselves to them, and made them more efficient, even while it counteracted them." The strife of opinions amid which he lived is thus seen to have been operative in shaping as well as suggesting the thoughts of his mature life. Before he went up to Cambridge he had gone

through enough convulsions to make any ordinary mortal's life tragic, and it was out of these struggles and conflicts that he finally reached definite and settled views. Two writers had much to do with the adjustment of points in his faith, and in placing him on the right track, Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, who afterwards became his attached friend, and Alexander Knox, the Irish lay theologian, who gave John Keble the first suggestion of the Oxford movement of 1833.

When he went up to Cambridge in 1823 he came in contact with Julius Hare, and a set of men among the undergraduates, over whom he had a remarkable influence, and by whom the reticent youth was powerfully affected in turn. Before he left the University he found himself the acknowledged leader of the most remarkable body of men within it, though it was a leadership which others were much more anxious to concede to him than he to assume. John Sterling used to say in those days that he spent his time "in picking up pebbles beside the ocean of Maurice's genius." The testimony of young Arthur Henry Hallam, then in his nineteenth year, in a note to Mr. Gladstone, reads thus: "I do not myself know Maurice, but I know well many whom he has known and whom he has moulded like a second nature, and these, too, men eminent for intellectual powers, to whom the presence of a commanding spirit would in all cases be a signal rather for rivalry than reverential acknowledgment. The effect which he has produced on the minds of many at Cambridge, by the single creation of that Society of the Apostles (for the spirit, though not the form, was created by him), is far greater than I can dare to calculate, and will be felt, both directly and indirectly, in the age that is upon us." The man that influenced Maurice most at Cambridge was Julius Hare, in later years his brother-in-law. Maurice attributed to him the setting before his pupils of an ideal, not for a few "religious" people, but for all mankind, which can lift men out of the sin which "assumes selfishness as the basis of all actions and life," and secondly, the teaching them that "there is a way out of party opinions, which is not a compromise between them, but which is implied in both, and of which each is bearing witness." Hare made his pupils feel this, and thus put a new spirit into them. There was one point in Maurice's Cambridge career which illustrates his moral character in a remarkable way. He was obliged to subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles in the English Church in order to hold his scholarships, and, to use his own words, refused to "hang a bribe round his

neck to lead his conscience." His father wrote to a friend in the spring of 1827: "Fred has left Cambridge, and has preserved his principles at the sacrifice of his interests. With this I am more satisfied than if he had taken a degree and had been immediately presented with a fellowship. He was willing to state that he was a full believer in Christianity, and would conform to all the rules of the gospel; but subscribe he must if he would retain his scholarships, for they had presented him with two. This he could not do, and therefore was not permitted to take his degree, though he had passed all his examinations with credit." In 1830 he was induced to spend some months at Oxford as an undergraduate, during which time his opinions in regard to subscription changed. Then he came into contact with Newman and Keble, and found himself in sympathy with the views which were shortly after embodied in the Oxford movement. It was the seething time in the mind and heart of one of the sincerest of men. He could not say, as Newman has, that "at that hour, in that field," he was taught this or taught that; his thoughts and character did not express themselves in that way; but "as each new thread of thought was caught by the shuttle of his ever-working mind, it was dashed in and out through the warp and woof of what had been laid on before, and one sees it disappearing and reappearing, continually affecting all else, having its color modified by successive juxtapositions, and taking its own place in the ever-growing pattern." In 1833 his mother explained Maurice's position in a letter to a Unitarian friend, who was naturally indignant that he was about to take orders in the Church of England. She says: "It was not until he had received the most solemn impression on his mind that he could best serve the Lord by becoming a Christian minister, that he ever ventured to entertain the thought of entering that church. I need not, my dear sir, tell him to pause. He has long been, and with much prayer, deeply considering the awful subject, and believes himself truly called to preach the words of life to perishing sinners. There never was a human being more free from inconsideration, either as it respects acting hastily or from inattention to the feelings of others; for, in this respect, those who know him best know him to be only too sensitive. If ever anybody acted from pure motives, I am sure it is he; for a more disinterested and noble disposition does not exist."

The residence at Oxford not only resulted in his decision to take orders, but enabled him to gauge the characteristic life of

the time at the two Universities. When he left Cambridge he was not ready to declare himself a *bonâ fide* member of the Church of England, but when he entered his name at Oxford, it was what he had deliberately done. He explained himself thus, — “that the Cambridge demand was much more distinctly and formally exclusive than the Oxford, inasmuch as it involved a direct renunciation of Nonconformity,” and “that the subscription to Articles on entering Oxford was not intended as a test, but as a declaration of the terms on which the University proposed to teach its pupils, upon which terms they must agree to learn.” His pamphlet on “Subscription no Bondage,” written at this time, embodied this distinction and gave him the good-will of the leaders of the new movement at Oxford, who began to regard him as a powerful advocate of their opinions. In an autobiographic letter he says of this pamphlet and its connections: “I had a tolerably clear instinct when I wrote it that I could never be acceptable to any schools in the Church; that if I maintained what seemed to me to be the true position of a Churchman, I must be in hostility more or less marked with each of them. The newest form of parties was then only beginning to develop itself. I did not personally know either Mr. Newman or Dr. Pusey. The first I regarded as an eminent Aristotelian divine and popular tutor who had been in great sympathy with Dr. Whately, and who was then following Mr. Keble in his reverence for Charles I. and in devotion to Anglican Episcopacy. The latter I only knew of as a Hebrew and German scholar, who had answered a book of Mr. Hugh Rose on the subject of German Rationalism. Both were at this time strongly opposed to any relaxation of subscription; both appeared to take the Thirty-nine Articles, even more than I did, as representing the belief of the English Church. To both my pamphlet was shown — not at my request — in proof; both, I was told, accepted it as one contribution to the cause which they were advocating; both, I have no doubt, disliked the tone of it. In a short time Mr. Newman was the declared antagonist of Luther, the defender of the English Church only as it presented itself in writers like Bishop Bull, who had resisted the reformers’ doctrine — that simple belief in Christ is the deliverance from evil and the root of good. That doctrine was still more undermined, as I thought, by Dr. Pusey’s tract on Baptism, published a short time after; a tract that drove me more vehemently back on what I took to be the teaching of our catechism — that by baptism we claim the position that Christ has claimed for all mankind. At the same time this

conviction put me in direct opposition to the Evangelicals. They were at this time passing through a new phase. . . . They had adopted the maxim of Dr. Chalmers — that, as men are fallen creatures, religion must be distasteful to them ; that there will be no natural demand for it, therefore that it must be recommended by all external aids and influences. No doctrine could be so much in harmony with a theology which was built upon the acknowledgment of sin ; no doctrine could be so at variance with the notion that it is a gospel which men have need of, and in their inmost hearts are craving for. Men who had the reverence which I felt for the old Evangelical movement were obliged to choose between those two conflicting ideas, which were now practically presenting themselves to every young divine. More and more I was led to ask myself what a gospel to mankind must be ; whether it must not have some other ground than the fall of Adam and the sinful nature of man. I had been helped much in finding an answer to this question by your dear old friend Mr. Erskine's books — I did not then know him personally — and by the sermons of Mr. Campbell. The English Church, I thought, was the witness for that universal redemption which the Scotch Presbyterians had declared to be incompatible with their confessions. But this position was strictly a theological one. Every hope I had for human culture, for the reconciliation of opposing schools, for blessings to mankind, was based on theology." This was written in 1870. Maurice acknowledged his mistake about the subscription list. The Liberals were right, he finally saw, in opposing it because it meant to most the renunciation of the right to think, and involved dishonesty. He thus accepted the humiliation. He said : "I give the Liberals the triumph which they deserve. But they feel and I feel that we are not a step nearer to each other in 1870 than we were in 1835. They have acquired a new name. They are called Broad Churchmen now, and delight to be called so. But their breadth seems to me to be narrowness. They include all kinds of opinions. But what message have they for the people who do not live upon opinions or care for opinions. Are they children of God or must they now and forever be children of the devil? The Broad Churchman gives no answer. To me life is a burden unless I can find one. All these parties I knew, when I wrote 'Subscription no Bondage,' and I know much more fully now, contain men at whose feet I am not worthy to sit. I have longed for sympathy with them all. But God has ordered it otherwise." The son adds a word as to his position at this time to the father's ex-

planation. It was on a visit to London that he took a walk to Clapham to attend one of the meetings of the "Clapham sect." "He often spoke," says the son, "of his having taken Dr. Pusey's tract with him on a walk of this kind, and how, as he went along, it became more and more clear to him that it represented to him everything that he did not think and did not believe, till at last he sat down on a gate, in what were then the open fields of Clapham, and made up his mind that it represented the parting point between him and the Oxford school. He always spoke of it with a kind of shudder, as it were of an escape from a charmed dungeon. 'They have never allowed any one who has once come within their meshes to escape,' was often his last sentence on the subject." In 1835 he wrote to Richard (now Archbishop) Trench: "Oh that our High Churchmen would but be Catholics! At present they seem to me three parts Papist and one part Protestant; but the *tertium quid*, the glorious product of each element so different from both, I cannot discern even in the best of them. Pusey has just written a tract on Baptism of which I fear this is true." The separation from Dr. Pusey was abundantly reciprocated. During the controversy with Mansel, he is reported to have said that he and Maurice believed in two different Gods. In 1867 Maurice wrote: "The substitution of dogma for God, which is the characteristic tendency of Pusey and his school as much as of Auguste Comte and his school, is surely leading to a fearful atheism or to a devil-worship." In 1836 he wrote a note to Julius Hare concerning the appointment of Dr. Hampden to the divinity chair at Oxford, in which he measures the breadth of Cardinal Newman: "That Newman will prove him a heretic I do not doubt; the fear I should have is that he may convict himself by the same process, for this seems generally the hard fate of men who attack a one-sided notion, that they give currency to the other half of it, which in the end proves equally mischievous." About this time Maurice wrote the letters to a Quaker, the Rev. Samuel Clark, soon after published under the title of "The Kingdom of Christ," which concerned English Churchmen more than Quakers, and in the second letter commented on Dr. Pusey's theory of baptism. He afterwards said of it: "Nothing I have written had so important an effect on my life. It set me in direct antagonism with his school, to which I had many attractions." When, in 1845, Cardinal Newman published his essay on "The Development of Christian Doctrine," by which his speculative intellect hewed a passage to the Church of Rome, Maurice and Mozley were the two champions

of the Church of England who exposed its weak points, and set forth, each in his own way, the reasons why the English Church was a vital and integral part of Catholic Christendom. With great charity for the struggle through which Cardinal Newman was then passing, Maurice, in the following paragraph, which is found at the end of his "Review of Mr. Newman's Theory of Development," strikes at the root of the difficulty of the school to which Newman and Pusey belonged: "Chronology in the history of mental conflicts is most uncertain: to-day there may be sensations of vehement disgust for that which was once very dear, to-morrow a return of first love. If the decision is ultimately an honest one, we have no right to assume a cognizance of the previous struggles and revulsions of feeling, which are really known only to the Judge of all. I think we shall miss the lesson, the humbling and therefore the useful lesson, which Mr. Newman may teach us if we busy ourselves in seeking excuses for condemning him. He finds the barriers which he thought would preserve us from Rationalism insufficient. Is he not right? are they not insufficient? Will a mere belief in the Fathers, or in succession, avail to answer the question, 'Is God really among us or no?' Will sacraments avail, if we look at them apart from Him, if they do not testify of his presence?" All through life friendly relations existed between Newman and Maurice, though there was no intimacy, but when Maurice had exposed the Procrustean character of Dr. Pusey's tract on Baptism, the Oxford divine was exceedingly angry, and the whole party saw that they had mistaken their man. To Dr. Pusey, who united the saint and the dogmatist in one life in rare proportions, Maurice was "self-deceived," his humility a sham, his earnestness of speech an impertinence.

Maurice, even in youth, was a self-centred person. His intellectual life was self-active, and he had an ever-growing conviction that words were to be said through him that he could refrain from speaking only at his peril, whether Dr. Pusey or all the doctors in the world opposed them. His humility was great and genuine, but he had as much personal religion as knowledge of spiritual truth. One who knew him in 1836 said: "He is a man of much prayer; his sisters told me that when he was with them they frequently found that he had not been in bed all night, having spent the whole night in prayer." His out-look at this time was broad and high. Sir Edward Strachey, then his pupil, wrote to a friend: "Maurice says all sects are fast breaking up and preparing to vanish away, that we may again have one Church throughout

Christendom — a Church, the parts of which will be nationally and universally united under their true Head, instead of being confounded under a pope or separated into sects. Thus the child will be the father." The point which he raised in "The Kingdom of Christ" in 1838 was sharply antagonistic to Dr. Pusey's theory of baptism. It was whether the Church is exclusive or inclusive, whether its great privilege is that it confers certain selfish advantages on its members, or that it is the representative of what is true for all mankind. The book, as a whole, is a vindication of the position of the Catholic Church as the "spiritual constitution" designed to maintain both human and divine relationships. Maurice had the rare and remarkable characteristic of of all great thinkers, that he carried particular ideas constantly into their wholes or universals. He saw things in their integrity as well as in their relations. Reviewing his life, in 1871, he said in rather a sad tone one day to his son: "I have laid a great many addled eggs in my time, but I think I see a connection through the whole of my life that I have only lately begun to realize; the desire for Unity and the search after Unity both in the Nation and the Church has haunted me all my days." In 1843, in a letter describing Carlyle's function to be, to show clergymen their ignorance and sin, and the deep wants of the age with which they profess to deal, he says: "I tremble to think what a crushing of all systems, religious and political, there must be before we do really feel our gathering together in Christ to be the hope of the universe; before we acknowledge that the manifestation of the actual centre of society, not the creation of some circle for ourselves, or the indefinite enlargement of the circumference of our thoughts and notions, is what we are looking for." Just as the coöperative movement was beginning in 1849, he took up the same line of march in the following words: "The strong sense of a vocation, — I may say, for you will not misunderstand me and set down the words to mere vanity, — of a vocation to be a church reformer, has struggled in my own mind with great natural indolence and despondency, and, in my social intercourse, with the incapacity of joining those who seek reformation, but who give a meaning to the word which seems to me frivolous and false. I cannot enter into a party for the sake of compassing an end which involves the destruction of party. I have, therefore, been more delighted than most other persons would have been at the opportunity of meeting earnest people as friends, and not as allies, who must assuredly be agents, perhaps the main agents, in bringing about

whatever changes, good or evil, take place during the next ten years. I am most thankful to connect church reformation with social reformation — to have all one's thoughts tested by their application to actual work and by their power of meeting the wants of suffering, discontented, resolute men. Whatever will not stand that trial is not good for much." To him "the great elements of Christianity as the revelation to mankind and the universe" are "the truths of God's absolute, fatherly love, of the Incarnation, of the Sacrifice for all." Church reformation in its highest sense he conceived to "involve theologically the reassertion of these truths in their fullness apart from their Calvinistical and Tractarian limitations or dilutions; *socially*, the assertion on the ground of these truths of an actual living community under Christ in which no man has a right to call anything his own, but in which there is spiritual fellowship and practical coöperation; *nationally*, the assertion of a union, grounded, not on alliances and compromises, but on the constitution of things, between this Universal Community and the state, of which the principle is Personal Distinction and the symbol Property." As early as 1844, he writes to Daniel Macmillan: "The one thought which possesses me most at this time, and, I may say, has always possessed me, is that we have been dosing our people with religion when what they want is not this, but the Living God." In a letter to the Rev. Charles Kingsley, dated the same year, he says: "If once the teachers in our theological schools would have the courage to proclaim theology to be the knowledge of God and not the teaching of a religion, I am satisfied that the scientific character of the Bible would be brought out as conspicuously as its practical character, one being seen to be involved in the other. Then it would not be necessary to assert for theology its place as the *scientia scientiarum*, or to bid others fall into their places in connection with it and in subordination to it; far less would it be necessary to be perpetually proclaiming church authority in favor of such and such doctrines. The truths concerning God would be felt so essential to the elucidation of those concerning men and nature, the relation of the one to the other would be so evident, there would be such a life infused into the portions of human knowledge, and such a beautiful order and unity in the whole of it, that the opposition to them would be recognized as proceeding just as much from prejudice and ignorance, sure to disappear when these came with moral causes to sustain them, as the opposition to gravitation or any of the most acknowledged physical or mathematical

principles." There is no outreach in all the letters of Maurice — letters in the variety and richness of their spiritual meaning that have never been paralleled — which is higher than the following passage from a note to Miss Hare, the sister of Julius Hare, and afterwards Maurice's second wife: "I do find the love of God is the only power in the universe to accomplish *any* result. All must be the Devil's, if *it* were not at work. Shall it not in some way or other vindicate all to itself? I wish to think awfully on the question, confessing with trembling that there is an unspeakable power of resistance in our wills to God's love — a resistance quite beyond my understanding or any understanding to explain — and not denying that this resistance may be final, but still feeling myself obliged, when I trust God thoroughly, to think that there is a depth in his love below all other depths; a bottomless pit of charity deeper than the bottomless pit of evil. And I answer that to lead people to feel that this is a ground for them to stand upon is the great way of teaching them to stand. They are not made to hang poised in the air, which is the position, I fear, of a good many religious people, in a perpetual land of mist and cloud, never seeing the serene heaven, nor feeling the solid earth. 'God is in the midst of us; therefore we cannot be moved.' What might there is in these words!"

From 1849 to his election in 1866 to the professorship of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge, his life was very largely that of a social and educational reformer. The theologian was not swallowed up in the socialist. Maurice was quite as much at home with the proletariat as with the aristocrat. He organized the Christian socialist movement in 1848, which, as Chartism, created a revolution in Paris, and threatened one in London. He made Christian socialism respected; nay, he made the Church of England roomy enough to take it in. This cost him his professorship of Theology at King's College; it drew upon him volley after volley of the poisoned arrows of the religious press; but the way soon opened for the Workingmen's College, of which he was the president, for the organization of "Queen's College for Women," in which he was a constant worker, for the organization of Bible classes, in which he was successful to an extraordinary degree, and for many other plans and movements in which the Church, as the living minister of Christ, goes forth to do its work among the people. In this field Maurice did a work which makes him the model clergyman of modern times to the English-speaking world. His method with his Bible classes was typical of his work in many

other directions. He says of it: "I was known to a few friends who frequented a Bible class at my house. Our intercourse was of the frankest kind, but this was the foundation of it. They found that I was far less accomplished in general science and literature than numbers of my order, but that I regarded the knowledge of God as the key to all other knowledge, — as that which connected knowledge with life. They found that I accepted the Bible as the interpretation of the history of mankind. They found, as they might have expected, that I did not demand that they should bring that conviction with them. They might, if they pleased, bring just the opposite conviction. They might think that the Bible was no better than any other book, or that it was a worn-out book. The truth, it seemed to me, would establish itself. I at least was not afraid to subject that belief which had possession of me to any test. I thought that it would only be proved and spread if it was brought to the severest test." This method made his numerous Bible classes successful, and in their turn the knowledge which Maurice thus gained of what the average man was thinking about was of the greatest service to him as a teacher, and changed both the form and character of all his later writings. By playing the part of the Devil's Advocate he drew out the thoughts of others, and in this way acquired such a knowledge of the actual difficulties, doubts, and objections of the more thoughtful laymen of his time as few clergymen either have or attempt to have. His son says of these classes that indirectly they had other effects: "When books appeared in which he met the objections which men of earnest thought were putting forward in all lay societies, those of the clergy and those dissenting ministers with whom it had become a habit to imagine that they could stifle inquiry by snubbing thought were aghast at the frank statement of objections, to which he did full justice before he answered them. These men believed that he was inventing arguments which they had never heard, because they had carefully closed their ears. On the other hand, from all parts of the country, clergy and laity, who had become aware that one man at least believed that the faith in Christ was strong enough to face fairly its adversaries, and need not bury its head in the sand in order to avoid them, poured in letters upon him. In this way, therefore, he acquired an acquaintance yet more extended with the thought of his age." There is no better place than, as a sequel to the statement of the constructive growth of Maurice's social and religious beliefs, to quote the words in regard to his life-work

which his son thinks would have pleased him most, — the words spoken by Dr. Montagu Butler in 1872, when the turf had just been placed upon his grave: “Whenever rich and poor are brought closer together, whenever men learn to think more worthily of God in Christ, the great work that he has labored at for nearly fifty years shall be spoken of for a memorial of him.” His own words, almost his last, were: “I am not going to death; I am going into life.”

It remains to show the relation of Maurice’s beliefs to present religious thought. His hereditary convictions, not less than the growing beliefs on which he stood, were based not more upon an accurate knowledge of the thought of his own time than upon the affirmations of our spiritual nature which lie beyond the limits of experience, and exist in the essential truth of things. What he found in Coleridge — “the power of perceiving that by the very law of the reason the knowledge of God must be *given* to it” — seemed to him “a most precious preparation for the inquiry which belongs more strictly to our age, but still is only a preparation.” What Coleridge was to one generation Maurice was to the one that followed. He valued Coleridge because he delivered him from certain philosophical phrases and generalizations, which had become the conventional way of stating religious truth, but really obscured its meaning. Maurice is valued to-day because he brought theology back to its true centre in the being of God, in the revelation of God, in the unfolding of the relations of God to man. More and better than any other man of his time he understood himself and the world of thinking beings in which he lived. The Anglican clergy have some understanding of Catholic truth because they are taught theology upon the basis of the historical creeds, as distinguished from modern schemes of salvation, but they are too often ignorant of what men are thinking about in the age in which they live. Maurice, by temperament, by education, by growing convictions, by large experience, apprehended early and held constantly the integrity of the ethical facts in theology and life. As a religious teacher, he escaped from the trammels of party, and looked at principles in their essence. He saw truth as a whole, as a relation of God to humanity; his error was that he rejected too often what he mentioned as the fault in the teaching of Alexander Knox, “his all-individualizing spirituality,” which he felt “was not after the mind of Christ.” And this leads to an explanation of the secret of Maurice’s influence that is generally overlooked. His writings

are chiefly occasional efforts; they were put forth to meet a crisis, or grew out of a controversy; they are concerned with the thought of the day; it was not in him to compose a treatise as Hooker drew up the "Ecclesiastical Polity;" his thought took the form of a letter or a sermon; he was what Lord Macaulay has been aptly called, a pamphleteer, with his subject-matter not in politics and history, but in the more recondite realm of theology; his substantial and unique merit — and in this he is Coleridge's true successor — is that he always carries his point from the region of particulars to that of universals, from the personalities of men to God in the Christ. He could not be a party theologian in the Church of England. He could not follow Dr. Pusey's teaching, neither could he indorse that of Dr. Jowett; for the Evangelicals he had the pity that borders on contempt; but for the essential truth that each held, for that truth in its corporate form, for that truth as it is set forth in human society through the organized "republic of God," of which Christ is the Supreme Head as known to men, for that feeling out into the unknown for things certain which is the characteristic of religious genius and is granted to the sympathetic spiritual consciousness, he had that regard and reverence and devotion and instinct which have been vouchsafed to few men in any age of the world. The strength of his writing is not in its form, but in its method, in its spiritual insight, in its grasp of spiritual truth, in its penetration to the essential and final fact. Systems have no value in his eyes; the "scheme of redemption" is a misnomer; but in the chamber where Socrates and Plato sit down to inquire into the truth of things the new-comer, the kindred spirit, after the lapse of centuries, is Frederick Maurice. He has their sympathy with the essential, the universal. He is as close to God in his day as they were in theirs. He brings God, as they do, close to the thought of living men, in and through the Christ. His quality is that of the seer, the prophet, the man who "sees the vision of the Almighty." Not strictly logical, he is always true to the higher reason. Like the old prophets, he is always talking about Israel, but his words reach out to that larger truth that finds its fulfillment in humanity and in the Christ that is to be. This quality of the seer explains his influence. It is not as a system-maker, but as a teacher of truth, that he appeals to men. He founded no school; this was not in his mind; but he was instrumental in changing the order of religious thought, and in restoring the teaching of the kingdom of God to its original and true order in the processes of history. He made men see that

theology begins with the knowledge of God, not in the sinfulness of man. He introduced nothing new, but he restored the method which had been lost sight of amid the vagaries of Protestant speculations about theology. His work was infinitely grander than the founding of a school, because it quickened the life of God in men, in which all schools find their justification. He felt himself that he was here to say things that came to him, as if they were revealed to his mind through the life of the Spirit. Writing to his young friend, now Sir Edward Strachey, in 1838, he said: "I believe, so far as I am able to keep my end in sight of reconciling the facts of Christianity with its principles, and of showing how both are required to satisfy the wants of men now and explain those which history makes known to us, and how they can only co-exist and coöperate in a church, I shall do some good to persons in a certain state of mind. The sphere of my influence will be limited, I know from experience; for many whom I had expected at least to understand me I find have not the slightest dream of my purpose, but I do not aspire to do more than act upon a very few, who may act upon others."

While Maurice's great gift was the power of interpreting the thought of his time in the light of eternal truth, of relating the circumference of men's thoughts to their true centre, a power which he noted as the chief defect of John Stuart Mill's work, and the lack of which in Thomas Carlyle he deeply deplored, though he had the greatest reverence for his spiritual insight, he had another quality which cannot be too much insisted on. He had strong convictions about the order and constitution of the Universal Church, and it was the conviction that the English Church had this order and constitution which probably determined him to exercise his ministry within its fold. He had Richard Hooker's strong sense of order, of organization. He dreaded individuality, whether in society or religion. He had the constructive way of looking upon Christianity. It was Christ's method of regenerating humanity; it was also his method. His father had taught him the importance of social action, and when he wrote "The Kingdom of God," his first considerable work, its distinct outcome was that humanity in the concrete is to be reached through the constructive agencies employed in the Church of Christ. In earlier ages, Anglo-Saxon, cathedral-building, convent-founding, the Church of England made itself felt as a national institution. It organized society upon the basis of the Christian religion. The late J. S. Brewer, in his "History of Henry VIII.," calls it "the

church of the middle classes," and affirms that from these it derives its strength. It represents a social as distinguished from an individual or party religion, and Mr. Brewer rightly calls its book of social prayer "the most wonderful achievement of any age,—the greatest, next to the Bible, of any human production." In his view, "so long as the middle classes remain the governing and main power in the nation, so long will the Church of England remain as the representative of their religious peculiarities and convictions, their plain good sense of duty, their love of order, their intense loyalty, their indifference to ideal excellence, their dislike of novelty, their suspicion of all departures from the common and familiar types of human honesty and goodness." Maurice had Mr. Brewer's view of the Church of England, both in a national and a spiritual sense, as the church of the middle classes, but went still farther. He believed that the duty of the church is to regenerate the great working class that has grown up outside its walls and is somewhat fiercely prejudiced against it. Into this work he threw himself with passionate zeal and large-minded devotion in the middle of his career, and remained its most conspicuous leader to the end. His object in this social direction was to bring the sympathies of the Church of England as an ecclesiastical organization into closer and living contact with the thought, the movement, the energy, and the conflicts of the present day. The work he did to this end, like Norman McLeod's in Scotland, did something to change the activity of the Church of Christ in Great Britain. He applied the latent forces of organized Christianity to the neglected classes in English life, and did much to place the Christian religion in a broader and truer relation to modern society. The difficulty with work intended for the redemption of man as a social being since the Reformation and in Protestant circles is that it has been individual and unorganized and ephemeral. Maurice went back to the ancient church in principle, and taught men afresh how to make the Church of Christ a great, renewing, and humanizing force in present society. He anticipated the work that has specially fallen to our own time, and pointed out the methods by which it could best be done. He was an exponent of Christian democracy. Here again he was as truly a prophet of social forces as he was a teacher who had "the vision of the Almighty."

In these two positions of insight into truth and life, Maurice is quite as much alive to-day as when men felt his personal influence, and read his kindness of heart in his sympathetic and penetrating glance. Such men never die. On his death-bed, Maurice said,

"I am going into life;" but in another sense he is in life now. He is closely related to our present religious thought. First, he has done something to increase the religious toleration of the Church of England. He had close affiliations with the Broad Church party of which the late Dean Stanley was the head, but his influence has practically broadened that party out of existence by removing the narrowness of thought on which a party is always based. He never aimed his work beyond the English Church, but the English Nonconformists, at least those who are not Unitarians, are in their present religious temper as much the result of his influence as the changes are which are now modifying religious thought in the National Church. The change among the Nonconformists is in drawing them along historical lines to the affirmations of the Christian creeds, regardless of what modern schemes of salvation have taught. It is the strengthening of our affirmations of common truth. It should not be said that Maurice has been the only teacher of the return to historical theology of the more spiritual sort. Schleiermacher initiated the same movement in Germany before Maurice initiated it in England, but for the English-speaking people there is something far off in the operations of German thought. Maurice had the right of it, in contrasting English thought with German, when he said, "We must always be, to a considerable extent, unintelligible to each other, because we start from exactly opposite points; we, naturally, from that which is above us and speaks to us; they, naturally, from that which is within them, and which *seeks* for some object above itself." He further said, as was characteristic, "I most eagerly assert the worth of our English position to prove that the truth must look down upon us if we would look up to it; that Truth must be a person seeking us if we are to seek him." Maurice will never have a school in England any more than Coleridge had, but wherever men are feeling their way to the great affirmations about God, the Christ, and the Spirit, he will be recognized as a true prophet of the soul.

In this country his influence has been perhaps more general than in England. In the Episcopal Church the transformation of parties into schools of thought would have come about in the natural order of things, but there can be no doubt that the influence of Maurice upon men like Dr. Washburn and Dr. John Cotton Smith, both endowed with the gifts of spiritual insight in the sense that Maurice was, greatly hastened the development of a higher and better order of thinking. His name has stood for a better statement of theological truth, for a more concrete preaching, for a

more general application of Christian principles to the problems of society. The best representative of Maurice in America, the man who has been most enriched by his method and spirit but whose strongly philosophical mind has not become the slave of Maurice's thought, is Dr. Elisha Mulford. His "Republic of God" is saturated through and through with the teachings of Maurice and Hegel, and has carried the thought of both far and wide among American scholars and preachers, — a seed-book that will effectually regenerate any man's life who thoroughly masters it, and has probably done more to quicken the atmospheric change in American religious thinking than any book that has appeared since "Ecce Homo" presented the thought of Maurice in a fresh conception of the Christ in modern society. Partly through the reading of the "Republic of God," partly by the general circulation of different volumes of Maurice's writings, partly as an indirect influence of the study of German theology, partly as the increment of mutual contact and discussion about the essential interests of man which characterize modern life, there is a great change in all the representative religious bodies in America. It is most seen in the children of the Puritans, but the disciples of Roger Williams, the spiritual descendants of John Knox, and even the followers of Wesley, to say nothing of those who reverence the name of Channing, are in the same general movement; and a close analysis reveals the fact that the great truths of revelation which Maurice lived to set forth anew and apart from the barnacles that had fastened themselves upon them are the truths which are bringing all these children of God together upon the plane of a higher spiritual life, and upon the basis of an organic relation of the Christian Church to the life of the world. It is not what Maurice would have cared for, that people should call themselves by his name, and those who follow his thought and work upon his plan need to remember that behind all his thought on its spiritual side was his large and strong belief in the organized church, in an order and constitution of things that makes the individual a part of the whole, and causes him to influence society as a soldier in the army of the living God. Men seem to be reaching in these days along all the lines of our broken Christianity, as has been admirably said by Julia Wedgewood, "to a stronger belief in the present life, — the life that belongs to the seen and the outward, the life that satisfies, the life that quenches the thirst for God," and in this realization of the presence of God in our daily life, of the control of things that are against us as well as for us, of the movement of the Spirit of

God over the face of modern society as He is once said to have moved over "the face of the waters," the life-work of Frederick Maurice finds its true expression and consummation.

Julius H. Ward.

MECHANICAL EVOLUTION.

I believe in man, therefore I believe in God. This is the fundamental article of natural religion. Whatever our theory of the origin and ancestry of man may be, natural theism requires the belief that he *is*, and that he is a self-determining power.

There is a phase of thought bearing the name "evolution" which cannot by any possibility be reconciled with religion. It is subversive not only of theology, but equally of every high belief. In it the world is conceived of as having behind it not an intelligent will, but only a mindless energy. All things are what they are by necessity. Each term in the vast series of existences has been forced into being by those that have preceded it. Nothing that has taken place could have been in the slightest degree different from what it has been or is. Man, the most highly-evolved product, has become possessed of reflective intelligence; but this, his distinguishing characteristic, is the source of illusions which make him not the wisest thing, but only the most deceived thing that has existed. He is the most deceived not only in that he has inadequate ideas of the world that surrounds him, but essentially deceived in that, by the necessity that governs all things, he thinks of himself as the reverse, the absolute contradiction of what he is. He cannot help believing in himself as a cause, a responsible cause. He is, in fact, only a result that has come to pass by the impact of atoms acting and reacting upon each other through untold ages, without purpose and without intelligence.

I will not try to prove the position that this view of the universe is subversive of every high belief. If the statement does not carry conviction with it, there is some quality in the mental processes of the reader that no amount of argumentation is likely to influence. Mr. Herbert Spencer has recently given us his notion of the religion of the future, the motive power of which is to be the thought that we are "ever in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy." This to some minds may stand for a high belief, and if so, it would probably be labor thrown away to try to prove that it is

not high. The task which I have set before myself is, I hope, a more practicable one: namely, to demonstrate the unscientific character of Mr. Spencer's evolution. This, let me hasten to say, will not carry us into a refutation of his metaphysical "first principles," for the simple reason that these have and can have no vital connection with the *real* basis of his system.

A philosophy that destroys the reality of mind, by recognizing no permanent element in it, cannot indulge itself in metaphysics. If it is an "illusion" to suppose that "at each moment the ego is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas, actual and nascent, that then exists,"¹ anything like a trustworthy intuition or ultimate datum of consciousness is an impossibility. Such a supposed intuition is also an illusion. In saying this, I am not ruling out Mr. Spencer's agnosticism; for this, instead of being, as some of his admirers have claimed, an unessential part of his philosophy, is the necessary outcome of it. Spencerism is, in substance, the philosophy of Hume, illustrated and enforced by certain abstractions from modern science; and, as certainly as that philosophy, it leads to universal skepticism. What I do object to receiving, in such a connection, is that "datum of consciousness" which makes an "Incomprehensible Power," the "Absolute," a necessary object of thought. And with this must be excluded also all that metaphysical machinery, borrowed from Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel, to regulate and limit the too potent spirit which this datum of consciousness has called up. All this part of Mr. Spencer's system may be detached as easily as the dress of a masquerader. I therefore take the liberty of removing it and referring it for an answer to the many discussions, past, present, and future, of the views of the above mentioned writers.

What, then, is the real basis of Mr. Spencer's system? It is the doctrine of the persistence of force combined with an abstraction which he calls evolution. In his own words, "The phenomena of evolution have to be deduced from the persistence of force. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down; and on this a rational synthesis must build up."² A fuller expression of the same idea is as follows: "Given the persistence of force, and given the various derivative laws of force, and there has to be shown not only how the actual existences of the inorganic world necessarily exhibit the traits they do, but how there necessarily result the more numerous and involved traits exhibited by organic and super-organic exist-

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, p. 500.

² *First Principles*, p. 398.

ences — how an organism is evolved? what is the genesis of human intelligence? whence social progress arises?"¹

If a reader of the "Synthetic Philosophy" will continually bear in mind this position, it will very much reduce the seriousness of the dilemmas to which he finds himself shut up. Thus Mr. Spencer says, "Psychical changes either conform to law or they do not. If they do not conform to law, this work, in common with all other works on the subject, is sheer nonsense: no science of psychology is possible. If they do conform to law there cannot be any such thing as free will."² Now, as persistence of force is Mr. Spencer's ultimate law, what he really means is this: Psychical changes either conform to *mechanical* law or they do not; if they do not, this work is sheer nonsense. Mr. Spencer has assumed that the formulated laws of the lower and less complicated domain are sufficient for the explanation of the phenomena of the higher. His philosophy is an application of this assumption. But in making it he labors, not as we might have supposed he would, to show that his theory of evolution as applied to mind is justified by the facts of human consciousness, but, on the contrary, to show us what these facts ought to be in order to fit his construction of evolution. Practically, therefore, it is an attempt to educate men to disbelieve that which they naturally — we may say constitutionally — believe.

This radical revolution in our fundamental ideas is entered upon with a light heart by Mr. Spencer because he feels confident of his ability so to replace that which has been taken away that the thinking world will not object to the change, but will, on the contrary, be only too thankful to accept at his hands its old conceptions transfigured and inverted. It must be confessed that in this expectation he has not altogether miscalculated; for notwithstanding its lack of a philosophic or truly scientific basis, the "Synthetic Philosophy" has been elaborated with great skill. The parts are fitted with such adroitness that one seems to grow out of another as naturally as a branch grows from a tree. The course of thought is so diversified with abounding illustration, and so enriched with scientific detail and subordinate truths, that the reader who surrenders himself to its surface current may be carried along, as in a pleasantly moving dream, to conclusions that are at variance with his deepest convictions. There is a fascination in the seeming completeness and sufficiency of this scheme. It smooths away difficulties, explains the origin of things that had hitherto seemed mysterious; and, without any very well defined reason for so doing,

¹ *First Principles*, p. 555.

² *Principles of Psychology*, p. 503.

preserves throughout an air of hopefulness and good cheer for the future.

To a large class of readers, therefore, the "Synthetic Philosophy" has come as a timely and helpful straightening out of things that were crooked. Much of this sense of completeness must be conceded to the personal persuasiveness of the writer, but much also must be accorded to the underlying conception which pervades the whole. It is the evolutionary idea that binds one part to another and holds the reader as with a spell. Mr. Spencer seems to have rescued this idea from the loose, indeterminate forms in which it appears in connection with different classes of phenomena, and to have reduced it to laws as well defined as those of mechanics. By the universal application of these laws, all questions as to the origin of ideas, whether of things in heaven or things on earth, may be solved; and our notions of the nature of phenomena, hitherto conflicting and uncertain, may be rectified and fixed forever. It has been claimed by ardent adherents of Mr. Spencer, that in the realms of mental science and sociology he has done a work which is as great as that of Sir Isaac Newton in astronomy. Now, it may be asked, does not the fact that this form of evolution explains so much, that it seems to make a straight road where there used to be only a crooked path, constitute a strong presumption for its truth? I answer, it does not; because the facts which it does *not* explain, but which it traverses without compunction, are many and important.

It is Mr. Spencer who has laid down the law that "there is no mode of establishing the validity of any belief, except that of showing its entire congruity with all other beliefs."¹ It would be hard to hold the constructor of a system to a literal interpretation of this rule. But we are certainly interpreting according to the spirit and not according to the letter when we insist that a philosophy which reduces to "illusions" ideas that have hitherto been regarded as the unimpeachable data of consciousness shall give some better reason for its authority than that, having explained *many* facts, it is to be assumed that *all* facts are subject to it.

We are brought, therefore, to the critical examination of Mr. Spencer's idea of evolution; and I shall endeavor to show that scientific evolution is not responsible for this evolutionary idea; but that this latter is a purely fanciful thing, conceived by a speculative mind, eager to reduce to fixed and easily applied laws a theory which is, and which must be, for a long time to come, in

¹ *First Principles*, p. 138.

the early stages of formation. As Professor Samuel Harris has well remarked, "Even if the theory of evolution is a grand insight of genius, it is not surprising, especially considering how recently it was announced, that it remains neither adequately formulated nor proved; and that only fragments which may ultimately find place in a comprehensive theory seem to be assuming the definiteness and certainty of scientific facts."

It is unnecessary to multiply expressions of opinion with regard to that which speaks so clearly for itself. All the way along the course of evolution we have to recognize at intervals the introduction of new, active elements which complicate the problem, and make it impossible to formulate, except in a very imperfect way, the laws by which its ends are accomplished.

When we pass from the evolution of things without life to that of living forms in the vegetable world, we encounter the new and utterly mysterious factor of organic growth. As we rise in the scale we come to a further complication in the hitherto non-existing factor of sentience; farther on we come to consciousness and intelligence, and still farther on we come to self-conscious intelligence, and self-determining will in man. In our present state of knowledge each one of these new factors appears to be, in many respects, antagonistic to those before existing. They modify, and to some extent neutralize, the laws which it was possible to formulate for the explanation of the more simple and less evolved existences. An immense amount of patient scientific inquiry, therefore, into the particular problems of evolution as they exist in these widely separate, though related, realms of nature must be gone through with before any general, comprehensive law of evolution can be reached. "It is not," says Dr. Maudsley, "sound science to apply the known laws of the phenomena of the lower domain to an entire explanation of the phenomena of the higher domain; still less to beguile one's self into the belief of an explanation by the vague misapplication of the special terms of the former, which have definite meanings in their proper use and place, to the more complex phenomena of the latter, where they not only do not cover and fit the facts, but have their own exact significations blurred and defaced by the misuse."¹ In rejecting Mr. Spencer's conception, therefore, we are not rejecting the doctrine of evolution. We are only rejecting a fanciful and unscientific form of it, in order to prepare the way for a truer construction which shall be at the same time scientific and theistic.

¹ *Body and Will*, p. 189.

The first position which I would assume as the basis of such a construction is, that a scientific application of evolution to mind can be made only by taking into account all the *facts* of mind which present themselves to us as ultimate data of consciousness. We must recognize at the outset two distinct departments of research, in each of which we come upon ultimate facts which can in no wise be invalidated. There is a subjective as well as an objective induction to be made. By the one we ascertain the facts of physical nature through sense-perception. By the other we ascertain the facts of mind-nature through self-consciousness. Deductions made from facts in the one realm cannot be used to override facts observed in the other. It is continually claimed by the representatives of natural science that they concern themselves only with facts that admit of verification. The claim is not well founded. In so far as they confine themselves simply to observing and recording that which exists and takes place in nature, their facts admit of verification. But they do much more than this. They reason about conceptions abstracted from these facts. Certain characteristics common to a group of facts are used to generalize from, and in this way they arrive at what are called "laws of nature." But these laws are abstractions which do not admit of verification. They may be proximately proved by convergence of evidence. But so long as the facts to which they are referred exhibit a side which is not only not included in the generalization, but which contradicts it, they must be regarded as imaginative conceptions, based upon one aspect of a many-sided reality. They are speculations without a reasonable foundation, because derived from a partial induction.¹

I have said we must recognize *two* distinct departments of research, in each of which we come upon ultimate facts belonging to a different order. Taken by itself, this would be a crude and insufficient statement. As a fact, the universe of created things presents itself to us not as divided into compartments, separated from each other by hard and fast lines, but rather as a series or scale of modes of existence. These modes have each their own specific class of relations, which must be expressed in terms which

¹ Some of the most widely received generalizations of modern science, often referred to as "established laws of nature," are of this character. The atomomechanical theory, for instance, has been shown to be at variance with the fundamental laws of special sciences, — with those of chemistry, physics, and astronomy. For an able exposition of this fact, by one who writes purely in the interest of science, see "The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics," by J. B. Stallo, International Scientific Series, vol. 38.

have their special application, and which cannot be transferred to express relations of a different order. But it is at the same time true that all these modes of existence are linked together, so that each is seen to be closely related to that which is next higher and to that which is next lower. When we speak of two departments, therefore, we are simply contemplating the whole series from the opposite standpoints of its extreme limits,—on the one hand, from the extreme of inorganic nature, and on the other, from that of self-conscious mind. We do not have to travel all the way from inorganic existences to mind before we reach a point where mechanical laws are manifestly inadequate to express the relations of phenomena. As soon as we pass from the contemplation of the inorganic world to that of organized, living structures, facts are encountered which refuse to yield their secret to the key of a mechanical explanation. While there is an appearance of mechanism of a distinctive kind, there is also a very important something more.

In every living organism there is an appearance of autonomy. There is an initiative and determinative power which seems to proceed from the structural unit itself. A single nucleated cell, under certain favorable conditions, sets to work to organize and elaborate itself. It does not simply multiply itself, but it exhibits a constructive ability which causes it to take certain forms having the most diverse characteristics and adapted to a great variety of functions. Now, in the contemplation of such phenomena our minds unconsciously reach about, not only for some words by which to designate the observed process, but also for a conception, borrowed from some other department of knowledge, which shall stand for a partial explanation of it. Every thinking man is perpetually striving after a unification of his knowledge; and what he calls an explanation is often little more than the noting of similarities between existences and processes, by which he is able to class the less known to some extent with the better known. Thus, when we seek for an explanation of the movements of the simplest forms of organized life, we have open to us two fields in which to search for similarities; for as these phenomena occupy an intermediate position between the extremes of mind and inorganic matter, we may reasonably expect to find analogies in both realms. We *ought* to search for them in both. But this is not what has most frequently happened. The acquisition of a two-sided conception does not satisfy that craving for a simplification of knowledge which is one of the most imperative wants of

the human mind. We have therefore seen the thinking world divide itself into two opposed parties, each of which is inclined to look with obstinate preoccupation on one side of the shield.

Those who approach it from the side of the inorganic find abundant evidences of what looks like purely mechanical action, and advance to the position that mechanical law reigns supreme. Whatever is at variance with this conclusion they feel justified in neglecting on the ground that it constitutes only an *apparent* exception, which will ultimately be proved, as science advances, to be no exception. But those who approach the same phenomena from the side of the more highly organized find equally conclusive reasons for classing the simplest phenomena of organized life with the action of an intelligent mind. Having their thoughts fixed upon those activities which originate in the human mind, they demand a *cause* for that which they observe, which shall be something more than a sequence of phenomena, — a cause which can be expressed in terms of intelligence and will. These opposite tendencies flower, on the one hand, into systems like that of Mr. Spencer, and, on the other, into conceptions which are based upon the assumption of mind as the more or less immediate cause of every movement in nature. On the one hand, it is dogmatically affirmed that life is only transformed physical and chemical force; and, on the other, with better reason, that physical and chemical force are only *transformed* life or mind.

By the former party it is argued that the whole course of creation is a process proceeding from lower to higher forms, — from the inorganic to the organic; that the theory of evolution obliges us to look at the whole series of existences as pushed into being, each one by that next lower in the scale; that mind itself is a result of this process; and that the idea of originating cause which we connect with it must therefore be an illusion. Man, in common with the brute, the plant, and the stone, is the product of inexorable forces, of the nature of which he can have no knowledge, and over which he has no real, but only an imaginary control. On the other hand, those who refer all power to intelligent will have on their side the incontestable fact that mind is the sole originating cause of which we have any knowledge, and that in our experience of real causation the process is uniformly not from matter to mind, but from mind to matter. Those who assume cause to lie in the direction of the inorganic, and effect in the direction of the organic, have simply borrowed the idea of causation, which has originated in self-conscious mind, inverted it, and

given it a purely imaginative application. It can also be said with truth that those who reduce everything to terms of mechanical force can never quite get away from the conception of intelligent causation. Their talk of molecules and atoms is meaningless without the accompanying conception that these have a certain individuality, and act as individuals act; and the admission of an "inscrutable power," an "incomprehensible cause," is in reality a reluctant concession to the idea of an intelligent, originating agent.

Now, while theism must hold to the truth of that interpretation of nature which takes its departure from the side of mind, it is not from a point of view so generalized and abstract that we can hope to ascertain the bearing of the doctrine of evolution on the phenomena of mind. Scientific evolution did not originate in a study of intuitions, any more than it did in the study of inorganic life. It was suggested by the observation of the processes of organic life. The successive stages of growth in the individual were seen to be, to some extent, expressive of the successive stages in organized life regarded as a whole. This afforded the clew from which the theory was formulated, and then reformulated, as the study of biology in all its branches threw additional light upon the problem. In making an application of evolution to the phenomena of mind, therefore, it is necessary for us to come back to the starting point from whence all the speculative applications of the doctrine have been derived. We must draw our analogies directly from those phenomena which characterize the evolution of the individual organism. In other words, if there is such a thing as the evolution of a human mind, we must try to understand it by scrutinizing carefully that which takes place in the evolution of a human body.

The first fact to which I would ask attention is this, that the whole process of evolution in the individual is marked by two very distinct stages. In the first stage, which takes place in the egg, and which in the case of a chicken occupies from twenty to twenty-one days, there is an exceedingly *rapid* evolution or differentiation. This process is not the expansion of a minute organism into a larger one. It is the construction of an organism by the multiplication of cells. The original nucleated cell takes the initiative and transmutes the matter which surrounds it. During the whole of this period the immediate environment is the same. Changes in the more remote environment of the egg may arrest growth. But, as Dr. Maudsley observes, "its successive variations do not owe much apparently to natural selection; rather would

they appear to make their own election. . . . The very remarkable evolution of the microscopic germ is not due to its environment, but to occult qualities in itself, to its intrinsic essence.”¹ Instead of appearing as an adjustment of internal relations to external relations, therefore, it appears rather as an exceedingly rapid and revolutionary adaptation of external relations to internal relations, in the course of which the immediate external relations are made to disappear. The minute active cell has gathered to itself the whole little world of the egg and transformed it into a complete organism having the most wonderfully diverse parts, capable of the most varied and complicated functions. When this stage is finished, the second phase of existence begins. In this, the organism is no longer surrounded by an unchanging environment on which (without opposition) it makes constant aggression. It finds itself, on the contrary, in the midst of a variable and aggressive environment; and, from this time on, its evolution is a conflict. It is in this second stage that the principle of natural selection comes most manifestly into view. And it is during this stage alone that we are able to make those observations which result in the various theories of the cause of evolution. Let us notice, again, that in this second stage evolution has ceased to be a marvelously rapid process of variation by which non-existing organs are successively formed. It has become a comparatively slow process in which no new organs are formed. The structure and nature of the individual was completed and fixed in that utterly mysterious phase of existence which antedated its appearance on the stage of this world’s activities and conflicts. But from this time forth we may observe, tabulate, and partially explain by environment the gradual changes which take place in it.

Passing now from the individual to the species, we enter upon a wider problem of evolution; and in applying analogically the facts just passed in review we ought to look for two distinct stages in the genesis of species corresponding to those observed in the history of the individual. The first of these should be a period of more or less rapid and radical differentiation, at the close of which the type should have become fixed. Do we find such a correspondence between the individual and the species? No one is able to testify from having been present as an observer during the whole process of the birth of a species. But we have a record of what has taken place in geology, and the testimony of this is directly to the point. In the words of Dr. Le Conte, “As a question of history there is

¹ *Body and Will*, p. 144.

no witness upon the stand except geology. . . . Her evidence and hers alone must eventually settle this question. Now, the evidence of geology to-day is that species seem to come in suddenly and in full perfection, remain substantially unchanged during the term of their existence, and pass away in full perfection.”¹ So far as this record is concerned, therefore, whenever a new species is formed, its type seems to be reached by a comparatively rapid and, for the most part, inexplicable process of differentiation. Then ensues the history of the species corresponding to the life of the individual as a completed organism. By the study of this history we are able to account for many modifications of and variations from the original type by the influence of environment, heredity, and natural selection. But throughout the whole range of our observation the type remains essentially the same. The species has its distinctive structure and nature, its possibilities which it does not transcend. It is characterized by faculties and powers which may be strengthened or the reverse; but, so far as our knowledge extends, there is no passing into a type radically different, except as the result of a sharply defined crisis, — a period of rapid differentiation.

This argument is further strengthened from the necessities of the principle of natural selection. Even a useful variation must be developed with a considerable degree of suddenness, or it cannot survive. In the case of man the difficulty of accounting, on the theory of slow variation, for the characteristics which separate him so widely from the most highly developed brutes, has led even so staunch an advocate of natural selection as Mr. Wallace to attribute *his* origin to an exceptional working of the differentiating power. He declares it to be utterly inconceivable that the higher faculties of man could have been produced through the action of a law which looks only, and can look only, to the immediate material welfare of the individual or the race.² It is unnecessary to dwell upon this point; for it has been amply set forth by a multitude of writers, and emphasized not only by the opponents, but also by some of the most strenuous advocates of evolution.

From the above considerations I would deduce, first, the conclusion that *it is in accord with science as well as philosophy to regard the deliverances of self-consciousness as reliable data from which to determine the meaning of the word evolution as applied to mind.* We may assume the position that the essential features

¹ *Religion and Science*, p. 22.

² *Natural Selection*, p. 359.

of the human mind have always been what they are to-day. This is not to deny the working of evolution in the sphere of mind, but to affirm that, reasoning analogically from what we know of evolution in other departments, we may not expect to analyze the process of its becoming beyond a certain point. It is to affirm that the transition from the brute to the human mind must not be conceived of as an imperceptible and long drawn out gradation from lower to higher forms, but as a critical epoch in history. We must conceive of the birth of the human species as the result of a period of rapid variation like that which goes on in the egg before the birth of the individual. And as the organizing process which goes on in the egg is utterly mysterious, so the differentiating process by which the brute mind became human is mysterious and beyond analysis. We have to take up the study of mind, therefore, at a point where it must be regarded as an organism that has already reached a well defined stage of development. Its nature, its faculties, its possible relations to the world of thought and knowledge are essentially what they will always be, so long as man continues to be man. At the same time the analogies of evolution teach us, further, that we must conceive of the faculties and ideas of the human mind at this early stage as standing in the same relation to those of civilized man that the physical organs and activities of a new-born child bear to those of the age of maturity.

It may be useful here to remind the reader that I am not resting the validity of our ultimate beliefs upon these views of evolution. I have only tried to show that the analogies of scientific evolution, as now understood, are not inconsistent with the demands of philosophy and common sense; and I would further call attention to the fact that the opposite theory of evolution (that of slow variation) presents no contradiction to this view of mind as a well defined and separate entity, though it makes the conception of it more difficult. From the present drift of scientific discovery there is every reason to anticipate that a further knowledge of nature will afford analogies which will reduce the difficulty of harmonizing the facts of self-consciousness with the facts of sense-perception. But it is not impossible that new discoveries may produce a counter-current that will, for a time, increase the difficulty of obtaining a clear conception of mind as evolved from the lower orders of creation, and yet as having an essentially permanent and distinct nature. But these difficulties cannot shake the fact of its reality and its reliableness: they can only cast a doubt upon

the correctness of our notion of evolution. Having premised this, I will further call attention to the consideration that our observation of men as they exist to-day, in the least evolved societies, corroborates the view presented by the foregoing analogies.

It is manifestly an unwarranted assumption to regard the lowest existing savage as the complete equivalent of primitive man; for there is reason to believe that man, in the course of his moral evolution, has varied in a downward as well as in an upward direction. But, waiving this consideration, what do we find as to capacity for mental and moral improvement among the most degraded savages? Notwithstanding the accumulation of inherited tendencies, we find among them minds that are capable of being developed, sometimes in a single generation, to a stage which is both morally and intellectually in advance of that reached by great classes of the most civilized races. This fact, taken in connection with the cerebral development of the savage, so impresses Mr. Wallace that he does not hesitate to declare the human brain to be an example of structure in anticipation of function. Speaking of the lowest known human being, he says: "They possess a mental organ beyond their needs. Natural selection could only have endowed savage man with a brain little superior to that of an ape, whereas he actually possesses one very little inferior to that of a philosopher."¹ The testimony of missionaries, as the result of intercourse with uncultivated tribes in the most widely separated countries, is unanimous to the effect that men, the world over, are essentially the same. Facts collated by anthropologists like Sir John Lubbock and Mr. E. B. Tylor afford the strongest confirmation of the same view. Even Mr. Darwin, with his mind intent on observing the resemblances between men and animals, says: "The Fuegians rank among the lowest barbarians; but I was continually struck with surprise how closely the three natives on board H. M. S. Beagle, who had lived some years in England, and could talk a little English, resembled us in disposition and in most of our mental faculties."²

In the light of these facts and analogies, the radical defect of Mr. Spencer's theory of the evolution of ideas, a defect that vitiates his main conclusions, is manifest. In his ambition to analyze and exhibit the whole process of the creation of mind, and thus supply proofs of its evolution by the mechanical action of environment, he has inverted the order of its phenomena. He has given us the evolutionary tree upside down, — the stem as the re-

¹ *Natural Selection*, p. 356.

² *The Descent of Man*, vol. i. p. 33.

sult of the branches. He does what is equivalent to making organs appear as the product of their activities, faculties as the outcome of their functions. Conceptions which we might almost call congenital are, with him, only incidents in the adaptation of the human organism to environment.

This will be seen with greater clearness if we follow Mr. Spencer in the account which he gives of the evolution of one of our fundamental conceptions, that of causation. So long as we retain the conviction that the will of man is, within a limited sphere, an originating and self-determining power, we are not at a loss to account for the belief (one of the most persistent of all our beliefs), that *every event must have a cause*. As Dr. Newman has truly observed, "The assent which we give to the proposition, as a first principle, that nothing happens without a cause, is derived in the first instance from what we know of ourselves; and we argue analogically from what is within us to what is external to us."¹ Unless the human will is, within certain limits, an originating cause, we can nowhere point to the existence of such a thing. The idea stands utterly without credentials. It has somehow got a foothold in the human mind, but it cannot show its right. The mind is very tenacious of it, but everything tends to the belief that it ought not to be there. Physical science shows us that no such thing is to be found throughout the length and breadth of its wide fields of investigation.

Now what does Mr. Spencer give us to build our idea of causation upon? The idea of causation, he tells us, is one of the latest fruits of evolution. It has come to us not full formed and complete; it is not a simple idea that has arisen in connection with the causative power which we ourselves exercise, — a conception, therefore, that has sprung up with our earliest self-knowledge, and has expanded as a faculty expands. On the contrary, it is one which has been arrived at, as yet, only by the leaders of thought, one which is only partially evolved in the minds of many scientific men. "Intellectual progress," he tells us, "is by no one trait so adequately characterized as by development of the idea of causation, since development of this idea involves development of so many other ideas. . . . Even the simplest notion of cause, as we understand it, can be reached only after many like instances have been grouped into a simple generalization; and through all ascending steps, higher notions of causation imply wider notions of generality."² Farther on in the same chapter he tells us that

¹ *Grammar of Assent*, p. 63.

² *Data of Ethics*, p. 47.

causation is least recognized by men "in respect of those classes of phenomena amid which, in consequence of their complexity, causation is most difficult to trace, — the psychological, the social, the moral." "On studying the various ethical theories," he says, "I am struck with the fact that they are all characterized either by entire absence of the idea of causation or by inadequate presence of it."

It must be manifest to the reader that what Mr. Spencer here calls the "idea of causation" is the idea of second causes, or mediate causation. But what we call second causes are not, strictly speaking, causes at all. We have a chain of events which follow each other with regularity, and our experience of this regularity leads us to associate each one of these events with those that precede and those that follow it. We advance from this to the belief that these events will continue to follow in the same order. But how do we come at the idea of cause? Why is it that our minds instinctively travel back over the series, reducing on the way each supposed cause to an effect, in search of an efficient or *real* cause, altogether different in its nature from those that flow from it? This question is not a difficult one to answer on the basis of our old-fashioned consciousness.

But Mr. Spencer, in trying to arrive at the idea of causation by generalization, is pursuing something which he can never overtake, simply because it lies in the opposite direction; and the more he generalizes the more he gets befogged. When men become exclusively absorbed in the contemplation of, and search for, second causes, the idea of real or efficient cause becomes obscured, till a conception of it is arrived at which is hazy in the extreme; so hazy, indeed, that it is no wonder that only a select few of the world's educated minds have been able to attain to it. Mr. Spencer himself can only think he grasps it in moments of exceptional evolutionary exaltation. When, in calmer mood, he is laying the foundations of his philosophy, he speaks to us of an "incomprehensible cause;" and of this he says, though it "cannot in any manner or degree be known, in the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that its positive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness; that so long as consciousness continues, we cannot for an instant rid it of this datum; and that thus the belief which this datum constitutes has a higher warrant than any other whatever." But Mr. Spencer does not arrive at this idea of cause by generalization; and the passage is only a glaring illustration of the contradictions which abound in the "Synthetic Philosophy." As we

have before seen, his application of a mechanical theory of evolution to mind has destroyed its reality. He has left himself nothing in which to find a necessary datum of consciousness. He is perfectly right on the basis of his psychology in saying that "the 'Absolute' cannot in any manner or degree be known;" but all the rest of the sentence is, in the light of his philosophy, "unthinkable," "sheer nonsense."¹

What, then, is the true account of the origin and development of our idea of causation. Mr. Spencer recognizes the fact that it is impossible to know much about the traits of prehistoric man, except as we are content to fill out the general idea which evolution gives us, by the study of existing races of savages.² As regards the early appearance among savages of a desire to investigate causes, I can find room for only one quotation; but that shall be from a high authority. Mr. E. B. Tylor says: "Man's craving to know the causes at work in each event he witnesses, the reasons why each state of things he surveys is such as it is, and no other, is no product of high civilization, but a characteristic of his race down to its lowest stage. Among rude savages it is already an intellectual appetite whose satisfaction claims many of the moments not engrossed by war or sport, food or sleep." I have quoted this only as bearing upon the question of the early or late development of the desire to *enlarge* the original and simple idea of cause, — an idea which antedates the development of such a desire, and for the existence of which we have certain proof. Mr. Spencer's volume on Sociology gives us a vast collection of facts bearing upon this question, all of which go to prove that the idea of efficient cause is full formed in the mind of the savage from the time he begins to be conscious of himself.

Let us follow out one of his illustrations. In connection with the passage already quoted from the "Data of Ethics," Mr. Spencer says: "We hear with surprise of the savage, who, falling down a precipice, ascribes the failure of his foothold to a malicious demon." Are we surprised? On the supposition that the savage's mind is constituted like that of a civilized man, I say, most naturally reasoned! It is supposed, of course, that the fall has taken place under such circumstances as to seem to require an outside agency for the explanation of it. And such being the case, the inference is a natural deduction from his experience, and proves him to have a very clear, though narrow idea of cause. The will of an intelligent being is the only cause which he knows

¹ *First Principles*, p. 98.

² *Principles of Psychology*, p. 43.

much about; therefore if his own will did not cause the event, he naturally jumps to the conclusion that some other will did. And because, from the undeveloped state of his mind, he has little idea of process, and is unable to view the event except in relation to his personal injury, he infers an invisible malicious agent, acting in close contact with himself. Stripped of its accessories, the kernel of the conclusion, namely, that everything that takes place in the world must be traced to an intelligent will, is the truth. The simplest essential idea of cause, therefore, is fully evolved, though as compared with the wider idea of an educated man, it is what the hand of a baby, poor, weak, untaught thing, is to the hand of the adult, full of strength, and trained to a thousand skillful activities.

In the early stages of human development, the idea of process has but a small place in the conception of phenomena. The efficient cause and the result are brought close together. When the anthropoid animal became man by acquiring the power of sustained self-consciousness, the conception of process, we may assume, was at zero. The knowledge of himself as an actor, on the contrary, was a prominent element in that initial revelation by which he became known to himself. And as his causative power must have been exerted almost wholly in direct and simple acts, so his conception of cause would for a time continue to be that of a simple and direct exertion of his personal energy. But the progress of man in material civilization has ever been achieved by the invention of processes which become continually more and more extended. The use of fire, of water, of various implements, the construction of permanent abodes, and the elaboration of language familiarized primitive man with the use of processes in his own life; and by this the materials for the idea of mediate causation were accumulated. The idea itself could be grasped only when the power of abstract thought had become sufficiently developed for its recognition. As soon as it is grasped, and an effort is made to extend its application, there is a fermentation in the mind. For although when considered in relation to short and simple processes there is no confusion and no antagonism between the ideas of primary and instrumental causation, an antagonism ensues as soon as the problem is enlarged to take in a series of complex phenomena. A man thinks and speaks of himself as the cause of everything which he brings to pass by simple processes. Though he may, by accommodation, say that the fire cooks his food, he never thinks of calling the fire the cook. But

as soon as he turns to the consideration of results which have required longer processes, his mind is easily diverted from the thought of a real cause by his preoccupation with second causes.

When, for instance, attention is turned to the cause of a skein of home-spun yarn, the housewife who sat at the spinning-wheel is thought of. But in the case of a similar skein, produced by more elaborate machinery driven by steam, it is the steam-driven machinery that is thought of. Although perfectly well aware that the one as much as the other is the product of an intelligent human will, yet it is only by a slight compulsion of the mind that this is clearly recognized. So when man begins to project his idea of cause from the realm of human agency to the great world of natural phenomena, there ensues a conflict. The discovery of a mediate or instrumental cause where he has hitherto conceived an immediate one requires a reconstruction of his notion which it is not easy to make.

Scientific investigators are unconsciously led astray by an imperfect application of the analogy with which they start. Mr. Spencer's volume on sociology, as I have said, profusely illustrates and emphasizes the fact that the uneducated mind always demands an intelligent will to explain causation. Now, when the knowledge of process intervenes, the originating will is naturally sought for by tracing back, step by step, the series of second causes. Thus a detective, beginning with a slight clew, may work patiently for years at a problem of human causation, unearthing one link after another of a buried chain, till at length his patience is rewarded by coming upon an originating cause. It is the feeling that an originating cause ought to be discoverable in the same way by nature's detectives, when they unveil and trace back her hitherto hidden processes, that results in unbelief, when the chain seems to extend into infinity. A more careful application of the analogy would lead to the discovery of an intelligent will in the one case as certainly as in the other. Whenever causation is traced to a man, other than one's self, it is traced not to a physical organization, which is apparent to the senses, but to a mind which is never cognizable by the senses. A real causative power is believed to exist in connection with a human body, not our own, solely because we cannot help drawing an inference from our own self-consciousness. Reasoning in the same way, we must postulate a real cause of a similar kind as the source of the phenomena of the universe, though we cannot associate it with a physical form. But for those who are to be satisfied only by the discovery of a

physically embodied first cause, the only logical conclusion must be that the whole idea of efficient cause is an hallucination, and that the human will, like everything else, is only a link in the great chain of second causes.

But scientific explorers are not the only ones who find difficulty in extending the idea of mediate causation from its simpler manifestations to the problem of the universe. Those who cling through everything to the idea of origination by intelligent will are tossed upon a sea of conflict when they try to rationalize their conception of God. When the idea of many invisible agents, acting in close connection with phenomena, has given place to the idea of one will at the centre of the universe, there arises on the one hand the conception of an infinitely extended process with a God infinitely removed from connection with human beings; and on the other hand there arises the conception of a God in close connection with events, and sustaining to his works a relation similar to that which the mind of man bears to his body and to the activities which he manifests through it. The first is intolerable, and renders human intercourse with God inconceivable. The second savors of pantheism, and is rescued from it only by retaining a firm hold on the fact of human personality. Thus, from the never-ceasing stimulus of conflicting ideas, progress—evolution—results. By the interaction of destructive and reconstructive forces, of criticism and thought-building, the idea of causation, as applied to the universe, progressively works itself clear of misconception, while it ever assumes, in the mind of the theist, a more definite and rational shape. In other words, the evolution of this idea is the progress of the human mind on *one* of the great lines by which, in the realization of a pre-ordained plan, it seeks after God if haply it might feel after Him and find Him, though He be not far from every one of us.

If this account of the genesis of our idea of a Great First Cause as an intelligent self-determining Personality is true, we are in possession of principles which may be applied in other departments of mind. The evolution of the complex conscience of a Christian civilization may be deduced from the simplest ideas of ought and ought not, given in consciousness through a similar conflict of thought and experience; and in this evolution we may recognize another of those great lines of progress on which we advance to ever higher and purer conceptions of the *character* of God.

F. H. Johnson.

EDITORIAL.

INDISPOSITION TO FACE RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

MANY years ago, one of the pupils of a then well-known instructor in biblical literature gave us an amusing account of the professor's method of meeting difficulties. When a passage was reached which contained etymological or theological perplexities, he would exclaim, "Gentlemen, here is a difficulty. Let us not be timid; let us look it fairly in the face." Then, after a moment's pause, he would resume: "And now, gentlemen, having faced the difficulty, let us pass on." The good man's Falstaffian valor probably seems less unique to his former pupils now than in their student days. They have often found themselves, when confronted by a problem, sorely tempted to "face" it after the same transient fashion. If they have ever yielded to the temptation, they have probably comforted themselves with the thought that they had many respectable companions in transgression.

For they must have been dull observers of the life of the Church if they have not found out that unwillingness to face problems which the Providence of God and the leadings of his Spirit have forced upon it has been and is one of its serious defects. That this defect is more serious than many good people think, and that it is not an unprofitable task to point out its causes, is our conviction.

It is to be noticed, to begin with, that the temptation to this fault has not mastered exclusively, perhaps not chiefly, the more selfish and worldly. Its peculiar power has lain in its appeal to qualities which give Christian life seriousness and efficiency. Hence the painful contrast between the spirit of the service rendered by many Christians and the tone of their intellectual life. When some piece of work is set before them they are prompt and resolute in attacking it; when they are summoned to form a new conviction, or to modify an old one, they are timid, procrastinating, and self-indulgent. Attacked by a spiritual foe, they will fight heroically; confronted by a hard problem, they will turn and flee.

We need not go beyond our own country, scarcely beyond our own generation, for abundant illustrations of this inconsistency. When called on to face its responsibility for the use of such power as it had to hem in and weaken slavery, at least to prevent its spread, was the Church, as a body, eager to take up the ethical question involved, knowing as it did that it was not an abstract question, that great moral issues were at stake, and that its own character might be damaged by its refusal to get conviction and use it?

Though it should not be forgotten that the power of the abolition movement lay largely in the religious convictions of the few church-mem-

bers who belonged to it from the first, yet candor demands the admission that the strictures passed by their radical associates upon the Church were for a time well founded. Long after the moral effects of slavery were clearly seen — when were they hidden? — and the aggressive temper of the slave-power had become felt, a very large part of the Church, including some of its leaders, wished to suppress the anti-slavery agitation. Many who shared this wish afterwards became leaders in the anti-slavery movement; but they lagged in those earlier years, not because they were time-serving, but because they shrank from facing the question at issue. It involved an important modification of their conception of Christianity, a new departure in ethics and biblical interpretation, and this they were slow to make.

Then the resistance long made to the demand which evangelism fifty years ago put forth for larger liberty in its conception of human freedom as against divine sovereignty; did not this show reluctance to respond to a divine call to reëxamine a leading tenet of theology? Perhaps the conservative leaders had done their thinking before the issue arose, and could only fight and pray against what they deemed a formidable heresy; but they would not have had power so to stir the churches against the new teaching if a large part of the rank and file had not shut their minds to the disturbing ideas and followed on. The problem once met, the essential worthiness of Finney's and Taylor's teaching was recognized, and the flames of strife died down. The charred brands remain to show how long the question was put aside. The reluctance of church teachers to meet the questions concerning the Mosaic cosmogony raised by geology twenty-five years ago is another illustration. "It will be time for us to ask whether our belief accords with the facts," was the plea for delay, "when the geologists have come to an agreement as to what the facts are." So, by the specious pretext that the teachings of science have no decisive value for the Christian mind, delay was gained. When geology had established its position among the sciences, new interpretations of Scripture were invented which modified the discrepancy between its teachings and the Scripture cosmogony. These served their purpose well. The question was long avoided. Biblical science is demonstrating that these artificial interpretations must be given up, — that the sacred writers must be interpreted according to the laws of language, — and that the questions between the Mosaic account of creation and the teachings of geology must be met — but in the face of sturdy opposition from a large part of the Christian public.

This defect in the life of the Church, illustrations to which need not have been confined to the past, is, as has been already said, a "defect of its qualities." To understand it, we must go back of its remaining "old heaven" to some of the noblest features of its life.

First, its hearty love for the old teaching which has made it free makes it unwilling to put itself in an attitude which involves the possible aban-

donment of any of it. The conservative plea that, by keeping the old without jot or tittle of alteration we secure all that it brought to the fathers, while avoiding the perils of change, is by no means an absurd one. Its weight with sober minds, when used in the political sphere, is appreciated by everybody. "The Reflections on the French Revolution" is the splendid proof of its power over one of the great political thinkers of modern times. This plea has still more force in the religious sphere, because there what is old contains more obviously imperishable elements, and the possibilities involved in change are greater and come more swiftly. The English Constitution is not founded on a divine revelation; the theology of Dr. Emmons was: The English government cannot be uprooted by any act of its own; the Church *may* renounce its belief in all revealed truth, and so destroy its life. We can easily understand, then, how a Christian can regard divine truth as wrought out once for all in the system of theology in which he was bred, and resist any attempt to modify that system, with all the energy of his religious conviction. "I have found this Bible to be God's book, and I believe that it all came from Him, even the language. If I regarded it as containing a single error, I could not believe it to be his book, for all his works are perfect. If I did not believe it to be his book I should lose my religious faith, for that faith is built upon the assumption that He gave it to the world to tell it of Himself. Therefore I shall not listen to men who try to prove that it contains errors. Why should I listen to them, if I am to keep on believing in the Bible and living under its influence?" It is a conservatism which not only refuses to accept the results of biblical study, but is inimical to it; which is hostile to textual criticism, even to re-translation of the Scriptures, — we have known it to be avowed by an influential layman, in these its logical inferences. This is not an unaccountable form of belief. We cannot wonder that men should regard the Bible as being what it is through that overshadowing and miraculous action of God in its composition in which they believe, and that they cannot be persuaded to look at the book itself apart from that conception. The association between their spiritual appreciation of its contents and this idea of it as an absolutely perfect because purely divine work, is so intimate that they could not consider the possibility of severing them without pain.

Another cause of indisposition to face religious problems is a certain enthusiasm of faith which glows in some generous minds. They glory in believing. It is chivalrous to trust an unseen Lord. They honor Him by taking what He says without query. The more fully they believe the more they honor Him. It is easy for them to forget that they cannot believe as Christ would have them, until they find out what He would have them believe, and that his ordering of the life of the Church and the world is such that the inquiry has to be constantly renewed, so that a hearty faith must be open-minded and truth-seeking. Many Chris-

tians do forget this, and form the habit of regarding the one act of the soul toward divine things as that of acquiescent trust. They acquire a dislike to the searching and pondering attitude. It seems undevout. They form an impression that there is an antagonism between thinking and trusting. So, instead of keeping their belief sincere and vital, they cultivate devout frames and postures. When difficulties come they shut their eyes and pray instead of facing them. It is the temper which impels men towards Rome.

Many ministers are kept from facing religious problems by a one-sided devotion to their work. They have to impress truth on the minds of their people. They cannot do this unless it comes from them with the ring of absolute conviction. Therefore they will cultivate the habit of believing mightily. They will live in those things that they are sure of. They will let the schools settle the hard questions; they will deal with assured results. So they think little and preach sturdily. And in time, as the power of living thought is taken from the strong convictions, they become feeble, notwithstanding all efforts made to preserve their force, and the sturdy assertions of truth begin to have, even to the preacher, a somewhat mechanical and hollow sound.

Ministers sometimes check the impulse to face problems through conscientious sympathy with the more conservative members of their churches. They cannot succeed in their work unless they have the full coöperation of such parishioners. This they will lose if they try to discuss disturbing questions. They must put away such questions, and live in the religious life of those who will not think. It is the temper which made many timid ministers ignore the slavery question during years when their influence was sorely needed in deepening the moral sentiment of the North. It leads many ministers to ignore the biblical questions which are now pressing upon the mind of the Church, not seeing that the immediate results thus gained are won by making a large subtraction from the effectiveness of those who follow them. In giving these not discreditable reasons for the defect in question, we do not assume that there are none which are less worthy. Those we prefer to pass over, believing that they are not so influential as those named. We may hereafter point out some of the consequences which follow the persistent shirking of religious problems.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE ULTRA-CONSERVATIVES.

THERE is in the churches a small body of men who are doing all in their power to retard progress, while they cry out lustily, We are the only safe guides; beware of all others! These are the ultra-conservatives who make loud, not to say impudent, professions of immaculate orthodoxy, and who claim for themselves immunity from criticism on the ground that they are the only surviving defenders of the truth. It is

high time that their hostility to the real interests of the churches and of society were exposed. In our honest judgment, they are doing more harm than any other equal number of men, and their power for evil is increased because they employ all arts to turn suspicion from themselves upon others. There is a true conservatism which is the condition of all real progress. There is an ultra-conservatism which is the sworn enemy of progress. Conservatism avoids by-paths and guides the chariot of the Lord along the solid highways of truth. Ultra-conservatism would chain the wheels and bring the chariot to a stand-still.

It has been the fashion for some time to call to account all those who favor changes in the statement or relative emphasis of religious truths. The churches have been vehemently warned against all such as dangerous innovators. It has been declared and reiterated, sometimes in very harsh terms, that trouble is to be looked for only in that quarter. Now, while it is true that, within certain limits, the burden of proof rests on the advocates of change, it is also true that in every generation some change is necessary, and that those who oppose legitimate progress may with still more reason be sharply called to account. We distinctly raise the question, then, whether the ultra-conservatives of to-day shall any longer have the immunity from accountability which they have so long claimed and enjoyed. Shall we tolerate them while they iterate the boast, I am holier than thou, and on the corners of the street thank God that they are not as other men are? The answer to the question is to be gained by recognizing their attitude and designating some of their methods. If we speak plainly, it is because we feel strongly.

The Church of Christ in this country, as elsewhere, has an immense problem before it. It is no exaggeration to say that the conditions of life and thought have never been so perplexing as they are at this present time. Outward changes in rapidity of travel, extension of commerce, growth of cities, influx of foreigners, modes of living, have scarcely kept pace, swiftly as they have come upon us, with the spread of intelligence, discoveries of the reign of law in the universe, the tremendous lurch towards materialism and mercantilism, the contagion of the democratic tendency which intensifies individualism and diminishes regard for authority, the new and pressing social questions which have arisen, the spirit of free inquiry concerning all inherited beliefs and traditions. Doubtless the truth and power of the gospel are adequate to meet these changed conditions, but does any one believe that the truth will be effective if it is presented only in the forms which were appropriate to the centuries which lie behind us? The gospel must be translated and interpreted to modern thought in modern terms. It must be incorporated in character which, instead of being insulated from the world, is in sympathy with it. The living Christ must be brought to the living soul. All honor to those men who, with unwavering faith in the Christ who is the same yesterday and to-day and forever, address themselves to the task of making Him in-

telligible to the thought, real to the need, and inspiring to the life of our own time. That some will go too far and attenuate, even eviscerate, the gospel, is no more than might be expected. Let us not follow after them. But that we should be called off from our sacred task, commanded to drop modern speech and methods, stigmatized as traitors, or at least brought under a cloud of suspicion, is most grievous. The ultra-conservatives are attempting to rob the churches of the spiritual gains which are peculiar to modern religious thought and experience, to hinder (they cannot arrest) the work which is so bravely going on. It becomes intolerable when, complacent in their own fancied security, they try to persuade good men that they are the people and wisdom shall die with them. There are such men among us who are vociferous with warnings, and they do maintain such an attitude towards progress. Let us not follow after *them*. One extreme is as bad as the other.

Their methods are characteristic of their attitude. One method is that of insisting that a certain phraseology shall be used in the preaching and teaching of doctrines. Phrases which once glowed with meaning, but have lost much of their heat and light, are made tests of doctrinal fidelity. This method may be called the Overworking of Phrases. For instance, concerning the doctrine of atonement, a stand is made on the use of the term *expiation*. Those who can say *expiation* are safe men. Those who cannot say *expiation* are dangerous men. It was not so long ago since a stand was made on the term *vicarious*. To be evangelical one must use the word *vicarious* freely. But since it is a term with considerable latitude of meaning, and since almost every one who accepts the Divinity of Christ has no objection to it, it is thought necessary to lay hold of some other word which is of unmistakable import. *Expiation* is a figurative term borrowed from the sacrificial altar to express the necessity of satisfying God, so that he can forgive sin. When used, not in a quantitative, but a spiritual meaning, it expresses an important truth, — indeed, in our judgment, the fundamental truth of atonement. We believe that the reconciliation of God effected by the death of Christ is assumed even by those who deny the necessity of it. The *expiation* made by Christ has been so effective, and pardon is therefore so freely offered, that some, in their clear recognition of the result, lose sight of the cause, and declare that it never was necessary to reconcile God. But notwithstanding our conviction that the necessity of reconciliation lies primarily in the character of God, we object decidedly to making any one phrase concerning it a shibboleth. It is impossible to express the significance of Christ's atonement by a single word. *Expiation* is a word that has come down to us from the past, and has its uses, but it is not found in the Bible, and hence has not the advantage which propitiation has, and no one has a right to impose it as a test. Moreover, we request those who hold up this word so prominently to explain precisely what it means to them. Are they not using it themselves in a somewhat vague

sense? Are they not reviving the notion of a quantum of suffering endured, and getting back into mechanical and mercantile conceptions. They must be more explicit, and tell us what their crucial test really is. They are overworking a phrase which, whether in itself or in its associations, is incapable of covering all the facts. When one says he accepts the new creed in its statement concerning the atonement, it is replied, Oh no, you must insert expiatory. So with the phrase *infallible*, as applied to the Bible. It is not enough to say that the "Scriptures constitute the authoritative standard by which religious teaching and human conduct are to be regulated and judged." You must say infallible. But those who would thus lord it over us either do not explain what they mean by infallible, or they limit infallibility to certain spheres of truth, or they assert an infallibility which is only relatively infallible, if any one knows what that means. They do not trust the Bible to assert itself, but would prop it up with a phrase which, unless it means too much, means nothing at all. An eminent judge of the United States courts writes: "While I know that the progressive spirit in theology has come to stay, I can see that there is a strong effort to capture this city in the interests of the sixteenth century." What is this overworking of phrases but an attempt to cast the present doctrinal beliefs of the churches in the rigid mould of a former period, to force the new wine into old bottles? The golden age of Christianity is always in the future. The ultra-conservatives find it in the past. John Foster explained the aversion of men of taste to evangelical religion by showing that truth has been presented in an outgrown or an ambiguous terminology. This aversion will be deepened if we are to be summoned back to the old creeds and phrases, and are to make them ultimate expressions of belief.

We wish the specification of methods could stop here, and that the issue could be squarely joined on the use of mediæval or of modern statements of doctrine. But more must be said. Some of the methods employed are wonderfully suggestive of tactics which are fast coming under condemnation even in politics and business. They are not altogether honorable. It seems as if the ultra-conservatives were deliberately trying to create a panic in the churches. A panic arises not from a calm and candid survey of the facts, but by starting vague and threatening reports. The shout goes up that these progressive men are denying the atonement, teaching a second probation, undermining the authority of the Bible; and timid souls are alarmed. It even goes so far as to the selection of a rallying-cry which will be most *likely* to alarm the churches. It is agreed that a certain cry shall be taken because it will be effective. Then certain statements of fresh views are cut out of their connection and put in another light, which makes them look dangerous. It is like the political method of stalwart Republicans trying to conduct a campaign by waving the bloody shirt. They care nothing about Southern outrages, but they want a party cry.

The ultras seem to take advantage, intentionally, of the patience and magnanimity of those they attack. They resort to insinuations, misrepresentations, vague but alarming surmises, because they suppose no reply will be made. For the sake of peace and to avoid making the impression that progressive theology is animated by a controversial spirit, the obstructionists have been left unmolested. They have supposed the policy of silence would be maintained, and so have said whatever might serve their purposes. Surely we should not condescend to the use of the same weapons, but there comes a time when patience and silence cease to be virtues. It is not well that truth should suffer and spiritual interests be imperilled for the sake of the semblance of peace. When a determined and combined, we had almost said unscrupulous, attempt is made to bring and keep under suspicion those who are trying to preach or teach the truth as Christian men should, when resort is had for this purpose to incorrect and misleading statements, caricatures, false reports, we cannot keep silence. We do not deny that we and our friends are sensitive under the treatment to which we have been subjected; but we are sensitive not because we are sore, but because we are indignant. When candidates soon to come before councils are privately informed that if they hold this or that view they will be rejected, what is this but petty persecution? What would they not say if progressive men should resort to similar measures?

Are these men not to be held accountable for the needless alarm they are causing, and for the wretched mischief they are working? Is it not an excessive love of quietness which refrains from characterizing them as they deserve? They are found in all denominations, and in all generations. They are the lineal descendants of those who drove the Wesleyans out of the Church of England, who drove Jonathan Edwards out of Northampton, who put Albert Barnes on trial for heresy. They have always been the men who would stop the wheels of progress.

It may not be true in religion and theology, but it certainly is true in all other relations, that those who stoutly and incessantly proclaim their own excellence, who declare that they alone are above suspicion, will bear watching. We suspect those who take pains to assure us that they are not to be suspected.

The methods employed betray the consciousness of a waning cause; but one sinner is capable of destroying much good. We believe that the number of ultras who are would-be leaders is insignificantly small, but their activity is out of proportion to their numbers. When determined men can work in comparative safety, a few may hinder the development of a spiritual theology adapted to the needs of the age. The rising tide has its dangerous undertow. We are not indulging in hasty invective. It has been our judgment for many months that the ultra-conservatives are doing much to hinder the progress of truth, and we have at length decided to express our unfavorable opinion. We have no

apologies to offer, for we are stating only what ought to be known. We have no expectation of convincing any one of our opponents of the error of his ways, but we do hope to relieve some of our readers of needless fears, and to point out those who are really the chief offenders. We will claim no exalted virtue by saying that it pains us or grieves us to be obliged to bring such charges against Christian brethren. It pains us that the facts are what they are, but it is a relief and a pleasure to give expression at length to our pent-up feelings of honest indignation.

WOMEN AT OXFORD UNIVERSITY.

THE voting at Oxford on the admission of women to examination for honors has been a genuine surprise. The majority in favor of it is so large that people are rubbing their eyes and asking, not what the vote means to the women, but what it means on the part of the men voting. The largest vote ever cast by the graduates of Oxford was called out on this issue. Obscure rectors came up from all parts of the kingdom and helped to swell the majority. Conservatives in politics voted for, Liberals against, and every one has been asking what it all means.

The facts are soon recited. Some years ago Cambridge University accorded to women the right to be examined on the same terms with men for honors in mathematics, classics, history, and the natural sciences. Other universities of less note had previously granted the same privileges. Oxford had merely given certificates of a certain degree of proficiency in the studies pursued. The demand has been strongly pressed that Oxford should admit women to examination for honors. It was not asked that women might become candidates for degrees, nor that they should have residence in the University, but that they should be examined for honors, and that the names of the successful candidates should appear in alphabetical order precisely as if they were men.

The reasons behind the request were not sentimental, as such demands are in America, but economical. Many of those who apply for examination intend to earn their livelihood by teaching. It has been found that those who succeed in the examinations for honors get the good situations, while the Oxford certificates of proficiency, having no fixed value, are nearly worthless. It was not sentiment that was involved, but bread and butter, — and this explains, in part, the surprising vote.

The resident graduates having voted in favor, an appeal was taken to the non-resident graduates, that is, the Congregation appealed to the Convocation, whose decisions are final. Nearly 800 Masters of Arts came together, — a larger number than appeared at a time of recent theological excitement, a larger number, in fact, than ever assembled, — and by the decisive majority of 143 voted that women should be admitted to the examinations. Who would have predicted that country rectors and curates would hold so advanced views? But a rector has daughters.

It is popularly supposed that he has a good many, and that he is at his wits' end how to support them. One of them had failed to secure a certain position because she had no honor certificates. It is not strange that the bright daughters pack off papa for the Convocation, nor that he is quite ready to go, that by his vote he may improve their chances of earning a living. Not political, nor ecclesiastical, nor sentimental, but domestic reasons had most to do with the remarkable result. It was felt that an unfounded prejudice should not close the doors of employment to intelligent women. Solemn warnings were uttered and dismal forebodings expressed by dignitaries of the church concerning the ruin likely to overwhelm the country by reason of this innovation, one of the Dons predicting that Oxford would become a matrimonial bureau; but nothing availed to alarm the determined voters. The opposition has, at least, the satisfaction of knowing that it is thoroughly beaten, and that it is useless to reopen the question.

Such a vote admitting women to valuable privileges in the most ancient and conservative of English universities does not show that woman suffrage is certain to follow, nor even that a long step has been taken towards the elevation of women. It means that an Englishman loves fair play. It also exhibits the good sense of Englishmen in one important respect. They are willing that the legitimate occupations should be open to woman. There is no silly prejudice standing in the way of a woman who must earn her own livelihood. She does many things in that country, and has for years, which in democratic America custom does not allow her to do. Women here have, indeed, too much of that freedom which only harms them, but they have too little of the freedom which helps them. It is to be desired that some of the conventional restrictions of England might take the place of the excessive freedom permitted here in the mutual relations of men and women, especially of young men and women, but, on the other hand, that our narrowness in excluding women from various respectable occupations might make way for the liberty so generously accorded in the mother country.

THE INDEPENDENT IN POLITICS.

It would be too much to say that the independent commands the present political situation. Nevertheless, politicians will do well not to underestimate his power. Possibly he may not be a determining factor in either of the nominating conventions. Certainly he will be a determining factor in the election if his fair claims are ignored. We can conceive of the two parties as alike satisfying the independents by their nominations and by their assertion of principles, and so virtually eliminating the independent movement from the conflict. But such virtuous action is not to be anticipated. In all probability there will be a choice in respect to Presidential candidates and in respect to the degree in which they are committed to questions of reform.

What is the *real* strength of the present independent movement? Recent events have brought into prominence the fact that the independent seems to hold the balance of power. Is this his strength? Certainly not, in distinction from that of any third party in a contest. The mere holding of the balance between two factions of a party, or between two parties, has no permanent significance. The situation may be purely accidental. According to present indications the independent movement has deeper and more permanent sources of strength.

One source of its present strength evidently lies in its recognition of the place and province of the established parties. It does not seem to be aspiring to make of itself another party. Four years ago there was more discussion about such an attempt than there is to-day. Time has shown the unwisdom of the project. The issues involved are not such as create parties. The corruption of an existing party is not a necessary reason for the organization of a new one.

The Republican party supplanted the Whig party, not because the Whig party was corrupt, but because it was too conservative. It refused the leadership of the moral movement then making itself felt throughout the non-slaveholding States. Party corruption is too often a matter of circumstance, a question of opportunity, as with the Democratic party in its handling of the Irish vote, or with the Republican party in its handling of the negro vote. Or it may come through the local intrenchment of a given party in power, as with the Democratic party in New York city, or with the Republican party in Philadelphia. Historic parties are not to be overturned or swept away through popular impatience or indignation with political managers. There are less costly and more effective ways of punishing insolent and unscrupulous politicians. The independent movement is strong because it is so terribly personal. It names men. Its contention is not simply for general morality of administration. It does not hesitate to say of such and such men that they have not the political character which warrants the trust of citizens.

The emphasis thus placed upon political character, if rigidly insisted upon and supported by resolute efforts toward civil service reform, will surely purify American politics. And nothing else will. If the independents allow themselves to go out into other issues which belong properly to the established parties, they may gain in certain localities some temporary advantage, but they will not effect their main object. The party managers will gladly make concessions upon any question which may be brought before the public as a substitute for the one question of purity of administration. Happily the independent movement shows no sign at present of wavering in the resoluteness or singleness of its purpose.

Another source of its present strength lies in its method of training for political leadership. The acknowledged party method is that of

organization. The political aspirant is "the worker." The ward of the city, or the school district of the country, is the field of his operations. The field must not be too large, else it will not be well "worked." The local politician who gains a reputation for thoroughness puts himself in the way of promotion. He makes himself necessary to the party. A larger field is given him to cultivate, and with the larger power at his command comes the larger claim for services rendered. The only limit to promotion by this method — but the limit is a very rigid one — is that of personal political influence. A man who is simply a political manager is of no account outside his own field, and the largest field open to such a man is the congressional district or the State. There are men in Congress, both in the House and in the Senate, who have nothing to expect from the nation at large. They have no power whatever beyond the power to maintain themselves in their seats. Even Mr. Conkling, with his acknowledged general ability, never made a place for himself in national politics. His political influence was always confined to his own State, where he was the master of its peculiar political methods.

Doubtless the independents, without forming a party, will have to deal more or less with organization. The organizing faculty belongs in politics. But this faculty has shown itself thus far in the independent movement, not in the manipulation of voters, but in the management of public measures. Young men have given themselves to the careful investigation of questions of vital public interest. They have studied into them as they would have studied into like questions in business. And as occasions have offered they have had something to propose. Their plans have been seen to be simple, practical, far-reaching. The press has taken up the men and their measures and given them a hearty support. Their constituency has been limited only by the number of those whom their reforms effect. Hence their influence has been far more than local. They have become influential through the necessity and reach of the interests with which they have identified themselves, and which they have shown themselves competent to handle. "Mr. Roosevelt will never become a political leader," wrote one of the old-time leaders at Albany to a citizen of Central New York. "But he is already a leader," was the reply. "He has been leading all of you throughout the session."

But the chief source of strength in the independent movement is, of course, its independence, — its independence within party, its independence, if need be, of party. Everything depends in the last result upon the assurance of consistency of action. The power of the threat lies in the certainty of its execution. It is, however, to be noticed that this quality of independence is becoming less an irritating force as it asserts itself more in practical measures of reform. The independent, as a type of the reformer, improves under work and with success. He is less a cynic, less a critic, than formerly; he is less frequently spoken of as an impracticable; he has less and less occasion to bolt his party. The more

independence is shown within party, the less is seen to be the need of independence of party. As was natural, from the fact that it was the party in power, the criticisms of the independent have been upon the Republican party. So, too, his work is now largely within the same party. The independents are to be well represented in the Chicago Republican Convention. Their delegates go there with well defined and expressed antagonisms, though there are different degrees of antagonisms toward different possible candidates. These antagonisms are more clearly defined and more clearly expressed than their preferences. The independents do not assume to dictate the nomination. They do affirm, however, their determination to oppose certain possible nominations in a very different way from that in which party opposition usually ends. They enter the convention with the understanding that under very possible contingencies they will not submit to the decision of the majority. This purpose shows an independence within party which it is to be hoped will remove the necessity of the assertion of independence of party.

Meanwhile, whatever may be the result of the approaching conventions, or of the approaching election, the cause of civil service reform advances. It is rapidly passing the stage of experiment. It has received full and hearty recognition at the hands of the present administration, and, thus indorsed, it has gone over from national politics into the politics of the State and of the city. It is not likely to meet with any permanent reverse.

A LETTER FROM BISHOP BRYENNIOS.

THE personal interest in Bishop Bryennios awakened in this country by his candid and scholarly presentation of his important discovery leads the recipient of the following letter to yield to the request of his associate editors for its publication in full:—

CONSTANTINOPLE, April $\frac{1}{2}$ ⁶, 1884.

REVEREND AND DEAR SIR:—

I duly received your letter of March 24th, as well as the number of the *Andover Review*, of which you are the editor. I beg to offer you my best thanks for what you so kindly write of my *Prolegomena* on the $\Delta\delta\alpha\chi\eta$; I had already received from a Greek student of theology in one of the German universities a translation of your article before receiving the *Review* you did me the favor to send me. If I understand rightly your request, you [would] like to have a fuller account of the discovery of the now celebrated Codex; unfortunately the details are very few and unimportant. The library in which the manuscript was discovered belongs to the Convent of the Holy Sepulchre, where the Patriarch of Jerusalem resides when on a visit to Constantinople. It was during the seventeenth century that Dositheus ($\Delta\sigma\sigma\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$), Patriarch of Jerusalem, and

one of the benefactors of the Holy Land, began to collect these manuscripts, augmented since by his successors. In perusing over the catalogue of manuscripts my attention was particularly attracted to this one because of its contents; in fact, the Synopsis of the Old and New Testaments, by St. John Chrysostom, was the oldest treatise contained in the whole catalogue. But knowing by experience that every manuscript very often contains several treatises written by different authors, and that only the first of the series is marked on the outer sheet, in turning over the leaves I discovered Clement's Epistles, and, last of all, the *Διδαχή*. These are the only details of the discovery.

*Ζώης ἐπὶ μήκιστον ὀλβιος ἐν ὀλβίοις, τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν φι-
λῶν, οὗ ἡ χάρις εἴη μετὰ σοῦ διὰ παντός.*¹

✠ Φιλόθεος Βρυέννιος,
μητροπολίτης Νικομηδείας.

WHY BAPTISTS REGARD IMMERSION ONLY AS VALID CHRISTIAN BAPTISM: A COMMUNICATION.

THE article in the last number of this Review entitled "Baptism in the 'Teaching' and in Early Christian Art" is virtually a challenge to those who hold that immersion alone is valid Christian baptism. The article closes with these words: "Is it possible to justify the maintenance of the doctrine that baptism, in order to be baptism, must always and everywhere be administered by submersion without a 'Thus saith the Lord,' which, if ever spoken, would have made impossible the seventh chapter of the 'Teaching' and the further revelation of the church's consciousness of liberty in the early representations of baptism in Christian art?" The history of the Christian church shows that a "Thus saith the Lord" has not prevented among the professed followers of Christ the widest departures from Christian truth. Even in apostolic times Paul had occasion again and again bitterly to mourn over and sharply to rebuke his own converts who had forsaken the truth and accepted error. There is no need, therefore, of answering the question in the form in which it stands. The vital point, I apprehend, is this: Is it possible to justify the position held by those who maintain that immersion alone is valid baptism? It is this question, submitted in "all kindness and love of Christian unity and coöperation," that I purpose to answer. If this position is not capable of justification, the sooner the fact is made to appear, the better it will be for the cause we all desire to serve.

In their view that immersion only is valid baptism, Baptists appeal to the New Testament. They find here, they believe, a "Thus saith the Lord." The words of the great commission, as recorded by Matthew, are as follows: "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them," etc. Now, so far as baptism is concerned, what was the act enjoined in this command, and which is also suggested wherever baptism comes before us in the New Testament? We certainly cannot go astray if first of all we seek for the meaning of the word here employed. That word

¹ May you live very long, happy among the happy, loving our Lord Jesus Christ, whose grace be with you alway.

is βαπτίζειν, which lexicographers assure us means *to immerse, submerge*. Not a passage has been found, in sacred or profane literature, in which βαπτίζειν means *to sprinkle* or *to pour*. I may be told that the "Greek-English Lexicon" of Liddell and Scott, which is used so generally in all of our classical schools and colleges, defines βαπτίζειν, *to dip repeatedly, dip under, to bathe, to wet, to pour upon, drench, to dip a vessel, to draw water*. This is true of the first edition both in this country and in England. The correctness of the definition, however, was challenged, and in the second edition the words *to steep, wet, pour upon, drench*, were omitted, as without authority, and have not since reappeared. This second edition, however, retained the words *to dip repeatedly*. These, also, have disappeared, and in their place, as early as the sixth London edition, were introduced the words *to dip in* or *under water*; while to the definition *to draw*, for example, *to draw* wine from bowls in cups, the editors added in parenthesis, as if to prevent all possible misapprehension, the significant words, "*of course by dipping them*." The history of these changes in the successive editions of this standard Lexicon is, to say the least, a most suggestive one.

We reach the same result if we go to the standard New Testament lexicons. Cremer defines βαπτίζειν, *to immerse, submerge*. In Wilke's "Lexicon of New Testament Greek," revised by Grimm, we read under βαπτίζω, "In the New Testament it is used especially of the solemn rite of holy bathing first instituted by John the Baptist; afterward received by Christians as a command of Christ, and accommodated to the genius and nature of his religion—that is, immersion in water." βάπτισμα is defined *immersion, submersion*, and of Christian baptism it is added that, "according to the apostolic conception, this is the rite of holy submersion commanded by Christ." The testimony of the late Professor E. A. Sophocles, of Harvard University, is worthy of notice in this connection. In his "Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods," he says, "There is no evidence that Luke and Paul, and the other writers of the New Testament, put upon this verb meanings not recognized by the Greeks."

With the lexicographers agree the more prominent exegetical scholars of every name, Meyer, DeWette, Tholuck, Olshausen, Lange, Fritzsche, Lightfoot, Ellicott, Godet, and many others. Of Mark vii. 4 Meyer says: 'Εὰν μὴ βαπτίσωνται is not to be understood of washing the hands, but of immersion, which the word in classic Greek and in the New Testament everywhere means, *i. e.*, according to the context, *to take a bath*."

The word employed in the injunction cited, therefore, clearly indicates the act required. If now we *translate* the word, instead of *transferring* it, the great commission reads, "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, *immersing* them." What else is this but a "Thus saith the Lord"?

In the administration of baptism, therefore, immersion is essential in order to fulfill the divine command. It is also essential in order to preserve the symbolical significance of the ordinance as presented in the New Testament. In the first place immersion is the most appropriate symbol of that spiritual cleansing which baptism expresses. Jewish ideas on this subject Maimonides states when he says, "Whenever, in the Law, washing of the flesh or of the clothes is mentioned, it means nothing else than the dipping of the whole body in a laver; for if any

man dip himself all over, except the tip of his little finger, he is still in uncleanness."

But baptism is also and especially a symbol of the believer's death to sin, and of his rising to a new life. In his epistle to the Romans (vi. 2, 4), Paul says: "How shall we that are dead to sin live any longer therein? Know ye not that so many of us as were baptized in Jesus Christ were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death; that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life." A like thought is presented in Colossians ii. 12. In baptism, therefore, as the crowning act of repentance and faith, two great facts are symbolically set forth: Buried in the baptismal waters, the old man defiled by sin disappears, but emerging from the emblematic grave he rises to the new life in Christ. In a note to his remarks on Acts xvi. 33, 34, Meyer, referring to the above passage in Romans, says: "Immersion was a thoroughly essential part [*ein ganz wesentliches Stück*] of the symbolism of baptism." Says Lightfoot in his note on Colossians iii. 1: "The sacrament of baptism, as administered in the apostolic age, involved a twofold symbolism, a death or burial and a resurrection. In the rite itself these were represented by two distinct acts, the disappearance beneath the water and the emergence from the water." Weiss, designated in the March number of this Review as "the first New Testament scholar of Germany," gives, in his "Life of Christ," this same symbolical significance to baptism. "Holy ablutions," he says, "were customary among the Jews, and characteristic of the Essenes, but they aimed at levitical purification, and have nothing to do with this symbolical observance, which represents by immersion the complete disappearance of the old nature, and by emersion the beginning of an entirely new life." Let now immersion give place to sprinkling or pouring and this symbolical significance of baptism is destroyed. As Stanley says, "It is a greater change even than that which the Roman Catholic church has made in administering the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper in the bread without the wine. For that was a change which did not affect the thing that was signified; whereas the change from immersion to sprinkling has set aside the larger part of the apostolic language regarding baptism."

It is therefore because nothing can be substituted for immersion without disregarding the act designated in the divine command, and also without destroying the symbolical significance of the act, that Baptists are constrained to hold that immersion, and immersion only, is valid baptism. All possible variations they are ready to allow. It matters not with them whether baptism is administered in a stream or in the sea, in fresh water or in salt, in warm water or in cold. Nor does it matter how the act is performed. Dr. Judson, I have been told, was accustomed to place his hand upon the candidate's head, and the candidate then bowed down beneath the water instead of being laid back into the water, as the rite is now usually administered. Here plainly there is liberty of variation. So far as the act is concerned, the immersion only is the essential thing. It is in this ordinance as in that of the Lord's Supper. A little more than half a century ago Ralph Waldo Emerson was pastor of the Second Unitarian Church in Boston. In a sermon on the Lord's Supper he urged his people to abandon the observance of that ordinance, and "suggested a mode in which a meeting for the same pur-

pose might be held free of objection." I have been told that his suggestion was that the bread and wine should remain on the table at the communion season, and as the German philosopher told his students to "think the wall" the members of Mr. Emerson's church were to think the Lord's Supper. But they were unwilling to conform to Mr. Emerson's suggestion. It seemed to them that the change proposed would be an unwarrantable violation of the plain commandment of the Saviour, "Take, *eat — drink*," "This *do* in remembrance of me;" and so, rather than yield cherished convictions of duty, they accepted the pastor's resignation, and Mr. Emerson's ministry suddenly came to an end. Who will say that they were not right? It was not a question of one kind of bread or another, or of one kind of wine or another. Variation here is plainly allowed. But as to the act there was a "Thus saith the Lord" which could not be disregarded without destroying the symbolical significance of the ordinance as instituted by Christ and handed down to his followers.

But we are told in the Review that evidence has been discovered which shows that in the primitive church immersion was not "the only recognized mode," and that "it will not do to repudiate such testimony and fall back simply on the New Testament." In other words, it seems to be claimed that we now possess evidence of the consciousness of a liberty of variation in the administration of baptism in the early church which affords a presumption that immersion could not have been prescribed by our Lord and his apostles as "the only mode."

But let us not make too much of this consciousness of a liberty of variation. The only liberty which the "Teaching" recognizes is in case there is a lack of a sufficient quantity of water for immersion. It is to be remembered, however, that in no other writing of the second century is even this liberty recognized. All the other references to baptism, down to the middle of the third century, require immersion. We then come to a record that is exceedingly suggestive. Magnus, so the record runs, submitted to Cyprian the question whether if one by reason of "sickness and debility" should find it impossible to be washed "in the water" — that is, immersed — he would be accounted a legitimate Christian if he should be "perfused" on his bed "with the saving water." The question was suggested by the well-known case of Novatian. More than a century had passed since the time to which, by the Review, the "Teaching" is assigned. If, now, there was in the church the consciousness of a liberty of variation, how does it happen that such a question could be raised, and why is it that Cyprian, instead of replying hesitatingly and presenting a conception of his own "poor ability," failed to appeal to what was already well established?

But it is said that there are certain representations in art — frescos in the Catacombs — that furnish additional evidence of this consciousness of liberty of variation. This, however, is not *new* evidence. Moreover, it is not to be forgotten that among authorities there is not an agreement with reference to the significance of these pictures, and also with reference to the period to which they are assigned. Indeed, it is a significant fact that in one of the most recent references to these pictorial representations, Schulze's "*Archäologische Studien über altchristliche Monumente*," as was noticed in this Review for May, the position is taken that the pictures must be interpreted in harmony with the litera-

ture. Certainly these pictorial representations, which are assigned by eminent authors to different periods, and concerning whose significance art critics themselves are not in agreement, cannot be regarded as very important witnesses for a liberty of variation concerning which the literature of the period is so remarkably silent.

I cannot, therefore, but think that they ask a great deal who ask Baptists on this kind of evidence to abandon their position that immersion only is valid Christian baptism. Our motto is not, as some affirm, "Water, water," but "Obedience, obedience." We cannot call that baptism which Christ and the apostles did not call baptism.

Henry S. Burrage.

COMMENT.

We give the place reserved for other matter to the foregoing communication, because it proceeds from a clergyman qualified to state the position of that division of the Baptist churches with which he is connected, and because it is written not in a controversial spirit, but to express convictions of Christian obligation. We cannot follow it, within the space at command, into the general field of discussion which it enters, but will offer a few comments which seem to us important in order that the testimony previously adduced may be appreciated.

Our correspondent dismisses the question in the form we have submitted it, as not needing an answer, since the church is always exposed to error, and even Paul's disciples forsook the truth. But this is simply a refusal in advance to consider the evidence we have adduced. It assumes that there is but one possible interpretation of the apostolic rite of baptism, namely, submersion, and that all affusionists, however early they may have appeared, were errorists, whose testimony seals their condemnation. We think that our correspondent will find it difficult to adduce any passages in which Paul sharply rebukes men of the spirit of the writer of the "Teaching," and no less difficult to persuade others, or even himself for any length of time, that evidence from such a treatise is to be treated as proof of contumacy. When we asked, "Is it possible?" we were not oblivious of the liability of Christians to err. We were proposing a historical question. "Is it possible" that an author, using the language of the New Testament, writing for catechumens close upon, perhaps within, the Apostolic Age, enjoining upon them not to forsake the commandments of the Lord, but to observe them "neither adding to them nor taking from them," showing plainly a disposition of unquestioning obedience to divine precepts, could have written as he does of Baptism, if our Lord had explicitly or unmistakably enjoined submersion as indispensable to church membership and fellowship? And further, "is it possible" that there should have been in the church such consciousness of liberty in this matter as Christian art shows, if our Lord's command made submersion a test of obedience to Him, and essential to membership in his visible church?

We submit that these inquiries cannot be dismissed as not needing an answer, on the ground that Paul had erring converts, whom he sharply rebuked.

Our Baptist brethren have been wont to appeal to church history. A distinguished scholar, selected by Dr. Schaff to state their views, uses the following language: "The authorities on . . . the archæology and his-

tory of Christian churches are unanimous in asserting that the baptism of the New Testament and of the early ages of Christianity was a dipping or submersion of the candidate in water." "The archæologists, Augusti, Garucci (Garrucci), Martigny, De Vogué, etc., tell us that the monumental remains in Asia, Africa, and Europe prove that immersion was the act of baptism."¹ Such appeals to art and history are often made. If "this kind of evidence" has been admissible up to the discovery of the "Teaching," and has been deemed important, we are at a loss to understand why it is of less consequence now.

Although our correspondent dismisses the question proposed by us, and takes up another, he returns to it with the caution that we beware of making "too much of this consciousness of a liberty of variation." The "Teaching," he reminds us, concedes such freedom only in a specified case. But the peculiarity here is that a liberty of variation which allows this much of change subverts the entire Baptist position as defined by our correspondent. He shows a clear consciousness of this when he represents Baptists as ready to recognize liberty of variation in certain particulars, provided always there is submersion. The "Teaching" sets aside just this proviso. A catechumen, according to its instruction, can be regarded, in a particular case, as validly baptized who has not been submersed. A candidate, according to our correspondent, cannot be regarded in any case as validly baptized unless he has been submersed. The two positions are antagonistic in principle. One makes the mode essential, the other does not. It is of no consequence that the exception in the "Teaching" relates to a specified case, so long as the question at issue is whether or not submersion is essential. If the question were, Was submersion the rule? the limited character of the exception would be important. When the question is, Was submersion essential? the limited character of the exception is irrelevant. The mere *fact* of an exception, however limited, is inconsistent with the supposition that the witness regarded the rule as without exception; that is, as always and everywhere binding.

And here we would press upon our correspondent's attention the fact that the author of the "Teaching" recognizes pouring as baptism, and speaks of a candidate for affusion as a candidate for baptism. Some scholars claim that this shows that the words βαπτίζω (baptizo), βάπτισμα (baptisma), had already passed beyond their ordinary sense (immerse, immersion), and had acquired a technical or ritualistic meaning. This seems to be a fair inference. But conceding that the mere words in question still conveyed exclusively the notion of dipping or submersion, and that all we can properly infer from their use in the "Teaching" is that affusion, in a specified contingency, was accepted as a substitute for baptism, having equal validity, how, on this interpretation, does the matter stand? Obviously thus: A Christian teacher, solicitous to impress upon converts to Christianity the commandments of the Lord, perfectly aware that βαπτίζω means immerse, using it in this sense, so far from understanding that any divine injunction had made submersion indispensable, regarded himself as at perfect liberty, in a given case, to enjoin affusion, and this without the slightest apparent suspicion that the validity of the rite was thereby impaired. Nor did he deem it necessary to speak of a

¹ Schaff-Herzog *Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge*, i. p. 198.

candidate for affusion as anything other than a candidate for baptism, however well aware he was that the mere words, to "pour" and to "baptize," are not synonymous. A more striking testimony to an early consciousness of liberty of variation we cannot imagine. Its perfect simplicity and naturalness, its entire freedom from any trace of that particular sense of ritual obligation which we are told is distinctive of Baptists now, at once arrest attention. And in view of such a testimony, we cannot but repeat our question: How could such a Christian consciousness thus early have been developed if our Lord's command had the force and necessity claimed by our correspondent? To say that this result was reached by sheer, downright disobedience is to us an abandonment of the field of historical inquiry, and worse. It is so improbable that it seems to us to give for an explanation something very like an incredibility.

No more satisfactory is our correspondent's treatment of the evidence from art. The evidence is, he remarks, not new. This much we concede. Dr. Rossi's discoveries have been published long enough to admit of their being carefully tested. Yet, in some sense, the evidence they afford is new. It has but lately been appreciated in its historic validity and in its significance. Only within a few months has it received the literary confirmation to be derived from the "Teaching." Too much, probably, in the interpretation of the early pictures of baptism has been made of the silence of the literature of the second century respecting affusion. But however this may be, that silence is now broken. The "Teaching" speaks unmistakably, and it speaks for liberty, — the same liberty of which we have independent evidence in Christian art.

Our space is nearly exhausted, or we would refer more fully to the testimony of Cyprian. Why he did not choose to refer to other testimonies than those of Scripture it is impossible to say. If there were no facts in the way, our correspondent's inference might stand, at least as a conjecture. But no amount of conjecture can outweigh a grain of positive evidence. Besides, what is the question of Magnus, and what Cyprian's answer, and what the whole subsequent practice of clinic baptism, but a repetition of testimonies that there was a consciousness, more or less defined, of Christian liberty of variation?

Our correspondent appeals to the New Testament. But his citation of lexicons from Liddell and Scott's to Professor Sophocles' reminds us at once that the question he raises, even as a philological one, is broader than the New Testament. It is a historical and a dogmatic question, as well as a lexical one. And more than this, it is one of the nature and spirit of Christianity itself. Conceding all that is claimed as to the meaning of the word "baptizing" (*βαπτίζοντες*) in our Lord's command, the inference that it prescribes an exact rule as to the mode of symbolizing the spiritual transactions and relations involved is unsustained. There is a noteworthy absence from it of even the ceremonial detail found in the "Teaching." No mention is made of water. "Baptizing into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost" is the formula. The thought is borne on at once to the great spiritual conceptions involved. A ritual word is used, and an outward symbol is implied, but the command centres not on the mode of the rite, the immersion into water, but on the immersion into the revelation of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. To make such a command a "Thus saith the Lord," absolutely binding on the conscience, in respect to the mode

of using water sacramentally, seems to us to introduce into it an element foreign to its scope and design. It transforms the "great commission" into a "law of commandments contained in ordinances," and incorporates into it not a sacrament, but a ritual.

What appears so plainly in the very form of our Lord's command, namely, its spiritual concentration, is characteristic to our view of the entire treatment of the subject in the New Testament. The spiritual relation of the believer to God, to Christ, to the Holy Ghost, to forgiveness, to regeneration and purification, is what is uppermost and urgent. There is a marked absence of all that is fitted to promote what has been termed a ritualistic conscience. The outward rite is not ignored nor slighted, but there is no appearance of any desire to make its validity depend upon a particular mode of its observance, nor to limit and legalize it by the current meaning of the word which was appropriated to it, and which in its ordinary signification doubtless expressed the usual method of its administration. The central thought was spiritual, — purification, washing away of sins, cleansing in and through a new relationship to the God whom Christ revealed, a cleansing of the whole person of the believer. Submersion signifies this; so does affusion, and so does sprinkling of the head, the principal member and representative of the person. And the tenet of a necessity of submersion for all times, climes, and places, a ritualism of formal command, inflexible, invariable, binding on the conscience of all believers, absolutely necessary to ecclesiastical fellowship, — this seems to us something foreign to the spirit of the New Testament, and to the atmosphere of primitive Christianity. The church from the beginning has had a consciousness of liberty in this matter. It has used the mode of entire immersion, and also abridgments and substitutes for full immersion, meaning, however, the same thing, and has deemed them of equal validity. To our correspondent this savors of disobedience. To us it is an obedience of the most perfect sort, for it springs from the consciousness that the Christian society is intended for all times and nations and climes, and that it is contrary to the very genius of a communion created in the divine purpose to become universal, to make a literal submersion in water always and everywhere essential to admission to its fellowship.

Egbert C. Smyth.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE ALPHABET : An Account of the Origin and Development of Letters. By ISAAC TAYLOR, M. A., LL. D. 2 vols., 8vo. Vol. i., Semitic Alphabets, pp. xii., 358. Vol. ii., Aryan Alphabets, pp. 398. London : Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1883.

Man's earliest attempts to record his deeds are rude pictures of natural objects. The cave-man has made such a beginning. To these he adds by a graphic trope — the seen for the unseen — symbols for abstract ideas; first of all, perhaps, for numbers.

Out of the many ways in which an object or an action can be de-

picted, out of the many metaphors by which an abstract idea can be more or less definitely conveyed, the most convenient, or the most common, is fixed upon by an implicit convention. Here writing commences. As the picture or the symbol is constantly associated with a name, it comes in time to be for writer and reader the sign of the name rather than of the thing. Ideographic writing passes over into phonographic. Of this stage of the art, and of its unavoidable ambiguity, the familiar puzzle, the *rebus*, is a good illustration. Now some of the word-signs stand for monosyllables, other common words wear down to one syllable. In the composition of the *rebus*, monosyllables have a great advantage. Fewer signs are needed to express what we wish. The next step, therefore, is the syllabary, made up partly of primitive monosyllabic signs, partly by an analogical extension of the principle which has been called acrology or acrophony. So far the process is comparatively simple; and these successive steps, under various modifications, have repeated themselves independently in numerous systems of writing. But to analyze this seemingly ultimate element, the syllable, and to give to the consonant in writing the separate existence which it is unable to maintain in utterance, — this may well be counted one of the greatest and most difficult achievements of the human intellect. It has been independently and consistently accomplished only once in the history of man's manifold graphic experiments.¹ When once invented, the superiority of the alphabet must needs drive out of the field the earlier and more cumbrous ways of writing, though religion long preserved some of them as a sacred script. To trace the history of the origin, development, and propagation of the alphabet is the aim of these volumes.

Until recently, the attempt would have been in vain. In 1841 Sylvestre wrote in the introduction to his great work on "Universal Paleography:" "The manner in which this propagation was effected is one of the most impenetrable secrets of primordial history." If the secret has now been solved, we owe the result not more to the labors of a great number of scholars than to the fortunate discovery of most precious monuments of ancient writing. The fruit of these labors and discoveries Mr. Taylor has brought together for the first time in a comprehensive survey. The brilliant *opus imperfectum* of Lenormant, "*Essai sur la Propagation de l'Alphabet Phénicien*," is the only real predecessor. In the first volume, after a sketch of the principal systems of non-alphabetic writing, he comes at once to the question of questions, the origin of the primitive Semitic alphabet. He adopts De Rougé's derivation from the older type of the Egyptian Hieratic writing. The reasons for this view are given at some length and very clearly. The evidence gains in force by comparison with the attempts which have been made by Levy, Wuttke, Deecke, and others to find the originals of the Semitic letters in some of the various types of the Assyrian or Babylonian inscriptions. One of the things that comes out in this investigation is the extreme antiquity of an alphabetic writing in Egypt. Letters are found in the inscription of King Sent, the oldest written record in existence. But the Egyptians never adopted the consequences of their own discovery. They went on writing in a studious confusion of ideograms, verbal and syllabic phonograms, and alphabetic characters, each earlier stage of the development surviving to embarrass the succeeding ones.

¹ Mr. Taylor gives far too much credit to the untrustworthy tales about the Maya alphabet.

It was in passing from the land of its origin to another race that writing got rid of the incubus of its own traditions. A commercial people could not afford the luxury of graphic expression which was at the command of the sacred scribes. The result was the Phœnician alphabet of twenty-two letters, and alphabetic writing pure and simple. Phœnician merchants and trading posts brought the alphabet to the island Greeks, to Ionia, and to Hellas itself. In passing to an Aryan race, another development took place. The detachment of the consonant was most naturally accomplished by a race in which the consonant is strong, and the vowel relatively feeble and unessential. The Semitic alphabet contains only consonants. An Indo-European language, with its radical vowels written in such a way, would be unintelligible. So the Greeks, by degrees, converted the superfluous signs of the Semitic guttural consonants into vowel-signs. Through colonies of Chalcis the western type of the Greek alphabet passed over to Italy, and so became the parent of all the writing systems of Western Europe.

But the primitive Semitic alphabet had a divergent development of its own. That of Western Syria and Phœnicia has already been spoken of.

The Aramæans are in the front in the second period of Semitic history, and the Aramæan type of writing by degrees superseded the Phœnician, from which it was derived. From it descend the Square Hebrew, the various Syriac scripts, with the alphabets given by the Nestorian missionaries to their Mongol converts, the Arabic and the Iranian alphabets. A third, South Semitic, line of propagation gives us on the one side the Ethiopic and its daughters, and on the other the whole great family of Indian alphabets, connected by the inscriptions of Southern Arabia (Yemen) and Safa.

The descent of the Indian alphabets is still under discussion. A paper by Cust at the Oriental Congress maintaining the view stated above drew out a good deal of dissent. The direct evidence is not perhaps very conclusive, but the alternative, Indian invention, is untenable. There is no trace in India of the gradual evolution of the alphabet out of more primitive systems of writings. Science can give but one interpretation of this fact, — the Indians, like the Greeks, received the alphabet complete from another people. The theory adopted by the author that this people was Sabæan is the most plausible that has been proposed. It thus appears that all existing alphabets are descended from one original.

The way in which the author has accomplished the task of tracing these lines of development and filiation is very admirable. His volumes are a fine example of the application of a thoroughly scientific method to a most interesting chapter of the history of man. He thinks and writes clearly; a good disposition of his material and apt illustration give lucidity and sustained interest to what with less skillful treatment might easily be both dry and bewildering from its very wealth of learning.

The tables of alphabets are sufficiently accurate for the purpose of such a work, though we could wish sometimes that the author had relied less upon the resources of the type-founder. On page 243 of vol. i., *e. g.*, the Samaritan character used in the older MSS. of the Pentateuch resembles that of the Siloam Inscription considerably more closely than appears from the Samaritan type in the second column.

The book is finely printed and well indexed. As a whole, it can hardly be too highly commended.

George F. Moore.

KEILSCHRIFTTEXTE SARGON'S KÖNIGS VON ASSYRIEN. Von Dr. D. G. LYON, Professor an der Harvard Universität, Cambridge, U. S. A. Leipzig : J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1883.

Sargon is the Assyrian king of whom the Bible says so little and the inscriptions of Nineveh so much. When Botta unearthed the palace of Khorsabad he saw one central figure everywhere. Drawing the bow, fording rivers, receiving captives, riding in processions, pouring out libations to the gods, appeared the same towering form, the same commanding features. Who was this hero? It was Sargon, according to the cuneiform writing Šarru-Kênu. Here was the speaking portrait of the conqueror of Samaria and the father of Sennacherib.

It is no small service which Professor Lyon has rendered the reading public in editing the chief texts relating to this monarch. The very enumeration of the inscriptions transliterated and translated is a bird's-eye view of Assyrian art and religion. The Cylinder Inscription of seventy-seven lines recalls the hexagonal or octagonal barrels of clay, tiny in bulk and fragile in substance, on which the children of Asshur loved to record their greatest deeds. The Bull Inscription conjures up those colossal creations, half man, half beast, the personification of repose and vigilance, which awe the traveler with their bearded and crowned heads, as once their huge legs, parted by written tablets, dazzled and curbed the native. The fourfold inscription of Bronze, of Silver, of Gold, and of Antimony keeps us from forgetting the stone casket in which these builders of the Tigris were wont to place their fundamental documents and the solemn dedication made in the new moon of the "brick month" by the kings of Asshur to the Gods of heaven and earth.

The work of the author is opportune to the scholar no less than interesting to the reader. Like Dr. Paul Haupt, Professor Lyon is able to call Friedrich Delitzsch his teacher. In the preparation of his volume he has had access to the collections and the learning of this rising Assyriologue. Since Dr. Julius Oppert gave his last revision of a portion of the same inscription in the "Records of the Past," 1878, rapid progress has been made in Assyrian philology and lexicography. The "Assyrische Bibliothek" under Delitzsch and Haupt needed a better text and translation than was extant. The British Museum and the Louvre furnished the originals, and Professor Lyon first copied, then transliterated, and finally interpreted the documents in what we may call a masterly way. For the first time, the Bronze Inscription is given in a modern tongue. All the other inscriptions are rendered so that Theophilus G. Pinches, the successor of George Smith at the British Museum, has ventured the opinion that in Dr. Lyon's "Sargon" we have a better book than Dr. Lotz's Tiglath-Pileser. Such praise is doubtless excessive. The author would not communicate nor countenance it. That it has been spoken marks an era, none the less, in American cuneiform scholarship, and opens the way for an examination of the volume itself.

The Introduction has the merit of brevity and comprehensiveness. One section is On the Publication of the Original Text. Here the author tells us he has made the first of the two texts existing at Paris the basis of his work, and enables us to surmise that a fourth at London, now in the hands of a private gentleman, was held rather more tightly from American eyes than might have been expected. Fortunately, Mr. Pinches made good the omission of his compatriot. The section on

Transcription explains the absence of hyphens and determinatives on the ground of the presence of one in the glossary and the other in text. It also treats of the length of the vowels, the doubling of consonants, and the vocal ê, which, like Pognon's é, is held to have been an original i in certain Assyrian as in Syriac and Hebrew forms of the verb. In the plural, the ê must be retained throughout, as nišê, malkê, kakkê. Two sections follow on the Translation and on the Commentary and Glossary. Perhaps, however, the most interesting section of the Introduction is the first, which treats of the name and person of Sargon. Discussing the second part of the royal name GI-NA = ideogram for Kênu (written Ki-nu), he deviates from the *verbal* derivation of Schrader, by which Šarru-ukin would mean "He (*i. e.*, the God) established the king." Professor Lyon prefers the *adjectival*. His reason is Sargon's phrase in the fiftieth line of the Cylinder Inscription. This runs: "Corresponding to the name I bear, with which the great Gods have named me to guard justice and righteousness, to govern the infirm, to do no injury to the weak." For the full value of this name we need to have Sargon = this synonym of "true, faithful, righteous prince." In word, then, Sargon, like the hero of Isaiah's prophecy, is "*the righteous king*."

The German translation, which faces the transliterated and follows the cuneiform text, is clear and strong. Exactness rather than elegance has been sought. Conjectures are used sparingly. Where a word is unknown it does not wear a mask of familiarity. Meanings are justified by abundant references to the Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia by Rawlinson and Norris. Sobriety and independence mark the use of authorities. The notes elucidate instead of obscure. In compression they equal, in perspicuity they surpass, many German productions in kindred fields. If they expose blunders trenchantly, they recognize insight generously.

After all, Assyrian lexicography is yet in its childhood. Till the dictionary of the future appears, glossaries and commentaries like those of Professor Lyon must take the place of it. In this aspect we should be grateful for the new material which has been brought together so laboriously for the identification of important terms. Take *nartabu*, for instance. Oppert reads it "foundation." This omits the first of two signs. Lyon shows that the group IS-PIN means canal of irrigation. Tiglath-Pileser Col. VI. : 101-104, speaks of the increased crops by the increase of *nartabê*. Also the same ideogram occurs IV. Rawlinson, 58 and 59. In this passage, among the many places where penitents should supplicate pardon of the gods, *nartabê* meet us. "Lying, sitting, eating, drinking, by the hearth, at the tablet, on horseback, '*ina âhi nartabi, ina âhi bûri, ina âhi nâri, ina âhi êlippi*,' 'on the bank of the WATER CHANNELS, on the bank of the spring, on the bank of the river, on board of the ship,' — at sunrise and sunset, entering and leaving the city, by the gate, in the house, on the street, in the temple, — everywhere, should one implore pardon." The rivers of Babylon are sacred as Mount Zion.

Were we to blame anything in this excellent work, it would be its somewhat *controversial* tone toward Dr. Julius Oppert. To say that his edition of "Dour-Sarkayan" is critically worthless and swarms with blunders is needlessly severe. At the same time our author's scientific conscience must have been roused by this savant's sins of omission and commission. That Oppert should have rendered "eclipse over Harran,"

in line 6 of the Cylinder Inscription, is exasperating, for he can only do this by intruding a false subject and extruding the true, while giving to a third word a meaning which it never has. For this impossible translation Lyon gives, simply and satisfactorily, "Who stretched out his shadow over the city of Harran." On the other hand, our author expressly recognizes Oppert's services as a pioneer in the realm of cuneiform and the unassailability of his translation in its fundamental particulars, not hesitating here and there to adopt Oppert's rendering in preference to his own.

The lines from 30 to 42 are the Gordian knot of the Inscription. In general it is untied, not severed, by Professor Lyon. Where Oppert translates line 41: "Ašša šamni balti amêlûti mupašših bu'ânê mina mâti'a lâ akârîma Šamaššammê kî nirba ina maḥîri šâmi." "Tunc fuit impositus labor hominum evellentium herbas malas in terra mea non verum pretium reddente, et lolia, una cum deo Serah in opere isto;" our author has the plainer and preciser sentence, "Not to let oil, the life of men, the healer of wounds, become dear in my land, and to fix sesame in price like corn." This is a pleasing glimpse of a ruler great in peace as in war. With no little ingenuity and thoroughness Professor Lyon analyzes the ideogram nirba for ni-ir-ba. Its three parts are AN = Dingir, God; ŠÊ = grain, and a third compounded of ŠÊ and IR (read êltêg,) + d. = a kind of grain. With the sign for God (Dingir) as a determinative, we have a deity corresponding to Demeter-Ceres, who watches over the springing and the ripening harvest. From the deity to the grain itself is but a step backwards, and we get the designation "corn." II. R. 36: 17 illustrates the former use; V. R. 1: 48 the latter. This text is a medallion. Professor Lyon scours it and the traits of the monarch appear. We see the wise king, the bearer of gracious words, the planter of high cliffs, the irrigator of many a moor where canal had never come, the scatterer of water with full hands, quenching the thirst of every subject, and filling the broad land of Asshur with bread enough and to spare.

We are not sorry that this valuable work appears in the German tongue. In this dress it will reach Continental scholars; it will not escape Americans. Sargon, "the Vicegerent of Bel, the sublime Prince of Asshur, the favorite of Anu and Dagon," will be better known because of the inscriptions in the first palace exhumed at Nineveh, as unlocked by the first Professor of Assyrian at Harvard. The Summer School of Professor Harper, at Worcester, will, it is hoped and expected, be able, through Professor Lyon's learning, patience, and enthusiasm, to lead many a student of the Bible through the eight gates of Khorsabad, untouched by the final curse of the royal Builder, — "Wer meiner Hände Werk ändern, meine Bauten zerstören, die Mauern die ich gemauert, wegschaffen, meine Insignien verschleudern wird — dessen Namen und Samen mögen Asur, Samas, Raman, und die Götter, die alldort wohnen, im Lande weggraffen und ihn zu Füßen seines Feindes sitzen lassen gebunden!"

John Phelps Taylor.

NOVUM TESTAMENTUM GRAECE. Ad antiquissimos testes denuo recensuit, apparatus criticum apposuit, CONSTANTINUS TISCHENDORF. Editio octava critica major. Volumen III. Prolegomena scripsit CASPARUS RENATUS GREGORY, additis curis †EZRAE ABBOT. Pars Prior, pp. vi., 440. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1884.

Dr. Scrivener remarks (in his "Plain Introduction," etc., p. 482), "Tischendorf left almost no papers behind him. Hence the task of writing Prolegomena to his eighth edition, gallantly undertaken by two American scholars, Dr. Caspar René Gregory of Leipzig and Dr. Ezra Abbot of Cambridge, U. S., but for their own independent researches, might seem to resemble that of making bricks without straw." The courage of the undertaking has been more than matched by the patience and enterprise, the scholarly research and unflinching toil, with which now for well-nigh eight years it has been prosecuted, — as this first half of the achieved result abundantly evinces.

Professor Tischendorf's preface to his seventh edition was hastily prepared, in consequence (as is supposed) of his preoccupation with plans for a new critical journey. The subjects to which the American scholars have devoted the four hundred and forty pages just published are dispatched there in one hundred and ninety-three; and of these less than fifty seem to have been retained in the present volume. The latter, therefore, may justly claim to be in the main a new and original work.

Of the thirteen Sections into which, as appears from a schedule prefixed, the contents of the entire Prolegomena will be distributed, the volume now published comprises seven, which are occupied principally with the following topics. In Section I. a compendious sketch of Tischendorf's life is followed by a detailed list, covering fifteen pages and evidently prepared with extreme care, of the deceased Professor's publications, in their chronological order. Section II. treats of the four classes of critical helps (namely, Greek manuscripts, ancient versions, patristic quotations, printed editions) as used by Tischendorf in preparing his text. Some impression of his marvelous industry and success as a palæographer is afforded by the facts that the number of uncial manuscripts of the New Testament discovered by him was fifteen, first employed by him twenty-three, edited by him twenty-one, copied by him four, collated by him thirteen. He also discovered and used at least six new manuscripts in cursive characters; edited five manuscripts of that form of the Latin version known as the *Itala*, besides the *Amiatinus* text of the *Vulgate*. The third Section is occupied with a discussion of the principles on which these and the other critical helps are to be used in reproducing the Greek text. Here the practice is briefly vindicated of seeking to recover that text solely from ancient testimonies, and primarily from Greek manuscripts, the evidence from versions and fathers being chiefly corroborative. Then Tischendorf's example is followed in giving an exposition of the five rules, that "peculiarities are to be suspected," "obvious clerical errors eliminated," "in parallel passages the divergent reading to be regarded as the probable one," "that reading in which the others originated to be accepted as the original one," "the linguistic characteristics of the several authors to be heeded." In Section IV. we have an exhibition of orthographical and other details respecting the language, together with the reasons for adhering in these particulars to the general usage of the more ancient manuscripts. Material here to which the

seventh edition gave but seventeen pages has been so augmented as to fill fifty-seven. It is no disparagement to the labors of his predecessors, and particularly to the careful collections of Professor Hort, to say that Dr. Gregory has brought together here a store of information, valuable alike to the student of the Greek language and to one investigating the distinctive characteristics of the several New Testament manuscripts, which for fullness and for lucid arrangement is quite unmatched. Section V. deals with the order of succession of the several groups into which the New Testament books were early distributed, together with the position of individual books in their groups, as well as with ancient and modern divisions of the text into chapters, reading-lessons, and the like. This portion of the work also has grown from ten pages to fifty-two. Moreover, the reader will be especially gratified to meet with a thorough discussion of the origin of our modern division into chapters (which for cogent reasons is ascribed to Cardinal Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, who died A. D. 1228), together with a special Excursus of fifteen pages by Dr. Abbot, exhibiting the disagreement as respects verse-division to be found in fifty-one editions of the Greek text, and nine translations including King James's, — the original division in Robert Stephens's Greek Testament of 1551 being taken as the standard. This laborious Essay displays the characteristic diligence, clearness, accuracy, of its lamented author. The reader, however, should not fail to correct at once a few typographical blemishes, noted on p. v., which slipped in through an unfortunate misunderstanding after the Essay left his hands. Then follows in Section VI. a history of the Greek text, both written and printed. The latter, which has evidently been prepared with extreme care, closes with a collation (covering forty-eight pages) of the texts of Tregelles and Professors Westcott and Hort, the two recent critical editions the readings of which are not noted by Professor Tischendorf in the running commentary beneath his text. The seventh and concluding Section is devoted to a detailed account of the uncial manuscripts, which occupies one hundred and three pages as against sixty-four in the seventh edition. Here, again, the work by its orderly method and its completeness far surpasses anything hitherto published. Incidentally, too, it may be remarked that many readers will be glad to see the calumnious charge sometimes brought against Tischendorf, of bad faith in his mode of securing possession of the Codex Sinaiticus, put forever to rest.

The present limits forbid extended comment on the work of which the public are favored with a specimen in the present volume. But among its conspicuous merits every student will count, first, its tables and other summaries, such, for example, as those on pages, 31, 33, 78, 84, 93 sq., 197 sq., 200 sqq., 338 sq.; second, the lucid order observed in its treatment of topics, — an incalculable amount of time and patience will be saved, for instance, by the methodical and uniform way in which the uncial manuscripts are handled; third, and above all, the copious bibliographical and other references given in the foot-notes. In this last particular there is no work extant which approaches it; nothing, however fugitive or recondite, seems to have escaped the editors in the literature of Germany, France, Italy, England, America. As a thesaurus of references on the topics which it covers, it will have an independent value.

In short, the editors have done credit to themselves, brought honor to their country, and richly rewarded the public patience. Many besides

the present writer will deplore the fact that Dr. Abbot, ὁ μακαρίτης, did not live to receive his share of the thanks — the only recompense he looked for — which biblical students will feel to be due to the authors, without stint.¹ It will be gratifying to the friends of both to read the eulogium, as true as it is graceful, which Dr. Gregory, little anticipating the tender significance the words would take on before they saw the light, incidentally passes (p. 276 sq.) upon his collaborator. The best wishes of all the friends of sacred literature will attend the survivor in the travels and researches upon which he is about to enter, that so the end may worthily crown the work.

J. H. Thayer.

SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. By HENRY B. SMITH, D. D., LL. D., Edited by WILLIAM S. KARR, D. D., Professor of Theology in Hartford Theological Seminary Pp. xiv., 630. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1884.

The table of contents gives a full outline of the whole; the index is ample; paper, print, and binding are excellent.

A small book, containing Professor Smith's lectures on Apologetics, and another, his Introduction to Christian Theology, were published previously. This moderate volume contains substantially all his instruction on Systematic Theology. It will be heartily welcomed by his numerous pupils, who remember him with reverence and gratitude, and it deservedly claims the attention of all students of the science.

This work has been formed from complete sets of notes of Professor Smith's lectures, taken by his students in different years, and from his own sketches and outlines of them as left in manuscript, supplemented in parts with selections from his unpublished sermons. The latter can be readily distinguished from the rest, but it does not detract from the value or scientific method of this treatise that occasionally a truth appears in it in a more rhetorical form. The editor, himself a pupil and personal friend of Professor Smith, has evidently done his work with thoroughness and fidelity. As a result, we have in this volume an adequate presentation of the author's theology. We may less regret that he did not himself give his work its final form, because formal completeness of system was not one of his prominent aims. He would never match definitions, or force the parts or proportions of any truth as he conceived it, in order to make his system technically consistent. He carries his investigation of some difficult topics as far as he can, till the lines of his thought end, as he says, in mystery; and few men will penetrate that mystery farther on *those* lines. But he generally leaves his subject as though it were to be studied farther, and he leaves it well prepared for farther study. We find in this book, here and there, a discussion unfinished, another only outlined, a problem stated only in its conditions or limitations: but these are not defects; they have much positive value to the student, — more, indeed, than any formal completeness, — for

¹ It may be well promptly to correct an inaccurate statement on p. ii. (due doubtless to the fragmentariness of first accounts) respecting the date and cause of Professor Abbot's death. That event occurred at his home in Cambridge, Mass., on the twenty-first of March, at half past five in the afternoon, and was caused by intestinal disease.

they show us the theologian himself at his work as a student, and help us to understand his methods. It is greatly to the honor of Professor Smith that this publication of his actual teaching, as he left it when he ceased to teach, will not impair his reputation, but will renew and extend his influence.

Theology, as presented in this treatise, is wholly Christian, and it is all considered with paramount reference to its Centre. The author makes three divisions of the subject; the middle one in his plan, and central to all parts of the subject, is Redemption; and in Redemption the Centre is the Redeemer himself. The central fact is the Incarnation. In the author's language, "The central idea to which all the parts of theology are to be referred, and by which the system is to be made a system, or to be constructed, is what we have termed the Christological or Mediatorial idea, namely, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. This idea is central, not in the sense that all the other parts of theology are logically deduced from it, but rather that they centre in it. The idea is that of an Incarnation in order to Redemption." "By this, Christianity is distinguishable from all other religions, and from all forms of philosophy; and by this, and this alone, are we able to construct the whole system of the Christian faith on its proper grounds." "It is so really the centre of unity that when we analyze and grasp and apply it we find that the whole of Christian theology is in it. Thus: the analysis of Incarnation in order to Redemption *presupposes* the doctrine respecting the divine nature, the end of God in his works, the nature of man, and the condition of man as sinful,—the first division of theology,—The Antecedents of Redemption. The same principle, *in its concrete unity*, gives us the doctrines respecting the Person and Work of Christ, our second division of the system. And the same principle, *in its applications*, gives us the third division of the system, embracing regeneration, justification, sanctification, the doctrine respecting the church and the sacraments, and the eschatology,"—The Kingdom of Redemption.

Professor Smith is, we believe, the first prominent American theologian to conceive the whole science and to treat all its parts with paramount reference to Christ as its centre. As influenced by many others, this has been the tendency of the best Christian thought, but he has also led it effectively in this direction. More and more is this method coming to be recognized, not merely as the best, but as the only adequate one. And this method may be taken as one chief characteristic of the author's work. By nature and grace he was eminently qualified for theology, and his intellectual powers and habits were also in unusual accord with its true method. Whatever the subject of his thought, he sought its centre, caring relatively little for boundaries,—never for them first,—but seeking them, if at all, from the centre. And such were his intellectual insight and vigor that we generally find him strongest and clearest at the centre of his subject. This book shows that he has done his best work at the centre of the whole system and of each great part of it; but it also shows the great advantages of his method.

Another characteristic of Professor Smith, which is also one of the great excellences of this treatise, is his strong grasp of realities. He keeps them always prominent, and never loses his hold on them, even in the most abstruse discussions. He has a strong sense of the historic facts

of Christianity, and gives them adequate room and force as determining doctrines. Thus he views the Incarnation not primarily as doctrine, but fact, having "about it the majesty of fact." "Nor is it a mere fact of an inspired record; it is not merely a *truth* announced in such a record. So to speak, it lies back of the record, and the record tells us about it." In all his discussions we see and feel the realities which he is considering. Abstractions are distinguished as such; their use is restricted. All technical processes are held rigidly to the service of realities. So we do not distrust our master's art; he will come short rather than err; and if he err, it will be on account of inherent difficulties, and not as misled and misleading with merely verbal forms. He is very conservative in retaining old creed statements, specially those of Westminster, and some which might possibly be dismissed from farther service with advantage to theology and relief to the church. He clings to usage as to terms, scarcely suggesting any change in theological nomenclature. Yet in all his discussions he keeps the realities of his subject always in view, stating and explaining them with remarkable clearness, in simple, common language. He uses the phrase "original sin," and defends its use. But after discussing the real matter which it is used to designate, he says: "Yet we would not dispute about a mere word if the facts of the case are conceded. Native depravity is perhaps a more unobjectionable term than original sin. If people call it native depravity in a moral sense, and say that it comes from Adam, all that is essential is granted."

On the whole, we think this system of theology, or rather this book, is strongest on the divine side of the subject. Of the different parts, the chapters on the Being and Attributes of God, Creation, Providence, and specially the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Person of Christ, are very helpful to clear conceptions of these subjects, and will probably be regarded as the most conclusive. The Atonement is considered as a sacrifice, strictly expiatory and vicarious, made for all mankind. As to theories, which are discussed in four classes, the proposition is, "The different (imperfect) theories of Christ's atoning work give different aspects and relations of that work, and are true in these aspects while false in the implication or assertion that these give the only or ultimate point of view." The author does not attempt to show the ultimate point of view; he does not propose to give a complete theory. He states the ends which the Atonement must subserve, and the essentials included in it, but he explains only in part how it serves its purpose; he relieves its difficulties only in part, and he says, "There is a background of mystery in the Atonement, as well as in the Incarnation, and in the Atonement in connection with the Incarnation, which no man can fully fathom, which has not been, and was not meant to be, fully revealed." Eschatology has but a small place in this treatise, yet relatively as large as in most others. The views taken are those which have been commonly held by Calvinists. On the Parousia, the Resurrection, the Intermediate State, and Final Retribution, there is no adequate discussion or statement of the questions now claiming special attention. On the Nature of Virtue some clear aid is given, we think, to the supporters of what is, at the essential point, a different theory. The subject on which Professor Smith will probably call out most dissent from his ecclesiastical brethren is Sin, which he discusses at length, with great clearness and vigor, and specially in connection with the native moral condition of mankind. He shows us sin in its

root; he makes us feel it, and the helplessness of our moral condition in it. As to that hardest of questions, the Permission of Sin, he says, "We cannot state all the reasons for it; we cannot give a theoretical solution of the problem, while yet the Christian system gives a sufficient practical solution." Some will think the author has reduced human freedom to a minimum and raised human responsibility to a maximum. Certainly, freedom, as he conceives it, is quite consistent with divine purpose. With his conception of freedom and of the nature of sin, he shows that all men are helplessly involved in sin and ruin simply by their race connection with the first transgressor. And whatever our view of freedom, he shows that there is in it no practical relief from the helplessness of our moral condition. The demand which this system makes for Theodicy is very strenuous. Its Theodicy is wholly in Christianity. "As a *matter of fact*, to all the human race there is no hope out of the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. And on the highest question as to God's moral government, the solution must be found *not outside of, but within*, the Christian System." With the moral ruin of mankind in view, as demonstrated in this book, the question of Theodicy, Is Christianity adequate? becomes, to thoughtful minds, even oppressive. We must answer, Yes; but we shall still be pressed with the question, Are our doctrinal representations of Christianity adequate?

We heartily commend this treatise. With its clear, strong outlines of statement and discussion, it will be very helpful to ministers and students as a manual. Without witty remarks, or brilliant illustrations, or much use of analogy, it is deeply interesting. With great positive power, it has not a trace of controversial edge or partisan bitterness. It is intellectually invigorating and spiritually quickening. We commend it to men of all schools and classes; to conservatives, specially as showing that truth can be conserved among men only by renewed study and thorough use; to progressives, as showing in itself some clear steps forward, and as itself making good preparation, and also urgent demand, for more. We specially commend it as being, by its clear exhibition of race relations in sin and redemption, an antidote to the present excessive individualism in theology and in practical religion.

W. E. Merriman.

A CATHOLIC DICTIONARY, containing some account of the Doctrines, Discipline, Rites, Ceremonies, Councils, and Religious Orders of the Catholic Church. By WILLIAM E. ADDIS, Secular Priest, sometime Fellow of the Royal University of Ireland, and THOMAS ARNOLD, M. A., Fellow of the same University.

οὐδέ νυν
θνατὰ φύσις ἀνέρων
ἔτικτεν, οὐδέ μὴν ποτε λάθρα κατακοιμάσσει·
μέγας ἐν τούτοις θεός, οὐδέ γηράσκει.

SOPH. *Ædip. Rex*, 841.

New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co., 9 Barclay Street. 1884.

A most important and valuable work, for which we have long been waiting. The name of the second editor, that of the second son and namesake of Dr. Arnold, raises a presumption, which is amply borne out by the performance, that the Dictionary will be up to the height of the latest scholarship, both Catholic and Protestant, as well as of literary and

ethical refinement. Dr. Arnold's second son is a genuine and eminent Christian, though he professes Christianity in what appears to us an obsolescent form. And the articles of the Dictionary throughout are such as well become Christian scholars. The only notable exception is the article on the States of the Church, where the writer loses his head, and fairly raves.

Setting aside the few who can easily consult elaborate authorities, every educated Protestant minister, indeed every educated Protestant in the country, would want to have this book, if Protestants had but a glimmering consciousness of what fools they are almost certain to make of themselves whenever they open their lips about Roman Catholic matters, for want of acquaintance with the mere alphabet of Roman Catholic ideas and usages. We should think that Catholics would be ready to tear their hair in very desperation over some of the blunders which their Protestant neighbors fall into, not out of malice, but out of "ignorance, madam, pure ignorance," as Dr. Johnson admits of one of his definitions. Thus, we remember when a journal of high repute in the religious and another of high repute in the political world both expressed an artless surprise that the Rev. Mr. Farrell should have made a will, instead of quietly letting the Church come in as his heir, in ignorance of the elementary distinction between a secular and a regular. And we remember when a book was circulated by a great and learned church, the writer of which confuses "holy orders," — the four upper steps of the ministry — with "religious orders" that is, conventual associations. And most Protestants, we believe, have a vague notion that indulgences are a sort of sacrament, implying permission, for a sum of money, to commit certain specified sins, — an opinion, to be sure, for which Master Tetzel is mainly responsible, together with the fact that here, as in so many points, Leibnitz is justified in complaining that Rome in her practice is much worse than she is in her theory. Indeed, to meet all the requirements of Protestant ignorance, there ought to be a special edition of the book.

The Dictionary is thoroughly frank in all its positions, as of course it would be with such editors. They are staunchly and composedly Vaticanist, in the fullest acceptance. The principles of Boniface VIII., in the *Unam Sanctam*, appear to be assumed throughout as the standard of the relations between Church and State. We wonder more than ever, with Mr. Gladstone, what rags and shreds of separate jurisdiction are left to the State. It seems as if at present in Christendom human life was ready to part itself between an intolerant Ultramontanism and an intolerable Cæsarism, — two forms of despotism in both of which Antichrist finds his account.

The Dictionary espouses unshrinkingly the theory that the Church, in herself, has a coercive temporal jurisdiction. It does not, however, concede that she has, either directly or through the secular arm, the right of inflicting death, inasmuch as she cannot give up the hope of reforming offenders. As to mediæval burnings and crusades, the writers say, substantially, "These were the rough ways of the world till now." But the strange argument from the judgments of God inflicted through the apostolic word either proves the whole or nothing. When Rome confines her claims to the infliction of miraculous punishments, we will find no further fault.

Of course this claim of coercive jurisdiction throughout the Church involves the right of suppressing all dissentient Christian worship by immediate ecclesiastical action, should it be found practicable. The right of the Jews to their worship is conceded only because they, as unbaptized, are not within the jurisdiction of the Church. But towards Protestantism, where it has long been in possession, the tone of the Dictionary is without acrimony. The articles on Luther and Calvin are singularly mild. The moral judgments which, as subjects of Rome, the writers are obliged to form of the two great heresiarchs, are thoroughly controlled in their expression by "that most excellent gift of charity." A movement like Jansenism, subsequently arising within the bosom of Catholicism, is a severer strain upon charity, but one which is successfully borne. This article is wholly free from the coarse bitterness which disfigures even Wetzer and Welte, with their sneering taunt of "hypocritical rigorism." It is, indeed, the best conspectus we have seen of this great movement, and is as cordial in its appreciation of its various and illustrious excellences as is compatible with a thorough adhesion to the Papal condemnations of Jansenism as a whole. Towards the Jansenist, or Semi-Jansenist Church of Utrecht, the tone of the corresponding article is respectful, almost affectionate, while acknowledging that there is scarcely ever a conversion from Utrecht to Rome. Those of us who are peculiarly interested in this excellent little church are bound here to make our best acknowledgments. But, indeed, the whole treatment of Jansenism is an encouraging proof how inefficacious the utmost severity of theoretical separation is to check the advance of the large-heartedness of Christ to universal prevalency in his Church. Protestants may perhaps be indulged in the self-complacency of opinion that the Protestant education of various writers in the Dictionary has been of some help this way.

As respects the relation of Protestants to the plan of salvation, the articles on Baptism, Faith, Penance, and others, show that the writers make thorough work in applying the Roman condemnation of the doctrine that "grace is not given out of the Church." We cannot agree with Dr. Schaff in assuming that this must be so limited by the principle *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus* as to leave it still lawful to deny that grace given out of the Church is ever efficacious. Even bitterly controversial catechisms allow that salvation is possible to those who, though not in external communion with Rome, are united "to the soul of the Church," — an expression which we have also noted somewhere in the Dictionary. The Roman Catholic theory may be easily and succinctly stated, following the lines traced by Cardinal Manning in his admirable letter to Dr. Pusey: (1.) Baptism, duly administered in form, and intended as Christian baptism, is valid, by whomsoever administered, and regenerates every recipient not in mortal sin. (2.) Heresy and schism, resulting only from education, and not from heretical pravity, are not mortal sin. (3.) Baptismal grace, maintained and improved, merits increment of grace, and at last the grace of final perseverance. (4.) Baptismal grace, forfeited by mortal sin, may be recovered by an act of perfect contrition, accompanied with the desire of penance. (5.) Where, through wrong education, the desire of penance is not explicitly present, it is reasonable to hold that it is imputed as implicitly present, in the sincere intention of fulfilling all the law of Christ. (6.) Nevertheless, Protestants cannot,

like Catholics, be restored to baptismal grace by attrition merely, since this must be accompanied by actual penance. And lacking, as they do, nearly all the sacraments, they are deprived of the chief defenses and channels of grace. And breathing an atmosphere of false doctrine, unsound morals, and ecclesiastical contumacy, their state must be regarded as mournfully precarious. Nevertheless, where, as Pius IX. says, "their lives give evidence of faith which is made operative by charity," it is lawful for Catholics to breathe such an aspiration as that of the "Catholic Mirror," which concludes an obituary notice of Dr. Fuller, the eminent Baptist minister of Baltimore, thus: "But, above all, Dr. Fuller was emphatically a good man. May the Lord forgive his errors, and receive him among the number of his elect!"

The statement in the Dictionary that there is now practical unanimity in holding the theories that attrition with penance suffices to a state of grace, and that probabilism is preferable to probabiliorism, — that is, that it is lawful, in morals, to follow a probable, against a more probable opinion, — serves to show how the poison of legalism, deepening into servilism, which has been in Catholicism from its first subapostolic development, has become ever more virulent in the veins of the great Italian organism, until it now renders the hope of its future recovery to evangelical health almost chimerical. The many myriads of Christians within it whose spiritual soundness is proof against all malaria cannot well be blamed for clinging loyally to it. But they must allow us to look for Christ's lightning stroke which shall set them free even against their will. With the opinion, mentioned not unapprovingly in the Dictionary, that the Roman bishopric is not of necessity the centre of unity, they may some day find that there is far more bound up than they are now in any way willing to admit.

The Dictionary, against Wetzer and Welte, but supported by Bellarmine, maintains that the Pope, if he uses his authority to oppose previous definitions of the Church, may be deposed, even if he does not *ipso facto* cease to be pope. It appears, then, that Ultramontanism, in giving the weapon of Infallibility into his hands, does not use Trajan's words, *Prome, si mereor, in me*, but only, *in hostes meos*. So that our pleasant little scheme of some day having Infallibility infallibly condemned by a fallibilist pope is fairly headed off by this timely *caveat* of our friends.

In the articles on matters of common Christian doctrine there is some very profitable reading. See Conscience, Predestination, and Hell. The latter article is an admirable one, and in its mixture of dignity, decision, mildness and mournful sternness, large concessions and firm maintenance of the possibility and, in some cases, the eventual reality of eternal punishment in its strictest sense, it appears to us that it represents both the temper and the doctrinal conclusions to which the Universal Church will ultimately settle.

This admirably prepared Dictionary shows in clear lines how completely at one the two divisions of Western Christendom are in the object of their faith and the goal of their hope, and how profoundly and irreconcilably at variance as to the instrumental means by which that faith is to be expressed and nourished and that hope to be attained.

Charles C. Starbuck.

EPITOME OF ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, AND MODERN HISTORY. By CARL PLOETZ. Translated with extensive additions by WILLIAM H. TILLINGHAST. Pp. 618. Boston : Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1884.

This is partly a translation, partly an enlargement, of the seventh edition of Carl Ploetz's "Auszug aus der alten, mittleren, und neueren Geschichte," Berlin, 1880, a little work which we have used for some years, and found among the most helpful of the now numerous historical handbooks. The intention of the Auszug is to afford, not a text-book, but mainly a book of ready reference for dates, these being printed in more or less prominent type according to importance, but comprising also sufficient historical matter to make the whole into a bird's-eye view of universal history. The original Ploetz is, in a word, a chronology and an historical conspectus both in one. Most useful among its historical material are the sketches of important modern treaties and of the main causes and results of great wars. Mr. Tillinghast's purpose seems to be a little more ambitious than Ploetz's, and has resulted in placing before us what, should any teacher wish to employ it so, might answer for a text-book. There is, first, a good translation of Ploetz, nothing being omitted save a very few unimportant details about the wars of 1866 and 1870. But Mr. Tillinghast's own contributions to the book have a considerably larger compass than the translated parts, so that it is at least of three times the original's size. Most of the paragraphs on French history have been enlarged, several of those on English. Entirely new sections appear — a valuable addition — upon Hindoo, Chinese, Japanese, Persian, old Celtic and old Slavic history, upon the early religions of Greece and Rome, and upon the ancient Teutons in England and in the Scandinavian North. There are, besides, several new paragraphs on the history of Great Britain, many more still on American history. Some new and very fine genealogical tables are given. The index is extensive, minute, and about faultless, the finest feature of all. The book is usually accurate; we have noticed, so far, but two errors, — these, doubtless, due to mere oversight: "Edward VII." for "Edward III." at the foot of page 273, and the assignment of the Battle of Bennington to the year 1776 instead of 1777, page 429. The Epitome will prove a valuable new instrument in our every-day historical apparatus, and can be sincerely recommended to all readers and students of history. As an aid in the speedy refreshment of memory, in the quick recall or certification of dates, of prominent events, of the general characteristics of an historical period, and the like, it has no equal in our language. We cannot but feel, however, that a much smaller volume would have fulfilled quite as well as this, if not better, the only service to which this will probably ever be largely put, namely, that of reference. Might not the author, in his additions, have profitably kept more to the purpose of Ploetz? Could not many details have been just as well omitted, and the remainder compressed still more by a freer use of catchwords in numerous places where entire sentences now stand? Still, in the art of successful abridgment, one must confess that imitation of Ploetz is more easily recommended than carried out. Mechanically, as otherwise, the Epitome is a success, although the types used for main dates are not so bold, nor the differences of type so striking, as in the original.

E. Benj. Andrews.

LAUDENT OMNES. Hymns and Tunes for Congregational Singing. By Rev. JOHN E. TODD, D. D., Pastor, and WILLIAM E. CHANDLER, Organist and Chorister, of the Church of the Redeemer, New Haven, Conn. Boston: Russell Brothers. 1884.

This book is a selection of about two hundred hymns arranged for congregational singing, and has a decided advantage over larger collections, since all the hymns can become familiar. Nothing induces a congregation to sing like the frequent repetition of favorite hymns. Nearly all of the tunes have long been in general use. Although wellworn, Hamburg, Rockingham, Duke Street will never be outworn. Such tunes as Eventide, Passion Chorale, and Hursley are the exception. It is a pity the compilers had not added half a hundred tunes which belong to the English revival of church music, for without them worship is likely to become monotonous. Dr. Todd's congregation is led by a large chorus of trained singers, and there was a fine opportunity to educate his people with the use and love of a still higher order of music. As it is, the book contains only such tunes as no collection can omit. Doubtless these are rendered with spirit under so inspiring leadership, but so would the others be. The hymns are those which are sung to the old tunes, and are grouped without regard to subject under the tunes which have been chosen for them. The low price of the book recommends it to small churches and for use in social meetings.

George Harris.

TENNYSON'S IN MEMORIAM. Its Purpose and Its Structure. A Study. By JOHN F. GENUNG. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1884.

Rarely does a single poem gather in itself the aspirations of an age, and give utterance with just range and choice of tone to the mingled hopes and fears that swell

“The still, sad music of humanity.”

The “Divina Commedia” spoke thus for mediæval Catholicism, and he who would know the best that has been thought and felt under that phase of faith must traverse the threefold world with Dante. Our age with its new complexities of view and feeling finds voice in the “In Memoriam.” More fortunate than Dante, Tennyson has not to wait for posthumous recognition. Two years after its appearance, in 1852, Frederick Robertson hailed this as the most precious work of the century, and counted its teachings “the most satisfactory things that have ever been said on the future state.” Interpretation and comment have multiplied with years, and, better yet, the poem has become both a psalm and a prophecy to perplexed and saddened hearts.

The latest interpreter, Mr. Genung, begins with the relation of the poem to the age and to the poet's spiritual and intellectual growth. Tennyson's volume, published in 1842, was separated by nine years of silence from his earlier verses, and showed, in such poems as “Locksley Hall,” “Two Voices,” and “Love and Duty,” the influence of the new Time-Spirit, the higher mood of faith and of doubt. Careful critics even then traced back this change in Tennyson to Arthur Hallam's death, and anticipated larger results. With these fulfilled predictions before us, it is still easier to see in the earlier, shorter poems the promise of the later work.

The purpose of the "In Memoriam" Mr. Genung reaches by successive steps. It is an elegy, but it differs from Milton's "Lycidas" and Shelley's "Adonais" in the intense reality that scorns conventional expression, meets openly the problems of faith and fate, and sets in clear light both seeker and object sought. It is a tribute of friendship, and itself suggests comparison with Shakespeare's Sonnets (lxi. 3); but though both works are deeply introspective, and both singers speak in their real character, the unselfish, idealized love of Tennyson is far above the sensuous level of the Sonnets. The full purpose of the poem, however, is not revealed under either of these aspects. Beyond all else, its chief worth lies in the clear, calm, spiritual vision that loses personal feeling in larger interests, gathers in one the hopes, aspirations, and efforts of the age, and seizes with wise forecast the future of humanity itself.

With this "increasing purpose" the structure of the poem corresponds. At the outset the passionate emotion of the elegy predominates, while further on the tribute flows in more even course, until at last a wider outlook and a deeper peace are gained. After the introductory lyrics, the songs fall into three cycles, each cycle beginning with Christmas-tide. Step by step the essayist follows the progress of the poet's thought, through doubt and question and partial answer and higher teaching, to the triumphant close. He analyzes carefully the successive variations of the single central theme, and illumines by reverent, sympathetic interpretation each change in view and mood. His style is pure and clear, as befits his subject, and his modest volume forms a useful introduction and companion to one of the noblest of English poems.

Theodore C. Pease.

CORNELII TACITI ANNALIVM AB EXCESSU DIVI AUGUSTI LIBRI. THE ANNALS OF TACITUS. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by HENRY FURNEAUX, M. A., formerly Fellow and Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Vol. I., Books I.-VI., pp. 612. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1884.

Of ancient works illustrative of that most interesting subject of collateral study for the student of church history or the clergyman, the condition of the Roman world in the opening years of Christianity, the "Annals of Tacitus" are of course the most important; the extant portions of them including by far the larger part of the reigns of Tiberius, Claudius, and Nero.

Until quite recently, the only aid in English to the understanding of this masterpiece of the works of the prince of Roman historians was the edition published in London in 1853, as one of Arnold's School Classics, consisting of the text of Karl Nipperdey, with a translation from the German of his Prolegomena and notes; the former containing, among other things, suggestive and instructive remarks upon "the political theory of Tacitus" and the credibility of the "Annals," and an exposition of what is there called "the grandeur and earnestness of his style." The original work of Nipperdey has now, however, reached its seventh edition, and has been thoroughly revised and much improved.

In 1870 there appeared in three small volumes, in the series entitled "Oxford Pocket Classics," a very serviceable edition for the general student, having in addition to the text an introduction, a life of Tacitus, a full chronology of the "Annals," and short notes, chiefly renderings of the more obscure or difficult passages.

Two years later, the commentary of Rev. Percival Frost was published in London, as one of the volumes of the "*Bibliotheca Classica*." This contains in the Preliminary Remarks an interesting discussion of the trustworthiness of Tacitus as an historian and of his other qualities as a writer, which are summed up in characterizing him as "picturesque in narrative, forcible in expression, and profound in reflection." This edition has also a considerable collection of words and constructions peculiar to this author or his age, or found elsewhere only in the poets, which are grouped together for examination and comparison. The comments on the text, quite limited in extent, are mainly upon the subject-matter, explanatory of allusions to personages, events, customs, etc.

Of very much the same character are the annotations in the "*Annals of Tacitus*," edited by G. O. Holbrooke, Professor of Latin in Trinity College, Hartford, pp. 523, Macmillan & Co., London, 1882. With slight variations this edition follows the text of Halm (Leipsic, 1877), and the notes are based on a careful consultation throughout of the standard critical works upon Tacitus, from Lipsius down. The numerous references to Madvig's and Roby's Latin Grammars, the maps of the empire and of Rome, Germany, and Campania, and the abridgment of Draeger's "*Peculiarities of the Language and Style of Tacitus*" add not a little to the value of this commentary.

The work of Furneaux, as it is the most recent, is also by far the ablest, and will be, when finished by the publication of the second volume, the most complete and the most profitable for study of all these treatises expository of Tacitus' "*Annals*."

Some idea of the character of the Introduction may be given by even a mere enumeration of the topics of the nine "chapters," or separate essays, which compose it. These treat in succession of the life and works of Tacitus, the genuineness of the "*Annals*," the sources of information open to the author and their probable value, the use made by him of his materials and the influence of his ideas and opinions on his treatment of history, the constitution of the early principate, the general administration and condition of the Roman world at the death of Augustus and during the principate of Tiberius, the estimate in Tacitus of the character and personal government of Tiberius, and the genealogy of the family of Augustus and of the Claudian Cæsars.

It is unnecessary to say that all these are points of exceeding interest and importance to any who are investigating the history of the first Christian century as well as to students of Latin literature.

Nearly all the chapter on "the syntax and style of Tacitus with especial reference to the '*Annals*,'" covering thirty-two pages, the editor has derived, as he tells us, from "the exhaustive and no less concise treatise of Dr. Draeger into which are also gathered up the chief results of the labors of Döderlein, Bötticher, Roth, and others on this subject;" and that statement is certainly a sufficient guarantee of its superior value.

Furneaux adopts the text of Halm, preferring it to that of Ritter or even Nipperdey, as nearer to the manuscript, and prefixes to each book a full summary of its contents.

Confidence in the exposition he has given of the text is awakened at the outset by the assurance that "the whole commentary has been mainly drawn up from the abundant material collected by so many predecessors, among the earlier of whom those most used have been Walther and the

valuable edition of Ruperti, in which all the excursus of Lipsius and the chief results of the labor of other commentators down to his date are contained, while among later editors, those most constantly consulted have been Ritter, Orelli, Draeger, and Nipperdey." And this confidence is strengthened by the editor's use of such special works bearing on the criticism and interpretation of the text as Bötticher's "*Lexicon Taciteum*," that part of the complete and exhaustive new "*Lexicon Taciteum*" of Gerber and Greef which has been published, and in illustration of the subject-matter of such authorities as Mommsen's "*Römisches Staatsrecht*," Marquardt's "*Römische Staatsverwaltung*," Friedlaender's "*Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*," and Merivale's "*History of the Romans under the Empire*."

Of all these helps to the comprehension of this most difficult of Latin authors, Furneaux has certainly made a judicious and scholarly use. His commentary is not a collection of extracts from them, nor a mere digest of their opinions or statements; but it gives the results of his own independent study alike of the text itself, of the various views of its different expounders, and of all the best sources of information upon the history and antiquities of the time, in a clear and concise form.

As an evidence of the painstaking thoroughness with which he examines every point requiring consideration, and of his fair and impartial treatment of different judgments upon the same question, may be cited the paragraph preliminary to his discussion of "the estimate in Tacitus of the character and personal government of Tiberius:" —

"Several of the works on this subject are mentioned by Nipperdey, to whose list of various judgments may be added the vigorous defense of Tiberius by Professor Beesly ('*Catiline, Clodius, and Tiberius*,' London, 1878), the more modified praise in M. Duruy's *History*, the more unfavorable view taken by M. Boissier in his work '*L'Opposition sous les Césars*' (especially ch. 6, on the delators), and the unmeasured invective of Comte Champagny ('*Les Césars*').

"Many obligations, not easy to specify in their places, must be here acknowledged to several of these works; but my chief endeavor has been to give an independent judgment on the facts and interpretations of facts contained in Tacitus and other original authorities."

Remarking that Tacitus would undoubtedly wish his readers to take as his most deliberate judgment on Tiberius the summary at the end of the Sixth Book (ch. LI. 5), where his life is marked out into [five] periods, showing a gradual moral deterioration, affecting both his private habits and personal government, Furneaux proceeds to a critical and searching examination of all that is on record of the life of Tiberius, public and private, including the motives imputed to him by ancient historians.

The result at which the critic arrives is that "the stages and periods of change noted by Tacitus can be on the whole made out; though we should consider the explanation put into the mouth of Arruntius, that the character of Tiberius 'had been thrown off its balance by the force of despotism,' to be nearer the truth than the theory adopted by the historian as his own, — that of a true character asserting itself by slow degrees against the disguise of hypocrisy."

Perhaps this is the most satisfactory decision that can be reached as to this difficult historical problem, unless we prefer to remain content with the negative conclusion of Merivale: "While in the ample gallery of

full-length portraits which Roman history has given us between Cæsar and Vespasian Tacitus' painting of Tiberius undoubtedly displays the greatest genius in character delineation, the accuracy of the likeness is a matter of dispute which can never be settled."

E. P. Crowell.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

FROM CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

Lectures on the History of the Jewish Church. By Arthur Penryhn Stanley, D. D., Dean of Westminster. In three volumes. Vol. II. Samuel to the Captivity. New edition. With maps. Pp. xxiv., 511. 1884. \$2.00. Vol. III. The Captivity to the Christian Era. New edition. With two maps. Pp. xxx., 440. 1884. \$2.00.

ΔΙΔΑΧΗ ΤΩΝ ΔΩΔΕΚΑ ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΩΝ. Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, Recently discovered by Philotheos Bryennios, Metropolitan of Nicomedia. Edited with a Translation, Introduction, and Notes, by Roswell D. Hitchcock and Francis Brown, Professors in Union Theological Seminary, New York. Pp. vi., 37. 50 cents.

Sermons to the Spiritual Man. By William G. T. Shedd, D. D., Roosevelt Professor of Systematic Theology in Union Theological Seminary, New York. 8vo, pp. v., 421. 1884. \$2.50.

The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice. Chiefly told in his own letters. Edited by his son, Frederick Maurice. With portraits. In two volumes, 8vo. Vol. I., pp. xi., 552. Vol. II., pp. xii., 712. 1884. \$5.00.

FROM HODDER & STOUGHTON, LONDON, THROUGH THOMAS WHITTAKER,
2 & 3 BIBLE HOUSE, NEW YORK.

The Theological Library:—

Life: Is it worth Living? By the Rev. John Marshall Lang, D. D., Minister of the Barony Parish, Glasgow, Author of "Heaven and Home," "The Last Supper of the Lord," etc. Crown 8vo, pp. xii., 207. 1883. \$1.25.

Does God Answer Prayer? By the Rev. R. McCheyne Edgar, M. A., Author of "The Philosophy of the Cross," etc. Crown 8vo, pp. xv. 272. 1883. \$1.25.

How is the Divinity of Jesus Depicted in the Gospels and Epistles? By the Rev. Thomas Whitelaw, M. A., D. D., Author of "Pulpit Commentary on Genesis," etc. Crown 8vo, pp. viii., 271. 1883. \$1.25.

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Is God Knowable? By the Rev. J. Iverach, M. A., Author of "The Life of Moses." Crown 8vo, pp. vi., 233. 1884. \$1.25.

Are Miracles Credible? By the Rev. John James Lias, M. A., Vicar of St. Edward's, Cambridge, and Hulsean Lecturer for 1884. Crown 8vo, pp. viii., 280. 1883. \$1.25.

Does Science Aid Faith in Regard to Creation? By the Right Rev. Henry Cotterill, D. D., F. R. S. E., Bishop of Edinburgh, formerly Bishop of Grahamstown, and sometime Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. Crown 8vo, pp. xi., 228. 1883. \$1.25.

FROM BOARD OF PUBLICATION OF THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA, NEW YORK.

The Reformed Church in the Netherlands. Traced from A. D. 1340 to A. D. 1840, in Short Historical Sketches. By Rev. Maurice G. Hansen, A. M. Pp. 330. 1884. \$1.50.

FROM HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY, BOSTON.

The Diary and Letters of His Excellency, Thomas Hutchinson, Esq., B. A. (Harvard), LL. D. (Oxon.), Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief of His Late Majesty's Province of Massachusetts Bay, in North America; With an Account of his Administration when he was Member and Speaker of the House of Representatives, and his Government of the Colony during the Difficult Period that preceded the War of Independence. Compiled from the original documents still remaining in the possession of his descendants. By Peter Orlando Hutchinson, one of his Great-Grandsons. Pp. vi., 594. 1884. \$5.00.

Balzac. By Edgar Evertson Saltus. Pp. 199. 1884. \$1.25.

Epitome of Ancient, Mediæval, and Modern History. By Carl Ploetz. Translated, with Extensive Additions, by William H. Tillinghast. 8vo, pp. xii., 618. 1884. \$3.00.

Memories of Rufus Choate. With some Consideration of his Studies, Methods, and Opinions, and of his style as a Speaker and Writer. By Joseph Neilson. 8vo, pp. xx., 460. 1884. \$5.00.

American Men of Letters. Edited by Charles Dudley Warner. Margaret Fuller Ossoli. By Thomas Wentworth Higginson. 16mo, pp. 323. 1884. \$1.25.

James and Lucretia Mott. Life and Letters. Edited by their granddaughter, Anna Davis Hallowell. With portraits. 8vo, pp. vi., 566. 1884. \$2.00.

Studies in History. By Henry Cabot Lodge, Author of "Life and Letters of George Cabot," "A Short History of the English Colonies in America," etc. 12mo, pp. 402. 1884. \$1.50.

In the Tennessee Mountains. By Charles Egbert Craddock. 16mo, pp. 322. 1884. \$1.25.

FROM A. C. ARMSTRONG AND SON, NEW YORK.

System of Christian Theology. By Henry B. Smith, D. D., LL. D. Edited by William S. Karr, D. D., Professor of Theology in Hartford Theological Seminary. Pp. xiv., 630. 1884. \$3.50.

FROM THOMAS WHITTAKER, NEW YORK.

Jesus Christ. God, God and Man. Conferences delivered at Notre Dame, in Paris, by the Rev. Père Lacordaire, of the Order of Friar-Precursors. Translated from the French with the Author's permission, by a Tertiary of the same Order. New Edition, in one volume. Pp. x., 418. 1884. \$2.00.

FROM SOUTHERN METHODIST PUBLISHING HOUSE, NASHVILLE, TENN.

Studies in the Forty Days between Christ's Resurrection and Ascension. A Series of Essays for the Times. By A. A. Lipscomb, D. D., LL. D., Emeritus Professor, Vanderbilt University. 12mo, pp. 363. 1884. \$1.00.

FROM ESTES AND LAURIAT, BOSTON.

Biogen. A Speculation on the Origin and Nature of Life. By Professor Elliott Coues, Member of the National Academy of Sciences; of the American Philosophical Society; of the Philosophical and Biological Societies of Washington, etc., etc. Second Edition. Pp. 66. 1884. 75 cents.

FROM JOHN ALLYN, BOSTON.

The Iliad of Homer. Books I.-VI. With an Introduction and Notes. By Robert P. Keep. Pp. xlii., 322. 1883.

FROM METHODIST BOOK CONCERN, PHILLIPS AND HUNT, AGENTS,
NEW YORK.

Library of Biblical and Theological Literature. Edited by George R. Crooks, D. D., and John F. Hurst, D. D. Vol. III. Theological Encyclopædia and Methodology. Pp. iv., 596. 1884. \$3.50.

FROM FUNK AND WAGNALLS, NEW YORK.

The Dance of Modern Society. By William Cleaver Wilkinson. 12mo, pp. 78. 1884. 60 cents.

Apostolic Life, As revealed in the Acts of the Apostles. By Joseph Parker, D. D., Minister of the City Temple, Holborn Viaduct, London. Author of "Ecce Deus," "The Paraclete," "The Priesthood of Christ," etc. Volume I. From the Ascension of Christ to the Withdrawal of Peter. Pp. xiii., 353. 1883. \$1.50.

Critical and Exegetical Hand-Book to the Epistle to the Romans. By Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, Th. D. Oberconsistorialrath, Hannover. Translated from the fifth edition of the German by Rev. John C. Moore, B. A., and Rev. Edwin Johnson, B. A. The Translation revised and edited by William P. Dickson, D. D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow. With a Preface and Supplementary Notes to the American Edition, by Timothy Dwight, Professor of Sacred Literature in Yale College. Pp. xxiii., 588. 1884. \$3.00.

ERRATA.

Page 124, line 32, for *in* read *is*.

Page 237, line 7, for *foes* read *folds*.

Page 269, line 36, omit *in*.

Page 429, foot-note, for 24 read 20.

Page 429, foot-note, for *ch. iv.*, read *ch. iii.*

Page 442, foot-note, for *σωθήσονται* read *σωθήσονται*; for *αληθείας*, *ἀληθείας*.

Page 533, line 25, and *passim*, for *Garucci* read *Garrucci*.

Page 533, line 27, for *Bulletino* read *Bullettino*.

Page 539, foot-note, for *Bulletino* read *Bullettino*.

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